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Chapter 1: Neofunctionalism and CARICOM
Chapter 1: Neofunctionalism and CARICOM
1.1 Introduction
This chapter establishes the scope and objectives of the thesis. It offers a short introduction
to the Caribbean Community (CARICOM),3 the phenomenon of regional integration, and theorizing
regional  integration.  It  also outlines  the  modus operandi,  and presents  a  general  outline  of  the
dissertation. 
1.2 The Phenomenon of Regional Political and Economic Integration
Regional political and economic integration is not a new phenomenon. In fact, it has been on
the  rise  since  the  end of  the  Second World  War  (Haggard  and Kaufmann 1997;  Mattli  1999).
Currently, there is a dramatic increase in the global tendency to create trans-national regimes, as an
answer to both exogenous and endogenous problems. It is currently the 'new normal' for states with
similar  political  ideals  and  shared  political/economic  interests  to  engage  in  some  form  of
cooperation. Regional integration has therefore become more than an ideology; it is an instrumental,
substantial and prominent means of achieving economic and political development. As a result, it
has been proposed that the traditional nation-state or even the “established nation state is in full
retreat”.4
Acknowledging these factors, how can this process of dis/integration5 be studied and better
understood? How do we understand and analyze the process and impact of adopting trans-national
practices, organizations, regimes and unions by nation-states that are in decline? 
A theoretical analysis of regional integration provides the possibility to understand not only
the phenomenon of globalization, but also the decline (and other issues) of power and sovereignty
of the traditional nation states; aligned with the rise of trans-national coalescence. 
The  aforementioned  rise  in  regional  economic  and  political  integration  has  undoubtedly
attracted economists, sociologists and political scientists to the field of International Relations (IR).
This had led to a plethora of literature on theorizing the process of regional integration; including
description along with the analysis of the integration process, along with complex explanations for
3 A more extensive introduction and presentation of CARICOM can be found in Chapter 2.
4 Haas (1968:297).
5 This is especially important for any political or social study of regime politics, particularly in the Caribbean.
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the motives for integration, and projections for the future of these arrangements.
In  actuality,  especially  in  the  Caribbean,  regional  integration  is  widely  criticized,  with  a
prevailing tendency to view the phenomenon as a means by which newly gained sovereignty is
ceded (see for example Mordecai 1968) at one nation’s expense for a new form of colonization.
1.3 Introducing the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
With regards to peaceful economic integration, “the experience of the European Union (EU)
is the most significant and far-reaching among all attempts at regional integration”.6 Theorists such
as  Malamud  and  Schmitter  (2011:135)  propose  that  “the  Common  Market  of  the  South
(MERCOSUR)  and  the  Andean  Community  (AC)  are  regional  integration  projects  that  have
reached the greatest level of formal accomplishment after the EU”.7 
At the same time,  an examination of the institutional  structures and functional aspects of
CARICOM reveals that, second to the EU, it is one of the most developed systems of regional trade
in the world. 
It  is  easy  however  to  see  why  CARICOM  is  often  underestimated,  overlooked  and/or
neglected.  It  is  relatively small,  possesses limited natural resources,  and a purported minuscule
significance with respect to global economic and political affairs. Compared to other regions, macro
economic indicators reveal limited purchasing parity and domestic output in CARICOM. With a
combined population of approximately 158 million9 inhabitants and a combined GDP of 34 billion10
Euros;  the  regional  economic  output  is  significantly  less  than  its  trading  partners.  To  make  a
comparison with other unions, the combined population and GDP of the Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA)11 is approximately 760 million inhabitants, and approximately 13 trillion Euros12
respectively. In Europe, the population of the EU13 is approximately 500 million14, and its GDP is
approximately  13  trillion  Euros  In  Asia,  the  Association  of  Southeast  Asian  Nations  has  an
6 Malamud and Schmitter (2011:135).
7     Malamud and Schmitter (2011:25).
8 Without Haiti, less than 7 million people.
9 Unless otherwise stated, all statistics are from 2013. CARICOM statistics are sourced from CARICOM National 
Accounts Digest, August 2013. EU statistics are sourced from eurostats.org August 2013; USA statistics are sourced
from worldbank.org August 2013; and ASEAN statistics from ustr.gov August 2013 and Hansakul & Keng (2014).
10 All GDP statistics are current rates and long scale calculated i.e. 1012.
11 Free Trade Area of the Americas.
12 Statistics from World bank indicators. 
13 With reference to the EU 28.
14 Statistics are sourced from europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/living/index_en.htm last visited June 2015.
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estimated  population  of  620 million15 and  a  GDP of  approximately 3 trillion16 Euros  In South
America, The Andean Community has 120 million inhabitants and a GDP of 80017 billion Euros
Mercosur has a combined population of 280 million inhabitants, and recorded a combined GDP of
2.918 trillion Euros These statistics explain the tendency to overlook CARICOM, as it is a small
union  both  in  terms  of  population  and  purchasing  parity.  However,  recent  examinations  of
CARICOM19 reveal noteworthy and intriguing details pertaining to the:
Functional  aspects  of  CARICOM:  since  the  West  Indies  Federation,  integration  in  the
Caribbean has evolved to an established single market and economy;20 which includes the deep
integration  of  the  Organization  of  Eastern  Caribbean States  (OECS)  and the  Caribbean Single
Market and Economy (CSME). 
The OECS includes a monetary union (and a single currency); a common judiciary system;
harmonized provisions for health, education, information and technology; and the free movement of
goods, capital and persons.
The  single  market  in  CARICOM  incorporates  both  harmonization  of  regional  customs
regulations and liberalization of trade and economic barriers. It embodies an area of border-less
travel  and  establishment  in  the  Caribbean,  with  guaranteed  regional  safety  standards  and  the
possibility to transfer social securities.21
Institutional structures: the Community has established supranational institutions such as a
regional  trade  and  a  final  appellate  court,  the  Caribbean  Court  of  Justice  (CCJ).  The  CCJ  is
composed of independently elected judges who preside over community matters in interpreting the
Revised  Treaty  of  Chaguaramas,  which  established CARICOM  and  the  Single  Market  and
15 Statistics sourced from the Office of US Trade Representative Asia www.ustr.gov/countries.../southeast-asia.../asso-
ciation-southeast-asian-nat. Accessed June 30, 2015.
16 Statistics are long scale represented i.e. 1012. They are taken from Hansakul and Keng.
17 Figures exclude values from Venezuela. Statistics taken from Group Latin America 
http://www.grouplamerica.com/andean_pact.htm Accessed June 30, 2015 GDP was converted from US dollars to 
EU using the Frankfurt Stock Exchange Rates at the end December 2014 http://www.boerse-
frankfurt.de/en/currencies/usd+eur+us+dollar+euro+cur+XC0009666410   Accessed June 30, 2015.
18 Statistics are taken from IADB Moody's Analytic, and can be found at 
https://www.economy.com/dismal/analysis/free/248931. Accessed June 30, 2015 GDP was converted from US dol-
lars to Euro, using the Frankfurt Stock Exchange Rates at the end of December 2014 http://www.boerse-frank-
furt.de/en/currencies/usd+eur+us+dollar+euro+cur+XC0009666410 Accessed June 30, 2015.
19 See for example Onnis 2013.
20 Integration in CARICOM comprises two streams, the deeper commitments of the Organization of Eastern Carib-
bean States (OECS) which includes a single market and economy, a single currency and a court of appeals; and the 
commitments of all CARICOM members to the CSME which includes a single market and a court of first instance 
and final appeal. Further information on the OECS and the CSME is provided in the sections in Chapter Two titled 
'History of Regional Integration in the Caribbean' and 'Overview of Regional Integration in the Caribbean'. 
21 For more information of the Single Market and Economy in CARICOM see Chapter 4 which offers an expansive 
overview and analysis.
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Economy (CSME); and additionally rule on final appellate cases. The CCJ is the sole court which
possesses the characteristics of both a court  of first instance and a court of final appeal. It has
passed  judgments on cases under both jurisdictions and extends a level of  de jure and  de facto
competence over CARICOM member-states.
Geographical  alignments:  the  expansive  and  profound  level  of  market  liberalization  and
harmonization in CARICOM redefined both the internal and external trade processes of the union.
Not only have CARICOM member-states expanded their  regional commitments to include new
members,  but  they have  also  negotiated  extensive  trade  agreements  with  external  unions  on  a
regional platform. For example, CARICOM is the first regional grouping of its kind to negotiate
and sign an open trade agreement with the EU22 that forms both an economic and social alliance.23 
Democracy: macro indicators such as input legitimacy, participation, control, power limitation
and human rights reveal a high level of democratic stability in CARICOM which is  especially
notable in comparison with other African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) groupings24. In 2006, in
characterizing democracy in the Caribbean, the then Deputy Managing Director of the International
Monetary Fund noted that “since independence, Caribbean countries have exemplified transparent
institutions and governance in the Western Hemisphere. Pluralism and democracy have flourished,
and racial and gender equality have long underpinned the political process”.25 He went further to
add that “CARICOM countries have healthy competitive political processes, decades of experience
with regular national elections, and entrenched respect for civil and economic liberties”.26 These
healthy processes  have  also had a positive impact on regional  institution building and regional
integration in general.
Economic  impact:  despite  their  small  size,  both  statistics  and  World  Trade  Organization
(WTO) dispute cases reveal the high level of economic impact on the global economic partners of
the  CARICOM member-states.  For  example,  Jamaica  is  ranked as  the  sixth  global  supplier  of
Bauxite.27 Furthermore, Trinidad and Tobago is not only the largest oil28 and natural gas producer in
22 EU Partnership Agreement,(EPA) December 2007.
23 For more information on the CARICOM-EU EPA please see Chapter 6, which offers an extensive overview and 
analysis.
24 See Onnis (2014).
25 Carstens (2006).
26 Carstens (2006).
27 Bauxite is an Aluminum ore the main source of Aluminum. Some of the uses of Aluminum are: transportation: air-
craft, automobiles, marine vessels etc; packaging: cans etc; electrical transmissions: cables etc; and construction: 
windows, doors, electronic appliances etc. 
       Statistics taken from the Jamaica Bauxite Institute. http://www.jbi.org.jm/pages/industry Accessed June 30, 2015.
28 Proven crude oil reserves in 2013 were estimated at approximately 728 million barrels according to the country's 
ministry of energy. http://www.energy.gov.tt/our-business/oil-and-gas-industry/ Accessed June 30, 2015.
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the Caribbean, but is also the largest exporter29 of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) to the United States
(U.S.) accounting for approximately 74% of U.S. LNG imports in 2013. The impact of agricultural
trade on its regional competitors can also be observed with recent WTO disputes.  The so called
WTO 'Banana row' revealed the impact of  the Caribbean Banana30 trade with the EU on both the
U.S. and Latin American economies.  CARICOM countries are also niches for 'Offshore Financial
Centers' and Internet Gambling. These have become so successful that they have been met with
hostility by regional competitors. For example, Antigua and Barbuda have created a niche in the
Internet gambling industry that resulted in the U.S. taking measures to remove cross border supply
and the  soliciting  of  customers  from within  the  U.S..31 These  cases  are  some examples  of  the
economic influence of the CARICOM member-states on other global actors.
Essentially, CARICOM is an established regional community with defined legal, functional
and institutional  structures;  a  border-less  regional  market  and  economy;  and  a  platform  for
negotiating  with  the  rest  of  the  world.  It  therefore  offers  an  ideal  laboratory  within  which  to
examine theories  of  regional  integration.  It  provides  the possibility to  observe  and analyze  the
general  process  of  regional  integration  outside  of  the  EU  setting,  and  to  test  EU  integration
theories.32 The recent advances highlighted above also necessitate an increased focus and scrutiny in
CARICOM, both for the purposes of understanding integration in CARICOM, and with regards to
theoretical analysis and theory building.
1.4 Aims of the Thesis
Since the beginning of the integration process in Europe in the early 1950s, quite a number of
integration theories have been applied to the process.  Many of these  theories are beneficial and
suitable for understanding the union in question, and moreover, to postulate about the future.
Authors including Axline (1979); and Langhammer & Heimenz (1990); use regional political
integration as a prescriptive measure for developing countries to achieve ‘collective self reliance’,
29 It also houses one of the largest natural gas processing facilities in the Western Hemisphere along with the world’s 
largest exporter of ammonia and the second-largest exporter of methanol. Statistics taken from the United States 
Energy Information Administration at http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=td Accessed June 30, 
2015.
30 CARICOM agricultural products, including banana, coffee, rice and sugar dominate markets in the western Hemi-
sphere. For an expansive overview including trade statistics please see the Caribbean Export Development Agency 
website at http://www.carib-export.com/ Accessed June 30, 2015.
31 For an expansive overview of the WTO case, between Antigua and the United States of America please see the Dis-
pute Settlement Case at the WTO's website at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm 
Accessed June 30, 2015.
32 In applying EU theories outside of the EU, issues such as proposed sui generis nature of the theories can be re-
solved.
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economic development and political power. This thesis constitutes an additional aspect: it employs
the theory of Neofunctionalism to examine the motivations and process of regional integration in
developing countries in the Caribbean, specifically CARICOM.
The principal objective is to assess the benefits of applying the theory of Neofunctionalism to
CARICOM.33 That is to say, to primarily examine the process of integration in CARICOM; and to
secondarily learn more about the theory of Neofunctionalism from its application to a non-EU case.
The specific aim of this thesis is therefore to examine and understand the process of regional
political and economic integration in the Caribbean, focusing on CARICOM. Questions34 that will
be addressed in this thesis are:
why is integration in CARICOM progressing as it is?
which are the critical support factors and impediments of this process?
what is the role of institutions in the process of regional political and economic integration 
in CARICOM?
where and how far has the process of integration in CARICOM developed?
what are some external effects on the process of integration in CARICOM?
In order  to  answer  these  questions,  the  thesis  rests  on  the  premise  that  since  its  inauguration,
decisive changes have occurred in CARICOM on a functional  level,  leading to a  deepening in
integration through structural and institutional development. These include35 the evolution of the
common market in CSME; and the introduction of a regional trade and final appellate court, the
Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ); and the negotiation and signing of an EPA with the EU.
Laursen  (1995:7)  suggests  that  in  “the  classical  literature  on  European  integration, three
dimensions  were  considered  especially  important:  functional  scope,  institutional  capacity  and
geographical  domain”.  This  research  is  shaped  around  all  three  dimensions.  It  focuses  on  the
functional  scope  through studying the  issues  related  to  general  cooperation  in  CARICOM, the
evolution of its aims, and general functional changes. The institutional capacity in CARICOM, in
that  it  focuses  on structural  changes  in  CARICOM's institutional  landscape  and issues  such as
decision-making  of  the  said  institutes,  as  well  as their  competences  and  provisions  for  the
implementation and enforcement of decisions. The geographical domain, by analyzing the effect of
CARICOM's relationship with other unions  on its process of internal regional integration. These
33 To primarily deduce information on CARICOM and secondarily on the theory of Neofunctionalism. 
34 The questions will provide a succinct account of the process of integration in CARICOM.
35 Also that membership in CARICOM has increased exponentially, from the initial creation of CARIFTA with three 
members to fifteen in the CSME.
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three modus operandi are the pillars of this research.
The thesis  additionally inspects  three crucial  concepts in  the process  of regional  political
integration to see the influence of applying the theory of Neofunctionalism to CARICOM. These
are:  functional  spill-over,  political  spill-over  and  the  virtual  alignment  of  common  interest.
Neofunctionalism argues that political  élite and institutions control both the level  and speed of
integration, and that it is up to them to increase power at the trans-national level. Therefore, the
validity of the influence of political élite and institutions will be explored.
It should be noted that the thesis neither defends the process of integration in the Caribbean,
nor does it suggest alternative routes. Instead, it proposes that, it is this very skepticism of regional
integration  which  should  lead  us  to  study  regional  economic  and  political  integration  in  the
Caribbean. Although there has been debate over the benefits of integration in the Caribbean36, it is
more pragmatic to first examine why “integration is still in the process of deepening and widening,
which are the critical 'engines' and 'brakes' of this process and what could be seen as the ultimate
goal of the endeavor”. 37
1.5 Justifications for Applying European Theories of Regional Political 
Integration to CARICOM
1.5.1 Why Theorize Regional Integration? 
Theories have long been employed in the natural sciences to make sense of an improbable
world, or rather to prove just how probable the natural world actually is. However, in the social
sciences,  the  proposal  to  extrapolate  information,  understand  and/or  analyze  a  particular
phenomenon by using  theories, is still greeted to some extent with dismay or disdain38. Theories
have  however,  proven  to  be  instrumental  in  the  social  sciences  for  their  power  to  guide,
characterize,  explain,  understand,  analyze,  and  predict  processes.  The  fields  of  international
relations (IR) and is no exception. Theories provide researchers in IR with the ability to analyze,
understand and characterize world politics. In undertaking a theoretical analysis, one is able to test a
36 We are obliged to accept that there is both structural and existential criticism of regional political and economic in-
tegration in the Caribbean.
37 Wolf (2002:29).
38 Despite the possibilities of a theoretical application, scholars have warned against a tendency to approach the appli-
cation of theories of integration in unions using a zero sum notion. According to Axline (1979:33) such a path has 
traditionally given rise to “confusion and disagreement about the kinds of normative and analytical knowledge that 
theoretically informed empirical research should offer: about the desirability of integration; its economic and politi-
cal costs and benefits; the likelihood of success of integration; and about the relevant economic and political pro-
cesses through which integration occurs”.
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particular theory which leads to impartiality, consistence and non contradiction in observation and
analysis.  One is  also able  to  observe and understand a particular  processes;  make comparisons
between  processes;  and  predict  future  occurrences,  and  make  postulations  based  on  initial
observations.
In theorizing regional integration, either of two routes can be taken: a set of theories can be
utilized as a guide to examine a particular phenomenon, such as regional economic and political
integration; or theories can be used as the result/outcome of research. That is to say, theories are
created once the research is completed. The theory is then a logical explanation of a particular
phenomenon, such as the Great Recession39, globalization or regional integration.
This undertaking uses the former route. It employs theories as a set of lenses through which to
observe  and analyze  the interactions  of  CARICOM and the  particular  phenomenon of  regional
economic and political integration therein. In doing so, the theories have been utilized based on
their power to explain the process of regional political integration.
1.5.2 Why Theorize Regional Integration in CARICOM? 
In the Caribbean,  the creation of CARICOM and the deepening of integration have been
greeted with increasing interest from numerous scholars. This has led to a considerable amount of
research centered on specific areas of the process of integration in CARICOM. Some of the most
extensive researched areas40 in CARICOM include investigations accounting for the inefficiency
and  malaise  in  CARICOM,  including  the  CSME41; and  problems  relating  to  the  structure  of
CARICOM  and  its  government42.  There  are  also  notable  studies  available  on  the  future  of
CARICOM43;  particularly  in  light  of  developments  such  as  the  EPA,  and  its  likely  effect  on
CARICOM member-states or particular sectors.44 There are moreover analyses of the CCJ and its
structures45;  and studies46 and commentaries on specific cases of the CCJ, such as Shanique Myrie
versus the states of Barbados 47 and their impact on CARICOM and the member-states.
However, an area that is widely neglected in CARICOM scholarship is theorizing the process
39 The term 'Great Recession' applies to the global economic crisis that occurred between 2007 and 2009. For more in-
formation see for example (Grusky, Western and Wimer 2011).
40 Ian Boxill (1993) offers an overview of the approaches of Caribbean integration and additionally gives a concise 
summary of the review of the literature.
41 See for example Hall and Chuck-A-Sang (2012).
42 See for example Hall and Chuck-A-Sang (2012) Hall (2003).
43 See for example Payne (1981).
44 See for example Girvan (2008).
45 See for example Jordan (2004).
46 See for example Fuchs and Straubhaar (2003).
47 This case was heard in 2013 before the CCJ and summarized in this thesis.
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of regional integration. Although theorizing is an otherwise vital part of studying/analyzing any
field, it has been lacking in CARICOM regarding the subject of regional integration. Considering
that there have been significant recent developments in the field of integration in CARICOM, it is
necessary to initiate a dialog on theorizing CARICOM. This is because, and as mentioned earlier,
before one can comment on the future of this phenomenon in the Caribbean, much less prescribe the
form or scale of integration, it is first necessary to examine, analyze and characterize the process of
integration in CARICOM, including the actors, motives, level and scope. Moreover, it is necessary
for  any region  undergoing  economic  or  political  integration  to  amass  a  field  of  research  that
specifically  uses  theories  for  the  analysis  of  that  region.48 Additionally,  as  mentioned  earlier,
theories provide a set of tools with the ability to focus on specific instances of integration, and to
better understand these processes; such as the structure of a union, the process of integration, or the
effects of integration.
1.5.3 European Theories of Regional Integration 
Much of the theorizing of regional political integration concentrates on the EU, and has risen
from research carried out on this region. In the field of regional integration theory, the EU is often
held  as  the  exemplary  union  and  the  yardstick  against  which  all  other  processes  of  regional
integration  are  measured49.  The  EU  has  long  been  the  focal  point  for  analysis  of  regional
integration,  whether  economic  or  political.  It  is  therefore  no  surprise  that  theories  of  regional
integration have been created specifically for the study of the EU. Initially, popular IR theories,
such as customs union theory, federalism and rationalism, were utilized to analyze the EU. Soon
after its creation, however, scholars created new paradigms and theories specifically with the aim of
analyzing  this  unique  process.  These  theories  have  since  been  successfully  utilized  to  study
numerous  aspects  of  the  process  of  integration  in  the  EU,  including  attempts  to  understand,
examine,  and  predict  integration  in  the  EU.  The  theories  include,  Neofunctionalism,
Supranationalism and Liberal-Intergovernmentalism. 
Modern scholars of regional political integration such as Haas, are proponents of a revised
form of Functionalism: namely, Neofunctionalism50.  This theory seeks to explain “how and why
48 This research therefore serves as a starting point in applying theories of regional integration to CARICOM, and will
hopefully set the pace and inspire similar research in CARICOM.
49 Laursen (2013 and 1995) for example assert that the EU is the best example of a genuinely successful integration 
scheme.
50 There are notable theoretical analyses of the Caribbean and Latin America incorporating the theory of Neofunction-
alism. These include Etzioni (1965) and Schmitter (1969). For an overview of other previous approaches to the 
study of regional integration in the Caribbean see Boxhill et al (1997) However, the two attempts cited above serve 
as a starting point for the application of theories of regional integration to the Caribbean. Since these attempts have 
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nation-states cease to be wholly sovereign and how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and
mix with their neighbors”.51 It accepts the role of member-states in regional integration, while also
emphasizing the  role of  non-state  actors  in  the  process.  It  advances  that, whilst  member-states
determine the content, context, and provisions of the initial regional agreement, it is the non-state
actors such as institutions and political élite who determine the direction, depth and the process of
regional  integration.  It  further  proposes  that  economic  integration  will  'spill-over'  to  political
integration; and that in carrying out the functions delineated by states, there is an exploitation of:
the inevitable 'spill-overs' and 'unintended consequences' that occur when states agree to
assign some degree of supra-national responsibility for accomplishing a limited task and
then  discover  that  satisfying  that  function  has  external  effects  upon  other  of  their
interdependent activities. (Schmitter 2002:4)
The concept of supranationalism was introduced in Europe by Robert Schumann.52 It is based on the
notion that a supranational union which fits somewhere between confederate and federal unions. It
implies  a  certain  type  of  governance  which  functions  above  the  nation  state, which  is  more
integrated than a confederate union and less integrated than a federal union.
In 1981, Weiler in 'The Dual Character of Supranationalism', proposed that there are two main
facets  to  European  supranationalism,  that  it  was  legally  supranational,  simultaneously,  it  was
politically  intergovernmental.  He  reasoned  that  the  judiciary  and  legislature  introduced,
implemented,  and executed  supranational  provisions;  and at  the  same time  there  are  dominant
national political structures and intergovernmental sentiments. A rise in the supranational aspects of
integration signaled a decline in the intergovernmental aspect.
Rainer  Schmalz-Bruns  (1999)  and  Joerges  (2002)  proposed  additional  aspects  of
Supranationalism, focusing  on  legitimate  governance  beyond  the  constitutional/national  state;
therefore the theory  of  supranationalism advances  the  notion  that  integration  is  driven  at  a
supranational level instead of or more than a national one. 
The theory of Intergovernmentalism places a strong emphasis on the role of the nation-state in
the process of regional integration.  It  maintains that  nation states are  the primary actors in the
been made, the Caribbean has undergone fundamental changes. These changes are evident in three main areas: the 
functional scope, institutional capacity, and the geographical domain. It is therefore necessary to re-theorize integra-
tion in the current CARICOM.
51 Haas (1970:610).
52 See for example Ruszkowski (2009).
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process of integration, and that they only create institutions to delegate tasks and mandates, while
retaining their sovereignty over these institutions. They can therefore revoke this leeway, that they
have afforded the institutions at any time. It also specifies the motivation of social actors, states and
leaders, and makes predictions of their  behavior and of the effects from their interactions. It “is a
theory that stresses the role of the varied social interests and values of states, and their relevance for
world politics”.53
Theories of European integration are ideal for studying regional integration, especially since,
unlike other theories of International Relations, they were developed specifically for the study and
analysis of the subject of regional integration. However, if these theories were only applicable to the
EU they would  be  sui  generis. For  the  purposes of  theory building,  testing  and analysis,  it  is
important and undoubtedly necessary to apply European integration theories to other case studies,
irrespective of their location.
Theories  of  European  integration  offer  an  ideal  setting  in  which  to  analyze  CARICOM.
European Integration has proven to be a peaceful ideal, exerting democracy and free trade. Unlike
previous notable political and economic integration attempts, such as the Ancient Greek or Roman
Empire, the political integration in the EU was by choice and based on objectively negotiated terms
which excluded the use of military power. Hodges (1972:9) for example proposes that:
the  greatest  achievement  of  European  regional  organizations  has  been  to  establish
patterns  of  peaceful  cooperation  in  various  fields,  as  a  preliminary step  to  build  a
community at the international level by negotiation rather than coercion … (its appeal
lies in the provision of an) ideal opportunity to test theories of peaceful community
building. (Hodges 1972:9)
Additionally, the terms used in EU integration are both normative and general; therefore, they can
be applied to  developing unions such as CARICOM, which have been established by peaceful
efforts at political cooperation and economic liberalization. 
European  theories  of  integration  are  inundated  with  explanations  regarding  the
commencement and process of integration, the underlying factors of integration, and the role of
institutions in the process of regional integration. There is an expansive body of discourse available
on EU theories.  These theories have been applied to  numerous aspects of  the EU and  address
53 Moravcsik (2010:1).
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functional criticisms. 
As with many broad topics, it  is quite typical to find both proponents (Andic, Andic and
Dosser (2011); Payne and Sutton (1984); Nye (1968a); Garrett (1992)); and critics (Girvan (2008);
Mordecai (1968); Webb (1983); Mattli and Slaughter (199854) and Cram (1996)) of the process and
the theories, who build a body of analysis around the topic. 
The sizable research on theories of European Integration therefore provides an ideal set of
lenses for examining the process of integration in the Caribbean. An application of these theories to
a non-EU union is also important for understanding the union, for the development of said theories,
and for political practice in the field of International Relations.
At  the  same time,  Axline  suggests  that  “while  studies  in  other  areas  of  the  world  have
constituted real attempts to understand the processes of integration under differing conditions, few
attempts have been made to use this understanding to modify the basic precepts of the Europe-
centered theory”(1979:33). He then continues with the point that:
outside of Europe the conditions under which integration schemes have been established
are fundamentally different from the conditions in post-war Europe- in terms of the size
of the countries involved, their level of economic development, and the nature of their
political  processes…etc...  Yet,  in  face  of  these  widely  divergent  situations  the
adjustments made to the theoretical framework to account for these differences have
consisted mainly of arbitrarily suggesting alternative variables or functional equivalents
to compensate for the absence of variables important in European integration. (Axline
1979:33)
That is to say, although efforts have been made to make the theories more adaptable to non-EU
unions, the nexus of the theories has not been modified: only the variables have been changed,
depending on the application of the theories. Whether an oversight or a structural problem, this
error has generally impeded the application of European integration theories to other unions. With
the present state of the Caribbean and CARICOM, it is possible to re-evaluate the application and
the  ‘fundamental  nexus’ of  European  integration  theories,  as  will  be  analyzed  and  justified  in
54 For example, Mattli and Slaughter (1998:1) propose that “both Neofunctionalism and Intergovernmentalism neglect
the range of specific motives and constraints shaping the behavior of individual litigants and national courts”.
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Chapter 3. 
Instead of focusing on functional equivalents of the European experience, we can examine the
effects  of  factors  such  as  the  political  environment,  size,  and  specific  type  of  leadership  and
nationalistic values on integration in CARICOM. It is, moreover, possible to concentrate on specific
cycles of integration, such as the CSME. Furthermore:
the likelihood of establishing a viable integration scheme will depend on the political
conditions  within  the  countries  involved.  Factors  such as  nationalism,  the  nature of
leadership,  and  the  role  of  interest  groups  and labor  unions  will  directly  affect  the
cooperation of governments on a regional level. Axline (1979:38) 
These are universal  factors  and can form empirical  variables for an analysis.  In examining the
factors of integration, we are further able to isolate instances and the general process of integration
for studying regional integration.
Furthermore,  regional  political  and economic cooperation  in  the  Caribbean,  mimics  some
qualities found in the EU, such as peaceful community building, democratic consent, and a spill-
over from economic to political integration. CARICOM is similar to the EU, in that, it was created
for political  purposes,  one of them being to  enable the islands  in the Caribbean to exert  more
political influence internationally.55 As with the EU, CARICOM was built on economic terms and
then grew into an economic and political union, entailing a single market and economy, in addition
to an overarching court of justice. 
The possibility of applying European integration theories to ACP and Latin American regions
has also been proposed numerous times56. The fact that regional political integration is prevalent not
just  in  Europe  but  is  also  increasing  globally,  suggests  that  the  study of  this  process  on  one
continent could inform endeavors on others.  CARICOM provides an ideal setting for empirical
analysis, since the dependent variables in such a case offer information about the process and the
outcome of  integration  itself.  This  suggests  that  European integration  theories  can  be  a  viable
choice for analyzing other unions apart from the EU. 
55 Please refer to the Preamble of the Original Treaty of Chaguaramas.
56 For more information on suggestions and attempts at using EU theories in other regions, see for example Malamud 
and Schmitter (2007); Dorrucci, et al (2002); and Schelhase(2008:27).
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As  established  in  the  previous  section,  theories  of  European  integration  can  be  used  to
examine the variables cited in this study of CARICOM. All three classical theories of European
integration,  i.e. Neofunctionalism,  Supranationalism,  and  Intergovernmentalism,  can  provide
valuable insights into the process of integration and disintegration in CARICOM. They are also able
to dissect the empirical variables in this thesis.
However, the theory of Neofunctionalism is the sole theory that can  singularly  achieve the
task outlined above; and can best assist in explaining the process of institution building, economic
integration  and  external  trade  negotiations  in  the  Caribbean.  Reasons  for  the  suitability  of
Neofunctionalism vis-à-vis the other theories of European integration include factors such as:
A  comprehensive   and   contextual  in  approach:  Neofunctionalism  rests  on  four  analytic
attributes  of  regional  integration:  the  actors,  the  motives,  the  process,  and  the  context  of  the
integration process. In concentrating on the actors and their motives for integration, it is possible to
analyze the incremental stages of integration.  Conversely,  the emphasis on the process and the
context, provide the opportunity to observe the interaction of these actors and the effects that their
interactions have on integration. Neofunctionalism is additionally able to focus on non-state actions
and their effects on integration. The employment of the theory of Neofunctionalism to this scenario
generates the contingency to focus on the institutional structure, functional capacities, together with
the geographical domain of theoretical analysis in CARICOM. Rather than limiting the parameters
of the analysis, the theory offers insights into notable aspects of CARICOM and the process of
integration for the proposed investigation. It further provides the possibility to better understand the
process of both political and economic integration. The analytic attributes of Neofunctionalism also
enable us to observe the national, regional and inter-regional dynamics of integration which are also
requirements for this analysis. The theories of Supranationalism and Intergovernmentalism would
not be able to offer such a broad analysis when applied individually. Since both of these theories
start their analysis by specifically approaching the actions of states in integration, and concentrate
on either the role of supranational institutions or nation states in the process of integration. Both
theories57 would have to  be employed to achieve the results  of an application of the theory of
Neofunctionalism.
Targets the 'Structure' as well as the 'Actions': by employing the theory of Neofunctionalism,
57 The use of the two theories would also offer contradictory points especially relating to the theories and therefore 
such an application would not be empirically sound. As argued before, it is imperative at this early stage of theoriz-
ing CARICOM that the focus is primarily on the process of integration in CARICOM, and secondarily on the theo-
ries.  
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not only is it possible to examine the structure of CARICOM, but also to place due emphasis on the
actions of the political élite, the institutions and other actors related to the integration process. This
ability  to  examine  the  structure  and the  actions,  provides  a  decisive  view  of  the  process  of
integration, in that we can also analyze the actions of non-state actors in addition to concentrating
on their competencies. The analysis of the empirical variables of this thesis requires an examination
of both the structure of the CSME, CCJ and EPA, as well as, the competencies of the institutions
and actors in the said variables. It is also necessary to examine the actions of the actors within the
scope of their competencies. The theory of Neofunctionalism also holds that an increase in the level
and scope of  competencies  positively corresponds with an increase in  the depth of  integration.
Therefore, through the theory of Neofunctionalism, we are able to appraise the depth of integration
in CARICOM by concentrating on the level and scope of integration.
Utilitarian  outlook:  Neofunctionalism offers  a  utilitarian  approach to  implementation  and
non-compliance, which is a looming issue in Caribbean regional studies. The implementation of
provisions and regional agreements, and compliance with these agreements, have been problematic
in  the  past,  especially  concerning  the  CSME,  one  of  the  empirical  examples  in  this  thesis. A
utilitarian  approach  helps  to  explain  the  cause  of  compliance  or  lack  thereof  in  CARICOM,
particularly with regards to the CCJ rulings and the implementation of the CSME. Additionally, this
utilitarian approach can be coupled with the level and scope of integration and other factors such as
competencies. In doing so, one is able to observe, understand and explain compliance issues in
CARICOM. The same is not possible with the other theories of European Integration.
'Spill-over' effect: Neofunctionalism proposes that regional economic integration spills over to
regional  political  integration.  This  idea  supports observations of  the  process  of  economic  and
political integration in the Caribbean. The theory of Neofunctionalism can be utilized to analyze all
the empirical examples in the thesis and to observe how the provisions of the CSME, which has a
purely economic character, spill-over into legal and political spheres; or how the rulings of the CCJ
on the  economic  provisions  of  the  Revised  Treaty impact  political  integration. Moreover,  it  is
possible  to observe  the  effects  of external  factors on  the  process  of  regional  integration  in
CARICOM; for example, how the WTO ruling on CARICOM-EU trade influences the EPA, and
how this economic agreement, in turn, affects political integration in CARICOM. Thus, the theory
of Neofunctionalism enables us to have an economic approach with which to observe regional
political, and to some extent, social integration in the Caribbean.
Progression cycle:  Schmitter  (1969) Offers  a  descriptive analysis  of the so-called 'cycles'
15
1.6 Justifications for Applying the Theory of Neofunctionalism to CARICOM
through which a union progresses throughout the process of its integration. As per the theory of
Neofunctionalism, the process of integration follows a progressive pattern from the initiation of
integration  to  its  priming and subsequent  transformation. In  examining the  empirical  examples
through Neofunctionalism, we are able to observe integration with the perspective of these cycles.
Wider application: in reading Barrera and Haas (1969); Haas (1961 and 1968); and Haas and
Schmitter (1964); Rosamund (2005) suggests that:
the  Neofunctionalist project  was from the  outset  a  comparative  exercise  in  regional
integration  theory.  The  explicit  purpose  of  the  Neofunctionalists was  to  utilize  the
pioneering  European  experience  of  integration  to  generate  hypotheses  for  testing  in
other contexts. In short, the plan was to develop not a theory of European integration,
but  to  arrive  at  a  more  generic  portfolio  of  propositions  about  the  dynamics  of
integration in any context. Rosamund (2005:10) 
This is especially important because, “without this capacity for application beyond the European
case,  Neofunctionalism  would  become  nothing  more  than  (at  best)  an  exercise  in  dense
description”.58 Unlike other theories of European Studies, the theory of Neofunctionalism, at its
core,  can  be  aptly  used  and  applied  to  other  cases  outside  of  the  EU,  independent  of  the
supranationality or intergovernmental characteristic of the union. This is of paramount importance,
not just for theory building but also for cross analysis.
Exclusive  focus  on  relevant  factors:  the  theory of  Neofunctionalism specifically  explores
“how and why nation-states cease to be wholly sovereign and how and why they voluntarily mingle,
merge  and  mix  with  their  neighbors”.59 In  doing  so,  it  inherently  advocates  that  nation  states
voluntarily grant some form of sovereignty to regional institutions. This is especially important for
the present analysis, as it enables the direct focus on the stated objectives without initially tackling
other peripheral issues, which are not applicable for the present case study of CARICOM since the
intention of this analysis is to study 'how' and 'why' states integrate. The theory of Neofunctionalism
enables the achievement of exactly this possibility. It avoids empirical flaws such as ongoing issues
related to the loss or gain of member-state sovereignty. Additionally, in presupposing that there is
some form of supranationality in CARICOM through the creation of institutions, even if these are
soft forms, we are better able to concentrate on the specific aims delineated above.
58 Rosamond (2013:247).
59 Haas (1970:610).
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Reflexive and expansive: the theory of Neofunctionalism provides the possibility to carry out
an  investigation  of  CARICOM based  on  our  'specific'  requirements  and  parameters.  Due  to  a
reflexive nature, we are not required to 'fit' our variables and examples to a specific theory; rather,
Neofunctionalism offers the possibility of fitting a  theory to  specific  demands.  For  the present
venture,  it  is  necessary that  a singular theory provides  the possibility to investigate the critical
questions raised in this thesis. The theory of Neofunctionalism is able to analyze and answer these
requirements. It can therefore be applied to CARICOM without needing to change the aims of the
thesis  or  to  amend  its  variables.  This,  however,  cannot  be  said  for  the  other  theories,  which
concentrate on intergovernmental bargaining or 'supranationality'. 
Reviving previous studies: lastly, and on a much smaller note, the theory of Neofunctionalism
has a special link and relationship with CARICOM. CARICOM and Neofunctionalism have had
past  notable  relationships.  As  mentioned  above,  the  theory  of  Neofunctionalism,  or  even  its
precursor - functionalism, has been introduced to the Caribbean region. Etzioni (1965), for example,
used some form of Functionalism to comment the West Indies Federation. Subsequently the theory
of  functionalism  has  undergone  major  reshaping  and  has  morphed  into  the  theory  of
Neofunctionalism. Simultaneously, integration in the Caribbean has also transformed over time. The
West Indies Federation has evolved into the present CARICOM, with a single market and economy,
a court of justice, and a regional platform for bargaining. Therefore, it seems promising, to say the
very least, to again apply the theory of Neofunctionalism to CARICOM in a contemporary light, to
see what new insights about CARICOM can be inferred from these revived studies. 
This is not the say that other European theories of integration might not also be relevant for
analyzing CARICOM. The other two classical European theories of integration, Supranationalism
and Intergovernmentalism, and new theories, such multi-level governance, could in fact be applied
to  CARICOM  and  would  yield  interesting  results.  Both  Intergovernmentalism  and
Supranationalism  have  merit  in  analyzing  institutional  structures  and  government  in  the  EU.
Although they are relevant for an analysis of government structures and institutional settings, they
are  not  singularly  able  to  be  effective  in  the  present  undertaking.  This  initial  analysis  of
CARICOM,60 based on the empirical variables available, necessitates a theory that is able to look
beyond government structures, and additionally offer the possibility for examining geographical
dimensions, such as external trade; and functional dimensions, such as the spill-over of legal rulings
60 This research represents a first attempt (of what is hoped to be a school of literature) of employing European theo-
ries of regional integration (specifically the theory of Neofunctionalism) for an analysis and application to CARI-
COM.
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on trade,  the free  movement of  people,  or  investments  and property and so on.  The theory of
Neofunctionalism has been proven by authors such as Schmitter (2002) to be a versatile theory for
starting a process of analysis. It is multifaceted and offers the possibility to start a field of research
around examining the process of integration in CARICOM. One can utilize Neofunctionalism to
examine the institutional structure in CARICOM, and new competencies created by the Revised
Treaty  and  their  implementation.  Additionally,  Neofunctionalism  allows  the  concentration  on
notable factors such as rule and government, spill-over and even the spill-back of integration.
The success of this theoretical application would create the environment for new empirical
research in CARICOM. New avenues would be possible, such as combining theories, comparative
analysis, and a dialog between/among theories and discipline. It is the hope, therefore, that this
endeavor acts as a foundation for future theoretical investigations of CARICOM61.
1.7 The Approach
1.7.1 The Empirical Examples 
As mentioned earlier, and as the following chapter on CARICOM will further discuss, three
significant accomplishments can be highlighted since the Original Treaty of Chaguaramas62. These
accomplishments mark not only a concerted effort at deepening integration, but also a move away
from  intergovernmental  cooperation  to  the  clear  embrace  of  open  regionalism;  and  highlight
specific cycles of deepening and/or widening of integration in the entire CARICOM area. They
moreover provide a specific time frame in which to analyze the process of regional economic and
political integration in CARICOM63. The empirical examples are: the creation of the CSME; the
61 This idea will be examined further in the final chapter of this thesis.
62 Regional integration in the OECS marks a considerable deepening of commitments within CARICOM since it re-
flects extensive commitments at regional integration, including a monetary union, a single currency, a central bank, 
and harmonized foreign and security policy. However, due to the fact that this thesis represents the first attempt at 
theorizing regional integration in the entire CARICOM region, an attempt at analyzing regional integration in the 
OECS as compared to the CSME was not undertaken due to empirical issues. Namely, the thesis focuses on the in-
cremental changes that have occurred in the entire CARICOM area since the Original Treaty of Chaguaramas. All 
three empirical chapters reflect extensive changes that have affected the entire CARICOM region. Given that the 
changes in the OECS represent development among only a particular grouping in CARICOM, the OECS was not 
included as an empirical chapter in the dissertation. That is to say, whilst the three empirical examples include com-
mitments among all CARICOM member-states; the OECS represents integration among a group of states within 
CARICOM. This is not to say that the deep integration of the OECS, is not notable. On the contrary, the thesis, 
highlights the importance of this phenomenon, (segmentation in CARICOM) and the usefulness for analyzing it. 
Therefore, future research on economic integration, foreign policy and comparative analyses in CARICOM should 
take this phenomenon into account.
63 These are: from the initial discussions of the CSME and EPA until their implementation; and judgments of the CCJ 
from its inauguration until this thesis was drafted in 2013. These periods create the possibility to clearly analyze re-
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creation of the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ); and the initiation, negotiation and signing of the
European Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU.
The Creation of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME): the CSME marks the
fourth in a  series of events towards deepening economic integration in the Caribbean.64 It  also
exemplifies  a significant  change in  the functional  scope of CARICOM through the creation of
regional  institutions  and  the  extension  of  regional  competencies;  which  replace  the  initial
conservative structures in the organization. Furthermore, it creates clear structural changes through
the ratification of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, and the creation and provision of extensive
regional competencies, through the nine protocols in the treaty. It is therefore possible to examine
non-compliance and breaches of these provisions,  and to  isolate  and analyze various factors of
integration. For example, to examine the degree which member-states relinquish sovereignty, the
role that institutions and other political élite play in integration, and the process of spill-over of
economic provisions to legal and political integration.
The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ): the establishment of the CCJ marks the creation of
one of the first and the most powerful supranational institutions in CARICOM. The CCJ not only
possesses the sole power to interpret the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, (Revised Treaty) which
restructured CARICOM and established the CSME, but it is also empowered with final appellate
powers, which accredit the court as the highest tribunal in the region.65 This is no small feat for a
region  that  has  notably  embraced  intergovernmental  cooperation  and  strongly  rejected  open
regionalism, institution building and supranationalism in its past. The CCJ therefore represents a
major  change  in  the  institutional  structure  of  CARICOM.  Moreover,  the  CCJ  provides  the
possibility for analyzing institution building; the deepening of integration and the general process of
integration; and identifying soft form of supranationalism in CARICOM.
An initial  overview revealed that public material,  such as court  rulings,  treaties and trade
statistics make up the bulk of the reliable data on CARICOM66. An analysis of the CCJ offers the
possibility for circumventing this lack of information, and to focus on the available empirical data.
Furthermore, an examination of the competencies of the CCJ helps in analyzing the power of the
CCJ as a supranational institution in CARICOM and the scope of commitments and provisions for
regional integration in CARICOM.
gional competencies, including the actions of political élite and institutions in the process of regional integration in 
CARICOM.  
64 The first step was the West Indies Federation; the second, the Caribbean Free Trade Association; and the third the 
Caribbean Common Market.
65 For countries in CARICOM who subscribe to its rule.
66 See for example Onnis (2013).
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An examination of the complete rulings of the CCJ67 aids to observe: patterns in the rulings of
the CCJ68; the implementation process of rulings and the extent to which member-states abide by
the  rulings  of  the  CCJ,  including  any  breaches  by  member-states;  and  the  spill-over  and
implications of legal decisions in the sectors of CARICOM.
This  approach provides  a  consequential  analysis  of  the  CCJ as  it  delineates  the  route  of
analysis for the following two empirical examples.
The  Economic  Partnership  Agreement  (EPA)  between  CARICOM and  the  EU: chapter  2
advances the notion that  integration in  the Caribbean is  based on external impacts,  forces,  and
controls.  It  further  argues  that  integration  in  CARICOM  largely  reflects  efforts  to  cope  with
externalities such as global pressures;  the EPA is proof of such an argument.  The EPA, an EU
construct for trade, was imposed on CARICOM by a ruling of the WTO. This is because, due to
WTO  disputes,  CARICOM  was  given  the  choice  to  either  negotiate  an  agreement  to  replace
existing preferential agreements with the EU, or to bilaterally trade with the EU as independent
countries, the latter being a direct contradiction of the provisions of the CSME. As such, the EPA
represents a change in the geographic scope of integration in CARICOM. The examination of such
a construct additionally isolates a specific time in the integration process of CARICOM from other
dependent  variables  of  integration.  An analysis  of  the  EPA therefore  offers  the  opportunity to
observe a specific case in point and an isolated event in CARICOM. In doing so, notions of spill-
over, spill-around and other impacts proposed by the theory of Neofunctionalism are easily traced
and examined. Moreover, the EPA offers the ability to: observe the actions of CARICOM; assess
how the individual member-states, and non-state actors, including regional institutions cope with
and  negotiate  and  expansive  trade  agreement  under  external  pressures;  and  examine  how  the
provisions and terms of the EPA affect the process of integration in CARICOM.
The EPA offers the ability to achieve four possibilities. Specifically to observe CARICOM’s
reaction to external pressure, that is to say it answers questions such as what happens to the process
of integration when there are clear external pressures; to observe the negotiation process of the
EPA, it addresses queries such as how do member-states cope with the negotiation processes; and
who/what is important in the process of negotiation; to analyze the provisions of the EPA and its
implementation  process  in  CARICOM;  and  moreover  to  analyze  an  isolated  occurrence  in
67 An examination of the rulings of the CCJ under its final appellate and its original jurisdiction. Some cases are found
in the Annex.
68 If the CCJ sets precedent in its judgments, rules independent of the member-states, and for the 'common good' of 
the Community; or if the CCJ is bound to the member-states and rules to appease them. When the CCJ does the for-
mer then there is some form of supranationalism in CARICOM, which also reflects the deepening of integration.
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CARICOM that affects every member.
All three empirical examples offer the possibility for examining the provisions of a treaty;
examining  the  implementation  process  of  said  provisions;  and  assessing  any breaches  and the
compliance to these provisions. Furthermore, the EPA offers the additional opportunity to analyze
bargaining procedures in CARICOM. Therefore, although there are compound differences between
the empirical examples, they all possess some similarity regarding observation and analysis; and
accordingly offer a high degree of structural continuity for this thesis.
1.7.2 General Outline
This research is organized into seven chapters, which are briefly described below: Chapter 1:
the current chapter's objective is threefold; namely: to provide the background to the scope of this
research and present the 'aims' of this study; to substantiate the approach or the  modus operandi
adopted; and present a general overview of the research.
The chapter additionally highlights the need to study the process of regional political and
economic  integration  in  the  Caribbean,  particularly  CARICOM,  and  presents  the  idea  of  a
theoretical analysis of CARICOM as a pragmatic and empirically sound method for such a study.
It moreover outlines the main aims of this research that are investigated in this study; list the
pertinent questions related to the critical issues responsible for the deepening, widening, and the
evolution  of  integration  in  CARICOM;  establishes  the  'modus  operandi'  of  this  research  -
investigating the regional political and economic integration in CARICOM via  the  application of
European theories of integration; and introduces the theory of Neofunctionalism as an ideal theory
for such this undertaking.
Chapter  2: introduces  CARICOM and  provides  a  short  geographic,  economic  and  social
overview of the union, along with its structure, institutions, and their competences; and offers a
historical  background to  the  process  of  regional  integration  in  the  Caribbean.  It  advances  that
integration in the Caribbean was initiated by external bodies and factors, and that this integration is
a reaction to external events and pressures. That integration in the Caribbean started in the pre-
colonization era with a purely political character, and it was only during the post colonization era
that the focus changed from political to economic.
Moreover, it establishes that the small size of the Caribbean countries was a primary factor
that compelled them to pool resources and to integrate economically, in order to coordinate foreign
policy and to cooperate functionally in bilateral negotiations and inter-community trade. 
Chapter 3: provides an in-depth overview and analysis of the theory of Neofunctionalism, the
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theory employed in this thesis.  It  examines the birth,  death and rebirth of Neofunctionalism. It
moreover relies on the new structural development in the theory to explain the advances in regional
integration in CARICOM; and offers a 'recycled'  view of the theory of Neofunctionalism as an
angle from which to examine regional integration in CARICOM. This recycled version includes
new hypotheses  regarding the notion of spill-over, such as 'spill-around', spill-back' and 'muddle-
about'.
Chapter  4:  employs  the  theory  of  Neofunctionalism to  analyze  the  CSME.  The  chapter
examines the provisions of the CSME and its implementation, which includes compliance and the
role and impact of regional institutions in the process of integration. Moreover, through the focus on
the provisions of the CSME, this chapter additionally concentrates on institutional characteristics
while analyzing the economic aspects of integration.
Chapter 5: utilizes the theory of Neofunctionalism to analyze the Caribbean Court of Justice.
It looks at the structure of the CCJ and discerns its competencies. It additionally examines all the
rulings made by the CCJ until December 201369, thereby providing the possibility to observe the
establishment of regional institutions, their competencies and compliance mechanisms. The chapter
argues that Neofunctionalism offers insights into the process of integration through its ability to
examine the functions, competencies, and impact of institutions in CARICOM, such as the CCJ, on
integration. In asserting that élite create institutions through which their functions cause integration
to  spill-over,  the  theory  of  Neofunctionalism addresses  the  process  of  institution  building70 in
CARICOM. Based on the  structure  of  CARICOM, the  CCJ is  the  most  isolated  institution  in
CARICOM, spill-over is thus easily identifiable in analyzing the CCJ. 
Moreover, the chapter takes the additional approach of encompassing a national and regional
spectrum by examining the legal competences of the Caribbean Court of Justice71. Such an approach
enables us to examine a very specific part of regional integration in detail. The isolation of a single
variable helps us to specifically concentrate on the unique process of integration and to analyze the
ideas  of  the  theory of  Neofunctionalism in  detail.  As such,  this  section  of  the  thesis  carries  a
specifically legal quality. 
Chapter  6:  utilizes  the  theory  of  Neofunctionalism to  analyze  the  Economic  Partnership
Agreement between CARICOM and the EU. It takes the negotiations of the Economic Partnership
Agreement as a prime example of the embedded change in both the internal and external relations in
69 When this chapter was drafted.
70 And spill-over mechanisms.
71 In doing this, the spill-over effect is isolated and examined in detail.
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CARICOM. Although  it  starts  from a local level and moves to  an inter-regional level,  like the
previous  two  empirical  chapters,  this  chapter  also  possesses  a  CARICOM/institution  centrist
approach. It emphasizes bargaining, and in so doing highlights the political dynamics in CARICOM
and relationships among member-states. This approach complements the previous two approaches
that specifically examined sub regional forces and impacts on the process of integration.
Chapter 7: reflects on the previous chapters, and mainly discussing the analysis of chapters
four, five and six. It also provides concluding remarks and recommendations for future theoretical
applications. 
When isolated,  each chapter  provides a specific approach to the process of integration in
CARICOM. The combination of all  three empirical  examples in the thesis  provides the unique
ability to observe very specific processes of integration from a  holistic angle.  The fourth chapter
offers an economic approach to the process of regional integration in CARICOM, whilst the fifth
chapter offers a legal/social analysis of the process of integration; and the sixth chapter observes an
interplay between internal and external forces on the process of integration. The combination of the
three  empirical  chapters  therefore addresses  significant points  within the process  of  integration
while  maintaining  a  general  overarching  approach  towards  integration.  By  examining  the
functionality of institutions, cross border spill-over and the process of negotiations in and among
CARICOM  and  between  CARICOM  and  other  unions,  this  thesis  provides  the  possibility  to
observe CARICOM from various perspectives.
Notably,  the theory of Neofunctionalism compliments the approach of the three empirical
variables. It offers an insight into the role and function of institutions in CARICOM, the effects of
institutional choice on the process of integration, and the effects of local, national and international
events likewise the preferences of member-states and national élite on the process of integration. 
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Chapter 2: Regional Integration in CARICOM
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to offer an introduction to  the Caribbean and the Caribbean
Community (CARICOM). It focuses on the geographical composition of the Caribbean; and the
economic, cultural and social characteristics of the region. The chapter further presents an account
of the history and study of regional political  integration in CARICOM, including member-state
relationships; institutions and structures. 
2.2 Examination of the Caribbean
2.2.1 Geography
The  region  of  the  Caribbean  includes  the  Caribbean  Sea  and  the  Caribbean  Basin.  It
comprises islands located north of South America, south-east of the Gulf of Mexico, and east of
Central America and Mexico.72 This area  comprises approximately 115 discovered islands, inlets,
reefs  and  cays.  The  Caribbean  region73 is  further  divided  into  jurisdictions74 consisting  of  15
Caribbean Community (CARICOM) member-states75;  two sovereign non-CARICOM countries76;
six  British  Overseas  Territories77;  two  Netherlands  Antilles  Territories78;  three  French
Departments79; and two USA Commonwealth States80.
72 Refer to Appendices for a map of the Caribbean showing CARICOM countries.
73 Geographical groupings typically referred to in researches include the British West Indies (Anglophone Caribbean);
the Dutch Antilles; the French Antilles; the Greater Antilles; the Lesser Antilles; the Leeward Islands and Windward
Islands.
74 Information taken from CARICOM.org Accessed June 30, 2015.
75 14 of these states are sovereign, and one (Montserrat ) is a British Overseas territory. The sovereign states are An-
tigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St Kitts & Nevis, 
St Lucia, St Vincent & Grenadines, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
76 Cuba and Dominican Republic. An imposed commercial and financial embargo on Cuba (lifted in 2015) by the 
United States of America prohibits Cuba from becoming a member of CARICOM. The Dominican Republic is in-
cluded in a Cariforum union with CARICOM member-states.
77 Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat (CARICOM member-state), and Turks and 
Caicos Islands.
78 Aruba & Curacao.
79 French Guiana, Guadeloupe and Martinique.
80 Puerto Rico and the US Virgin Islands.
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Most of the Caribbean islands feature three main geographical characteristics, namely: they
are enveloped by coral reefs and white sand beaches; created by volcanic activity, which led to a
composition characterized by a mixture of black and white sands and arable soil; and defined by
alluvial, coastal, and low terrace deposits. 
Additional geographical features of the Caribbean islands include their mountainous terrain,
undulating countryside,  coastal  plains,  a  tropical  (marine)  climate,  and a  mixture of  limestone,
volcanic  and  swampy  landscapes.  Active  volcanoes  still  exist  on  Montserrat81,  Dominica,  St.
Vincent, St. Lucia, and Grenada which has crater lakes formed by recent activity. 
Although limited, Caribbean countries feature natural resources such as deposits of bauxite
and gypsum in Jamaica; petroleum, pitch, and natural gas in Trinidad and Tobago; and deposits of
copper, lead, manganese, and zinc on most of the Caribbean islands82. The Gulf of Mexico and the
northern South American basins, two of the largest hydrocarbons territories border the Caribbean
region; due to this  researchers advance,  and recent studies83 reveal potentially large deposits of
hydrocarbon in the Caribbean. 
Notwithstanding their small sizes/limited land area84, agriculture is a main source of income
for most countries. However, Pearson et al. (2008: 37) notes that, along with a climate favorable for
the specific tropical crops, CARICOM countries are “highly susceptible to weather-related natural
disasters” due to “their location within the hurricane belt”.85
There is a glaring disparity between the member-states in CARICOM with respect to their
size and population86. Montserrat, the smallest country in CARICOM, with an area of a mere 102
square kilometers is less than 10% of the size of the largest country, Guyana, which has an area of
more than 190,000 square kilometers. Guyana and Suriname together account for more than 81% of
the total land mass of CARICOM87. The land area of more than a third of the CARICOM member-
81 In Montserrat, explosive/effusive volcanic eruptions in 1995 saw the total destruction of the capital city and airport,
and the evacuation of approximately half the country's population.  
82 In some cases, these resources are so limited that the islands are forced to import additional supplies from external 
sources.
83 See for example Escalona1, Mann, and Bingham (2008).
84 Total land area -in the Caribbean is over 727,000 square km, and the total land and sea area is over 3 million square 
km. Statistics taken from CARICOM.org. Accessed June 30, 2015.
85 They further note that these environmental factors affect the CARICOM economies, which tend to exhibit a sharp 
downturn due to damages; that “environmental degradation, including excessive deforestation, soil erosion, and in-
creased susceptibility to floods and landslides, also are common problems facing the countries in the Caribbean 
Basin region”(Pearson et al 2008:37).
86 Total population in the Caribbean is over 37 million. The chapter later reveals that factors such as population and 
size contribute to what some term as malaise in CARICOM. For more on malaise in the Caribbean see for example 
Girvan (2008).
87   Excluding Haiti.
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states is less than 500 square kilometers, whilst that of more than another third is above 10,000
square kilometers. 
There  is  also  a  huge  disparity  between  CARICOM  member-states  with  respect  to
population88.  Montserrat  has  the  smallest  population  in  CARICOM,  approximately  5,00089
inhabitants. Dominica has the second smallest population, approximately 72,000, compared to more
than 1.2, 2.8 and 9.6 million inhabitants in Trinidad, Jamaica and Haiti respectively. 
The distance between the CARICOM islands is also significant90. The islands are typically
isolated and removed from one other; for example, Jamaica is located in the center of the Caribbean
Sea91, and Trinidad and Tobago is located at the other end of the archipelago, in/near the Atlantic
Ocean.  Belize  is  closer  to  Central  America  than  it  is  to  Jamaica  or  Haiti.  These  distances
significantly impact on trade, for example, it is logistically more cost-effective and practical for
Trinidad and Tobago to trade with Venezuela and other countries in Latin America than with Belize
(close to Central America) or with Jamaica (in the center of the Caribbean). 
Notably, these limitations actually drive CARICOM countries to integrate92 because:
ever since their independence, Caribbean countries have been painfully aware of the
constraints of small size, and it is these constraints that, perhaps more than anything
else,  have  driven  the  regional  integration  process  (through)  economic  integration,
foreign policy coordination and functional cooperation. Jessen and Vignoles (2005:3)
2.2.2 Economy
The  CARICOM  economies  exhibit  many  similarities;  all  CARICOM  member-states  are
former colonies, and therefore were once plantation economies,93 with their major exports being
sugar,  tobacco  and/or  bauxite,  and  later  tropical  crops.  More  recently,  these  economies  have
gradually diversified to include the assembly and export of apparel and light manufactured goods,
tourism, and financial services.94 
88  Statistics from the CIA World Fact Book, 2010 estimates.
89  Approximately 8,000 refugees left the island following volcanic activity in 1995.
90 According to CARICOM.org (Accessed June 30, 2015) the largest distance North/South - approx. ,560 square km, 
and largest distance East/West - approx.4,480 km2.
91  The Greater Antilles.
92 In spite of these challenges, the integration process has recently deepened and widened in CARICOM. See follow-
ing section.
93  Except for some islands of the Lesser Antilles which have concentrated on mining.
94 Countries in CARICOM are now invested in offshore finance services, gaming and casinos.
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The  finance95 and  service  sectors  in  CARICOM,  complement/supplement  earnings  from
agriculture and natural resources such as bauxite, crude oil, minerals. Technology and structured
schemes such as Western Union help in measuring remittances, which account for a substantial part
of the national budgets of these small Caribbean states.
There is an intriguing correlation between the size of a CARICOM member-state, and its per
capita  GDP96.  All  CARICOM member-states  of  approximately (or  smaller  than)  10,000 square
kilometers97 feature the highest  per  capita  GDP in CARICOM98.  All  CARICOM member-states
larger than 20,000 square kilometers have the lowest per capita GDP99. Therefore, in CARICOM
the  smaller  the  member-state,  the  higher  its  GDP tends  to  be,  and  vice  versa.  Additionally,
“CARICOM members display highly dissimilar levels of economic development. Annual per capita
income in CARICOM ranges from $17,432 in the Bahamas to $557 in Haiti. The difference in per
capita income between the richest and the poorest CARICOM country is 35:1”.100
The economies of CARICOM member-states are all small, however, “some are much smaller
than others. Trinidad and Tobago, the largest economy in CARICOM, accounts for around 30 % of
the group’s combined GDP, whereas the seven OECS countries together account for just 8 %”.101
CARICOM economies  are able to take advantage of their proximity to the USA by engaging in
multilateral trade, based on exporting and importing goods and services. Most CARICOM member-
states  are  therefore  heavily reliant  on  the  USA for  trade,  investments,  remittances  and further
economic  assistance  in  the  form  of  loans  and  grants.  This  further  translates  to  an  economic
dependence on the  US dollar.  Additionally,  due to  their  historic  ties  as  colonies  to  the region,
Caribbean countries are also considerably dependent on Europe, especially England. More recently
they have developed ties with China relating to trade, investments, loans and grants. 
Research102 reveals  that  the  budgets  of  the  CARICOM  member-states  are  dependent  on
external countries and factors, instead of internal trade; mainly because “up until the nineties, many
small states did not pursue an especially liberalized trade regime. Even where there is movement
95 For example 'tax havens'.
96 Statistics from the CIA World Fact Book, 2010 estimates.
97 Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados and Trinidad are all approximately or smaller than 10,000 square 
kilometer.
98 per capita GDP of or above 10,000 USD.
99 Belize, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, and Suriname, which are the largest member-states have the lowest GDP in CARI-
COM.
100 Jessen and Vignoles (2005:8).
101 Jessen and Vignoles (2005:19).
102 See for example Onnis (2014).
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towards freer trade, many protectionist barriers still characterize the trade of most small states”.103 
Compared  to  a  recorded  annual  global  growth  of  3.5%  and  4.3%  in  other  developing
countries, the 1.8% growth of CARICOM countries reveals the sluggish nature of the CARICOM
economies, which has been a trend for the past 20 years104. Factors such as high unemployment,
narcotics trade and drug abuse, crime, and violence further affect persistently high poverty rates in
CARICOM  countries.  The  devastation  from  recurring  hurricanes  hampers  the  reaction  of
CARICOM countries in adjusting to global change. 105 
Moreover,  CARICOM  member-states  are  identified106 as  “carrying  debt-to-GDP ratios  in
excess of 100 percent and have economies that are struggling to recover from the spill-over effects
of the 2008 global economic and financial crisis”.107 
2.2.3 Culture
As mentioned above, the CARICOM member-states share a colonial past. They were all at
one time European colonies and plantation or mining economies. This shared history translates to a
similar culture in terms of religion, values and ideologies, music, and the way of life across the
Caribbean population.  It has often been argued that the cultural association and commonality in
CARICOM are more essential than economic compatibility among member-states. 
History  and  culture  in  the  Caribbean  have  proven  to  be  positive  factors  for  integration.
Caribbean political strategists and policy makers often emphasize the value of a shared identity and
culture, in propelling regional integration in CARICOM. In 1981, Trevor Farrell wrote that:
 
our basic motivation ‘for integration’ is not economic at all…because from a purely
economic point of view, there is more reason for Jamaica to be interested in economic
integration with Cuba or Puerto Rico than with Montserrat or Grenada. … I believe that
subconsciously we chose our  partners  first,  and then… began to worry consciously
about economics of the relationship… The real basis and impetus for our integration is
cultural. (Jessen and Vignoles 2005:5)
103 Ramkissoon (2002:10).
104 Statistics from Jessen and Vignoles (2005:12).
105 Jessen and Vignoles (2005:12).
106 These economic problems negatively affect the process of integration in CARICOM, especially relating to the im-
plementation of treaty provisions. 
107 Caribbean Community Secretariat (2013).
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This  cultural  identity,  which is  often alluded to  by academics  and members  of  the CARICOM
governments,  is  frequently  cited  as  the  driving  mechanism  behind  the  regional  integration
movement in the Caribbean. 
Therefore,  although  integration  in  CARICOM  is  approached  and  established  from  an
economic  perspective,  cultural  factors  are  often  held  to  be  complementary  to  unilateral  and
multilateral  trade liberalization.108 This is a compelling argument,  especially due to the benefits
gained from the harmonization of practical resources such as education. Countries in the Caribbean
have achieved harmonized education among its members including a unified “Common Entrance
Examination” for all primary school-leaving students of CARICOM member-states. There are also
unified  secondary  school  structures  and  a  regional  body  administrating  external  exams  for
CARICOM  secondary  school  leavers.  The  University  of  the  West  Indies,  with  campuses  in
CARICOM member-states, is a key institution at the tertiary level. Unified education structures
serve as quality control in the education system and also complement the free movement of people
within  the  Caribbean  Community.  Cooperation  in  CARICOM  should  then  be  identified  as
functional “where countries hope to achieve both cost savings and quality enhancements in the
common provision of social services”.109
The  level  and characteristics  of  democracy are  also  relatively similar  among CARICOM
members110. International indexes measuring factors affecting democracy such as general elections,
parliamentary meetings, civil society, press freedom and the structure, strength and transparency of
government  institutions  reveal  these  similarities  in  member-states.111 Except  Haiti,  CARICOM
countries reflect a mostly stable political society.112 
108 Jessen and Vignoles (2005:4).
109 Jessen and Vignoles (2005:5).
110 For more information see Onnis 2014.
111 The Economist Intelligent Unit uses 60 indicators grouped in five categories (electoral process and pluralism, civil 
liberties, functioning of government, political participation and political culture) for its Democracy Index. For more
information see http://www.economistgroup.com/what_we_do/our_brands/the_economist_brand_family/econo-
mist_intelligence_unit.html Accessed June 30 2015. 
     Freedom House publishes an annual report which assesses the degree of democracy of countries on a scale from
(most free) to 7 (least free). The indicators also include those above. 
      World Audit.org also uses Political rights, Civil liberties, press freedom, rule of law, corruption, human rights, and
other indicators to compare democracy among countries.  
112 There are democratic deficiencies which are reflected in voting structures and elections as prescribed by the respec -
tive constitutions. See for example Onnis (2014).
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2.3 History of Regional Integration in the Caribbean
Two primary  phases  of  integration  can  be  identified  in  the  region;  these  are  integration
attempts  by  England  under  colonial  rule,  which  can  be  labeled  as  the  'Colonial  Phase';  and
integration attempts of the independent Caribbean territories, labeled as the 'Post Colonial Phase'. 
Additionally, five major cycles of integration can be identified through examining the history
of regional integration in CARICOM. The first two cycles fall under the Colonial/Federation phase,
and the latter three, the Post-Colonial phase of Caribbean integration. These cycles are: 
• the first attempts at regional economic and political integration in the Caribbean by England;
• the West Indies Federation, which marked a rise in attempts at 'colonial integration' and also 
the end of colonization of the Caribbean;
• the creation of CARIFTA, which represents the birth of independence in the Caribbean and 
the first attempts of integration by the independent Caribbean Countries;
• the  creation  of  the  Caribbean  Community  which  signifies  a  deepening  of  economic  
integration among the Caribbean Countries; 
• a further deepening and widening of economic and political integration through: the creation
and implementation of the CSME, movements towards perceived political integration by the
creation of the CCJ, and the creation and utilization of a regional platform from which to 
negotiate with other regions such as the EU. 
Regional integration in the Caribbean can therefore be presented as an endeavor that was
initiated by external parties and intensified by the independent CARICOM states.
2.3.1 The Colonial Phase: The First attempts at Regional Integration
From the end of the 15th century until the mid-20th  century, the member-states of CARICOM
were colonies of Europe, specifically the British monarch.113 Throughout the colonization period,
the Caribbean countries possessed limited political and economic autonomy.114 Initially, the politics
and  economic  welfare  of  the  colonies  were  remotely  governed  from Europe,  and  much  later
political structures were created in the Caribbean; which reflected the design and regulations of the
British monarchy. The colonies were further characterized by:
113 Except  for Haiti, a former French colony which achieved independence in 1804, and Suriname, a former British 
and Dutch colony.
114 Under direct British rule, for example, the Caribbean countries were termed 'crown colonies', meaning that they 
were ruled by a governor who was appointed by the monarch.
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an appointed upper house, and an elected lower house. The electoral franchise, however,
was extremely restricted, being vested on a few wealthy male property holders. Power
was divided between the governor,  who executed the laws, and the assembly which
made them. However, the assembly retained the right to pass all money bills (including
the pay for the governor) and so used this  right  to obstruct  legislation or simply to
control new officials. Meditz and Hanratty (1987)
The function of the government was preoccupied mainly with bureaucratic efficiency; the 'crown
colony government' was essentially concerned with law and order, and serviced the land owners in
the colonies. Democracy or economic welfare for others,  such as former slaves and indentured
workers did not fall under the mandate of this government. Therefore since they were technically a
part of their respective European empire, the economies, mostly based on agriculture/plantations,
were created, designed and served the purpose of satellite economies. 
During British rule,  efforts  were made at  regional  integration in  the Caribbean as  a  step
towards  economic  austerity.  Attempts  at  integration  started  with  small  groupings  such  as  the
Leeward  Island  Federation  from  1871-1956,  whose  members  were  Antigua,  St.  Kitts,  Nevis,
Dominica, Montserrat, and the British Virgin Islands115. The Confederation of Barbados, Tobago,
and the Windward Islands  in 1876 was an additional effort  by the British monarch at  regional
integration in the Caribbean due to their proximity. Further attempts included the Union of Trinidad
and  Tobago  in  1887116,  and  the  union  of  St.  Christopher,  Nevis  and  Anguilla  in  the  late  19 th
century117. Internal pressure in the Caribbean, in addition to national issues in Britain, then resulted
in the idea of a confederation as a favorable option for the entire Caribbean colonies.
2.3.2 The Colonial/Federation Phase: The West Indies Federation
Regional integration in the Caribbean, especially the Anglophone Caribbean, owes its origins
to  the  British  mercantile  system.  The  West  Indies  Federation  was  an  initiative  of  the  British
authorities with which to push a modified version of self government in response to demands for
political  independence  from its  colonies.  The Federation  was also a  means of  streamlining the
115 This Federation was then enveloped by the West Indies Federation. 
116 This union is still in effect.
117 After independence Anguilla became an independent territory, and St Christopher and Nevis, remained a union, was
renamed St. Kitts and Nevis and became a sovereign state.
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management of the colonies and increasing administrative efficiency and centralization. According
to Revaugner (2008:1), the British administration attempted “to improve the management of the
local economies, and reduce the need for financial support from Britain” through the promotion and
implementation of a unified political system for its colonies. 
The  West  Indies  Federation  was,  therefore,  not  an  initiative  stemming  from  within  the
Caribbean, rather, it was systematically implemented by the British Administration for 'cost cutting'
measures.  In  1956  the  British  Parliament  passed  the  British  Caribbean  Federation  Act  which
formally  established  the  West  Indies  Federation  in  1958.  The  Federation  comprised  of  ten
Caribbean  countries118, all  former  British  colonies. Led  by an  executive  governor  general,  the
Federation’s structure consisted of a prime minister, an 11 member Cabinet, a 45 member elected
House of Representatives and a Senate comprising 19 nominated members. The Federation also
created supporting structures and established federal institutions such as a Federal Civil Service,
and a West Indies Shipping Service. In addition, it expanded the University College of the West
Indies into the University of the West Indies which functions to date. Furthermore, British West
Indies Airways was created by the Federation to enable intra-country air transport.
The responsibilities of the Federation included defense, foreign affairs and to a very limited
extent, finance. Moreover, the Federation fulfilled functional obligations including administrating
shipping,  education,  and the  West  Indies  Colonial  Welfare  funds.  However,  neither  the  British
Caribbean Federation Act nor the government of the federation granted it  de facto power. There
were no compliance mechanisms in place to coerce countries to adhere to the directives of the
federation. Besides, welfare and social structures remained competencies of the member-states, or
rather the monarch.119 The Federation was political in nature, notably “emphasis was not placed on
the economic aspect of Federation during the four years of its existence. Economically, the region
remained as it had been for centuries, and not even free trade was introduced between the member-
states during this period”.120 
Accounts and explanations for the failure of the West Indian Federation cite a push from
within the colonies for full political autonomy and independence from the British monarchy as an
underlying factor.121 In 1961, after a national referendum, Jamaica withdrew its membership from
118 Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, St Kitts-Nevis, Anguilla, Saint Lucia, St
Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago.
119 For more information on the responsibilities of the federation see the British Caribbean Federation Act.
120 CARICOM history found at http://www.caricom.org/jsp/community/caricom_history.jsp?menu=community Ac-
cessed June 30, 2015.
121 For more information on the West Indies Federation and the failure of the federation, see: Revauger (2008); Lewis 
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the  Federation.  This  move  was  followed  by  Trinidad  and  Tobago  and  shortly  afterward  the
Federation was dissolved in 1962. When  Trinidad and Tobago announced the withdrawal of its
membership it simultaneously proposed a new and more expansive union, with an emphasis on
economic trade. 
The First Heads of Government Conference122 was hosted by Trinidad and Tobago in July
1963 as a series of meetings to create this envisaged union. These meetings led to the creation of
The Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) in December 1965 through the Dickenson Bay
Agreement. 
2.3.3 The Post Colonial Phase: The Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) 
CARIFTA was  the  first  attempt  at  economic  integration  in  the  Anglophone Caribbean.123
Article two of the Dickenson Bay Agreement defines the objectives of CARIFTA which are purely
economic,  as  follows to:  promote  the expansion and diversification of  trade  in  the  area  of  the
Association;  ensure  that  trade  between  member  territories  takes  place  in  conditions  of  fair
competition; encourage the progressive development of the economies of the area; and foster the
harmonious development of Caribbean trade and its liberalization by the removal of barriers to it. 
In 1972, Caribbean leaders decided to transform CARIFTA into a common market and to
establish the Caribbean Community, of which the common market would be an integral part.
2.3.4 The Post Colonial Phase: The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) 
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) evolved from CARIFTA, whose predecessor was
the West Indies Federation124. It was established by the Treaty of Chaguaramas (the Original Treaty)
in 1973 and was signed by Barbados, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. It came into
effect on August 1st of that same year.  CARICOM was inaugurated as a “customs union with free
movement of  goods and services,  complemented  by foreign  policy coordination  and functional
cooperation in the economic, social, and cultural fields”.125 As a customs union, CARICOM created
(2008) and Wallace (1962).
122 Comprising all the former colonies of the Federation.
123 The new CARIFTA agreement came into effect on May 1, 1968 with the signatures of Antigua, Barbados, Trinidad 
and Tobago and Guyana. Dominica, Grenada, St. Kitts/Nevis/Anguilla, Saint Lucia and St. Vincent signed the 
agreement in July 1968. Jamaica and Montserrat signed the agreement in August 1968. British Honduras (now Be-
lize) signed the agreement in May 1971. 
124 The West Indies Federation was a short-lived political union/federation (1958-1962) comprising the British Carib-
bean Countries. After the Federation Collapsed, the Caribbean countries made another attempt at integration 
through the establishment of the Caribbean Free Trade Association in 1965.
125 Girvan (2008:5).
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a regional boundary for tariffs and quotas. The main goal of CARICOM, according to the Treaty of
Chaguaramas,  is  to  coordinate  and  deepen  integration  among  its  members  and  to  synchronize
domestic and foreign policy, in order to “improve the standard of living and work for its members,
enhance  international  competitiveness  and  the  achievement  of  a  greater  measure  of  economic
leverage and effectiveness of member-states in dealing with third sates, groups of states”.126 There
are currently 15 full members,127 5 associate members,128 and 7 observers in this union.129
Since its inauguration, CARICOM has evolved beyond being a customs union into a quasi-
single market and economy.
2.3.5 The Post Colonial Phase: The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
Seven  CARICOM countries130 signed  the  Treaty  of  Basseterre  in  1981  and  establish  the
OECS. The OECS evolved from the West Indies Associated States Council of Ministers (WISA)
which  was  formed  in  1966;  and  the  Eastern  Caribbean  Common  Market  (ECCM) which  was
established  in  1968.131 Lewis  (2002:1)  notes  that  at  an  OECS summit  “on  28th May 1987,  St
Vincent's Prime Minister … called on fellow Prime Ministers to merge their countries in a single
state”.
The Treaty of Basseterre was revised in 2010, Article 4 of which delineates the objectives of
the OECS that include:
• to promote co-operation among the Member States and at the regional and international  
levels having due regard to the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas  
• to seek to achieve the fullest possible harmonization of foreign policy among the Member 
States, to seek to adopt wherever possible, common positions on international issues, and to 
establish and maintain, wherever possible, arrangements for joint overseas representation  
and common services; 
126 www.caricom.org/community. Accessed June 30, 2015.
127 Antigua and Barbuda (1974) Bahamas (1983) (not part of single market) Barbados (1973) Belize (1974) Dominica 
(1974) Grenada (1974) Guyana (1973) Haiti (provisional membership 1998, full membership 2002)  Jamaica 
(1973) Montserrat (a territory of the United Kingdom 1974) Saint Kitts and Nevis (1974 as Saint Christopher-
Nevis-Anguilla) Saint Lucia (1974) Saint Vincent and the Grenadines (1974) Suriname (1995)  Trinidad and 
Tobago (1973).
128 Anguilla (1999) Bermuda (2003)  British Virgin Islands (1991) Cayman Islands (2002) Turks and Caicos Islands 
(1991). All the full and associate members of CARICOM are British overseas territories.
129 Aruba, Columbia, Dominican Republic, Mexico, Netherlands Antilles, Puerto Rico, and Venezuela.
130 Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, and St Vincent and the 
Grenadines.
131 For an extensive overview of the OECS; and a comparison between the OECS and the CSME please see Onnis 
(Working Paper) Titled 'The OECS in CARICOM: A Comparison of the OECS and the CSME Integration 
Schemes'.
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• to establish the Economic Union as a single economic and financial space.
The said article also bind the signatories to: “co-ordinate, harmonize and undertake joint actions and
pursue joint policies”132 particularly in the fields of mutual defense and security (including police
and  prisons);  judiciary  and  the  administration  of  justice;  external  relations  including  overseas
representation; international trade agreements and other external economic relations; financial and
technical assistance from external sources; international marketing of goods and services including
tourism; transportation and communications including civil aviation; tax administration; regulatory
and competition  authorities;  education;  intellectual  property rights;  economic  integration  of  the
Member States through the provisions of the Economic Union Protocol; and currency and central
banking.133
The structure of the OECS consists of organs and institutions. Organs of the OECS include
the Authority of Heads of Government of the Member States (OECS Authority); the Council of
Ministers;  the  OECS  Assembly;  the  Economic  Affairs  Council;  and  the  OECS  Commission.
Institutions include the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court; the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank; and
the Eastern Caribbean Civil Aviation Authority; 
The OECS Authority is composed of the heads of state of the member-states; and according to
Article  8.4  of  the  Revised  Treaty  of  Basseterre,  is  “the  supreme  policy-making  Organ  of  the
Organization.” 
The Council of Ministers is composed of Ministers of Government in the member-states, and
is responsible under Article nine of the Revised Treaty of Basseterre, to “take appropriate action on
any  matters  referred  to  it  by  the  OECS  Authority  and  shall  have  the  power  to  make
recommendations to the OECS Authority”.
According  to  Article  10  of  the  Revised  Treaty  of  Basseterre  “each  Parliament  of  an
independent State … shall be entitled to elect five of its members to the OECS Assembly. …(the
duty of which is to) consider and report to the OECS Authority on any proposal to enact an Act of
the Organization”.
Article  11 of  the Revised Treaty of  Basseterre,  list  the composition and functions  of  the
Economic  Affairs  Council.  Specifically,  it  comprises  Ministers  of  Government  named  by their
Heads of Government and act under the Economic Union Protocol. 
The OECS Commission is “the principal Organ responsible for the general administration of
132 Areas of Legislative competence of the OECS include common market including customs union; monetary policy,  
trade policy; commercial policy; environmental policy; immigration policy; and foreign affairs policy.
133 Article 4 of the Revised Treaty of Basseterre.
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the  Organization”134;  whose  functions  include  monitoring  the  implementation  of  Acts  and
Regulations f the OECS; providing secretariat services including servicing OECS meetings, taking
up action on decisions.
The OECS therefore representative of a  high level  of  segmentation and differentiation in
CARICOM. It moreover highlights deeper commitments at integration, as opposed to the general
CSME. Although it is not used as an empirical variable135, it requires further analysis. To this extent,
I offer possible proposals for future research in Chapter 7.
2.3.6 The Post Colonial Phase: The Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME); The 
Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ); and the European Partnership Agreement (EPA)
The Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME): at the 10th meeting of the Conference
of Heads of Government of the Community,136 a new strategy was launched for transforming the
common market into a Caribbean Single Market and Economy (CSME). The CSME was conceived
as 'an economic integration scheme' by means of 'open regionalism'137. It was initiated by the Grand
Anse Declaration in July 1989 to sustain economic development through the full liberalization of
capital, labor, production, services, and other human resources in CARICOM. It further envisions
coordinated  economic,  fiscal,  monetary  and  foreign  investment  policies  of  member-states.  The
CSME  is  therefore  a  means  for  maintaining  economic  development  in  CARICOM  through
economic  harmonization  and  liberalization.  Such  an  undertaking  additionally  requires
harmonization and coordination of legal and social policies by the participating member-states. The
Treaty of Chaguaramas, now Original Treaty, was amended to the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas
(Revised Treaty) to provide the legal basis for the operation of the CSME. Unlike the Original
Treaty, which legally differentiates between the Community and the common market, the Revised
Treaty  does  not  make  this  distinction,  therefore,  the  CSME  is  entrenched  in  the  Caribbean
Community. 
The CSME is divided into two parts: a single market and a single economy. Under a single
market, CARICOM introduces provisions for free intra-CARICOM movement of goods, services,
skills,  capital  and  the  right  to  establishment.  Under  the  single  economy,  a  monetary  union  is
highlighted as an ideal. The main focus of the CSME is on the single market, and less on the single
economy,  with  the  provisions  and  commitments  to  the  single  economy reflecting  little  or  no
134 The Revised Treaty of Basseterre, Article 12.
135 As highlighted earlier, the empirical variables address change in the entire CARICOM region, the OECS on the oth-
er hand represents change in specific regional in CARICOM. 
136 10th meeting 1989 in Grand Anse Grenada.
137 Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
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progress over time. Some of the initial accomplishments of the CSME include: 
• the abolition of a work permit for member citizens of CARICOM countries working in other
CARICOM countries; 
• the introduction of a CARICOM Skills Certificate which unifies skill levels in CARICOM; 
• the introduction of free entry for six months for visitors in all CARICOM countries as an 
attempt to universalize immigration laws; 
• the introduction of an indefinite length of stay of CARICOM citizens in a member-state; and
also 
• the right to transfer one's social security benefits from one CARICOM state to another. 
The CARICOM website also highlights changes that enable intra-community travel, including the
introduction of a CARICOM passport which excludes CARICOM nationals from visa requirements,
and queuing at immigration points. Both of these changes are designed to enable the free movement
of CARICOM member-state nationals within CARICOM.
The  CSME further  provides  a  guarantee  of  the  free  movement  of  capital  in  CARICOM
including the equal right to purchase land, and shares in companies, and the right to transfer social
securities in CARICOM. The CSME also calls for the harmonization of company and intellectual
property laws.  
Basic requirements for a functioning single economy include a central bank, which regulates
interest  rates,  and  a  single  currency.  Regional  provisions  and  regulations  do  not  reflect  these
necessary requirements. Chapter 4 offers a detailed overview of the single market and economy in
the Caribbean. 
The Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ): the institutional and legal framework of the CSME
includes the CCJ which was  established in 2001.138 Article 3 of the 'Agreement Establishing the
Caribbean Court of Justice' agreement establishes the original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction
of  the  CCJ.  which  possesses  two  jurisdictions:  an  original  jurisdiction  and  a  final  appeals
jurisdiction It is 
As a court of first instance, the CCJ possesses sole and compulsory jurisdiction139 to interpret
138Ten CARICOM members signed the agreement establishing the CCJ, namely Antigua and Barbuda; Barba-
dos; Belize; Grenada; Guyana; Jamaica; St. Kitts and Nevis; St. Lucia; Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. 
Dominica and St. Vincent and The Grenadines, signed the agreement on the 15th February 2003. 
139 Under Article 7 of the Agreement Establishing the CCJ, for more information see Chapter 5.
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the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.,  and therefore possesses exclusive jurisdiction to  hear and
deliver  judgment  on:  disputes  between member-states;  disputes  between member-states  and the
community;  referrals  from  national  courts  or  tribunals  of  member-states;  and  applications  by
nationals of member-states concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty. Article 13 of
the  agreement  also  appoints  the  court  the  “exclusive  jurisdiction  to  deliver  advisory  opinions
concerning  the  interpretation  and  application  of  the  Treaty”. Ipso  facto,  the  CCJ  is  the  sole
interpreter  and the only CARICOM institution that applies  the Revised Treaty when necessary.
Article 15 of the Agreement establishes the supranationality of the CCJ by imposing its binding
judgments on all member-states and institutions of CARICOM. The article specifically demands
that the parties to whom the judgment applies “shall comply with that judgment”. The compulsory
jurisdiction of  the  court  is  further  laid out  in  Article  16 of  the  Agreement  where  it  states  that
“contracting  parties  agree  that  they  recognize  as  compulsory,  ipso  facto  and  without  special
agreement, the original jurisdiction of the court”. 
Under  its  appellate  jurisdiction,  Article  25  of  the  Agreement  provides  the  court  with  the
authority  to  make  “final  decisions” on  civil  proceedings  for  both  intra-  and  inter-community
matters.  Article  25  also  empowers  the  court  with  the  final  decision  to  exercise  jurisdiction  in
determining the right of access to the CCJ. This suggests that the CCJ can overrule a decision of a
national court as to whether or not a member-state or citizen can bring a case before the CCJ.
Therefore, national appellate courts no longer possess sole power to grant leave for a case to be
heard before the CCJ. Furthermore, the CCJ also possesses the jurisdiction to overturn judgments of
the lower courts. Chapter 5 offers an in-depth overview of the structures, competences and rulings140
of the CCJ under both its final and appellate jurisdictions.
The Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA): between CARICOM and the EU was signed in
October 2008 and represents an agreement between the two unions which effectively binds all the
respective member-states to this agreement. The EU EPAs are the only existing economic based
treaties negotiated on a regional platform between two unions. 
After the creation of the CSME and the CCJ, the EPA constitutes the third significant step in
the process of institution building in CARICOM, and therefore represents a further deepening of
regional integration. It covers extensive provisions for the full liberalization and market freedom of
goods and services in both unions. It touches on commitments of the CSME, and essentially extends
most of these provisions to the EU. In so doing, the EPA opens up the liberalized CARICOM
140 Rulings up until December 2013.
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markets141 to  the  EU  and  vice  versa.  It  also  imposes  new  regional  institutional  structures  on
CARICOM member-states because by establishing new institutions in CARICOM to oversee its
implementation. These institutions are entrenched in the EPA, and established with the signing of
the EPA. 
In comparison with the EPAs of the other unions of the ACP groupings, the CARICOM-EU
EPA represents the most extensive and highest level of commitment between the EU and any other
union142. The CARICOM-EU EPA also exemplifies a new form of regional alliance, and a new form
of trade association. The bilateral agreements between two countries, or multilateral agreements
among a group of countries,  have been replaced by a  new form of  regionalism and institution
building.  This new type of partnership overshadows any previous economic agreement between
CARICOM and other countries, including the USA. It also testifies to the high level of economic
commitment and market liberalization among CARICOM countries, as such an extensive agreement
could have only been negotiated under the presence of internal market liberalization. Therefore, if
the CSME was not in place, it would have been highly unlikely that the EPA could have been so
extensively negotiated; and that the current level of commitment could have been achieved143. The
commitments  of  the  EPA,  including  its  extensive  provisions  for  trade  liberalization  between
CARICOM and the EU, were accepted by CARICOM because most were already present in its
internal  market.  The  CSME  exhibits  a  high  level  of  market  liberalization  and  regionalism.
Disparities in the negotiation process arose mainly from achieving a consensus on commitments to
the EU. The signing of the EPA therefore reveals information on the level and depth of integration
in CARICOM, as Chapter 6 will explore further. 
The creation of the CSME, establishment of the CCJ, and the negotiation and signing of the
EPA thus mark the most recent cycle of increased integration in CARICOM.144
141 The CSME liberalizes the CARICOM markets, and harmonizes market regulations. The EPA extends some of these
liberalizations to the EU.
142 Information as of December 2013. Refer to the EU's website on the EPA at 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/september/tradoc_144912.pdf for further updates on the statuses of the 
EU EPA.
143 Negotiations with other ACP groupings reveal that parties are reluctant to liberalize trade with the EU based on the 
necessity to also liberalize internal markets. For more information see for example 
http://www.stopepa.de/img/EPAs_Briefing.pdf  .
144 As mentioned in Chapter One, the negotiations of the EPA and the commitments represent a new geographical as-
pect of CARICOM, and reflect the commitments of the CSME.
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2.4 Examination of CARICOM
The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas outlines the institutional arrangement of CARICOM. It
makes  a  distinction between 'organs'  and 'bodies'.  The  'principal  organs'  of  CARICOM are  the
Conference of Heads of Government and its bureau (the Conference), and the Community Council
of Ministers (the Council), these organs are assisted by the Secretariat, the administrative institution
of CARICOM.
Article  10  of  the  Revised  Treaty  further  outlines  the  supporting  organs  that  assist  the
Conference and the Council  to perform their  functions.  These are  the Council  for Finance and
Planning;  the  Council  for  Trade  and  Economic  Development;  the  Council  for  Foreign  and
Community Relations; the Council for Human and Social Development. 
In  addition  to  these  institutions,  Article  18  of  the  Revised  Treaty  also  establishes  three
“Bodies of the Community”, namely: the Legal Affairs Committee; the Budget Committee and the
Committee of Central Bank Governors.
Article 18 of the Revised Treaty additionally confers the power to establish “as they deem
necessary, other bodies of the community” to the organs of the community. To this end, the organs
established  The  Caribbean  Regional  Negotiation  Machinery  (CRNM)145,  which  negotiated  the
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between CARICOM and the EU. The Conference also
established a non-active Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians, a deliberative and
consultative body whose members are elected representatives of CARICOM citizens. 
2.4.1 The Conference of Heads of Government 
As one of the “principal organs”146 of the community, the Conference's main objective, as laid
out in the Revised Treaty, is to “determine and provide policy direction for the Community”.147 The
Revised Treaty further grants the conference exclusive powers to establish institutions, and issue
directions about which policies the Community can pursue, and the manner in which they can be
pursued.  Moreover,  the said article  confers authority on the Conference to admit  members and
observers to the union. The Conference also possesses the final authority on concluding treaties
with external unions or member-states,  and determining the community’s policies and financial
affairs.148
145 Now called the Office of Trade Negotiations (OTN), which is incorporated into the Secretariat. 
146 Treaty of Chaguaramas Article 6 delineates 2 principal organs, the Conference and the Council.
147 Article 12 of the Revised Treaty.
148 Essentially, any order of business related to finance, policy, the inclusion of new members, and deepening of the 
community, falls within the scope of the responsibilities of the Conference. 
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The decisions of the Conference are only made after an affirmative vote by all the members149.
The heads of state vote according to country preferences, acting as direct representatives for their
individual  countries.150 These  characteristics  of  the  Conference  define  CARICOM  as  an
intergovernmental union, since the heads of government, who are directly elected by the citizens of
the member-states, are also the members of the Conference. 
2.4.2 The Council of Ministers
Article 13 of the Revised Treaty,151 defines the Community Council of Ministers (the Council)
as consisting “of Ministers responsible for community affairs and any other minister designated by
the member-states in their absolute discretion”. Among other responsibilities, the article gives the
Council the responsibility the obligation to plan and coordinate economic integration, functional
cooperation, and external relations; and to ensure the operation and development of the CSME.
Similar  to  the  Conference,  the  members  of  the  Council  are  designated  at  the  absolute
discretion of the member-states. The decisions of the Council, like those of the Conference, require
an affirmative vote from the members who reflect the intergovernmental aspect of both organs. 
2.4.3 The Secretariat
The  Secretariat  is  specified  by  Article  23  of  the  Revised  Treaty  as:  “the  principal
administrative  organ  of  the  community”152 and  consists  of  the  secretary-general  and staff.  The
article further outlines that the Secretary General and his administration shall perform their duties
independently of government, member-states, or 'any other authority'. This precludes member-states
from advising,  instructing,  and/or  influencing the  Secretariat.  Paragraph 5  of  Article  23  of  the
Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, additionally affords the Secretariat some autonomy, as it dictates
that:  “member-states (should) undertake to respect the exclusively international character of the
149 Additionally, Article 27 also makes it clear that member-states, whose contributions to the regular budget of the 
Community are in arrears for more than two years, shall not have the right to vote. At the same time, Article 27 also
delineates that a simple majority constitutes a quorum and Article 28 of said treaty also declares that non-participa-
tion in voting procedures is deemed to be an abstention and furthermore abstentions do not impair the validity of 
the decisions. Therefore, failing/withholding/abstaining from voting on issues does not hinder the passing of same 
issue through a quorum. Additionally, Article 28 also declares that “parties to a dispute or against which sanctions 
are being considered shall not have the right to vote on the issue falling to be determined”. Moreover, Article 5 pre-
scribes that the Conference may, by majority decision, modify the status of a member-state; this therefore includes 
the possibility of dealing so when the member-state is absent from proceeding under Article 28. As such, mem-
ber-states can be 'voted out' of the union without being present.
150  CARICOM often suggests that all social, economic and political decisions of CARICOM reflect the decisions of 
the member-states. 
151 Distinction made between the Original Treaty of Chaguaramas 1973, and the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas 2002,
based on the provisions they make. 
152 Also in Article 15 of the Original Treaty. The Revised Treaty did not make any changes to the provisions of the 
Original Treaty regarding to the roles and functions of the Secretariat. 
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responsibilities  of  the  Secretary-General  and staff  and  shall  not  seek  to  influence  them in  the
discharge of their responsibilities”. However, since the Secretary General can only be appointed by
the Conference on the recommendation of the Council for a term of 5 years, his/her position is
reliant on the Conference and the Council. Theoretically, the Council and the Conference can and
do have an impact on the selection of the Secretariat, and its work. Additionally, paragraph 6 and 7
of Article 23 imposes the will of the Conference and Council on the Secretariat; they declare that
“the Conference shall approve the staff regulations governing the operations of the Secretariat …
and … The Community Council shall approve the financial regulations governing the operations of
the  Secretariat”. Article  23  also  requires  that  the  staff  of  the  Secretariat  have  an  'equitable'
geographical distribution.  
2.4.4 The Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians (ACCP)
At  the  tenth  meeting  of  the  Conference,  it  was  agreed  that  an  Assembly  of  Caribbean
Community Parliamentarians would be established as a deliberative body to deepen the integration
movement153.  Article  3  of  the  agreement  establishing  the  ACCP  defines  its  membership  as
consisting of “representatives of member-states and Associate Members elected by their Parliaments
or appointed in such manner from their membership as the Parliaments shall decide”. It further adds
that  each  member-state  is  entitled  to  four  representative,  and associate  member-state  two.  The
ACCP is not directly appointed by the electors of the member-states, rather, members of the ACCP
are elected by the national parliaments of the member-states154. Article 4 of the agreement defined
the objectives of the ACCP. These include the mandate:
 to  involve  CARICOM  nationals  in  the  process  of  unifying  and  strengthening  the  
community; 
 to provide opportunities for involving CARICOM nationals in integration issues;
 to  provide  a  forum for  CARICOM national  to  make  their  views  known through  their 
representatives; 
 to deliberate  on and encourage the adoption of a common policy on economic,  social,  
cultural, scientific and legal matters by the CARICOM member-states.
Article 5 of the agreement lists the functions and powers of the ACCP as being a “deliberative and
consultative body for the discussion of policies, programs and other matters falling within the scope
153 Agreement Establishing the Assembly of Caribbean Community Parliamentarians introduction. 
154 Including elections from both the rulings and opposition parties. 
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of the Treaty”. Article 5 additionally confers the ACCP the power to make recommendations to the
Conference,  the  Council,  institutions,  associate  institutions,  and  the  Secretariat;  to  request
information  and  reports  from  the  councils  and  bodies;155 and  to  “discuss  and  make
recommendations on any matter within the scope of the objectives of the community”. Article 6 of
the Agreement states that the ACCP must meet “at least once in every year”. It also states that
decisions of the ACCP shall be made by a majority vote. Member-states were left with the full
obligation to ratify and implement the ACCP156. 
2.4.5 The Office of Trade Negotiations (OTN)
One of the main goals of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy is to enable the region to
compete in the global market. Due to the vital importance of trade negotiations in fulfilling this
goal, and given the limited human and financial resources of CARICOM, the Caribbean Regional
Negotiation Machinery (CRNM) was created in 1997 as an external arm of CARICOM. It was
entrusted with the coordination, development, and execution of all external trade negotiations of the
community at  multilateral,  inter-regional  (EPAs),  and bilateral  levels.  In  2009, the CRNM was
incorporated as an office within the CARICOM Secretariat and was renamed the Office of Trade
Negotiations (the Office). The Office consists of157 a 'Technical Working Groups' and a 'College of
Lead and Alternate Lead Negotiators', comprising individuals with expertise in various negotiating
subjects and trade-related disciplines including diplomats of member-states, CARICOM dignitaries,
member-state ministers of government, regional specialists, and consultant ministry advisers of the
member-states.158
The  OTN  assists  foreign  and  trade  ministers,  together  with  their  staffs  and  their
representatives in centers such as Brussels (EU) and Geneva (World Trade Organization [WTO]), in
integrating their efforts into common regional negotiating positions. The process of the external
negotiation by the OTN is achieved firstly through national and then through regional consultations.
It reports to the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED) which also defines the
mandate for its negotiations. 
155 Outlined in the above section.
156 The Agreement was signed by member-states between 19 February 1992 (Barbados) and 6 July 1996 (Montserrat 
and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines).
157 At the same time, CARICOM neither delineates clear rules and regulations on how members of the technical work-
ing groups and the college of negotiators are elected, nor does it specify which NGOs are involved in the negotia-
tion process. 
158 For an exhaustive list of the college of negotiators, visit http:www.crnm.org  . Note: the process of choosing the col-
lege negotiators is not addressed there. Although the OTN is incorporated in CARICOM, there are no amendments
or clear rules or regulations on election of members by CARICOM, as is typically done in CARICOM.
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The above overview of the organs and bodies of CARICOM reveals that the structure of
CARICOM is intergovernmental. Key officials of CARICOM are elected and appointed to national
positions  by  the  citizens  of  the  member-states.  These  national  positions  are  then  extended
regionally; there are no direct elections in CARICOM.159 Additionally, the bodies in CARICOM,
which are elected by CARICOM officials, are given limited power and effect on the member-states,
and work with the competences of the organs of CARICOM,160 with the exception of the CCJ.
In commenting on the organizational structure of CARICOM, Jordan (2003:4) suggests that
CARICOM lacks the institutional framework necessary to function effectively. According to Jordan
(2003:4) “the weakness in the CARICOM Treaty is that … the CARICOM agreement fails to create
an effective executive institution, such as the European Commission, to oversee the implementation
of  the  Treaty.” Instead  of  an  institution  that  monitors  the  implementation  of  the  Treaty,  the
CARICOM Secretariat's  function  is  that  of  an administrator  and think-tank within CARICOM.
Additionally, the above description of the Council suggests that it oversees the implementation of
policies in the member-states.  It  is not specified as to how this  monitoring should be achieved
however, and the Council's tasks are further limited to implementing only its own decisions, and not
those  of  other  institutions.  Therefore,  neither  the  Council  nor  the  Secretariat  implements
CARICOM policies in the member-states. Thus, there is no executive institution delineated by the
Revised Treaty to discharge or oversee the implementation of both internal and external agreements
in CARICOM161.
2.4.6 Other Councils and Bodies of CARICOM
As mentioned above,  the  Revised  Treaty of  Chaguaramas identifies  and outlines  specific
councils  and bodies,  and their  respective  responsibilities.  Notable  councils  are  the  Council  for
Finance and Planning; Trade and Economic Development; Foreign and Community Relations; and
Human and Social Development. These councils consist of the ministers of the respective member-
states  responsible  for  each  portfolio.  Noteworthy bodies  are  the  Legal  Affairs  Committee,  the
159 Therefore, there are no CARICOM elections by the citizens of the member-states; rather, the representatives who
are elected in the national and general elections in the member-states are those that fill the portfolios of the organs
and bodies, except for the CCJ and the CARICOM Secretariat. 
160 As the section below will reveal, the main  supranational  institution in CARICOM is the CCJ. It  interprets the
CARICOM Treaties, and acts as a final appellate court for CARICOM member-states. There is however no single
institution that enforces the judgments of the CCJ in CARICOM member-states. Though the CCJ might possess
some  de jure sovereignty over member-states, it lacks  de facto rule due to the unclear enforcement measures in
CARICOM. Therefore, the member-states operate as politically sovereign states in CARICOM. 
161 This includes those rulings of the CCJ, which will be fully addressed later on in this chapter and also in the conclu-
sion.
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Budget Committee and the Committee of Central Bank Governors. The Legal Affairs Committee is
made up of the ministers responsible for Legal Affairs or the Attorney General of the member-
states,  and is  responsible  for  providing the organs and bodies,  either  on request  or on its  own
initiative, with advice on treaties, international legal issues, the harmonization of community laws
and other legal matters; it only possesses an advisory position on legal matters of the Community.
The Budget Committee is also made up of the member-states’ senior officials; whose role is to
examine the draft  budget and work program of the community prepared by the Secretariat  and
submit recommendations to the Community Council. The Committee of Central Bank Governors
consists of the governors or heads of the central banks of the member-states, or their nominees. The
Committee's  task  is  limited  to  making  recommendations  on  matters  relating  to  monetary  co-
operation,  payment  arrangements,  free  movement  of  capital,  integration  of  capital  markets,
monetary unions and any other related matters referred to it by the organs of the community.
2.5 Overview of Regional Integration in CARICOM
2.5.1 The Impact of External Factors on CARICOM
The historical account of regional  integration above reveals that  there have been decisive
external influences on the integration process in the Caribbean since colonization. These endeavors
were initially conceived as cost-cutting measures related to the budgetary constraints in overseeing
the small islands individually. Initially, regional integration was also seen as a means of alleviating
the strain of governing the micro-states in the Caribbean individually. Revealing both economic and
political motivations and characteristics of integration. 
Regional integration in CARICOM, continued to be influenced by external events after the
Caribbean islands gained their  independence from colonial rule.  After colonization,  advances in
integration perfectly aligned with external events. That is to say, the major cycles and advances in
integration in the Caribbean (CARIFTA, CARICOM, CSME and the EPA) all coincided and were a
direct reaction to external events and external pressures. 
For example, the possibility of UK entry into the EEC in 1961 was the impetus that drove
Caribbean leaders to form CARIFTA; which came into effect in 1965. The second application of the
UK to the EEC in 1971 also provided stimulation for the negotiation and signing of the Treaty of
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Chaguaramas, establishing CARICOM in 1973.162
Further impacts of European integration on CARICOM were seen in the mid- and late 1980s,
with the European Commission's White Paper in 1985 and the incorporation of the 1986's Single
European Act in the Treaty of Rome. CARICOM responded to these events with a proposal for a
single market and economy in the late 1980s with a prescribed date of implementation set for the
early 1990s. 
Economic integration in CARICOM is also a direct reaction to globalization. Jones (2004:61)
argues that “the region and its affairs were increasingly being drawn into the international scheme
of things where the very barriers on economic transaction which the region had imposed on itself
were being dismantled”. 
The creation of the CSME is a reaction by CARICOM to integration in the EU, as well as
other  global  events.  For  example,  the  preamble  of  the  Revised  Treaty of  Chaguaramas,  which
establishes  the  CSME,  states  that  the  member-states  of  CARICOM  in  “recognizing  that
globalization and liberalization have important implications for international competitiveness (have)
resolved to establish conditions which would facilitate access by their nationals to the collective
resources of the Region on a non-discriminatory basis”. Economic integration in the Caribbean is
therefore utilized as a means of increasing bargaining power for negotiations with external countries
and blocs. In attempting to extend its regional political clout, the Conference actively chooses to
integrate and liberalize CARICOM internal markets. These attempts give rise to further actions of
deepening integration.163
Suggestions of external influence can also be seen in the political structures of the Caribbean
Islands.  Structurally,  the  internal  legal/political  make-up  of  the  CARICOM  member-states  “is
patterned on the Westminster model of parliamentary democracy and all countries retain allegiance
to the British sovereign as head of the state except Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago which have
become republics”164 The Privy Council in England, remains the court of last resort till date, for
most CARICOM countries who have not yet ratified the Caribbean Court of Justice as their final
appellate court.
Therefore, although internal economic and political factors are often highlighted as the main
162 During his process of deepening in CARICOM, there was the hope from larger Anglophone countries such as Ja-
maica that they might become associate members in the EEC due to ties with the UK. This anticipation saw some 
members stalling integration efforts in the Caribbean. 
163 This point of 'spill-over' will be discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapters.
164 Axline (1979:64).
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influences for the process of integration in CARICOM, external factors also play a decisive role in
the integration process.
2.5.2 Political Integration in CARICOM
The steps towards regional integration in CARICOM ultimately resulted in the creation of a
single market, and attempts to create a single economy, i.e., the CSME; and although the process of
integration in CARICOM is economic, it also possesses a political characteristic.
To  prevent  disintegration,  the  Revised  Treaty  explicitly  prohibits  member-states  from
introducing “any new restrictions on the provision of  services in the Community by nationals of
other member-states except as otherwise provided in this Treaty”. In liberalizing its internal market,
CARICOM introduces  Articles  that  initiates  political  and legal  integration.  The Revised Treaty
addresses  external  relations  and  foreign  policy  coordination,  which  are  critical  to  politics  in
CARICOM member-state; and are “often referred to as the second pillar of integration after the
CSME”.165 The Revised Treaty calls for member-states to collaborate with “the Council for Human
and Social Development to adopt measures to develop the Community's human resources which
shall,  inter  alia,  support  its  thrust  toward  international  competitiveness  in  the  development,
production and delivery of goods and services”. Moreover, in Article 8 of the Revised Treaty, there
is a 'Most Favored Nation Treatment clause', which states that “subject to the provisions of this
Treaty, each member-state shall, with respect to any rights covered by this Treaty, accord to another
member-state treatment no less favorable than that accorded to: (a) a third member-state; or (b) third
States”. These “fail safe” provisions in the Revised Treaty essentially ensure some insulation of the
CARICOM market and foster trust among the Community members. They further reflect political
motivations and political influences in the process of regional integration in CARICOM.
The Revised Treaty creates “the right of establishment, the right to provide services, and the
right to move capital in the Community”166. To facilitate these rights, the treaty also dictates that the
community is required to agree on  “common  standards and measures for accreditation or when
necessary for the mutual recognition of diplomas, certificates and other evidence of qualifications of
the nationals of the member-states in order to facilitate access to, and engagement in, employment
and non-wage-earning activities in the Community”. In establishing this policy, the provisions of
the CSME touch on political issues. 
Issues such as nationalism and nationalistic principles, pressure groups, and other elements of
165 Jessen and Vignoles (2005:3).
166 Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, Article 30.
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the  CARICOM  political  landscape  defer,  obstruct  policies  and  impede  the  overall  process  of
regional integration, therefore adding to the problems affecting regional integration in CARICOM.
The process is  often viewed by member-states as relinquishing newly found sovereignty for an
ineffective regional consortium. Prevailing nationalistic sentiments in CARICOM member-states
add to skepticism and distrust of regional cooperation and institution building. Essentially, regional
integration in CARICOM is preconceived, and to some extent, reflects a 'top down' approach, where
agreements are initiated and finalized by political élite, at times against popular choice. 
This can be reflected in Article 12 of The Revised Treaty, which addresses the competences of
the Conferences, states that “the Conference shall be the supreme Organ of the Community”. This is
a new inclusion, as the Original Treaty only detailed the functions and powers of the Conference,
and  did  not  define  it  as  being  the  supreme  organ.  This  compounds  the  idea  that  although
CARICOM has moved from a common market to a single economic space, political ideologies are
still crucial in CARICOM. 
2.5.3 Integration among CARICOM countries
Interestingly,  There  are  two  'streams'  of  integration  in  CARICOM.  The  CSME  and  the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS). The OECS is a nine member group167 of eastern
Caribbean island embedded in CARICOM. They share an economic union, with a single financial
and  economic  space  characterized  by  a  harmonized  monetary  and  fiscal  policy;  and  the  free
movement  of  goods,  persons  and  capital.  Moreover,  the  OECS  have  harmonized  agriculture,
education, energy, environment, health, tourism and trade policies. They additionally share a single
currency168 which is overseen by the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank; and a common high court and
court of appeal.169 
Integration in CARICOM is used as a means of achieving 'economic development'. Owing to
the small size of the region, the resources are limited and CARICOM therefore it is dependent on
external input for production. The constraints of small size also work against the coordination of
foreign policy in a union. These small public administrations possess limited resources with which
to  conduct  international  negotiations,  resulting  in  limited  opportunities  and  a  biased  outcome
against  CARICOM  when  participating  in  bilateral  negotiations  and  inter-community  trade.
167 The group consists of Antigua and Barbuda, Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St Kitts and Nevis,
St Lucia and St Vincent and the Grenadines. Anguilla and the British Virgin - See more at: 
http://www.oecs.org/about-the-oecs/who-we-are/about-oecs#sthash.AmSI1RiA.dpuf. Last visited June 30 2015.
168 Eastern Caribbean Dollar.
169 Like other CARICOM countries not subjected to the jurisdiction of the CCJ final appeals go to the Privy Council in
the UK.
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Considering this situation,  CARICOM's small size forces its member-states to pool resources and
integrate economically in order to coordinate foreign policy and to cooperate functionally. 
The  CSME  is  an  attempt  to  deepen  economic  integration  in  CARICOM.  However,  the
implementation of the CSME has been challenged by numerous obstacles. These include the level
of  participation  of  CARICOM  members  and  the  ratification  speed  of  treaties  and  directives.
Additionally,  regional  integration  in  CARICOM  can  be  viewed  as  counterproductive  in  some
instances170;  for  example,  in  the  1970s,  after  the  Montserrat  paper,  the  MDCs171 asserted  that
integration  was  preventing  individual  economic  development  in  favor  of  slow  regional
development. Regulatory fee and the assistance in the development of the LDCs, were some of the
requirements that were viewed with disdain and opposed by CARICOM member-states CARICOM
itself admits that there has been a profound difference in the importance of the Caribbean regional
market  for different  CARICOM member-states.  It  accepts  that  up until  recently,  the process of
integration in CARICOM has been:
affected by variations among member-states in the importance of the regional market for
their economics. For Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, CARICOM is a significant
market, absorbing 45 percent and 22 percent, respectively, of their total merchandise
exports  in the past  five years.  For Belize,  Jamaica and Suriname, it  is  not,  in these
countries the share of intra-regional in total exports ranges from 5-7 percent. (Jessen and
Vignoles 2005:10). 
During the process of integration in CARICOM, economic and social underdevelopment have been
addressed through regional policies. However, not all the countries in CARICOM demonstrate the
same level of integration, nor have they implemented all the CSME mandates. Member-states in
CARICOM may opt in and out of some sections of the CSME, and from external trade agreements
between CARICOM and other unions or countries. For example, during the process of negotiation
of the Economic Partnership Agreement between CARICOM and the EU, Guyana agreed to sign
only a part of the agreement, and Haiti decided to opt out of the agreement entirely. CARICOM
member-states can effectively define their level of participation in the CSME, or their participation
170 For more information see Onnis (2011).
171 The terms MDC (Most Developed Countries) and LCD (Lesser Developed Countries) were used in the Original 
treaty to distinguish among CARICOM countries with reference to their economic capacities.
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in regional agreements, though there is evidence of coercion.172
At the same time, trade and integration disputes such as the ‘onion rows’ and ‘textile wars’ in
CARICOM reveal a new rise in the importance of regional trade in CARICOM. The additional
polarization  and  specialization  in  CARICOM  countries  reflect  the  effects  of,  and  reaction  to
integration.  The observation  that  during  CARIFTA (and in the  formative  years  of  CARICOM)
disputes  were  centered  on  the  benefits  of  integration,  whereas  currently  CSME  disputes  are
generally centered on which country is profiting more from integration, reveals not only a shift of
emphasis but also in the values of CARICOM member-states.
Regional  integration  in  CARICOM  aloe  reflects  some  form  of  institutional  deficit.  The
COTED is the institution in CARICOM responsible  for “the promotion of trade and economic
development of the Community”173 which includes the obligation to “promote the development and
oversee  the  operation  of  the  CSME”.174 The  membership  of  the  COTED consists  of  ministers
designated by the respective country in CARICOM. Therefore, overseeing and implementing the
CSME  is  mandated  to  the  same  member-states  that  are  bound  to  its  provisions.  CARICOM
possesses  limited  or  no  supranational  force  over  member-states  in  addressing  issues  of  non-
compliance. For example, there is no appointed body in CARICOM that possesses  de facto rule
over the member-states with regard to implementing the provisions of the CSME. The CCJ is the
sole institution that interprets the Revised Treaty and decides whether member-states are in breach
of the said treaty; however, it possesses limited  de facto rule over the member-states. Therefore,
even if the CCJ rules that member-states should comply and fines them for breaches, there is a) no
institution to oversee these rulings,  and b) no provisions for how to deal with non-compliance.
Compliance in the CSME is thus based on an intangible rule of law or an honorary code of the
member-states. Member-states that breach CSME provisions are directed by the CCJ to rectify the
situation are left to their own decisions and inclinations as to whether and when they comply. 
The secretariat could be an answer to addressing de facto rule in CARICOM. However, it is
preoccupied  with  administrative  issues,  and lacks  administrative  support  among member-states.
Moreover, the:
secretariat’s authority is limited to requesting info and submitting reports. Members are
172 For evidence of coercion, see the section on the negotiation of the EPA in Chapter 6.
173 The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Article 15 Paragraph 2.
174 The Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Article 15 Paragraph 2 (a).
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allowed to implement agreements at their discretion and although the secretariat is the
only organ of the CARICOM capable of monitoring and enforcing community decisions
and initiatives, it  has no legal authority to do so. This inconsistency has handicapped
efforts at deepening integration. (Storr 2004:14)
It is however acknowledged that:
despite the slow progress in the formal integration process, there is anecdotal evidence
of  growing  'real'  economic  integration  among  CARICOM  countries.  This  is  most
evident in the financial sector … where in the face of growing external competition with
a lot of liquidity in their own market, Trinidadian companies are seeking to consolidate
their positions in their own market through investments in other Caribbean countries
financial institutions. It is also happening in other sectors of the economy, though to a
lesser degree. (Jessen and Vignoles 2005:35) 
Therefore although, integration in CARICOM has stalled and is characteristically slow, this could in
fact be seen as a part of the process of integration, i.e. of cycles of change followed by those of rest.
There might therefore be no real failure of integration in the region, or failure of the region to
integrate. Rather, there are slow starts and ebb and flows of integration. However, these arguments
do not  answer deficits  such as  the limited regional  de facto powers,  and other  implementation
deficiencies. There still remains the need for an institution or an office to provide such a service.175
2.6 The Study of Regional Integration in CARICOM
The study of the field of regional integration in the Caribbean has developed exponentially
over the last two decades and is relatively extensive, including literature in the economic, political,
and social fields.176
175 For suggestions refer to the section addressing possible solutions in Chapter 7.
176 In the economic field, for example, there is literature on the global economic crisis and CARICOM, on the Eco-
nomic Partnership Agreement and on the benefits and disadvantages of regional integration. Research in political 
science includes colonial studies, political and historical development, democracy or the lack thereof, and 
sovereignty. Other social research fields include overviews and examinations of media and telecommunications, ge-
ography, culture and development. 
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There is  however,  one research area which is  lacking in CARICOM. Theorizing regional
integration is not a new idea,  indeed it  is  essential  to the study of regional integration.  Yet,  as
highlighted in Chapter 1, in CARICOM, this area of study has been non-existent. 
Etzioni (1962) has long since proposed a 'Paradigm for the Study of Political Unification'. In
his paradigm he advanced the notion that in analyzing any integrative processes it is necessary to
focus on factors such as the state of international relations and the various political units at the time
of an  increase in  integration;  the  factors  that  enhance  hinder  unification;  the forces  utilized to
control the process; the pattern of unification; and the progression of sectoral integration.177 
These  factors  highlight  that  any  in-depth  analysis  of  regional  integration  in  CARICOM
requires an examination of a system based on actors and society, instead of popular state-centric
observations. 
Looking  back  at  regional  integration  in  the  Caribbean  at  the  time  this  information  was
published, properties had negative implications for regional integration in Caribbean.178 There were,
for example, only very small traces of unit integration in the West Indies Federation, with a limited
will  to  integrate  politically,  especially  since  the  British  colonies  were  hopeful  for  political
independence.  There  were  also  limited  analytical  properties,  in  terms  of  heterogeneity  and
unification. Additionally, indicators such as per capita income and land size, as explained above and
in  the  previous  chapter,  proved  to  be  hindrances  to  political  integration.  The  environmental
properties in the Caribbean additionally pointed to the unlikeness of successful integration under the
West Indies Federation. This is because mountainous states such as those in the Caribbean, which
are far apart from each other with limited means of transport and communication, are less easily
integrated than countries that are geographically close and economically dependent on each other. 
In  1965,  Etzioni  published  'Political  Unification:  A Comparative  Study  of  Leaders  and
Forces'. In applying these ideas, the West Indies Federation is presented as also lacking all three
basic  forces  required  for  success.  There  was  no  coercive  power  to  enforce  decisions;  limited
economic clout with regards to, for example, taxation; furthermore, there was a lack of 'identitive
assets'. 
Since his seminal works, there have been fundamental changes in both the development and
process of regional integration in the Caribbean; and in theorizing regional integration. 
Specifically, the West Indies Federation collapsed, and regional integration in the Caribbean
177 Etzioni (1962:47).
178 The West Indies Federation.
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took on an economic focus, reflecting institution building with internal market liberalization and
external borders. Furthermore, factors such as transportation and telecommunications, which proved
to  be  hindrances  to  integration  in  the  mid-1950s,  were  developed  in  the  Caribbean  and  have
contributed to creating a more viable network for trade. 
Furthermore, advances in the Internet, communications and telecommunications (ICT), and
transportation sectors in CARICOM create the possibility for the isolated and insular Caribbean
countries to trade with each other and as a 'unit' with other parties. This is evident from the signing
of the European Partnership Agreement with the EU.  This shift  of integration from political  to
economic can be seen in the creation of the CARIFTA, CARICOM, and CSME. 
These structural  and institutional changes have further  created a  new climate for regional
integration. These three variables offer new insights into regional integration in the Caribbean. They
provide new modules with which we can examine and analyze CARICOM. They also offer new
prospects  for  a  theoretical  application  in  CARICOM,  especially  considering  that  the  theories
themselves have evolved over the last 50 years.
Moreover,  the  field  of  regional  integration  has  seen  the  creation  of  theories  specifically
adapted to analyze the process of regional political and economic integration, especially that in the
European  Union.  New  terms  such  as  'spill-over',  'spill-around'  and  'spill-back'  give  a  clearer
understanding of the process of regional integration. Furthermore, identifying the main actors in
integration, such as political élite, creates clear independent variables for a broad analysis. 
This area of research offers the perfect laboratory in which to extrapolate both independent
and dependent variables; and to analyze their impact on integration. It is possible to utilize EU
centric theories to study the process of integration in CARICOM with limited transverse issues
and/or effects.
53
Chapter 3: The Theory of Neofunctionalism 
Chapter 3: The Theory of Neofunctionalism 
3.1 Introduction
The  objective  of  this  chapter  is  to  validate  the  theoretical  foundation  of  this  thesis.  It
introduces the theory of Neofunctionalism as the most viable mechanism for the first study of the
process  of  regional  integration  the  CARICOM,  while  acknowledging  and  rebutting  proposed
limitations by scholars. It explains the concept of Neofunctionalism, paying close attention to its
emphasis on institutional change, structural design and change, and to the notion of spill-over. The
chapter additionally investigates and subsequently questions the abandonment of Neofunctionalism
by scientists in the field of regional political integration. It also compares this abandonment with the
comparative weaknesses of other theories of regional integration. It then explores the rebirth179 of
Neofunctionalism and rationalizes it as a viable theory for the study of CARICOM. 
3.2 An Examination of Neofunctionalism
3.2.1 Neofunctionalism Explained 
Niemann  (2006:12)  proposes  that  “Neofunctionalism  is  the  most  refined,  ambitious  and
criticized  theory  of  regional  integration”.  Developed  in  the  1950s  and  1960s,  the  theory  of
Neofunctionalism “finds its intellectual antecedents at the juncture between functionalist, federalist
and communications theories, while also drawing indirectly from the ‘group theorists’ of American
politics”.180 Like  the  theory  of  Functionalism,  Neofunctionalism  proposes  that  the  process  of
regional integration is defined by functional consequences. However, it differs from functionalism
by proposing that functional gains are not the only factors of integration. It predicts that in addition
to functional gains and consequences, there are other substantial factors which are in fact imperative
to initiating integration. These factors consist of both internal and external components. Niemann
and  Schmitter  (2009:46)  additionally  suggest  that  the  theory  of  Neofunctionalism  “combined
functionalist mechanisms with federalist goals. Like functionalism, Neofunctionalism emphasizes
the  mechanisms  of  technocratic  decision-making,  incremental  change  and  learning  processes”.
Other main points of disjunction between the theory of Functionalism and Neofunctionalism are:
179 In doing so it presents the process of growth, death and rebirth of the theory of Neofunctionalism.
180 Niemann, A. & Schmitter, P. (2009:46).
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whereas  functionalists  held  that  form,  scope  and  purpose  of  an  organization  was
determined  by  the  task  that  it  was  designed  to  fulfill,  Neofunctionalists  attached
considerable importance to the autonomous influence of supranational institutions and
the emerging role of organized interests. (Niemann and Schmitter 2009:46)
Additionally,  whilst  functionalism did not limit  integration to any territorial  area,  the theory of
Neofunctionalism  focused  on  integration  at  the  regional  level.  Moreover,  the  theory  of
functionalism  “attached  importance  to  changes  in  popular  support,  Neofunctionalists  privilege
changes in élite attitudes”.181
Neofunctionalism further proposes that after the initiation of integration, additional factors
such  as  politicization  influence  and  shape  the  process  of  integration.  It  identifies  a  spill-over
dynamic  in  the  process  of  integration  and  attributes  decision-making  to  multi-actors.
Neofunctionalism therefore shifts away from a state-centric approach and presents a multivariate
approach  to  analyzing  the  process  of  integration.  An  in-depth  examination  of  the  theory  of
Neofunctionalism is given below. Specific postulations of the theory of Neofunctionalism are that: 
Regional integration is o  ngoing and evolving:  the theory of Neofunctionalism rests on the
basic premises, that regional integration is an ongoing process; is not a mere result of conscious
choice; and is unintended, indirect, and inevitable. One of the theory's main founders182, Haas, states
that  Neofunctionalism further  examines  community building,  portrays  integration as an upward
journey, and characterizes regional integration as not static, but always evolving, and 'becoming'
instead of 'being'. 
Influence  of  Non-State  Actors:  Schmitter,  P.  (2005:257)  suggests  that  the  theory  of
Neofunctionalism:
 
recognizes the importance of national states, especially in the foundation of regional
organizations and at subsequent moments of formal re-foundation by treaty. Yet it places
major emphasis on the role of two sets of non-state actors in providing the dynamic for
181 Niemann, A. & Schmitter, P. (2009:46).
182 Also credited to the theory of Neofunctionalism is Leon Lindberg. Whereas Haas developed his argument based on 
his examination of the European Coal and Steel Community, with a focus on functional determinants in a limited 
sector, Lindberg (1963:16) who focused on the European Economic Community proposed that “my own investiga-
tions have led me to adopt a more cautious conception of political integration, one limited to the development of de-
vices and processes for arriving at collective decisions by means other than autonomous action by national govern-
ments." Lindberg (1963:5) further advances that "it is logically and empirically possible that collective deci-
sion-making procedures involving a significant amount of political integration can be achieved without moving to-
ward a 'political community' as defined by Haas".
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further  integration:  (1)  the  ‘secretariat’ of  the  organization  involved;  and  (2)  those
interest associations and social movements that form around it at the level of the region.
(Schmitter 2005:257) 
The theory of Neofunctionalism is an approach to the question of community building; one whose:
“ontology is ‘soft’ rational choice. Social actors, in seeking to realize their value-derived
interests, will choose whatever means are made available by the prevailing democratic
order. If thwarted, they will rethink their values, redefine their interests, and choose new
means to realize them … The ontology is not materialistic: 'values' shape interests, and
'values' include many non-material elements. Haas (2004:xv)
 
Principally, Neofunctionalism is a theory of regional economic and political integration that relies
on  actors  who  use  a  utilitarian  approach  to  accomplish  their  interests.  In  this  aspect,
Neofunctionalism sees ongoing integration as creating a basis for the homogenization of interests.183
Spill-over dynamics: take on an integral role in the process of regional integration. Essentially
Neofunctionalism  proposes  that  'unintended  consequences'  of  attempts  of  regional  integration
include the scenario where cooperation in one sector creates and reveals necessities to cooperate in
other sectors. Spill-over becomes more likely with any positive movement of integration, which
results in a self perpetuating cycle.  In addition to the spill-over hypothesis of Neofunctionalism,
Schmitter (2002) adds new terminologies to the theory and angles to the process of spill-over, such
as:
• spill-around,  which  refers  to  the  ontogenesis  of  functionally  specialized  independent  
institutions
• build-up, which refers to member-states ceding authority to a supranational organization  
without expanding its competencies
• muddle-about,  which  describes  when  national  actors  attempt  to  maintain  regional  
cooperation without adjusting existing institutions
• spill-back, which describes retraction from prior commitments by member-states.184
Common regional  interests  motivate  co-operation and alliance:  the theory of  Neofunctionalism
accepts that common geographic complexities, (especially those attributable to economic, political
183 Rosamond (2013:237-254).
184 Schmitter (2002).
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and social  circumstances)  which cannot  be resolved at  the national  level,  give rise  to  regional
integration as a means to an end. These complexities can include pressure from external regions due
to standing trade agreements185 and changes in attitudes towards integration. Neofunctionalism also
proposes  that  a  typical  reaction  to  these  pressures  is  for  the  member-states  to  enter  regional
agreements as a means of addressing functional needs such as economic welfare.  Furthermore,
when political élite create these cooperative arrangements, integration becomes “self-perpetuating
through a 'spill-over' process. Through this mechanism, success in one functional area increases
demands for cooperative arrangements in other functional areas”.186 Lindberg (1963: 10) further
characterizes spill-over as “a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a
situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn
create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth”. 
Spontaneous, unplanned, yet continuous integration:  Haas’ notion of Neofunctionalism does
not  delineate  a  time  span  for  any of  the  steps  of  spill-over  and regime  building.  Under  these
circumstances,  spill-over  can  occur  spontaneously,  sporadically  or  even  calculatedly. Haas  did,
however, point out the changes/variables that would initiate/impact the spill-over process. These
are: 
an increase in economic interdependence between member-states,  crises of sufficient
magnitude due to unintended consequences, development of political competence and
autonomy  for  intervention  by  regional  bureaucrats  and  emergence  of  interest
associations capable of acting on the regional level independent of national constraints.
Schmitter (2005:258)
Integration is  a process  and not  a  result: the theory of  Neofunctionalism does  not delineate  a
specific time frame nor does it define the end result of an integration project. Rather,  it  proposes
that  the  most  probable  result  of  international  cooperation  between  sovereign  states  is  a  'self-
contained service-oriented' organization which neither affects the sovereignty of the member-states
nor expand its competencies. Furthermore, the theory suggests that “the contemporary international
system is replete with hundreds, if not thousands, of such 'regimes' at the regional and global levels.
Only in exceptional circumstances will such an initial convergence produce a collectivity that will
185 This is evident with the creation of the EPA, which was a reaction to WTO rulings on trade between the Caribbean 
and the EU.
186 Genna and Hiroi (2004:4).
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succeed in breaking out of its capsule”.187 These 'exceptional circumstances' are also unlikely to
produce a federal state. Rather, the union according to Schmitter (2002:15) “is likely to retain the
status of a ‘nonstate and nonnation’”. Neofunctionalism therefore proposes that the polity emerging
from an existing regional agreement does not have all the necessary characteristics of a nation-state
and therefore cannot be labeled as a federal state. The union would not be composed of a 'fixed
center',  more  inherently  possible,  is  a  network  of  jurisdictions  with  eventually  covariant
membership. 
Supranational dynamics: Haas (2004) places special emphasis on the point that in enabling
spill-over dynamics, supranational power conditions are in play in the theory of Neofunctionalism.
This is because the initiation and process of regional integration require a number of variables,
which when present, result in citizens “shifting more and more of their expectations to the region
and satisfying them will increase the likelihood that economic-social integration will ‘spill-over’
into political integration”.188 This leads to the conclusion that when political integration arises, it
will exhibit  some of supranationalism. With this regard, Rosamund (2005) also notes that Haas
precisely and purposely used the phrase ‘superimposed over’ instead of, for example, replacing', as
a means of signifying some form of supranational integration. Further supranational aspects of the
theory are ideas that regional integration is an:
 
intrinsically sporadic and conflictual process (and) … under conditions of democracy
and pluralistic representation, national governments will  find themselves increasingly
entangled  in  regional  pressures  and end up resolving their  conflicts  by conceding a
wider  scope  and  devolving  more  authority  to  the  regional  organizations  they  have
created. Schmitter (2005:257) 
Role of institutions and other non state actors:  unlike typical state-centric theories of integration
and international relations, the theory of Neofunctionalism focuses on the actions of bureaucrats in
shaping and driving integration. According to Neofunctionalism, member-states are not the sole
determinant of the speed and depth of integration. Bureaucrats and other 'political élite' also play a
very decisive role in the process. Furthermore, Neofunctionalism places emphasis on the process of
change in perception, where political actors are compelled to 'shift their loyalties' from a 'national
centric'  to  a  more  dynamic  'regional  collective'.  This  multivariate  approach  of  the  theory  of
187 Schmitter (2002:14).
188 Schmitter (2005:257).
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Neofunctionalism enables the concentration on both dependent and independent variables in the
process  of  regional  integration.  The  theory  focuses  and  conjointly  relies  on  the  actions  of
institutions in the process of regional integration. It presupposes that a large bulk of the steering of
integration falls  on regional  institutions that  require  not  only manpower but,  more importantly,
legitimacy to enact rules and regulations that are binding at member-state level.  
Decision cycles: Neofunctionalism additionally introduces ideas regarding so called 'decision
cycles',  which  refer  to  variations  in  the  stages  of  integration  and  characterizes  them as  being
essential  and  even  as  underlying  to  the  process  of  integration.  Decision  cycles,  which  include
'initiation',  'priming'  and  'transforming'  cycles,  determine  the  speed,  depth  and  direction  of
integration. The 'initiation cycle' signals the start of the process; the 'priming cycle',  defines the
depth of integration; and the 'transforming cycle', defines the final outcome of the process including
the redefinition of territorial scope and additional parameters. 
These  cycles  are  further  characterized  as  a  specific  wave  of  events  that  (positively  or
negatively) affect the process of regional integration. 
Schmitter (2002:31-32) also suggests that during the decision cycles “as regional processes
begin to have a greater effect, national actors may become more receptive to changing the authority
and competences of regional institutions”. He further proposes that only those regional integration
schemes that are able to succeed priming cycles are able to progress and coherently adopt functional
integrative strategies in both economic and political spheres (2002:33). 
Furthermore,  five  context-based  dependent  variables  are additionally highlighted  as
determinants of decision cycles. These are differences in: relative size/power; rates of transactions;
member internal pluralism; élite value complementarity; and extra-regional dependence.
Schmitter (2002) also points out five further necessary variables that determine whether a
union has started a priming cycle. These are: 
• equitable  distribution  of  benefits,  which  relates  to  the  perception  of  which  regional  
transaction costs are reciprocally divided among the member-states;
• regional  group  formation,  which  he  defines  as  the  “pattern  of  formation  and  active  
participation of new non-governmental or quasi-governmental organizations representing  
some or all members across national borders and designed explicitly to promote the interest 
of classes, sectors, professions and causes at the regional”189 levels;
• development  of  regional  identity,  which  relates  to  the  “extent  to  which  participants  in  
189 Schmitter (2002:27).
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regional processes come to regard such activity as rewarding due to material inducements, 
emotional-fraternal-symbolic  ties,  status  satisfactions,  etc.,  and thereby acquire  a  larger  
sense of loyalty”;190 
• regional reform-mongering, which refers to the level of engagement of actors/regional 
institutions in promoting and implementing new regional policies before the initiation of a 
politicization process;
• international Status Effect, which relates to the degree of dependence of the union and the 
individual member-states on regional institutions. 
It is further argued that during each decision cycle, additional imbalances and contradictions are
generated  and  that  these  imbalances  enable  the  union  to  avoid  ‘encapsulation’,  which  is
characterized as 'a state of stable self-maintenance'.
The  theory  of  Neofunctionalism  also  introduces  bivariate  and  multivariate  hypotheses
concerning the  Priming Cycles. The former proposes that there is a positive correlation between
changes in the size and power of national actors and equitable perception of benefits. Additionally,
the bivariate hypothesis proposes that:
the greater and more varied the changes in rates of transaction, the higher is the likely
rate of regional group formation and the more rapid is the development of a distinctive
regional identity likely to be … The greater the increase in internal pluralism within and
across member-states, the more likely are transnational groups to form and are regional
identities to emerge. (Schmitter 2002:27)
 
Other key features:  another predominant feature of the theory of Neofunctionalism is its concern
with  action and structure,  in our case the actions of the actors who are vital  to  the process of
integration and to the institutional structure of CARICOM. Neofunctionalism further pays attention
to the scope and level of integration. It proclaims that the scope of competencies given to regional
authorities directly relates to the level of integration191. Thus a limited scope signals a limited level
of integration.  Consequently, increased transactions lead to increased politicization, which in turn
leads to a deepening of integration.
As proposed in Chapter 1, the theory of Neofunctionalism can be viewed as a general (non
190 Schmitter (2002:27).
191 An application of the theory of Neofunctionalism to CARICOM provides the possibility to focus on regional com-
petencies (through analyzing treaties) and their effect on integration. 
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Euro-centric) theory of regional political integration, a quality which is essential for the present
analysis of CARICOM. Therefore, in this chapter, Neofunctionalism will be read and analyzed as a
general theory of regional integration.
3.2.2 The Proclaimed 'Obsolescence of Neofunctionalism'
Wolf  (2002:29)  argues  that  “no  other  theory  (has)  experienced  more  funerals  than
Neofunctionalism”. Moreover:
no  theory  of  regional  integration  has  been  as  misunderstood,  caricatured,  pilloried,
proven  wrong  and  rejected  as  often  as  Neofunctionalism.  Numerous  scholars  have
rejoiced  at  having  'overcome'  the  much-decried  antagonism  between  it  and
Intergovernmentalism ... So much so, that with very few exceptions, virtually no one
currently working on European integration openly admits to being a Neofunctionalist.
Its own creator has even declared it obsolescent – on two occasions! (Schmitter 2002:1)
According to critics, Neofunctionalism failed to predict or explain the empty chair  crisis in the
1970s  in  the  EU.  Even  after  much re-theorizing,  it  seemed to  many critics  that  the  theory of
Neofunctionalism had seen its best days and was not just out of style, but out of touch with modern
political  reality.  Below  are  some  of  the  proposed  key  limitations  of  the  theory  which  were
responsible for its suggested failure: 
Insufficient  predictive  qualities:  an  early  critique  of  Neofunctionalism  is  that  of  Stanley
Hoffmann's  Intergovernmentalist  view of regional political  integration.  Hoffmann’s critique was
established on the grounds that during the 1970s enduring national interests and sentiments were
clearly  present  in  de  Gaulle's  actions,  and  this  could  not  be  explained  by  Neofunctionalism.
Although  Neofunctionalism  predicted  defiance  from  national  authorities,  it  also  greatly
underestimated this factor. This underestimation can be observed in examining the power of the
European  Council  in  integration,  and  disintegration. It  was  therefore  advanced  that  although
Neofunctionalism explained the first steps of regional economic and political integration in the EU
up until the mid- to late 1960s, it could not fully account for what occurred afterwards. Moreover,
Neofunctionalism actually raised new questions rather than answering the questions that were put
forward when it was applied to regional integration in the EU in the 1970s. 
Challenged  theoretical  basis:  some  scholars  argue  that  a  critical  weakness  of
Neofunctionalism was not empirical but theoretical, namely, the base of the theory itself was faulty.
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Moravcsik (2005), for example, proposed that such a correction only occurred after the 1990s. Even
then, he suggested that Neofunctionalists attempted to explain the anomalies “in an ad hoc manner
by  invoking  various  exogenous  factors,  such  as:  anachronistic  concerns  of  high-politics  and
nationalism,  basic  ideological  antipathy  towards  transfers  of  sovereignty  … at  the  expense  of
regional deepening.”192
Excessively generic: another proposed empirical flaw by critics, was that Neofunctionalism as
a theory was spread too wide, and attempted to accomplish too much by endeavoring to explain the
process of regional integration in its entirety. That is to say, it was more general than specific in its
analysis, and broader in its explanation than deep. Thereby overlooking situations, abstractions, and
state  of  affairs.  For  example,  it  neglected  policy  areas  that  could  have  revealed  important
information about the factors that facilitate and hinder integration. Additionally, it was criticized as
being a post hoc theory plagued  with difficulties in generating testable hypotheses. Gaspare and
Hiroi (2002:5) for example propose that “not only is it difficult to identify a priori exactly what
issue-areas  and  what  levels  of  significance  of  problems  command  regional  cooperation  or
integration, but also functional needs do not necessarily pre-determine the direction of change that
countries choose to pursue”.
It  is  also  asserted  that  Neofunctionalism overemphasized  the  role  of  politicization  in  the
'empty chair crisis' of the 1970s, which came much later than Neofunctionalism proposed, and was
a factor for disintegration rather than for an increase in integration as the theory advanced.193  
3.2.3 Juxtaposition of Neofunctionalism with Alternative Theories
As established above, it is common to declare that Neofunctionalism is 'dead'. At the same
time, other theories of European political integration have also been met with criticisms. 
Not  different  from  Neofunctionalism:  not  only  are  other  theories  of  regional  political
integration just as, or even more insufficient in explaining certain aspects of regional integration,
but when they do they prove similarities to Neofunctionalism. Moreover, according  to Schmitter
(2002), most of the current theories used by scholars to analyze regional political integration are not
“theories at all, but just more or less elaborate languages for describing what the authors thought
had taken place in the recent past -- devoid of any discrete and falsifiable hypotheses about where
the process might be heading in the future”.194 He goes further to add that even when these attempts
are theory-based, they often resemble or take on some characteristics of Neofunctionalism, and that
192 Moravcsik (2005:355).
193 Schmitter (2002).
194 Schmitter (2002:2).
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“real-live Neofunctionalists may be an endangered species, but Neofunctionalist thinking turned out
to  be  very  much  alive,  even  if  it  was  usually  being  re-branded  as  a  different  animal”.195 For
example, Moravcsik’s Liberal Intergovernmentalism is argued to possess some of the same core
elements of Neofunctionalism. Moreover Schmitter argues that: 
if  Moravscik  were  to  concede  that  the  calculation  of  member-state  strategies  was
affected  not  only  by  'domestic  interests',  but  also  (and  even  increasingly)  by
Transnational firms, associations and movements working through domestic channels,
then, his approach would be virtually indistinguishable from Functionalism – just much
less specific in its assumptions and hypotheses. His epistemology would have to admit
that the gradual  processes of 'low politics'  could be unobtrusively encroaching upon
'high politics', his ontology would have to include the prospect that transformation might
be occurring, not just successive iterations of the same power game played by rational-
unitary national states. (Schmitter 2002:2)
Questionable  Comprehensiveness:  the  inclinations  and  core  of  other  theories  of  European
Integration  also  relate  to  a  limitation  in  their  application.  For  example,  the  theory  of
Intergovernmentalism is rooted in the independence and sovereignty of member-states in a union.
Moreover,  its  emphasis on intergovernmental bargaining processes neglects  other important and
necessary factors affecting regional integration, especially the role of institutions and other non-
state actors in the process of regional integration. With reference to the 'empty chair crisis' in the
EU, Awesti (2006:3) proposes that Intergovernmentalism “is able to explain the undoubted stalling
of  integration  in  the  visible,  ‘high’ political  areas.  However,  its  state-centrism  leads  it  to  be
blinkered from the underlying processes that drive the integration project”. These include actions in
'low politics' “which furthered European integration and which laid the foundations for future spill-
over into ‘high’ political areas. … the state was (and remains) only one player out of many in the
European polity”.196
At the same time, proponents of Intergovernmentalism similarly suggest that the theory of
Supranationalism does not adequately explain or take into account the role of influential and strong
nation states in the empty chair crisis. 
Conversely,  new  researches  reveal  that  the  theory  of  Neofunctionalism  might  not  have
195 Schmitter (2002:2).
196 Awesti (2006:4).
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actually  'failed'  in  the  1970s.  For  example,  McGowan  (2007)  paints  a  positive  picture  for
Neofunctionalism, in theorizing integration in Europe during this period. He proposes that:
regional integration was certainly occurring but at a slower pace and not on the scale that
Haas had imagined. ... Spill-over was much more localized but it could be identified. The
process of regional integration in Europe has always been about ongoing incremental
growth and in this vein is reminiscent of Monnet’s idea of creating Europe by stealth.
McGowan (2007:13)
 
Hence,  whereas  the  other  two  theories  of  European  Integration  failed  to  address  aspects  of
integration in the EU, recent research reveal an underestimation of the role of Neofunctionalism to
explain integration in Europe in the 1970s.  It  is  therefore worthwhile to 're-read'  the theory of
Neofunctionalism.
3.2.4 Revival Neofunctionalism
Rosamund (2013:22) proposes that the theory of Neofunctionalism is resilient and suggests
that in studies such as regional political integration, theoretical approaches are commonly judged by
two criteria. The first criterion is that the theory “is capable of asking meaningful questions about a
given object,  while insisting at  the same time that a theory’s success be judged in terms of its
capacity to generate findings consistent with its derivative hypotheses”.197 The second criterion is
“concerned with the theory’s internal consistency and its conformity (or otherwise) to established
rules of social scientific practice.”198 The theory of Neofunctionalism can be observed adhering to
both criteria. It asks meaningful questions and is resilient and able to conform to the rules of social
scientific practice. The theory of Neofunctionalism might not be 'dead', as previously decried; rather
it is quite 'alive'. Currently, when regional integration  is constantly theorized, it is the opportune
moment to re-introduce this theory as a consistent tool for analyzing CARICOM. Researchers are
increasingly finding new angles for utilizing the theory of Neofunctionalism to answer questions in
regional political integration. The following factors support the idea of 'revival' or 'recycling' the too
hastily disdained theory of Neofunctionalism: 
Multi-directional (forward and backward) integration:  the process of regional integration is
characterized by Neofunctionalism as a scheme of various possibilities rather than a plane with
movement  in  only one  direction.  It  acknowledges  what  can  be  phrased as  'disintegration'  as  a
197 Rosamond (2013).
198 Rosamond (2013).
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possible outcome of the process of integration. According to Schmitter's 'decision cycles'199, there
can be 'upwards' and 'downwards' movement of integration. New hypotheses, such as 'spill-back'
and  'muddle-about',  offer  additional  variables  and  new  insights  into  the  process  of  spill-over.
Therefore,  not  only  does  integration  take  place  under  uncertain  circumstances,  but  relies  on
innovation and has uncertain outcomes.
New  dimensions  to  the  theory:  since macro-hypotheses  have  been  redeveloped  and
reintroduced, in  the theory of  Neofunctionalism re-reading the theory of Neofunctionalism, and
applying it  to  new instances  of regional  integration is  a  worthwhile  undertaking.  For example,
terminologies  such  as  'engrenge200'  and  'natural  entropy201'  help  to  'recycle'  the  theory  of
Neofunctionalism by providing a network of possibilities in the process of integration. 
These ideas, and additional explanations, characterize the process of integration as a reaction
to tensions in the regional environment, contradictions of previous agreements and the engagement
of regional institutions.202
Effect of the adaptability of actors: Haas and Schmitter (1964:718) proposes that chief actors
in integration are highly adaptable and able to deal with complications, addressing any impediments
to integration. Haas (1961) also noted that, apart from an increase in the frequency of intra-regional
transactions203,  there  were  marked  changes  in  conflict  resolution  modes,  people’s  emotive
attachment, identification, in addition to expectations and outlook. 
The factors that accounted for the variations in the intensity and outcome of integration and
unions, and the original explanatory variables of integration according to Mattli (2005), are political
and social pluralism, including trade unions and interest groups;  bureaucratized decision-making
coupled with a supranational agency; and symmetrical regional heterogeneity, which includes size,
economic propensities and similarities. It is furthermore argued that “the content of each of these
factors or explanatory variables can be high or low, a high value favoring integration and a low
value rendering the likelihood of success more elusive”.204 
Influence  of  Non  State  Actors:  in  re-reading  Haas,  one  becomes  more  aware  of  the
explanatory variables of the theory of Neofunctionalism. For example, Haas (1967:323) argues that
199 See Schmitter (2002).
200 Refers to the impossibility of regional groupings to departmentalize and separate complex national issues, and the 
likelihood of these issues 'feeding back' to the regional units. 
201 Natural entropy refers to the idea that the process of integration will normally tend to 'rest' or even stagnate save for
an exceptional circumstance due to frustrations or even dissatisfaction. In the event of such regions are compelled 
to revise their level and scope of integration, which will lead to further spill-over. 
202 Schmitter (2002:21-27).
203 Relative to inter-regional transactions.
204 Mattli (2005:329).
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integration progresses and deepens when key politicians circumvent 'high politics'. Being endowed
with  ultimate  political  power,  they could  accept,  sidestep,  ignore,  or  sabotage  the  decisions  of
technocrats. He also underscored the role of non-state actors and political élite in the process of
regional integration (Haas 1967: 328).
He further suggests that there are various 'degrees of compatibility' between statements and
other  non  governmental  élite.  This  directly  addressed  criticisms  that  plagued  the  theory  of
Neofunctionalism concerning its  analysis  of  European integration in the 1970s.  Moreover,  new
proposals, for example those of Mattli (2005:119) emphasize the influence of political élite in the
process of integration. Integration deepens/ widens and/or quickens/slows down when political élite
share commitments with ‘heroic statesmen-leader’ in favor of/against integration.
The static character of priming cycles:  Schmitter (2002) proposed that previous suggestions
from critics that Neofunctionalism failed in its application to the EU were flawed, especially those
relating to the 'empty chair crisis'. That during this stage, the EU was merely undergoing priming
cycles, with extensive periods of static preceded by a widening and a deepening integration.  That
the scope and nature of common institutions could also be defined more clearly, especially when
assigned specified levels of governance. Under this reasoning, the past 'failures' of implementing an
EU constitution could be seen as a static part of a cycle205, of which the next step would be another
period of deepening and/or widening of integration. 
Schmitter  (2002:31)  goes  further  to  add  that  it  is  possible  to  discern  initial  signs  of
externalization in any priming cycles, since there is an underlying positive correlation between the
level and scope and the regional actions on external habituation. Moreover, success or failure of
these experiments affect international perception of the project, which in turn affects the motives of
national actors.
Complicating  factors:  Schmitter  (2002)  further  identifies  factors  at  the  national  level  in
member-states that lead to strategic change in regional integration. These factors include differences
in  relative  size  and/or  power;  differences  in  rates  of  transactions;  pluralistic  differences;  and
differences in extra-regional dependence. These extra factors present integration as an extremely
complicated process. Therefore, the actions of actors coupled with these factors over-complicate the
process  of  regional  integration.  Moreover, the  variables  of  regional  integration  are  “observer-
invented, orderings of facts and perceptions and not the physical occurrences themselves. … Even
more confusingly,  these concepts are  usually summations  or aggregate evaluations  of  complex,
205 The EU is currently moving towards this “transforming cycle” under the Neo-Neofunctionalism model.
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interrelated behaviors”.206 These complications  and technicalities  pose significant  challenges  for
theoretical  analysis  in  general.  Technical  issues  and  “failure  to  specify  how  the  multiple
observations are to be collapsed into a single assessment have plagued comparative research and
made inter subjective reliability poor ...  this problem has gotten worse rather than better  as the
integration process itself has become more complex”.207 
The 'recycled'  version of Neofunctionalism:  with the above factors  in mind,  predicting an
outcome of  integration  based on any given variable  or  sets  of  variables  might  not  be precise.
However,  the  'recycled'  version  of  the  theory  of  Neofunctionalism simplifies  this  complicated
spectrum by accepting  both  a  parabolic  effect  and  variation  in  values  of  both  dependent  and
independent variables.208
The 'recycled' version of Neofunctionalism offers the possibility for approaching integration
as a process that occurs between or among consenting national states. As a process that is complex,
transforming and evolving, which requires a theory that possesses the ability to also transform and
evolve along with it. In which case, the theory of Neofunctionalism is still relevant for the analysis
of regional political integration, be it in the EU or in this case, in CARICOM. 
Proponents of Neofunctionalism argue that criticism of spill-over (or the lack thereof in the
European case) might not be as critical as was previously acknowledged. Rather, “spill-over takes
hold  only  within  a  set  of  specified  conditions,  namely  situations  where  there  is  an  a  priori
interdependence  between  the  component  economies”.209 Additionally,  “if  cultivated  spill-over
placed its emphasis on the institutional interchanges between the EU actors and … competition
policy (then) ...  ultimately,  the EC competition regime’s growing credibility among ...  domestic
actors ensured that expectations and operations were increasingly to the supranational EU level of
decision making”.210
Bivariate and multi-variate hypotheses: the theory of Neofunctionalism advances the activist
role of actors (in particular bureaucrats) in the process of regional integration. It proposes that actors
will increasingly engage in 'reform-mongering'211, depending on previous scope of commitments,
the level of institutionalization and the 'upward-grading' of decision style. The bivariate hypothesis
also proposes a positive correlation among attention, concentration, independence and engagement;
and expansions  in  scope  and or  level  of  integration.  Moreover,  it  accepts  that  factors  such  as
206 Schmitter (2002:13).
207 Schmitter (2002:13).
208 Schmitter (2012:12)
209 Rosamond (2013:250).
210 McGowan (2007:2).
211 Schmitter (2002:29).
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benefits  from regional  integration  across  various  social/political  groups and distinctive regional
identity  also  have  an  impact  on  the  willingness  of  national  actors  to  create,  collaborate,  and
intensify pro-integrative efforts and strategies. 
The multivariate hypothesis additionally proposes an influence in the variation of regional
processes due to changes, prior to the start of the process. Furthermore, it proposes that these affect
understanding, analyzing and predicting any subsequent changes. Asynchronic values after these
initial  changes  will  result  in  asynchronism in  the  regional  processes,  and in  actor  strategies.212
Asynchrony in rates of change in member-states positively correlates with asynchrony in rates at the
regional  level,  which  in  turn  enhances  politicization. Another  crucial  point  highlighted  by the
multivariate  hypothesis  is  the  slow  rate  of  change  relating  to  regional  identity  and
externalization.213 
Wide scope; Beyond EU Applications: in re-reading the theory of Neofunctionalism, one is
made aware that it is not necessarily sui generis. It can be applied to unions other than the EU.
Although Haas argues that regional political integration might not readily occur in regions outside
of the EU, such as Latin America or the Caribbean, due to existing variables. He also suggests that
new 'political communities' could be established when there is “full political mobilization via strong
interest groups and political parties, leadership by political élite competing for political dominance
under rules of constitutional democracy accepted by leaders and followers. (Haas 2001:29–30)”. To
this end, Rosamund (2013:35) argues that “the story of Neofunctionalism is better told as a tale of
theory-building and evaluation that resonates with long-established social scientific norms”.
These  postulations  can  be  applied  to  all  three  independent  variables  in  this  undertaking,
namely, the CSME, CCJ and EPA, to better observe the process of asynchronic change. In so doing,
they can effectively measure the level of regional integration in CARICOM. 
3.2.5 Defense of Neofunctionalism
Why use the theory of Neofunctionalism, despite its contested standing, and base an entire
research on it? “Why bother to beat this dead horse? Why not celebrate its demise and move on to a
more  promising  and  up-to-date  approach?”214 Rosamund  (2013)  suggests  that  the  fact  that
Neofunctionalism was 'buried' in the first place does not reflect a problem with the theory per se,
instead,  such an action is  “indicative of a  tendency within the present  scholarly community to
produce narratives ...  that draw robust boundaries between past errors and present rigor.  In the
212 Schmitter (2002:30).
213 Externalization refers to the attempts actors to address exogenous factors such as dependence. 
214 Schmitter (2002:1).
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wrong hands this can induce all manner of closures and the establishment of claims that effectively
outlaw particular kinds of work”.215 The theory of Neofunctionalism is still viable for the following
reasons:
Promising Re-inspection: although it  is  proposed that  Neofunctionalism's own creator  has
decried  it  as  dead,  Neofunctionalism  is  later  defended  by  Haas  in  his  subsequent  writings.
Rosamund (2005) also highlights this fact. He argues that: 
it is striking how Haas responded to his critics by reasserting the significance of societal,
external and internal preconditions of integration. With that he laid the ground for (a) the
reorientation  of  Neofunctionalism  as  a  theory  of  ‘background  conditions',  (b)
Schmitter’s (1971) efforts to perfect Neofunctionalism as a theory of disintegration as
much as integration, and (c) Nye’s (1971) interest in ‘perceptual’ background conditions.
Rosamond (2013:250)    
Additionally, a re-inspection of Haas' own writings reveals that he vociferously defends the theory
of  Neofunctionalism.  For  example, Haas  (2004)  argued  for  the  current  relevance  of
Neofunctionalism.  He  contended  that  in  general,  the  outlook  should  be  a  positive  one,  that
Neofunctionalism still has a relevant purpose, and can indeed predict and explain integration, which
is an extremely complicated process. Moreover, he further establishes that a sole theory should not
be burdened with the onus of explaining an entire political system, and therefore, Neofunctionalism
must not be criticized for any supposed inability to characterize, understand, or predict the entire
process  of  regional  integration. To  this  end,  Haas  recently  proposed  that  the  theory  of
Neofunctionalism “is no longer obsolescent” (Haas 2004:iii); Rosamond (2013:35) also concur, and
proposes that the theory of Neofunctionalism should be seriously reconsidered as a suitable theory
for regional integration.216
This is because; the problem does not lie in the theory of Neofunctionalism, rather in its
interpretation and the way in which it  is  applied to  certain settings. Haas (1975) suggests  that
essentially, the supposed failure of Neofunctionalism resulted from the exclusion of the possibility
of  change  in  the  motives,  interests  and  values  of  actors.  Therefore,  it  is  “not  necessarily  that
Neofunctionalists failed to incorporate a theory of cognitive change into their overall approach, but
that it was probably always there within their conception of loyalties, persuasion, the evolution of
215 Rosamond (2013:254).
216 Rosamond (2013:35).
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expectations and interests.”217
McGowan (2007) also proposes that even if the theory of Neofunctionalism does not adhere
with the terms of macro-theorizing in regional integration, it can still be employed as a 'mid range
theory' which can be applied to analyze the dynamics and evolution of specific aspects of regional
integration. 
Rebuttal of criticisms: as explained above, criticisms of Neofunctionalism, pertaining to its
core  arguments  and  premises  can  be  disputed.  Additionally,  criticisms  pertaining  to
Neofunctionalism's abilities  such as predictability,  applicability,  and compatibility have all  been
recently answered and/or defended. The theory has seen re-inspections, for example by Schmitter
(2002); Haas  (2004); and Mattli  (2005). It  can therefore be held as a viable theory of regional
integration for conducting both singular and comparative analyses. 
Alive' in spirit: despite criticisms, Neofunctionalism is still held in the fields of International
Relations and Regional Political and Economic Integration as a serious theoretical approach to the
process of regional integration. In light of this:
there can be few students of the … EU who are not made aware, at least in passing,
about Neofunctionalist theory. It is rare to find a textbook on the subject that fails to
mention it and even its most trenchant critics feel obliged still to frame their analysis in
terms of the shadow cast by Neofunctionalism. For many of these, Neofunctionalism
represents  a  coherent  ‘other’  against  which  their  own  (supposedly  preferable)
approaches to explaining the EU and elements of European integration can be defined.
Rosamond (2013:238)
Although  Neofunctionalism was decried as dead, it  still  currently appears in  serious theoretical
analysis of regional political integration.218 This continued presence points to its usefulness in the
field  of  regional  integration.  The  'coming  back  in'  of  the  theory  follows  various  attempts,  a
concentrated analysis, and the dedication of an issue in the European Journal of Public Policy to
Neofunctionalism.219 This  speaks  to  the  importance  of  Neofunctionalism,  and the  usefulness  of
applying the theory of Neofunctionalism to CARICOM. 
Certain parameters valued by critics and proponents alike: critics of Neofunctionalism have
217 Haas (1958:292).
218 Rosamond (2013).
219 In 2005 The European Journal of Public Policy published an issue dedicated to Neofunctionalism.
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acknowledged that the theory is significant. For example, Moravcsik (2005:353) has conceded that
Neofunctionalism  contains  some  intrinsic  and  noteworthy  qualities.  He  also  admits  that
“Neofunctionalism is  dynamic.  It  seeks  to  explain  not  just  static  decision making under  stable
political conditions, but dynamic political transformation over time. (2005:353)”
Dynamic/non-static  mechanism  that  explains  the  ever-evolving  process  of  integration:
integration has, in a sense, also evolved and is ever changing. What was common in the 1970s,
1980s  and  the  1990s  has  evolved  and  is  currently  something  else.  A past  problem,  could  be
currently  analyzed  with  new  information  and  additional  scenarios.  In  analyzing  present-day
CARICOM, an overview of the literature relating to CARICOM reveals the necessity of a dynamic
theory for analysis. The theory of Neofunctionalism provides this non-static possibility. It is also
held as adaptable and trans-formative; it updates itself to fend off critiques and is not static, rather it
is adaptable. Neofunctionalism is trans-formative because it addresses situations where the actors in
integration and their relationship vary. It also predicts the changes in the strategies of the actors. 
Therefore, the prospect of a theoretical application to CARICOM promises interesting and
important results.  A theoretical application of Neofunctionalism to CARICOM would serve two
purposes,  it  would reveal information on  the process of regional integration in CARICOM, and
therefore  assist  in  understanding  and  characterizing  the  process  of  regional  integration  in
CARICOM.  Furthermore,  it  would  provide information on the theory of Neofunctionalism, and
therefore be useful for theory building and analysis.
At the same time, as long as the process of regional integration is occurring, there is also the
necessity for theorizing it. Condemned as dead or not, the theory of Neofunctionalism can shed
light on the integration process in CARICOM. 
3.3 Summary and Conclusion
As mentioned above, due to background variables certain unions are more prone to spill-over
than others.220 As established in the previous chapter, in addition to democratic and political factors,
integration in CARICOM was directly related to externalities. Both of these points are premises of
the theory of Neofunctionalism.  An application of the theory of Neofunctionalism to CARICOM
will,  therefore,  create  the  possibility  to  better  observe  the  variables  of  regional  integration  in
CARICOM and meet the aims of this thesis221. 
220 See for example Haas and Schmitter (1964).
221 The aim is to understand how and why integration in CARICOM is deepening and widening. An extensive explana-
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Moreover,  an  application  of  the  theory  of  Neofunctionalism  to  CARICOM  creates  the
possibility for observing the conditions under which  integration in the Caribbean is initiated and
continues  to  evolve. The  above  review  of  the  theory  of  Neofunctionalism  reveals  it  to  be  a
necessary tool for an analysis of CARICOM. It promises information on the factors of integration
and the effect  of these factors  on the participants in the process.  Neofunctionalism enables the
observation of sectoral spill-over, and thereby presents itself as an integral for a theoretical analysis
of CARICOM.
The  applicability  of  the  theory of  Neofunctionalism to  CARICOM includes  utilizing  the
macro-hypotheses  of  the  theory.  According  to  Schmitter  (2002:20),  the  macro-hypotheses  of
Neofunctionalism  “should  be  relevant  (and  potentially  falsifiable)  throughout  the  integration
process, i.e. during all of its decision-making cycles”. 
Descriptions  such  as  'decision  cycles',  and  additional  components,  such  as  regional
regulations, spill-over effects,  and the role of institutions in the process of regional integration,
address  the  explanatory  power  of  Neofunctionalism  in  characterizing  regional  integration  in
CARICOM.
tion is provided in Chapter 1.
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Chapter 4: Neofunctionalism and the Caribbean Single
Market and Economy
4.1 Introduction
This  chapter  offers  an  introduction  to  the  background,  origins,  and  initial  goals  of  the
Caribbean  Single  Market  and  Economy  (CSME);  and  introduces  the  Revised  Treaty  of
Chaguaramas  (Revised  Treaty)222 as  a  deepening  of  the  process  of  regional  integration  in
CARICOM. The chapter moreover reviews key hypotheses of Neofunctionalism, namely, spill-over,
externalization and politicization as they relate to the CSME.
Regional  integration  in  CARICOM is  composed  of  four  primary  components.  These  are
economic integration;  human and social  development;  foreign policy coordination; and security
cooperation.  The  CSME falls  mainly within  the  first  component:  economic  integration.  It  also
includes provisions for human and social development and foreign policy cooperation. Therefore, in
applying the theory of Neofunctionalism to the CSME, this chapter primarily focuses on economic
integration  in  CARICOM,  with  secondary  reflections  on  human  and  social  development,  and
foreign policy coordination. 
4.2 History and Overview of the Caribbean Single Market and Economy 
(CSME)
The Treaty of Chaguaramas223, which established the Caribbean Community (CARICOM224),
includes  provisions  for  liberalization  of  trade  in  goods  in  the  internal  CARICOM market,  the
creation of a common tariff and quota structure for external trade; and for the removal of barriers
that would affect the aforementioned liberalizations, including the establishment of business, and
the free movement of capital within CARICOM. 
The Original Treaty further prescribes the main responsibilities of CARICOM to two main
222 The Revised Treaty ratifies the CSME in CARICOM.
223 The Treaty of Chaguaramas is later amended to the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas, and as such the former is here-
inafter referred to as the Original Treaty.
224 In Chapter 2, it was established that before the CSME, the acronym CARICOM represented the Caribbean Commu-
nity and the Common Market. With the introduction of the CSME, the acronym now represents the Caribbean 
Community, and the Common Market is redundant.
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organs: the  Conference of Heads of Governments (the Conference), made up of the heads of the
member-states;  and  the  Common Market  Council  (the  Council),  made  up of  ministers  directly
elected for their national parliaments. 
Under the Original Treaty,  these two 'principal organs'  essentially delineated the direction,
depth, and speed of integration.  They were also supported by the CARICOM secretariat whose
mandate, was to deal with the daily activities of CARICOM.
At its 10th meeting in 1989, the Conference made a concerted effort to deepen integration in
CARICOM detailed in a declaration labeled the 'Grande Anse Declaration'. It began by stating that:
we, the Heads of Government of the Caribbean Community, inspired by the spirit of
cooperation and solidarity among us,  are  moved by the need to work expeditiously
together to deepen the integration process and strengthen the Caribbean Community in
all of its dimensions to respond to the challenges and opportunities presented by the
changes  in  the  global  economy.  Accordingly,  we  set  out  a  work  programmer  and
specific initiatives to be implemented over the next four years. 
This Grand Anse Declaration is essentially the first legal step by CARICOM to officially create the
CSME.  It  represents  a  binding  commitment  of  the  CARICOM  member-states  to  “deepening
regional  economic  integration  ...  in  order  to  achieve  sustained  economic  development  …
coordinated  economic  and  foreign  policies,  functional  co-operation  and  enhanced  trade  and
economic relations with third States”225.  The declaration is comprised of three key components,
namely a deepening regional integration in CARICOM through liberalizing its internal economy by
creating a single market and a single economy; a widening membership in CARICOM through the
inclusion of additional member-states; and creating, developing, and increasing external trade with
other third parties as a union226. 
The CSME is the first of the three components of the Grand Anse Declaration. It is further
divided into two sections a single market and a single economy. 
Under  the  single  market,  CARICOM  makes  provisions  for  the  liberalization  and  free
movement of intra-CARICOM goods, services, skills, and capital. Additionally, the single market
guarantees the right of CARICOM nationals to establish companies and other business enterprises
225 Paragraph 1 of the Preamble of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas Establishing The Caribbean Community includ-
ing The CARICOM Single Market And Economy.
226 Efforts such as the EPA can be placed under this initiative.
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in all CARICOM territories. 
The envisioned single economy suggests a liberalized structure of regional market integration
through a common currency and regional bank. In this economy, hindrances to free movement, such
as dual taxation, would be eradicated. 
The second component of the Grand Anse Declaration, i.e. widening integration, was a means
of achieving economic mass. To that end, Suriname, whose population was approximately half a
million, became a member in 2002. Anguilla, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands,
and Turks and Caicos were all granted Associate Member status between 1991 and 2003. 
Under the third component of the Declaration,  i.e. trade relations227,  CARICOM created a
Council  for  Foreign  and  Community  Relations  (COFCOR)  whose  main  task,  subject  to  the
provisions of Article 12 of the Revised Treaty, is to determine relationships between the Community
and international organizations and Third States. Further mandates of the COFCOR are to: 
evaluate,  promote and establish measures  to  enhance production,  quality control  and
marketing of industrial and agricultural commodities so as to ensure their international
competitiveness ... promote and develop … coordinated policies for the enhancement of
external economic and trade relations of the Community. (Revised Treaty:Article 12)
The main objectives228 of the CSME are to improve the standard of living and work of community
members; create sustained economic development in CARICOM; and to make CARICOM more
competitive through fully utilizing and liberalizing labor and other factors of production, including
capital and natural resources.229 The key elements of the CSME are: 
Free movement of goods and services: through measures for removing barriers impinging on
intra-regional trade in goods and services; the harmonization of safety and health standards; and the
implementation of legal measures for enabling the free movement of goods and services. 
Free movement of persons: under which the CSME grants the free and unrestricted travel of
CARICOM  nationals  throughout  the  CARICOM.  It  creates  provisions  for  harmonizing  social
services, establishes universal standards for accreditation and equivalence, and removes any barrier
that would impinge on free travel in CARICOM. 
227 Since the Grand Anse Declaration, the most notable external trade agreement that CARICOM has brokered is the 
European Partnership Agreement with the EU, which is examined in Chapter 6.
228 These objectives reflect a bias toward the single market in comparison with the single economy.
229 The above account reveals that Grande Anse Declaration is limited to the economic well-being of the CARICOM 
countries, and it does not include political and/or social integration in CARICOM. 
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The  right  of  establishment:  that  binds  CARICOM  member-states  to  remove  restrictions
hampering CARICOM citizens from establishing businesses in other CARICOM member-states.  
Free movement of capital: under which CARICOM member-states are required to eliminate
barriers  affecting  the  free  movement  of  capital  within  CARICOM  territories.  This  includes
eliminating foreign exchange control measures;  and creating an integrated capital  market and a
regional stock exchange. 
A common trade policy: that calls for the harmonization of both internal and external trade
policies.  For  internal  trade  policies,  the  CSME  requires  the  harmonization  of  economic  and
monetary policies; it liberalizes the CARICOM market; and guarantees border-less trade among the
member-states.  This  includes  the  coordination  of  economic  policies,  especially  those  related  to
exchange and interest rates; the harmonization of foreign investment policies; the harmonization of
company and intellectual property; and the coordination of indirect taxes. The CSME moreover
requires that CARICOM countries establish an external trade policy, and coordinate and negotiate
external trade on a joint CARICOM basis. 
A common external tariff:  the CSME introduces a  set  tariff  rate  for external goods to be
applied by the CARICOM member-states. It necessitates that the entry point of external goods in
the CARICOM market does not affect the price of the product. It also requires external tariffs to be
collected only once, at the first point of entry. It further creates provisions for CARICOM member-
states to share the customs revenue collected on external goods.
The  Revised  Treaty,  which  creates  the  legal  basis  for  the  CSME,  does  not  specifically
distinguish between a single market and a single economy. However, as the analysis below will
indicate,  the  provisions  of  the  treaty  inadvertently  make  a  distinction  between  the  two.  This
differentiation,  though  not  explicit,  is  a  vital  determinant  of  the  level,  speed  and  status  of
implementations of the provisions of the CSME. When possible, this distinction will be highlighted
throughout the remaining chapter.  
4.3 Examination of the CSME
The legal framework of the CSME takes the form of nine protocols which amend the Original
Treaty of Chaguaramas into the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. The protocols introduce, revise,
and update the agreements of the Conference on regional integration in CARICOM. They cover
five main areas: the institutional and legal framework of the CSME; market access in CARICOM; a
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macroeconomic  framework  for  trade  in  CARICOM; sectoral  policies  in  CARICOM,  including
trade, agriculture, transportation; and dispute settlements in CARICOM. The protocols therefore
reflect an entire restructuring, revision, and updating of the Original Treaty. As mentioned earlier,
the Grande Anse Agreement addressed limit provisions for economic integration. The protocols, on
the other hand serve as evidence of the systematic deepening of regional integration in CARICOM;
through a restructure of CARICOM's, they are examined below.
4.3.1 Protocol 1: Organs and Institutions of Governance 
This  protocol  updates  the  administrative  structure;  the  coordination  and  implementation
procedures; and the consultation and decision-making process in CARICOM. 
Administrative structure: the Protocol introduces institutions that redefine the institutional and
legal  framework  of  CARICOM.  Specifically,  Articles  12  and  14  create  two  councils  with  the
mandate to oversee the single market and the single economy respectively. The Council for Trade
and Economic Integration (COTED) is responsible for promoting trade and economic development
in  the  Community,  whilst  the  Council  for  Finance  and  Planning  (COFAP)  is  responsible  for
economic policy co-ordination in addition to the financial and monetary integration of CARICOM.
Additional  institutions,  such  as  the  Competition  Commission  (CC),  introduce  a  new  layer  of
supranationalism to CARICOM. Subject to Article 174, in respect to cross-border transactions or
transactions with cross-border effects, the CC is granted the power to “monitor, investigate, detect,
make determinations or take action to inhibit and penalize enterprises whose businesses conduct
prejudiced  trade  or  prevents,  restricts  or  distorts  competition  within  the  CSME”.  The protocol
further  introduces  new  competencies  to  the  Community,  by  creating  institutions  such  as  a
Committee  of  Central  Bank  Governors  (CCBG),  a  Conciliation  Commission,  a  Regional
Intellectual  Property  Rights  Office,  and  a  Standards  Organization.  It  effectively  expands  and
extends national competencies to regional institutions in CARICOM. 
Coordination  and  implementation  procedures: Article  12  of  the  protocol  provides  the
COTED230, with the power to  promote and oversee the development and operation of the CSME.
Specifically it can “evaluate, promote and establish measures to enhance production, quality control
and marketing of industrial  and agricultural  commodities”.  The COTED is also responsible  for
determining,  developing,  promoting,  and  facilitating  policies  and  measures  for  the  accelerated
development and marketing of services; the transportation of people,  goods, energy and natural
resources  on  a  sustainable  basis;  development  of  science  and  technology;  preservation  of  the
230 The COTED consists of ministers directly elected to the national parliaments, or a designated alternate.
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environment,  and  for  sustainable  development.  Additionally,  the  COTED collaborates  with  the
Council for Foreign and Community Relations, CFCR to co-ordinate external economic and trade
relations policies. In short, the COTED is responsible for the single market aspect of the CSME. 
Under  Article  14,  the  COFAP231 has  the  power  to  establish,  promote  and  coordinate
convergence on a macro-economic policy including a harmonized policy on foreign investment. It
can also promote and facilitate fiscal and monetary cooperation,  including the establishment  of
mechanisms for payment arrangements. Pending the establishment of a monetary union, the COFAP
moreover recommends measures to achieve and maintain fiscal discipline by the member-states,
and arrangements for the free convertibility of currencies. It also promotes the establishment and
integration of  capital  markets  in  CARICOM.  In short,  the COFAP is  responsible  for  initiating,
establishing, promoting, facilitating, and overseeing the implementation of the single economy. 
The COTED and the COFAP are further granted an overarching rule over the member-states.
They review and consider applications from CARICOM member-states' regarding hardships arising
from implementing  the CSME. The COTED/COFAP determine  if  member-state  can implement
temporary  restrictions,  and  the  period  and  adequacy  of  the  restrictions.232 This  removes  said
competences from the member-states and places them in regional institutions in CARICOM. 
Article 16 gives the Council for Foreign and Community Relations (COFCOR) the task to
“establish measures to co-ordinate the foreign policies of the member-states … including proposals
for joint representation,  and seeks to ensure … the adoption of Community positions on major
hemispheric and international issues”.  This is  an integral function for a cohesive external trade
agenda. Article 16 additionally takes the task of coordinating Community policy on international
issues  away  from  the  Conference  and  gives  it  directly  to  the  Community  Council,  which  is
independent  of  the  Conference.  Although  these  institutions  are  made  up  of  directly  elected
parliamentarians, they possess a wide scope of rule over the member-states. For example, based on
the new competencies, it can be inferred that Jamaican Parliamentarians can do more than 'liaise'
with their  fellow Barbadian counterparts: they can demand checks and balances, and hold their
counterparts  accountable for the initiation and implementation of the provisions of the Revised
Treaty. CARICOM institutions consequently possess the influence to oversee regional markets and
the  monetary  policy  coordination  of  their  member-states.  They  possess  overarching  regional
responsibilities which touch on the sovereignty of the same member-states which created them. 
The  institutions  are  afforded  the  role  of  'watchdog'  for  implementing  and,  moreover,
231 The COFAP consists of ministers directly elected to the national parliaments, or an alternate.
232 Article 47 of the Revised Treaty.
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upholding the CSME; they possess considerable and decisive influence over the welfare of each
CARICOM member-state than was previously acknowledged. Not only does the CSME effectively
creates a wide scope of freedoms, but it also creates its very own 'watchdog' to oversee the said
freedoms.
Consultation  and  decision-making  procedures:  the  competencies  of  the  institutions  in
CARICOM are redefined, enlarged, and expanded. For example, the Community Council is given
the mandate under Article 7, to establish rules that prohibit nondiscrimination in the scope and
application  of  the  Revised  Treaty.  Additionally,  Article  13  gives  the  Community  Council  the
'primary  responsibility'  to  strategically  plan  and  coordinate  development  policies,  economic
integration, functional co-operation and external relations. Article 32 further affords the Community
Council the possibility to “enlarge the body of rights” granted to CARICOM citizens. In doing so,
the  Community  Council  can  effectively  extend  and  deepen  regional  integration  in  CARICOM
through extending and deepening the regional commitments of the member-states. 
4.3.2 Protocol 2: Provision of Services, Rights of Establishment and Movement of Capital
Whereas  the  Original  Treaty  created  limited  directives  with  regard  to  the  Rights  of
Establishment,  Services  and  Movement  of  Capital,  the  second  Protocol  of  the  Revised  Treaty
creates  an  unbiased  freedom of  movement,  under  which  all  CARICOM citizens  are  treated  as
nationals of the member-state that they are visiting. 
Whereas Article 35 of the Original Treaty announced that “each member-state recognizes that
restrictions on the establishment and operation of economic enterprises therein by nationals of other
member-states should not be applied”; and further prescribed that “each member-state agrees as far
as practicable to extend to persons belonging to other member-states preferential treatment over
persons belonging to States outside the Common Market with regard to the provision of services”. 
Article 37 of the Revised Treaty in contrast, makes it clear that CARICOM “member-states
shall  abolish  discriminatory restrictions  on  the  provision  of  services  within  the  Community in
respect of Community nationals”. Protocol 2 therefore introduces expansive changes with regard to
the rights and freedoms of CARICOM nationals. 
Protocol 2 also prescribes actions for the removal of restrictions on banking, insurance and
other financial services; the prohibition of new restrictions on movement of capital and currency
transactions; the removal of restrictions on movement of capital and currency transactions; the co-
ordination  of  foreign  exchange  policies  and  exchange  of  information;  restrictions  to  safeguard
balance-of-payments; and measures to facilitate establishment, provision of services and movement
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of capital which were not addressed by the Original Treaty. 
Regarding  policies  for  'sectoral  development',  whereas  the  Original  Treaty  limited  the
coordination of economic policies and development planning to 11 Articles; the Revised Treaty is
more distinctive: not only does it dictate a community economic and development policy, but it also
offers a sweeping account of each sector, extensively outlining issues and policies for development
and comprehensively delineates policies in said sectors. It additionally makes a distinction between
industrial policy, trade policy and agricultural policy and establishes common supportive measures
for these policies.
4.3.3 Protocol 3: Industrial Policy 
Article 51 lists the objective of the Community Industrial Policy as being the “sustainable
production  of  goods  and  services  for  the  promotion  of  the  Region’s  economic  and  social
development”.233
Protocol 3 also details the coordination of economic policy in CARICOM. It addresses the
implementation of economic measures; sustainable development in sectors such as micro and small
enterprises, services and tourism; and the infrastructure for long-term development. The Protocol
positions the COTED and COFAP as the CARICOM institutions overseeing the infrastructure of the
provisions. 
The policy further delineates that information and communication technology (ICT) fall under
the purview of the Caribbean Telecoms Union (CTU). The CTU was mandated by CARICOM to
“harmonize sector policy and frequency usage and to coordinate regional positions on international
issues”.234 Additionally,  the CTU was given the primary mandate and resources  to  analyze  and
develop  a  CARICOM  ICT  and  telecoms  policy,  including  guidelines  and  directives  for
harmonization at the member-state level.235 The CTU, therefore functions as an administrator in
“maintaining,  revising  when  necessary  and  cataloging  all  legal,  regulatory  and  administrative
documents related to the sector”.236 
The industrial policy touches on the economic sovereignty of the member-states, and calls for
a community-led approach, focused on regional development instead of developments specific to
member-states. It reflects a profound 'deepening' of integration than was initially conceived by the
233 Article 52 furthermore dictates that CARICOM possesses the power over “the development of required institution-
al, legal, technical, financial, administrative and other support for the establishment or development of micro and 
small economic enterprises throughout the Community”. 
234 Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (2007:24).
235 Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (2007:24).
236 Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (2007:24).
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Grand Anse declaration. 
4.3.4 Protocol 4: Trade Policy 
This protocol addresses the previously limited provisions for trade policies in the Original
Treaty, which included rules of origin, a common external tariff, and the schedule of goods. In the
Original Treaty, trade policy was limited to just two articles, namely, 31 and 32. Protocol 4, on the
other hand, offers extensive provisions for trade policies. The objectives of the protocol includes
the:
full integration of the national markets of all member-states … into a single unified and
open market area … the widening of the market area of the Community … the securing
of the most favorable terms of trade for Community goods and services exported to third
States and groups of States. (Revised Treaty: Article 78)
The protocol further establishes “common instruments, common services and the joint regulation,
operation and efficient  administration of the internal  and external  commerce of  the CSME”.  It
requires CARICOM member-states to remove all restrictions on the free movement of goods within
CARICOM  borders;  including  measures  to  abolish  delays  of  CARICOM  products  within
CARICOM borders. The CSME makes specific provisions for CARICOM products which could
see intra-CARICOM goods treated more fairly than goods of national origin. 
The protocol introduces a harmonized structure of trade in CARICOM, and a CARICOM-
regulated  operation.  Article  78  requires  that  the  member-states  establish  and  apply  common
negotiating  strategies  to  bargain  'mutually  beneficial  trade  agreements'  with  third  parties.237 It
prohibits  member-states  from imposing new restrictions  on imports  and exports  of  products  of
Community  origin.  Not  only  does  it  effectively  bind  member-states  to  its  provisions,  but  it
precludes them from creating any new regulations that would alter or violate existing provisions,
effectively requiring a high level of commitment from the member-states.
It  furthermore  creates  institutional  legitimacy in  CARICOM, highlighting  the  role  of  the
COTED in coordinating the trade policy of CARICOM, and giving it the sole authority to amend or
suspend any of the common external Tariffs agreed on in the CSME. The protocol is therefore an
extensive reworking of the previous two articles of the Original Treaty: it addresses and creates
provisions for the removal of national barriers to regional trade, and introduces concise delineations
237 These conditions were not explicit in the Grande Anse Declaration. They therefore reveal an increase in the initial 
commitment to regional integration.
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for the total harmonization of national markets. 
4.3.5 Protocol 5: Agricultural Policy
The  Original  Treaty  proposed  a  “scheme  for  …  promoting  complementarity  in  national
agricultural  programs and providing special  opportunities  for  the development  of agriculture in
CARICOM”.238 Protocol 5, on the other hand, introduces extensive provisions for an agricultural
policy in  CARICOM. The main goal  of the Agricultural  Policy is  to alleviate  poverty through
improving income and employment opportunities in the sector. Additionally, the policy calls for
“increased production and diversification of processed agricultural products”. In achieving these
goals, Article 57 of the Revised Treaty states that CARICOM shall oversee “the establishment of
effective agricultural financing systems, including insurance, bearing in mind the special needs of
artisanal fishers, small farmers, foresters and agro-processors”. CARICOM further possesses the
power  to  establish  “linkages  among  the  member-states  with  complementary  natural  resources,
industries, agricultural skills and technical abilities”. Likewise, Article 57 demands the member-
states to develop “appropriate policies for the use of land and marine space with a view to increased
agricultural production”. 
Additional highlights of the policy are the development of a 'common' agricultural policy for
the member-states; the emphasis on creating and developing a regional infrastructure to manage the
common agricultural  policy;  the  creation  of  infrastructure  to  enable  the  implementation  of  the
common  policy;  and  the  creation  and  management  of  marketing  strategies  and  resources
complimentary to the policy. 
In creating a regional policy for agriculture, Protocol 5 removes national competencies in the
sector and places them in a regional authority. Furthermore, the Protocol creates the infrastructure
necessary for the policy to be implemented, by harmonizing the agricultural policies of the member-
states in a regional, superimposed system. 
4.3.6 Protocol 6: Disadvantaged Countries, Regions, and Sectors
The Original Treaty classified CARICOM countries with the terms 'More Developed' and
'Less  Developed'.  Protocol  6  changes  this  classification  and  creates  an  instrument  aimed  at
promoting development in particular regions within CARICOM, advancement in all member-states,
and improvement in certain specific sectors which could be disadvantaged by the CSME. In other
238 Original Treaty, Article 49. The goals of this scheme included the “development of a regional plan for the integra-
tion of agricultural development in the Common Market … and the improvement of the efficiency of agricultural 
production in order to increase the supply of agricultural products”.
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words, Protocol 6 serves as a fail-safe mechanism for highlighted areas in CARICOM that could be
placed at a disadvantage by the implementation of the CSME. 
4.3.7 Protocol 7: Transportation Policy
This protocol introduces further legal mechanisms that are intended to complement the free
movement of goods and people. The aspirations of the Grand Anse Declaration did not address any
substantial changes to the transport sector in CARICOM. In the initial agreement, a consensus was
achieved only for the removal of barriers to trade and free movement. The transport sector was later
identified as a sphere that was also in need of revision, to uphold the standards of free movement as
idealized by the Grand Anse Declaration. The protocol therefore addresses an unforeseen sector in
CARICOM, and revises and restructures the sector to create a new regional infrastructure. Protocol
7 thus reveals an extensive spill-over of regional integration in CARICOM.
The  idea  of  unifying  infrastructure  within  community  members  in  order  to  ensure
uninterrupted and sustained 'free' movement is proposed in this protocol. Unlike other unions which
have  to  contend  with  harmonizing  infrastructures  such  as  railroad,  in  CARICOM,  due  to
connections mainly by water and air,  the emphasis of a common transportation policy is on the
harmonization of safety standards and the creation of competitive services.239 
The policy requires the protection of “marine environment from the effects of vessel source
pollution and in combating the effects of such pollution”. 
Protocol 7 also highlights the COTED's overarching role in overseeing the implementation of
trade policy. In this respect, the COTED is conferred the power to “promote co-operation among
operators of air transport services of the member-states, particularly in purchasing equipment and
supplies,  the  management  of  inventories,  interline  and  inter-modal  operations,  code  sharing,
reservations, insurance, leasing and similar operations”.240 Furthermore, Article 135 of the protocol
avails  the  COTED,  the  capacity  to  coordinate  the  transport  policy and to  implement  “uniform
regulations and procedures … for the development of an efficient, multi-modal transport system,
particularly with respect to operations, safety, licensing and certification”. 
Outside of freedom of establishment and operations, CARICOM member-states are forced to
acknowledge licensing and certifications from each other. They are also compelled to harmonize
and adhere to regional safety standards, and are accountable to a regional authority rather than a
national  authority.  By  harmonizing  licensing  in  the  region,  CARICOM  dictates  the  level  and
239 Article 134 of the Revised Treaty delineates that the policy's aim is to provide “adequate, safe and internationally 
competitive transport services for the development and consolidation of the CSME”.
240 Article 138 Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.
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standards of the licensees, and binds the member-states to these levels and standards. Moreover, it
sets  environmental  standards,241 and  empowers  a  regional  body  and  ministers  from  other
CARICOM countries to regulate the transport sector of the member-states. Protocol 7 therefore
adds  to  the  unintended  deepening  of  regional  integration  in  CARICOM.  It  touches  on  deep
commitments to harmonizing and establishing a regional transport policy, and it creates soft forms
of supranationalism in CARICOM; and reveals the extent to which the CARICOM member-states
have committed to revising, liberalizing and harmonizing their markets.
4.3.8 Protocol 8: Competition Policy
Whereas Article 30 of the Original Treaty barely touches on restrictive business practices,
Protocol 8 outlines an expansive competition policy for the entire Community. The policy is divided
into two parts: part one focuses on rules of competition and anti-competitive practices, and part two
focuses on consumer protection.
Part One: Rules of competition: Article 169 of the Revised Treaty notes that “the goal of the
Community Competition Policy shall be to ensure that the benefits expected from the establishment
of the CSME are not frustrated by anti-competitive business conduct”. The protocol additionally
underscores  “the  prohibition  of  anti-competitive  business  conduct  which  prevents,  restricts  or
distorts competition or which constitutes the abuse of a dominant position in the market (and) … the
promotion of consumer welfare and protection of consumer interests”. 
Not only does Protocol 8 require member-states to notify the COTED of any existing laws
that are inconsistent with the competition policy within 24 months of signing the Revised Treaty;
but they are also obligated to abandon said legislations. The COTED then oversees a program to
repeal the aforementioned legislation and inconsistencies. 
The competition policy further dictates through Article 170 that “every member-state shall
establish  and  maintain  a  national  competition  authority  for  the  purpose  of  facilitating  the
implementation of the rules of competition”. This authority is required by the competition policy
under Article 170 to fully co-operate with the Competition Commission (CC) to achieve national
compliance to  the rules of competition;  investigate any allegations of anti-competitive business
conduct  referred  to  it  by  the  Commission  or  another  member-state;  co-operate  and  exchange
information with other national competition authorities to detect and prevent any anti-competitive
business conduct. 
241 Environmental standards were also not conceived in the Grand Anse Declaration, and therefore reflect an increase 
in commitments and spill-over.
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The CC is one of the few CARICOM institutions with a role at both the member-state and
regional levels. Under Article 173, it is granted the mandate to apply rules of competition at the
regional level with regards to anti-competitive cross-border business conduct; promote and protect
rules of competition at both the national and regional levels; co-ordinate the implementation of the
Community Competition Policy by the member-state; and perform any other function bestowed by
other organs and bodies of CARICOM. 
Article  173 also superimposes  the CC on the member-states.  It  grants  the CC a  form of
supremacy over private and public liability companies in member-states, and allows it to monitor
anti-competitive practices of companies, and state-run enterprises. The CC can review the progress
of the member-states  in  implementing the legal  and institutional  framework of  the competition
policy. Article 173 also places it in a position to “promote the establishment of institutions and the
development and implementation of harmonized competition laws and practices by the member-
states to achieve uniformity in the administration of applicable rules”.
Under cross-border  functions,  the CC additionally possesses the ability to investigate and
arbitrate cross-border disputes in the Community. Its arbitration powers endow the commission the
possibility:
in  respect  of  cross-border  transactions  or  transactions  with cross-border  effects,  (to)
monitor, investigate, detect, make determinations or take action to inhibit and penalize
enterprises  whose business conduct  prejudices  trade or  prevents,  restricts  or  distorts
competition within the CSME. (Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas: Article 174) 
It is further given the task to “make determinations regarding the compatibility of business conduct
with the rules of competition and other related provisions of the Treaty”. The CC is also granted the
power  to  “remedy  or  penalize  anti-competitive  business  conduct  (including  ordering)  the
termination or nullification as the case may require, of agreements, conduct, activities or decisions
prohibited by Article 170”. The CC can also direct and issue 'cease and desist' orders relating to
anti-competitive  business  conduct  by both  public  and private  enterprises.  Furthermore,  the  CC
possesses the possibility to:
take such steps as are necessary to overcome the effects of abuse of (any) dominant
position (in CARICOM) or any other business conduct inconsistent with the principles
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of  fair  competition,  (including  ordering  the)  payment  of  compensation  to  persons
affected; (and imposing) fines for breaches of the rules of competition. (Revised Treaty
of Chaguaramas:Article 174)
 
Additional  legal  provisions  of  Protocol  8  include  details  on  how  the  CC can  determine  anti-
competitive business conduct, including determining 'dominant position' and abuse of 'dominant
position'. The Protocol therefore places the CC in an advisory role over the member-states, where in
the case of uncertainty in prohibited business conduct, the member-states (under Article 174) are
given the possibility to “apply to the CC for a ruling on the matter”. 
The CC therefore acts without prejudice, and possesses some form of supranationality and
sovereignty over CARICOM member-states. 
Part Two: Consumer protection242:  Article 169 of the Revised Treaty introduces the second
function of Protocol 8, which is “the promotion of consumer welfare and protection of consumer
interests”. Under consumer protection, the Revised Treaty binds the Community member-states to
promote the interests of the CARICOM consumers. Appropriate measures highlighted by Article
184 include the requirements to:
• ensure that goods supplied and services provided in the CSME satisfy the regulatory 
standards and licensing codes set out in the Revised Treaty;
• provide consumers with expansive, informed and low cost goods and services through 
promoting fair and effective competition;
• create avenues that provide consumers with adequate information to enable the making of 
informed choices:
• prohibit discrimination against CARICOM goods and services.
The  protocol  further  calls  for  the  harmonization  of  any  legislation  in  the  member-states
relating to aspects of trade that would impinge on consumer rights. These include unfair terms in
contracts;  trading  practices  for  the  supply  of  goods  or  services  to  consumers;  removing  the
production  and supply of  any harmful  or  defective  goods  in  the  Community;  and harmonized
labeling and standards for goods. The Protocol empowers the CARICOM Regional Organization for
Standards and Quality (CROSQ) to promote the process of standardization and quality control of
goods in CARICOM. It also supports CARICOM member-states in harmonizing their infrastructure
242 These stipulations were not previously envisioned under the Grand Anse Declaration. However they were included 
in order for the provisions of the previous Protocols to function. As such, the regulations of Protocol directly reveal 
some form of functional spill-over. 
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through the development of certification and accreditation, and other standards and testing. 
The Protocol therefore offers extensive protection and possibilities for consumer recourse in
CARICOM, which were neither  present  in  the Original treaty nor previously envisioned in  the
Grande Anse Declaration. It offers a monitoring mechanism for both internal and external goods
and  services  in  CARICOM  member-states;  creates  a  liberal  regional  platform  for  goods  and
services in CARICOM; dictates standards and practices at the local and regional level; and protect
CARICOM consumers against anti-competitive business conduct.
4.3.9 Protocol 9: Dispute Settlement
This  protocol  offers  provisions  for  settling  disputes  concerning  the  interpretation  and
application  of  the Revised Treaty.  This  includes  any allegations  of  inconsistency,  injury and/or
prejudice by a member-state or CARICOM institutions against the provisions of the Revised Treaty,
and specifically the CSME. The avenues offered for dispute settlement under Protocol 9 include the
'good  offices'  of  a  third  party  independent  of  the  dispute  (such  as  the  Secretary  General  of
CARICOM), mediation, consultation, conciliation, arbitration and adjudication. Protocol 9 offers a
credible and authoritative means of settling disputes arising from the CSME. It further subscribes
and binds member-states to the authority of the CCJ243. This ensures that grievances related to the
CSME are taken into consideration and not dismissed by the party in question; and subjugates the
individual member-states to the power of a regional authority.244 
The CSME relies on both member-state governments and institutions to address cross border
enforcement. Safety and environmental regulations and health standards do not rely on cross-border
effect to be relevant for CARICOM nationals.245 Rather member-state governments are bound to
implement regional standards, regardless of cross border effect. 
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 Limitations in the Revised Treaty
The above examination reveals that the 9 Protocols which define the Revised Treaty focus
243 The CCJ is the sole interpreter of the Revised Treaty. In binding member-states to the authority of the CCJ, when 
one member-state brings a proceeding before the CCJ against another member-state, the latter is compelled to ap-
pear before the court and can not dismiss or disregard the proceedings.
244 Again, this provision was not idealized by the Grand Anse Declaration, however, it was deemed as necessary in or-
der for the above regulations to be in full effect.
245 Although the CSME addresses regional provisions on safety standards, it does not explicitly require a member-state
national to be another member-state to demand said rights.
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primarily on a single market. They create extensive provisions for the single market, and limited
and vague provisions for the single economy. Although there are notable acknowledgments of the
single economy; there is no specific protocol solely and satisfactorily addressing it. 
Extensive analysis of the Revised Treaty reveals provisions for foreign exchange policies and
balance of payments. 
Foreign  exchange  policy  : Article 42  of  the  Revised  Treaty  delineates  limited  provisions
regarding  regional  structures  and  competencies  related  to  foreign  exchange  policies.  The  first
paragraph states that “the member-states shall take such measures as are necessary to coordinate
their  foreign  exchange policies  in  respect  of  the  movement  of  capital  between them and third
States”. This article works contrary to the harmonizing principles246 of those addressing the single
market:  it  accredits  the  individual  member-states  with  sole  power  to  devise  foreign  exchange
policies, and therefore precludes a regional harmonization of national foreign exchange policies.
Article 42 only obliges member-states to “keep the competent authorities in other member-states
informed of significant unusual movements of capital within their knowledge to and from third
states”. This also precludes any authoritative regional action regarding capital flow.  
Notably,  the  Revised  Treaty  grants  COFAP the  sovereignty  to  “establish  procedures  for
periodic  consultations  including,  where  possible  and  desirable,  prior  consultations  with  the
objective  of  making  recommendations  to  the  member-states  concerned  for  the  removal  of  the
restrictions”. 
Balance of payments  : regional authorities are only given the power under Article 37 of the
Revised  Treaty  to  “assess  the  balance-of-payments  situation  of  member-states”;  and  prescribe
“alternative  corrective  measures”.  The article,  obligates  member-states  to  consult  with  regional
authorities  regarding  implementing  balance  of  payment  restrictions,  and  dictates  that  these
“consultations shall address the compliance of any restrictions ... and, in particular, the progressive
phase-out  of  restrictions”.  It  also  requires  that  all  findings  of  the  Committee  of  Central  Bank
Governors  “relating  to  foreign  exchange,  monetary  reserves  and  balance-of-payments,  shall  be
accepted and conclusions shall be based on the assessment by the Committee of the balance-of-
payments and the external financial situation of the member-states concerned”.
Article 43 of the Revised Treaty further limits the  competences  of regional authorities, and
expands those of the member-states regarding 'Balance of Payments'. Article 43 outlines that “in the
event of serious balance-of-payments and external financial difficulties or threat thereof, a member-
246 Whereas the single market liberalizes the freedom of movement etc, and creates blanket standards, this article relies
on the member-state to implement regulations that they see fit.
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state may, in consistence with its international obligations... adopt or maintain restrictions to address
such difficulties”. In doing so, the article provides a 'fail safe' option for member-states to avert any
regional regulation and adopt its own national regulations. The Article goes further to prescribe that
these “may include quantitative restrictions on imports, restrictions on the right of establishment,
restrictions on the right to provide services, restrictions on the right to move capital or on payments
and transfers for transactions connected therewith”. 
Compared with those of the single market, the above overview revel limited provisions and
obligations of the member-states regarding the single economy. They also reveal that the provisions
at times, endorse the competencies of the member-states, instead of creating regional regulations.
Inarticulate  and  insufficient  definition  of  Single  Economy: the  provisions  for  the  single
economy are intertwined with those for the single market, in the nine protocols. Except for the
creation of the COTED and the COFAP there is no distinction between the provisions for the single
market and those for the single economy. As presented above, the protocols represent the finalized
commitments for both the single market and the single economy. Compared with the single market,
there is a lack of specific provisions for the single economy. Four factors, which are essential for a
single economy are overlooked and not mentioned in the Revised Treaty. The Revised Treaty does
not make reference to the creation of a single currency in CARICOM; introduce commitments for a
Government Budget Deficit or Debt to GDP ratio; provide expansive regulations for exchange rates
or long term interest rates; nor create a central bank to coordinate, and oversee and govern the
single economy. Furthermore, additional factors that will hamper the implementation of the single
economy include:
Lack of harmonization procedures: as proposed earlier, the provisions for the single economy
as with the single market are limited; their descriptions are not precise as to what, when and how
member-states should harmonize. Unlike the single market aspect of the CSME, the single economy
does not have delineated provisions for the harmonization of policies. 
The  Revised  Treaty  sets  clear  provisions,  such  as  the  free  movement  of  people  across
CARICOM borders, which member-states are compelled to implement. However, it does not set
such  clear  provisions  for  fiscal  and/or  monetary  policy  regulations.  For  example,  it  does  not
delineate whether CARICOM countries should use a fixed or floating exchange rate. Additionally, it
creates clear competencies for institutions to oversee and help with the implementation of the single
market.  It  does  not  do the same for  the single economy.  For  example,  CARICOM created the
Competition Commission to investigate unfair competition practices of firms, and the COTED to
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oversee trade and economic development. It does not, however, provide or delineate the creation of
a CARICOM central bank that would oversee monetary issues. Additionally it does not delineate
how or what form/shape a CARICOM monetary and fiscal policy should take. 
4.4.2 Operation of the CSME
The Grand Anse Declaration proclaimed the urgency of implementing the CSME in the first
paragraph of the Declaration, the heads of government proclaimed that “we are determined to work
towards the establishment,  in the shortest possible time, of a single market and economy for the
Caribbean  Community”.  The  implementation  of  the  provisions  in  the  CSME  was  set  to  be
completed by 1993. 
The  ratification  of  the  Revised  Treaty  legally  binds  CARICOM  member-states  to  its
provisions; especially because the ratification included the signing of a 'Protocol on the Provisional
Application of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas'. The Protocol outlines that CARICOM member-
states acknowledge that “the Revised Treaty should be signed and provisionally applied before 31
December 2001”. Furthermore, Article 1 of the Protocol establishes that the CARICOM member-
states “have agreed … to apply provisionally the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas”. Therefore, the
implementation  of  the  provisions  of  the  single  market  can  be  viewed  as  a  step/formality  by
member-states  which  reconciles  national  laws  with  the  provisions  of  the  Revised  Treaty.
Consequently, even if national laws are not harmonized to reflect the provisions of the Revised
Treaty, in signing the above Protocol, the CARICOM member-states have agreed to the imposition
of regional obligations over their national authorities. The provisional application of the Revised
Treaty  therefore  implies  that  the  member-states  are  essentially  bound  to  the  Revised  Treaty
regardless  of  its  implementation;247 accordingly,  harmonization  of  national  laws  and  the
implementation of the provisions of the CSME serve a compliance purpose. Therefore, this section
further  examines  compliance  with  the  provisions  of  the  Revised  Treaty  through  analyzing  the
implementation of the CSME.248 
247 Therefore, an action against the regulations of the Revised Treaty can be defined as a breach of the Revised Treaty.
248 In calling for an implementation of the CSME by 1993, the Grand Anse Declaration neither made provisions for, 
nor created a legal framework for the implementation of the CSME. Consequently, not only were the deadlines for 
implementing the CSME pushed back, but it also became necessary to draft a legal framework to incorporate the 
CSME in national laws, and to ratify and implement said framework. The negotiations of the Protocols lasted from 
1992 until 1998, which was beyond the initial agreed deadline for implementing the CSME in 1993, as per the 
Grande Anse Declaration. During the negotiations, the Conference extended the deadline for implementing the Sin-
gle Market to 1999. However, this deadline was also pushed back and another deadline was set for 31 December 
2005. The deadline for implementing the single economy was also revised to 2015.
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4.4.3 Implementation of the Single Market
The goals of the single market were implemented in 'phases' in CARICOM. For example, in
1995 the Conference decided that free movement in CARICOM would be granted to CARICOM
members  who  were  university  graduates,  with  effect  from  January  1996.  In  July  1996,  the
Conference expanded the categories of free movement for work purposes to include Artistes, Media
Workers, Musicians and Sports Persons. This was made possible though the creation of a Certificate
of  Recognition  of  CARICOM  Skills  Qualification, which  could  be  obtained  from a  specified
ministry in each CARICOM member country. CARICOM then liberalized the movement of non-
wage earners, either as service providers and/or to establish businesses which came into effect in
2002.249 Additionally, CARICOM set the target for completion of implementing the free movement
of all CARICOM member citizens by December 2005. Essentially, the aim of CARICOM was to
strategically liberalize sectors and harmonize regulations affecting cross-border activities by the end
of 2005. This was seen as a feasible task as the then-Secretary General of CARICOM, Edwin
Carrington,  reported that  “there was no question of  an extension of time for  States  to  become
CSME ready by the end of the year”.250 He also added that “everyday we delay getting there, we
enhance the danger. We need to get there as quickly as possible so as to get ourselves ready to deal
with that avalanche of challenge that is coming, and believe me, its coming”.251 
In April 2005, Girvan published an article entitled 'Whither the CMSE', in which he asserted
that: 
approximately  one-half  of  the  actions  required  to  establish  the  CSME  have  been
completed ... The establishment of the legal and institutional infrastructure is reasonably
far advanced. The notable exceptions to this are that the majority of the member-states
have yet to enact the Revised Treaty into domestic law; and the majority have yet to
establish national competition authorities. (Girvan 2005:7)
However, as pointed out, the CSME derives its legal framework from the Revised Treaty, which up
until 2005 had been signed by 13 of the 15 CARICOM members. Also, as mentioned earlier, even
when  provisions  of  the  Revised  Treaty are  not  enacted  in  national  laws,  the  directions  of  the
Revised Treaty are nonetheless binding within CARICOM member-states. 
249 This also included managerial, supervisory and technical staff, in addition to spouses and immediate family. CARI-
COM set up a program for the removal of restrictions on this category, 
250 CARICOM Press Release 138/2005.
251 Ibid.
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Girvan (2005) based his analysis on three main areas: legal and institutional infrastructure;
single market provisions; and single economy provisions. He noted that for legal infrastructure, 15
elements with 168 actions needed to be implemented, and CARICOM countries had completed 81%
or 136 of these elements. Under the single market, 29 elements with 336 actions were necessary, of
which CARICOM countries had completed 64%, or 215 actions, including the transfer of social
security benefits (91%) and facilitation of travel (25%).
In July 2005, CARICOM issued a press release in which it asserted that the CSME deadline
would not be changed to accommodate any of the CARICOM member-states. It  suggested that
“Heads  of  Government  of  the  Caribbean Community ...  reaffirmed that  the  CARICOM Single
Market (CSM) and the Regional Development Fund (RDF) will be in place by December 2005”.
CARICOM further emphasized the heads of states should be adamant about meeting the deadline,
“proceed to put in place all of the arrangements across the Region to create a Single Market by the
end of this year (2005), subject also to putting in place a special affirmative economic program for
the OECS countries, Belize and Guyana”.252 
Ultimately, CARICOM member-states achieved the 2005 deadline and the CSME was ratified
by CARICOM member-states to be implemented on 1 January 2006. 
In  2007,  CARICOM initiated  the  CARICOM Trade and Competitive  Project,  the  aim of
which was to “provide more and better opportunities for the people of the CARICOM region to
participate  in  and  benefit  from  the  introduction  of  the  CSME”.253 The  project  featured  four
components: 
• harmonization and standardization of administrative practices and procedures;
• enhancing the effective functioning of  services  and labor  markets  through standardized  
licensing & certification and mutual recognition of licenses & certificates;
• widening  the  scope  of  participation  by stakeholders  & beneficiaries  in  the  process  of  
decision-making, implementation and operation of the single market;
• the creation of national facilities and institutions in each CARICOM country for overseeing 
the project. 
The  project  assisted  national  governments  in  reforming  administrative  rules,  systems,  and
procedures to comply with the provisions of the CSME. It also offered information to interested
CARICOM nationals about the provisions of the CSME, and provided a regional administration for
252 Press Release 148/2005.
253 CSME unit website of CARICOM. http://csmeonline.org/website/index.php?
view=article&id=159:ctcp&option=com_content Website last visited June 2015.
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regulating environmental and gender related objectives of the CSME. 
In January 2012, for example, CARICOM issued a press release stating that the CSME was
operating at  an approximately  64% level  of overall  compliance.  It  further  stated that “the core
regimes operate through transactions between governments and CARICOM businesses and persons;
... legal, institutional and administrative measures form part of the foundation elements from which
compliance  is  determined  and  measured”.254 CARICOM  additionally  offered  the  overall
'compliance statistics'255 for the member-states on the five core regimes of the CSME. These were
the: 
• free Movement of Skills under which CARICOM members harmonized approximately 66% 
of their laws to meet the requirements of the CSME;
• free Movement of Goods harmonized to approximately 80%;
• free Movement of Services harmonized to approximately 37%;
• free Movement of Capital harmonized to approximately 72%;
• right of Establishment harmonized to approximately 64%. 
Additionally,  an  examination  of  the  CCJ's  original  jurisdiction  rulings256 highlights  that,  when
CARICOM  countries  act  against  and  breach  provisions  in  the  Revised  Treaty,  they  are  held
accountable by CARICOM institutions.  They reiterate  that even if  CARICOM countries do not
harmonize their laws and regulations with those of the provisions of CARICOM/the Revised Treaty,
it does not necessarily mean that the freedoms granted by the CSME are invalid for their countries. 
Dispute cases brought before the CCJ reveal the overarching jurisdiction of both CARICOM
institutions and the provisions of the CSME. 
For example, the dispute between a Trinidad cement company and Guyana257 reviewed in the
upcoming chapter, which concerns  a  CARICOM country breaching the  provisions  of  the  CET,
reveals that the CCJ ruled against the actions of the country and required that the country repeal its
regulations  and  implement  the  provisions  of  the  Revised  Treaty.  In  brief,  Guyana  suspended
CARICOM  regulated  CETs  on  cement,  and  imported  cement  from  third  countries  below  the
CARICOM required percentage. The Case was brought before the CCJ, and Guyana was compelled
by the CCJ judgment, against its own reservations and protests to reinstate the CET on all cement
products under the stipulations of the CET.  
254 CARICOM Press Release no. 22/2012.
255 CARICOM Press Release no. 22/2012.
256 See Chapter 5 for an extensive analysis of the CCJ's judgments.
257 TLC v. Guyana, (2009) CCJ 5 [OJ].
93
4.4 Discussion
Moreover, the case, Myrie v Barbados (2013) CCJ [OJ]258 reveals that when countries breach
provisions of the Revised Treaty for Freedom of Movement for CARICOM nationals, not only is
this country directed by CARICOM to harmonize its regulations, but it is additionally compelled to
award punitive damages. 
Furthermore, additional disputes independent of cross border effects such as the case Trinidad
Cement v The Competition Commission259 [2012] CCJ 4 (OJ) reveals that CARICOM institutions,
specifically  the  Commission,  possess  the  power  to  investigate  unfair  competition  practices  of
companies operating in CARICOM, even without the knowledge and against the protest of these
companies.
4.4.4 Implementation of the Single Economy
As stated above, the implementation of the CARICOM single economy was set for 2015.
However, in recalling the overview of implementation of the single market, it was observed that the
bulk of the implementation was done 'last minute'. Therefore, at this time 260 it would be premature
to entirely assess the extent to which the provisions of the single economy have been completed.
This is especially notable, since CARICOM itself,  in a press release in 2010, noted that it  was
necessary to  “re-evaluate  the deadline  for  implementation  of  certain aspects  of  the CARICOM
Single  Economy  …  of  certain  things  and  to  identify  more  reasonable  targets  for  that
implementation”. CARICOM advanced that:
 
economic circumstances had an impact on the ability of member-states to implement
aspects  of  the  Single  Economy  …  The  domestic  challenges  spurred  by  the  global
economic and financial downturn meant that CARICOM member-states could not focus
on  the  policy  initiatives  that  would  have  seen  progress  on  the  Single  Economy …
(especially given the) limited human resources in (its) public sector. (CARICOM Press
release 105/2010)
In 2011, the then-Prime Minister of Barbados, who was one of those responsible for the CARICOM
CSME, announced that CARICOM “had come to accept that the existing timetable for achieving
the Single Economy and the remaining components of the Single Market was not achievable”. 261 He
258 See case review and examination in the upcoming Chapter 5.
259 See case review and analysis of CCJ case: Trinidad Cement v The Competition Commission (2012) CCJ 4 [OJ] 
Chapter 5
260 June 2014.
261 CARICOM Press Release 246/2011 Paragraph 1.
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stated  that  this  decision  should  not  be  interpreted  to  say that  CARICOM had  'abandoned'  the
'ultimate  goal  of  the  CSME';  however,  “in  light  of  the  existing  turbulent  social  and economic
environment, a new deadline would be realistic”.262 It was further advanced that a single economy
would remain a 'work in progress', and that:
while recent negative events have revealed the high degree of financial interdependence
that already exists in our region, we cannot pretend that our efforts at macroeconomic
convergence have reached the point that would allow us to create and, more importantly,
to sustain a Single Economy. (CARICOM Press Release 246/2011:1)
The theory of Neofunctionalism requires that clearly delineated regional structures, competencies,
and provisions are in place in order for the process of regional integration to progress. In comparing
the  adaptation  and  implementation  of  the  single  market  with  that  of  the  single  economy,
Neofunctionalism's  'hypothesis  of  natural  entropy'  becomes  relevant.  As  mentioned earlier,  this
hypothesis proposes that “all integration processes will tend toward a state of rest or stagnation
unless disturbed by exceptional (i.e. unintended) endogenous outcomes or exogenous conditions not
present  in  the  original  convergence  or  …  institutions  themselves”.263 Reactions  to  exogenous
circumstances can take the form of the deepening of the level and scope of integration as seen in
the single market, or encapsulation as seen in the case of single economy. In the latter, the theory of
Neofunctionalism proposes that the limited scope and level of integration has a diminutive impact
on changes at both the national and regional levels; consequently the process of integration does not
reflect  any spill-over,  spill-around and spill-about.  Instead,  as  can  be  observed with  the  single
economy, the process of regional integration comes to a 'stand-still'. 
Theory of Neofunctionalism, which also proposes that early in the process, i.e. before the
creation/implementation of regional provisions, actors may opt to stall the integration process due to
weak  symbolic  engagement.  According  to  the  theory  of  Neofunctionalism,  given  the  existing
variables it is possible and plausible that the single economy in CARICOM will stall. 
The  theory  of  Neofunctionalism  requires  member-states  to  introduce  new  commitments
addressing the single economy, such as a 'Single Economy Act'. In drafting and signing such an act,
the member-states would be bound to its provisions and also to the liberalization and harmonization
of their individual economies.
262 CARICOM Press Release 246/2011 Paragraph 3.
263 Schmitter (2002:21).
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4.4.5 Factors Affecting the Process of Integration in CARICOM
The above review of the provisions and implementation of the CSME reveals factors affecting
the level of integration in various areas of CARICOM. It also reveals consistent tendencies in the
process of regional integration with regards to CARICOM. These are:
Correlation between Level and Scope: the provisions of the single market reveal a concerted
effort  by  CARICOM  countries  at  deepening  integration,  especially  with  the  creation  of  new
institutions with overarching power over the CARICOM member-states. For example, the single
market provides the possibility for CARICOM nationals to travel and establish their businesses in
other CARICOM countries possessing the rights and privileges of the citizens of the country that
they travel to. This form of 'open regionalism' calls for the harmonization of national laws and the
implementation of the provisions of the Revised Treaties.  Additionally,  in signing a provisional
application of the Revised Treaty, in the event that certain parts of these rights are not harmonized
under national laws, they are still binding on member-states, and the member-states are in effect in
breach of the provisions of the CSME. This is not the case for the single economy, because, not only
are there no clear provisions or limited delineations for the single economy, but there is also no
clear institutional structure.
Moreover, the theory of Neofunctionalism holds that an increase in the scope of integration
will positively affect an increase in the level of integration. This hypothesis was also observed in the
review  above.  Once  provisions  were  made  for  integration  and  institutions  were  created  with
regional mandates, there was also an increase in the level of regional integration. Regardless of the
actions of member-states, the process of regional integration in CARICOM deepened. For example,
cases above point to the 'forced' compliance of member-states to the provisions of the CSME, and
the guaranteed liberalization of the economies of CARICOM member-states. 
When  a  legal  basis  and  institutional  provisions  are  created,  the  implementation  of  these
provisions can then be initiated and achieved to a certain level. This can be very clearly observed in
the creation of the Grand Anse Declaration. There was no implementation of any form of the CSME
until a legal basis was added to the Original Treaty in the form of the '9 Protocols' that defined and
deepened the scope, thereby increasing the level of institutionalization and regional integration.
Based on the theory of Neofunctionalism, it can be argued, that a) the lack of a legal basis and
b) the lack of regional competencies and regional institutions, are two of the main reasons why
there has been limited progress in implementing a single economy. 
For the single market to have been implemented it was necessary to create a legal basis. The
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same is  true  for  the single economy.  The single economy has  not  been fully or  even partially
implemented. For the single economy to be implemented, like the single market, it is also essential
to create legal provisions and a legal basis for its implementation. For example, it is crucial to create
provisions  for  the  harmonization  of  monetary  policies.  These  can  take  the  form of  a  'Single
Economy Act'. 
Spill-over  effects: as  highlighted  in  Chapter  3,  Neofunctionalism proposes  that  when  the
members of an integration scheme are unsatisfied with the achievement of the goals previously
agreed upon, they will try to resolve their dissatisfaction by264 devising alternative implementation
strategies  that  were  not  initially  in  agreement,  for  example,  by revising  an  original  treaty and
engaging in collective action in policy sectors not contemplated in the original agreement. They
could also resort to cooperation with additional/alternative sectors, thereby expanding the scope of
their  mutual  commitment.  Additionally,  they  could  intensify  their  commitment  to  the  original
sectors, thereby deepening both level and scope of integration.
The initial  conceptual focus of economic integration as envisioned under  the Grand Anse
Declaration spills  over  to provisions  for institution building and political  integration.  However,
since the Grand Anse Declaration did not compel any binding force on the CARICOM member-
states, it also did not create a legal framework for the CSME. It did not delineate specific provisions
to which the member-states should subscribe.  CARICOM was therefore obliged to take further
steps  to  deepen  regional  integration  to  implement  the  initial  conceptions  of  the  Grand  Anse
Declaration, and so fulfilled a hypothesis of Neofunctionalism by seeking out alternative means:
• the protocols of the CSME created new regional institutions in CARICOM to oversee the 
implementation/correct  breaches  of  the CSME. These institutions  possess  the power to  
coerce member-states to comply with the provisions of CSME. In this respect, they possess 
a natural super-arching role over member-states and reveal a form of supranationality;
• as institutions were created, they expanded their roles and created new competencies for  
themselves. CARICOM regional bodies became a decisive part of the process of regional 
integration. Before the Revised Treaty, two main organs in CARICOM, the Conference and 
the Council, possessed exclusive power and decision-making ability over the direction and 
pace of integration. The Revised Treaty created new regional bodies, which became decisive
in the process of integration. These bodies in turn created new modes of regulation that  
additionally impact the speed and direction of integration. Although limited, their roles are 
264  Schmitter (1969:162).
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still essential to the process and as such, they express new traces and soft forms of regional 
governance in CARICOM;
• member-states  acted  according  to  the  utilitarian  principles,  with  regards  to  the  
implementation of regional provisions and complying with these provisions. For example, 
suspending the CETs against the provision of the Revised Treaty was a clear utilitarian  
action;
• member-states  made collective  actions  that  were  not  previously in  existence.  The new  
protocols, as presented above, are extensive agreements that change the scope of the entire 
arrangement  in  CARICOM.  The  harmonization  of  trade  in  CARICOM  led  to  the  
harmonization of sectors that were not initially addressed by the Grand Anse Declaration.  
The initial agreement of the Grand Anse Declaration expanded to further areas of economic 
and monetary integration and other sectors such as telecommunications, safety standards and
quality control;
• once  borders/impediments  to  integration  were  removed,  other  hindrances  became  
apparent/develop  and  new  regulations  are  created  to  address  these  shortcomings.  The  
depletion of member-states borders, the abstract possibility for regional trade, services and 
the free movement of people become feasible. Obvious and general impediments to cross-
border trade is the harmonization of national laws, especially those related to transportation; 
health, safety standards, and quality control; and ICT. The review above revealed that these 
two sectors also became two (unplanned) sectors which saw an entire revision, restructure 
and liberalization due to the CSME;
• new  rules  and  regulations  are  imposed  on  member-states,  further  deepening  regional  
integration.  For example,  the member-states were obliged to deepen their  integration in  
relation to harmonizing standards such as the quality and packaging of goods, and other  
regional health and safety standards prescribed by the Revised Treaty. National and regional 
companies are bound to the regional regulations of CARICOM which reflect a spill-over  
from other sectors;
• harmonizing the movement of people and services across the borders of CARICOM created 
the necessity for efficient communication services in and among member-states. Roaming 
services and cheap data plans became necessities for business solutions. Telecommunication
enable an increase or deepening of interconnectedness among CARICOM countries. Thus, 
the entire sector was revamped and liberalized to accommodate the liberalization of trade in 
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CARICOM. 
The Externalization Hypothesis:  in chapter 2, it  was advanced that integration in CARICOM is
propelled by external factors. It was argued that from colonization to post colonization, integration
in CARICOM has been a reaction to external factors, and motivated partly by external events. The
above overview reveals that the initiation of the CSME through the Grand Anse Declaration is
indeed proof of this argument. 
The single market aspect of the CSME also underscored this hypothesis. The single market
was seen not only as a means of intra-CARICOM integration, but also as a platform for negotiating
with the rest of the world. One aim of the Single Market as proposed in the Protocols which create
the legal basis for the CSME was to interact with 'third parties'. 
According to Neofunctionalism's Externalization Hypothesis, once there is agreement on a
policy or set of policies, actors will be compelled, despite initial goals, “to adopt common policies
vis-à-vis nonparticipant third policies. Members will be forced to hammer out a collective external
position,”265and in doing so, are likely to increasingly rely on the new central institutions to achieve
their goals. This is particularly visible with CARICOM and the CSME. An increase in the depth of
integration in CARICOM, especially due to the competencies and provisions of treaties, gave rise to
a  common  and  unified  increase  in  the  reaction  to  external  events  and  factors.  Integration  in
CARICOM is partly driven by external motives, and creates a further interplay between regionalism
and other external factors. 
This common reaction to exogenous factors is based on a fixed reality of Neofunctionalism
that when these factors become salient, regional integration is utilized as a means to address them.
For  example,  globalization  and  attempts  by  external  partners/contemporaries  to  integrate  are
perceived  as  a  common threat  by the  individual  member-states  in  CARICOM,  who then  pool
resources to answer this threat through internal integration. 
Non-State Actors:  the examination highlighted the capitol  role  of non-state actors in the
process of regional integration in CARICOM. Although the Conference initiated the first steps at
deepening  integration  through the  Grande  Anse  Declaration,  the  analysis  identified  the  role  of
institutions  and  political  élite  in  deepening  integration  though  the  CSME.  The  scope  of
competencies of institutions was extended under the Revised Treaty, which actively affected the
implementation  of  the  CSME.  Member-states  were  bound  to  their  commitments,  and  regional
institutions promoted and oversaw the implementation process. 
265 Schmitter (1969:165).
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Necessity of  Institutions:  the theory of Neofunctionalism proposes that a large part  of the
implementation process  is  due to  the functions  of institutions,  which are necessary factors  and
driving forces, propelling regional integration.
Newly established institutions were given overarching power and responsibility over member-
states. The competencies of the CARICOM institutions (such as the Competition Commission, the
COTED,  the  Regional  Intellectual  Property  Rights  Office,  and  Regional  Organizations  for
Standards and Quality) point to their vital role in the process of implementation in CARICOM. 
The  application  of  the  theory  of  Neofunctionalism  to  CARICOM  reveals  consistent
tendencies that should be taken into account for theorizing regional integration in general. These are
once a  legal  basis  with clear  structures  and provisions is  created,  then there is  a deepening of
integration;  this  is  regardless  of  the  pace  of  implementation  in  any  particular  member-state.
Therefore  an  increase  in  the  scope  of  integration  correlates  with  an  increase  in  the  level  of
integration.
Moreover,  spill-over mechanisms are persistent in the process of regional integration.  Not
only does the scope of competencies and level of commitments increase, but these increases result
in  further  harmonization  of  member-state  policies,  which  in  turn  relate  to  further  regional
regulations. 
Additionally,  there are soft  forms of supranationalism, even in labeled 'intergovernmental'
unions such as CARICOM. As integration deepens through the creation of a legal basis, institutions
are also created and these institutions are granted power over the same member-states who create
them. These powers relate to the possibility to coerce the member-states to adhere to regulations
and provisions of the Revised Treaty. These institutions therefore further deepen integration. 
Also, non-implementation and harmonization of provisions does not necessarily imply that
member-states do not comply with and/or are in breach of regional arrangements. This is especially
since legally binding treaties such as the revised Treaty of Chaguaramas provide recourse for non-
compliance and breaches. 
The application also revealed information to  be  taken into consideration,  from theorizing
integration in CARICOM. Specifically: lack of clear and decisive structures and regulations will
stall  integration.  In  this  case,  the  single  economy.  To this  end I  propose  introducing  a  'Single
Economy Act' which would:
• create a Monetary Union in CARICOM, including a single currency; 
• introduce more competencies for the Committee of Central Bank Governors, to not only 
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make recommendations but to implement regulations for monetary co-operation, and  
payments arrangements;
• apply regulations to integrate capital markets in CARICOM;
• establish a Central Bank to oversee balance of payments, interest  rates, cooperation  
between national banks, economic and monetary policy; and to manage the common  
currency. 
Notably, the application revealed that there is no distinction of cross border effects regarding health
and  safety  standards;  quality  control  and  regional  certification.  The  Revised  Treaty  does  not
distinguish  between  regional  and  national  standards,  rather,  it  imposes  regulations  on  specific
sectors. Additionally, national standards effectively reflect regional standardization, and regulations,
concerning goods and services.
The application also revealed that although not explicitly stated in the Revised Treaty, CSME
regulations imply direct effect in CARICOM. Specifically:
• the Revised Treaty revokes 'direct applicability', where it becomes a part of national law;
• as  such,  there  is  a  defined framework within  which  direct  effect  in  CARICOM is  
effective;
• the Revised Treaty invokes an emanation of the states, due to a vertical direct effect:  
between citizen and the state. CARICOM citizens can therefore invoke CARICOM law 
on the member-state;
• there is also horizontal direct effect, where citizens can hold other citizens or companies 
liable for specific issues. For example regarding anti competitive practices.
Moreover, the application revealed that the Revised Treaty provides coercive mechanisms for
member-states  to  comply  with  its  stipulations;  and  also  creates  institutions  to  oversee  the
implementation process.
4.5 Summary and Conclusion
This  chapter  has  examined  the  CSME  through  the  lens  of  Neofunctionalism.  It  first
scrutinized the creation and the provisions of the CSME; and then analyzed the competencies of the
institutions entangled with the CSME, the initiation of the CSME, and the implementation of the
CSME. This undertaking afforded an exceptional understanding of the process of integration in
CARICOM. It revealed the nature and some of the factors and hindrances of the process of regional
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integration in CARICOM. 
These include a pronounced and unmistakable increase in regional integration in CARICOM
with the CSME. The CSME represents a series of commitments on deepening economic integration
in CARICOM, which extends to social and institutional arrangements. Organs and Institutions of
Governance,  institutions  in  CARICOM  are  revamped,  and  new  competencies  are  given  to
CARICOM. The Provision of Services, Rights of Establishment and Movement of Capital,  also
creates  new  rules  over  CARICOM  member-states.  They  impose  regional  regulations  in  the
individual member-states.
With the signing of the Revised Treaty, the Conference was relieved of some of its decision
making power; which relates to soft forms of supranationalism in CARICOM, especially through
the  creation  of  new institutions.  The Original  Treaty transcribes  the  decision-making power  in
CARICOM  to  the  Conference  of  Heads  of  Governments  and  the  onus  to  oversee  the
implementation of said decisions to the Council of Ministers. The Revised Treaty marks a change in
the institutional structure of CARICOM, and also in the regional commitments of the member-states
to deepen integration, especially since new institutions were created with regional mandates. These
institutions  were established for  checks and balances  and their  mandates  were overarching and
imposed on the member-states.  For example,  the members of the Competition Commission are
elected from a regional body. This is purposely done to eliminate the sentiments of member-states
and to create an independent regional body positioned above member-states to police and act as a
'regional  watchdog'.  Furthermore,  the  Revised  Treaty  fundamentally  accorded  CARICOM
superiority  over  national  laws  in  numerous  economic  cases.  For  example,  the  Revised  Treaty
demanded that CARICOM countries revise their laws, both those directly and to some extent those
indirectly relating to market and economic liberalization. Essentially, the immigration acts of most
countries essentially became invalidated due to the regulations of the CSME on harmonization and
liberalization of CARICOM immigration. 
In  liberalizing  its  markets,  and  creating  a  single  market,  CARICOM  member-states
relinquished their basic border & immigration rules and adopted CARICOM Protocols. This chapter
therefore reflected the trickle down of rules and decisions from the regional level to the member-
states and, most importantly, in numerous sectors of the member-states including, air,  freight &
transport, and standards & quality;  which were not at first relevant from the initial Grand Anse
Declaration. These are clear traces of the spill-over effect hypothesis of Neofunctionalism.
Remarkably,  the  provisions  of  the  Revised  Treaty  extend  further  than  cross-border
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transactions  or  transactions  with  cross-border  effects.  They  affect  the  internal  markets  of
CARICOM, especially relating to competitive practices; Moreover, they touch on standardization of
education  and  certification  programs,  and  health  and  safety  standards.  Regional  integration
therefore, address deep internal structures in the CARICOM member-states' economies.
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Chapter 5: Neofunctionalism and the CCJ
5.1 Introduction
This Chapter analyzes the  competencies and judgments of the CCJ  and their effect on the
process of regional integration in CARICOM.266 The competencies are analyzed in order to observe
the  scope  of  commitments;  and  the  process  of  institutionalization  by taking  into  account  both
prescriptive and descriptive integration. The judgments are analyzed in order to see whether there is
a  pattern  in  the  CCJ's  rulings,  and  to  determine  whether  and  how they affect  the  process  of
integration. The decisions of the judges, moreover reveal if the CCJ: generally references itself in
making decisions,  thereby reinforcing  its  competencies;  upholds  decisions  by other  community
institutions, in so doing reinforcing regional authority and regulations in the Community; and rules
in favor/against the deepening of integration. A review of both competences and judgments, provide
information  on  the  meaning  and  implications  of  the  CCJ  in  the  process  of  integration  in  the
Caribbean. They further provide the opportunity to observe the process of creating rules;  and the
ways in which institutions reinforce their legitimacy and make decisions affecting integration at a
technical level. 
The examination of the CCJ further covers two areas: the regional area, with factors such as
the competencies of the CCJ; its  de jure powers and institutionalization; and the contents of the
rulings, including the references it makes in substantiating it rulings are scrutinized. The national
area,  where  observations  will  be  made  regarding:  the  direct  and  indirect  impact  of  the  CCJ's
decisions on the sovereignty of the member-states; spill-over of integration from the legal scope to
the economic, political, and social scope and sectors; and compliance with the CCJ's decisions by
the member-states.
The chapter therefore primarily focuses on the institutional capacity in theorizing regional
integration, and secondarily on the functional aspect of theoretical investigation.
266  Judgments from The CCJ's inauguration up until the end of 2013. This time span is used to cover all judgments 
made during the writing of this thesis. At the end of 2013 the court delivered rulings on 74 Appellate Jurisdiction 
cases and 16 Original Jurisdiction cases.
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Between 2001 and 2003, CARICOM member-states signed the Agreement Establishing the
Caribbean Court of Justice (the Agreement). Page one of the Agreement notes that in signing the
Agreement, the CARICOM heads of government were “aware that the establishment of the Court is
a further step in the deepening of the regional integration process”.267 They also declared that they
were  convinced  that  the  CCJ  “will  have  a  determinative  role  in  the  further  development  of
Caribbean jurisprudence through the judicial process”.268  
The mission of the CCJ, as outlined in its first annual report,269 is to “perform to the highest
standards  as  the  supreme  judicial  organ  in  the  Caribbean  Community  ...  underpinning  and
advancing the CARICOM Single Market and Economy ... (and) foster(ing) the development of an
indigenous Caribbean jurisprudence”.
The  first  annual  report270 also  outlines  the  vision  of  the  CCJ,  which  is  to  provide  an
“accessible, fair, efficient, innovative and impartial justice system built on jurisprudence reflective
of  our  history,  values  and traditions  while  maintaining  an  inspirational,  independent  institution
worthy of emulation by the courts of the region”.  
The CCJ is administered by a Court Executive Administrator, who is head of a Department of
Court Administration that is answerable to the President of the CCJ. In addition to the president,
there are nine presiding judges who are appointed and granted tenure by a Caribbean Regional
Judicial  and  Legal  Services  Commission,271 and  are  not  elected  by  member-states.  The  CCJ
proposes  that  the  judges  and  therefore  the  decisions  of  the  CCJ  to  are  independent  of  the
CARICOM member-states, including political influence and sentiments.
The court is seated in Trinidad and Tobago and is funded by a trust fund administered by the
Caribbean Development Bank. The budget of the court is further financed by the payment of fines
and the court costs of the parties who use the services of the court.
Established in 2001, the CCJ was inaugurated in 2005 and is the only existing court which
serves both as a court of first instance and a court of final appeal. 
267  Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice p.1.
268  Agreement Establishing the Caribbean Court of Justice p. 1.
269  CCJ (2006) p1.
270  CCJ (2006) p1.
271  The commission is composed of eleven members: including the Court President, who is the Chairman of the Com-
mission; and persons appointed by the National Bar Associations, Public Services Commissions, the Secretary Gen-
eral of the Community, and the Dean of the Faculty of Law of the University of the West Indies. 
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5.2.1 Appellate Jurisdiction
At its sixth meeting in 1970, the Conference of Heads of Government of CARICOM (the
Conference) decided to create a regional court to replace the Privy Council as the final appellate
court for the CARICOM member-states. 
Under Article 25 of the Agreement Establishing the CCJ, the role of the court is to exercise
appellate jurisdiction arising from final decisions of the courts of appeal of the contracting parties in
the following proceedings: civil and for dissolution or nullity of marriage; those which involve the
interpretation of the constitution of the contracting party; those relating to redress for contravention
of the provisions of the constitution of the contracting party; those relating to the exercise of a
jurisdiction conferred expressly on a superior court under the constitution of the contracting party;
and other cases as may be prescribed by any law of the contracting party.
According to the CCJ' first Annual Report (2005-2006:91), “appellate Courts have a peculiar
responsibility to protect the rule of law by correcting errors, and developing and clarifying the law”.
It additionally maintained that:
appellate courts should provide review sufficient to correct errors made by lower courts
including intermediate appellate courts. … (protecting) the rule of law and improve(ing)
the manner in which lower courts decide cases and dispense justice. ...  The result is
increased confidence in the entire judicial process. (CCJ Annual Report 2005-2006:91)
As a final appellate court, the CCJ serves as the sole jurisprudence on final appellate matters in the
member-states in CARICOM, which presents the CCJ as providing checks and balances in regional
jurisprudence, creating regional integration in final judicial affairs in CARICOM. In the CARICOM
intergovernmental community,  the CCJ has supranational power over the member-states in their
own national laws and practices:  the court  hear matters relating to civil proceedings as well  as
overturning national court decisions. The CARICOM member-states are bound to:
agree to take all the necessary steps including the enactment of legislation to ensure that
all authorities of a Contracting Party act in aid of the Court and that any judgment,
decree,  order  or  sentence  of  the Court  given in  exercise of  its  jurisdiction  shall  be
enforced by all courts and authorities in any territory of the Contracting Parties as if it
were a judgment, decree, order or sentence of a superior court of that Contracting Party.
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(Agreement Establishing the CCJ:Article 26)
Article  26  characterizes  the  rulings  of  the  CCJ under  its  appellate  jurisdiction  as  those  of  the
member-state  appellate  courts,  additionally  empowering  the  CCJ  “to  make  any  order  for  the
purpose of securing the attendance of any person, the discovery or production of any document, or
the investigation or punishment of any contempt of court that any superior court of a Contracting
Party has power to make as respects the area within its jurisdiction”. Not only does the article
guarantee the unbiased implementation of the CCJ judgments, but it also grants the CCJ the power
and jurisdiction  to  summon  evidence/persons  to  assist  in  making  judgments,  granting  the  CCJ
overarching competences in relation to the jurisdictions of the member-states.
As of December 2013, only three272 members of CARICOM subscribed to the CCJ's appellate
jurisdiction, notwithstanding efforts by CARICOM member-states to ratify the CCJ as their final
appellate court. For example, in 2005 the government of Jamaica attempted to ratify the CCJ as the
final appellate court  of that country;  however,  this  was challenged in the Privy Council  by the
opposing national  party in  Parliament  and other  national  civil  society organizations.  The Privy
Council ruled against implementing the CCJ and removing itself as the highest final appellate court
of that country. It further stated that the only recourse for implementing the CCJ was a national
referendum; this was never initiated, for numerous political and financial reasons. In Trinidad and
Tobago,  political  disputes  have  also  limited  the  scope  of  implementation  of  the  appellate
jurisdiction of the CCJ, where a proposed compromise is that the CCJ would only have appellate
jurisdiction on criminal but not civil matters; this has still not been implemented to date273. St. Kitts
and Nevis have also indicated interest in ratifying the CCJ's final appellate jurisdiction. Antigua and
Barbuda has additionally called for an OECS-wide referendum on the CCJ as a final appellate court.
Dominica has also signaled its interest in implementing the CCJ as its final appellate court in 2015.
There  are  therefore  indicators  that  the  appellate  jurisdiction  of  the  CCJ  will  be  expanded  to
additional CARICOM members. As of December 2013, the Caribbean Court of Justice had ruled on
74 appellate jurisdictions cases.274
272 Barbados, Guyana and Belize adopted the CCJ as their final appellate court, in 2014 Dominica adopted the CCJ as
its final appellate Court, and other CARICOM countries have started proceedings to ratify the CCJ's final appellate
jurisdiction.
273  At the time this chapter was drafted in 2013.
274 Taken from a case count of rulings posted on the court's website (January 2013 when this chapter was drafted) The
court has expressed in its first annual report 2005-2006 that all rulings will be posted on its website as soon as they
are available).
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5.2.2 Original Jurisdiction 
As a court of first instance, the CCJ's task is to settle disputes in relation to the Revised Treaty
of Chaguaramas (Revised Treaty)275. The CCJ possesses the sole authority to interpret the Revised
Treaty of Chaguaramas, which establishes the Caribbean Single Market and Economy, (CSME).
Article  12 of  the  Agreement  confers  exclusive jurisdiction  on the CCJ (subject  to  the  Revised
Treaty)  to  hear  and deliver  judgments  on  disputes  between  contracting  parties  and contracting
parties and the Community; referrals from national courts or tribunals of contracting parties; and
petitions by nationals concerning the interpretation and application of the Treaty.
In exercising its original jurisdiction, the CCJ functions as an international tribunal, it applies
the rules of international law in interpreting and applying the Revised Treaty.
Through its  interpretation  and application  of  the  Revised  Treaty,  the  CCJ determines  the
functions of the CSME and, to an extent, the level and speed of integration in CARICOM. 
Article 16 of the Agreement establishes the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. It demands
that “contracting Parties agree that they recognize as compulsory, ipso facto and without special
agreement, the original jurisdiction of the Court”. Furthermore, “in the event of a dispute as to
whether the Court has jurisdiction, the matter shall be determined by decision of the Court”. As
highlighted in Chapter 2, Article 15 of the Agreement Establishing the CCJ effectively binds all
applicable parties (including member-states and Community citizens, Organs, and Bodies of the
Community) to 'comply' with the judgments of the CCJ. Additionally, Article 14 addresses interim
measures relating to the application of its decisions. The article proposes that the CCJ “shall have
the power to prescribe if it considers the circumstances so require, any interim measures that ought
to be taken to preserve the rights of a Party”. 
As stated earlier, ratification of the CCJ's appellate jurisdiction in CARICOM is controversial
and complicated in comparison to ratification of its original jurisdiction. Only three countries 276
have enacted the legal requirements to make the CCJ their final appellate court. In spite of these
complications, the appellate rulings of the CCJ are significant for any theoretical analysis of the
CCJ. They reveal information on the competencies procedures, patterns of the CCJ's rulings, and
the impact of these judgments on the general process of integration in CARICOM.
Below is an analysis of the notable cases.277 The cases are reviewed first based on a time line,
i.e., from earliest to latest, and then grouped together as a cluster of cases when two or more are
275  As mentioned in chapter 2.
276  Up until when this chapter was drafted in 2013 Barbados, Guyana and Belize were the only CARICOM members
who had ratified the appellate jurisdiction of the CCJ.
277  A review of the entire judgments of the CCJ (up until the end of 2014when this thesis was drafted) is presented in
this thesis; for the purpose of analysis, space and readability some rulings are placed ' the Annex of Chapter 5'.
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related to the same matter.
Under its original jurisdiction, the CCJ has the sole “responsibility to develop and clarify the
law by interpreting the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas”.278 
Article 38 of the Agreement addresses the implementation of the CCJ's decisions and declares
that “the Contracting Parties shall take all necessary action, whether of a legislative, executive or
administrative nature, for the purpose of giving effect to this Agreement. Such action shall be taken
as  expeditiously  as  possible,  and  the  Secretary-General  shall  be  informed  accordingly”.  These
articles establish the overarching competencies of the CCJ, and reveal that CARICOM member-
states are bound to uphold and execute its decisions.
All CARICOM members ratified the original jurisdiction of the CCJ in their national laws,
and as of December 2013 the CCJ had ruled on a total of 16 original jurisdiction cases.
5.3 An Examination of the CCJ
5.3.1 Judgments under the CCJ's Appellate Jurisdiction
1  st   Case:  Barbados  Rediffusion  Service  Limited  v    Asha  Mirchandani  Ram  Mirchandani
McDonald  Farms   LTD:  the  first  final  appellate  case,  which  concerned  defamatory  charges  in
calypsos that were broadcast in Barbados, was brought before the CCJ in 2005. The case had been
previously dismissed by the Barbados national appellate court, but a request was made from the
appellant for a hearing before the CCJ. The CCJ was then compelled to address its jurisdiction for
granting application for special leave. In its first ever final appellate judgment, the CCJ ruled that:
our function on this application is a very limited one. Our concern is only whether there
is some special feature of this case which would warrant our giving special leave to
appeal to this Court in these circumstances in which there is no appeal as of right and no
basis on which the Court of Appeal could have granted leave to appeal to us. (Barbados
Rediffusion v. Mirchandani 2015:para 42)
The CCJ ruled that although there was no basis for the Barbados court of appeal to grant leave for
the  case  to  be heard  before  the  CCJ,  it  possesses  the  jurisdiction  to  grant  such a  leave  under
extraordinary circumstances.
278 Caribbean Court of Justice first Annual Report (2005-2006:91).
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Implication/s of the ruling: through this ruling, the CCJ established its jurisdiction to grant
special leave for an appeal when such leave is denied by the lower courts. The CCJ ruled that it can
grant leave for appeal regardless of the ruling of the lower court. It can therefore circumvent the
authority of the lower court  of appeal and grant leave for appeal,  which effectively extends its
jurisdiction and represents its power over the member-states. 
2  nd   Case:  Barbados  Rediffusion  Service  Limited  v    Asha  Mirchandani  Ram  Mirchandani
McDonald  Farms   LTD:  the  second  case  was  a  follow-up  commentary  on  the  first,  in  which
explanations were given for the exclusion of certain aspects of the appeal and sections of the case.
Under its jurisprudence, the CCJ additionally pointed out that before the case was heard by the CCJ,
it was in the Barbados national court system for more than 15 years. It commented that such a long
period of time was unacceptable, thereby criticizing the legal process in Barbados. It further gave
the directive that Barbados should aim to expedite such cases in the future. Its ruling then, not only
pertains to the current case before it, but also to the overall legal system of Barbados, and future
cases of this nature.
Implication/s of the ruling: in pointing out the level of stagnation and deficiencies, in the
Barbados judicial system, the CCJ acts outside of its 'normal' requirement for ruling on a specific
case. The actions of the CCJ thus reveal one of the predictions of the theory of Neofunctionalism,
which is that institutions, in carrying out their functions and expanding their competencies, often
times act outside of said competencies.
19  th    Case:   Barbados  Rediffusion  Service  Limited  v    Asha  Mirchandani  Ram Mirchandani
McDonald Farms   LTD: the 19th appellate case before the court was the judgment related to the
cases above. Special leave was granted to hear the case before the CCJ.
The ruling again made notice, observations and commentaries “of the enormous delay which
has occurred in this case and about which both sides have complained”.279 The CCJ ruled that due to
lack of participation by either party, it would defer its ruling.
Implication/s of the ruling: the CCJ uses its  power to comment on the judicial  sphere in
CARICOM member-states. The cases reveal that the CCJ act independently of the member-states,
on its  own behalf,  and for  its  own purposes.  The CCJ made reference  to  its  previous  rulings,
including the content and the sentiments of these rulings. In so doing, the CCJ sets a precedent in it
first rulings and establishes its political clout as an independent regional institution.
3  rd   Case: Brent Griffith vs Guyana Revenue Authority and the Attorney General of Guyana  :
279  Barbados Rediffusion v. Mirchandani, (2015) CCJ 1 [AJ] p. 45.
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the third final appellate case before the CCJ was related to labor law in Guyana. It challenged the
termination of a government employee. The CCJ ruled that it possessed jurisdiction to hear the case
as an appeal case originating form Guyana; however, it ruled that the application itself was flawed
due to procedural inconsistencies. The CCJ additionally ruled that:
although we consider it right to entertain this application, it must be remembered that
special leave to appeal is granted purely as an act of grace … In other words the grant of
special leave is always a matter of discretion and never a matter of right. (Griffith v.
Attorney General, 2006 CCJ 1 [AJ]: para 27)
Like its Original Jurisdiction ruling on Doreen Johnson vs CARICAD280, the CCJ saw the Revenue
Authority (where the claimant worked) as: 
a new corporate entity distinct from the government although it is a public corporation.
The employees of the Revenue Authority are not holders of any public office nor are
they employed in the service of the government of Guyana in a civil capacity. (Griffith
v. Attorney General, 2006 CCJ 1 [AJ]: para 46)
The CCJ complicates  the  definition of  a  public  sector  worker,  awarding itself  responsibility to
decide on the definition. Since the claimant was viewed by the CCJ as not being a public officer or
a public  sector worker,  his  claim was dismissed.  The move of the CCJ to define public sector
workers in Guyana  in addition to the procedural application for appellate hearing,  establishes a
precedent for the interpretation of future cases. The CCJ is now required to hear and pass judgments
on cases that are similar in nature; in so doing, they require a widening of the competencies of the
CCJ. The CCJ also declares that it possesses the sole power to decide on the 'right' of Applicants for
special  leave,  underscoring  that  this  discretion  would  be  reviewed  on  a  case-by-case  basis.
Therefore, the CCJ places itself in an authoritative role to decide on granting special leave.
Implication/s of the ruling: reflecting on the above and previous extraordinary rulings of the
CCJ, a clear pattern in the CCJ's judgments can be observed. The CCJ continuously rules outside of
its initial requirement for the case. In making comments on the level of stagnation of a national
judicial system including its own power to grant special appeals outside of national constitutions
280  For more information see Johnson v. Caribbean Centre, (2009) CCJ 3 [OJ] in the following section.
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and the CCJ Act, the CCJ acts as an independent and supranational institution in CARICOM281.
Moreover, in pronouncing that leave is granted purely as an act of grace, the CCJ ruled that it
possesses the sole discretion to determine the merits of an extraordinary case; furthermore, these
merits  would be based in its  interpretation,  and there is  no 'law'  to apply in such a case.  This
effectively implies that the CCJ is able to create a new body of 'law' regarding special leave.
4  th   Case: The Attorney General Superintendent of Prisons vs Jeffrey Joseph Lennox Ricardo
Boyce: the fourth appellate jurisdiction case was an appeal following criminal court sentences in
Barbados. Prior to its inauguration and shortly thereafter, the CCJ was considered to be a “hanging
court”.282 Therefore, this case concerning the commuting of death sentences to life in prison is of
high importance for the analysis  and discussion of the CCJ's decisions on criminal matters and
death sentences. When the case was brought before the CCJ, an appeal had already been made
before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the unconstitutionality of the death penalty in
the  state  of  Barbados.  Death  warrants  were  read  to  both  men  twice  in  a  period  of  two years
(between 2002 and 2004). The CCJ reviewed the case and decided to rule on three principal issues;
namely: the exercise of power of the Governor-General of Barbados with reference to commuting a
death sentence; whether it (the CCJ) can commute or give other relief to death sentences; and if so,
“in what manner, if at all, may unincorporated international human rights treaties which give a right
of access to international tribunals affect (the present case)”.283 The CCJ judges ruled unanimously
that the CCJ possesses the jurisdiction to commute death sentences to life in prison, and also that it
can grant other relief to death sentences. 
Implication/s of the ruling:  this ruling exonerates the CCJ as a 'hanging court,' representing
the commitment  of  the  CCJ to offer  “fair...  impartial  justice”284 and  to  act  as  an “independent
institution”.285 However, The CCJ did not make reference to the existing  Charter of a Caribbean
Civil  Society (the Charter);  rather,  it  looked to international  instruments  in  spite  of  the charter
having been adopted by all the heads of government of the Community. In sidestepping the Charter
and applying international instruments, the CCJ attempts to establish itself as an international body
281 This is in line with the Neofunctionalism's prediction, as the analysis in the section below will further explain
282 In 2004, the Jamaican Parliament passed bills to establish the CCJ as its final appellate court. The opposition party 
appealed the bill in the Privy Council, the country's final appellate court. It did so under the grounds that the CCJ 
was a 'hanging court'. It referenced cases such as Pratt vs Morgan Pratt & Morgan -v- The Attorney General of Ja-
maica [1994] 2 AC 1, where the Privy Council previously granted a commuted capital punishment to life in prison. 
It was feared that the CCJ would in future similar cases, interpret Jamaica's constitution, and uphold death sen-
tences.
283 Attorney General v. Joseph, (2006) CCJ 1 [AJ] para 11.
284  CCJ (2005:1).
285  CCJ (2005:1).
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that is reliant on international law, instead of regional regulations and laws. This action establishes a
precedence in interpreting international law regarding human rights instead of the Charter. It also
reveals the CCJ's aspirations to be an international court.
The CCJ decided that human rights treaties protect the right to life, which should be upheld in
capital punishment sentences. It held that even when member-states have not subscribed to these
human rights treaties, they still can be used in delivering judgments. This aspect of the judgment
embodies the 'externalization hypothesis' of Neofunctionalism, which proposes that there is at times
difficulty in isolating decisions of institutions from a global context, and these difficulties further
lead to tensions and or contradictions.
The CCJ additionally decided on steps that Barbados should take in future capital punishment
cases to create a case body. In creating a case body, the CCJ sets precedents and make references.
Both  actions  increase  its  level  of  supranationality,  and  are  proposals  of  the  theory  of
Neofunctionalism.
5  th   Case: Tyrone da Costa Cadogan vs The Queen: the fifth appeal case is also a request for
special leave to appeal the conviction for murder, which carries the mandatory death sentence in
Barbados.
Due to a ‘savings’ clause in the Constitution of Barbados, the national courts are precluded
from repealing mandatory death sentences in spite of the fact that a death sentence violates the
fundamental rights protected by the Constitution of Barbados, which are granted by the Charter and
other international treaties to which Barbados is a signatory.  Due to this, the Barbados Court of
Appeal upheld the trial judge's ruling directions on the “need for the jury to be satisfied that the
accused intended to kill or cause serious bodily harm to the victim”.286 The appellant argued that it
was necessary for the trial judge to “direct the jury that they were not entitled to find the necessary
intent for murder unless they felt sure that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty as a
result of the Applicant’s actions”.287
The appeal was dismissed by the CCJ, citing that there was no miscarriage of justice. This
was in spite of two additional points raised during the case, which are: a lack of public funding for
making the services of an independent (non government) expert witness for legal aid defendants;
and limited legal aid fees for murder trials, which should be higher, with the provision of a leading
counsel and a junior counsel, or at least two counsels.
The CCJ rejected these claims,  noting that  there  is  inadequate evidence for  alleging that
286  Cadogan v. The Queen, (2006) CCJ 4 [AJ] p. 2.
287  Cadogan v. The Queen, (2006) CCJ 4 [AJ] p. 2.
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government employed expert witnesses are biased or incompetent.
Implication/s of the ruling: the two above points could probably have refined the legal system
in Barbados; however, the CCJ decided that it was not necessary to change them. Additionally, the
CCJ could have made an extra-judicial ruling on the death sentence of the case. It could also have
issued directives on other aspects of the case, which would have allowed the case to be heard before
the CCJ on other grounds. Substantiated grounds were given later when the case was brought before
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights under a mistrial based on the questionable mental state
of the appellant. These grounds should have been suggested by the CCJ as a reason for a new
retrial, or for a discretionary hearing and a new final appellate ruling.
The exclusion of such a possibility shows disregard for the provisions of the Charter. Also, it
goes  against  previous  rulings,  in  which  the  CCJ  considered  international  treaties  and  their
provisions regarding fundamental human. This ruling is a brutal blow to the reformation of the legal
system in Barbados, especially given the CCJ's past comments on the legal process there. 
In contrast to the previous case, the CCJ had already expunged its reputation as a 'hanging
court'. Neofunctionalism characterizes actions such as these as 'conflictual' and contradicting the
status  quo.  It  further  proposes  that  such  actions  are  accomplished  as  a  result  of  institutional
convictions and misconceptions. 
9  th   Case:  Dwarka  Nauth  v    The  Attorney  General,  the  Public  Service  Commission,  the
Regional Executive Officer, the Minister of Finance of Guyana: the ninth final appeal case, from the
Court of Appeal in Guyana, was dismissed by the CCJ. The case concerned a temporary social
security  officer,  who  after  dismissal  sought  and  was  granted  remuneration  and  compensatory
salaries in the Public Service Appellate Tribunal in Guyana. The decision was appealed by the state
of Guyana, and the appeal was granted, which saw the initial ruling set aside. 
The CCJ based its rulings on two issues: the applicants brought the application to the CCJ
after  the  deadline,  and requested  special  leave  to  appeal;  and it  considered  whether  there  was
sufficient merit to grant special leave. 
The CCJ referred to its previous ruling Griffith v. Attorney General, (2006) in its judgment, in
which it “laid down the parameters within which it will exercise its discretion to grant special leave
to appeal, and emphasized that the grant of special leave is purely an act of grace or discretion, and
never a matter of right”.288 The CCJ therefore decided that because of the long delay in submitting
the application289, and given that the excuse for the long delay was unacceptable, the court could not
288  Nauth v. Attorney General, (2007) CCJ 4 [AJ] p. 6.
289  The required time for submitting an application is 30 days after a ruling of from the court of appeal, and this appli-
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be  “persuaded  that  there  are  sufficient  and  adequate  grounds  for  the  exercise  of  …  (its)
discretion”.290
This procedural flaw in the application process was cited as the main reason for rejecting the
application.  However, in the same case to which it  made reference to  substantiate its  judgment
(Griffith v. Attorney General, (2006)), the CCJ ruled  that procedural flaws should not affect the
judgment of a case. 
Furthermore, the CCJ had also ruled that an application for special leave can be granted when
there are reasonable grounds for the appeal. Application for leave could have been granted for the
above case based on its merits, irrespective of 'procedural flaws'.
However, the CCJ decided that: “no proposed grounds of appeal were filed by the Applicants,
but one can safely assume that they would have been the same as those advanced as grounds for the
application for special leave”.291
It further ruled that there were no arguable grounds for granting special leave for an appeal. In
doing so, it:  precluded the Applicants from submitting substantial grounds for appeals; dismissed
any 'probable' grounds for appeals; and refrained from advising/precluded the Application to submit
updated grounds for the appeal. 
Implication/s of the ruling: these contradictory behaviors reveal a pattern in the CCJ's rulings.
Although it sets precedents and interprets national/regional regulations and laws, the CCJ retains a
fixed set of ideals. 
These inconsistencies do not reveal a discrepancy in the CCJ rulings; rather, they exhibit an
unwritten internal code by which the CCJ performs and operates. These underlying factors often
surpass  the  very requirement  of  the  CCJ to  show impartiality in  its  judgments.  The theory of
Neofunctionalism addresses  such behavior  by proposing that  such actions  signify that  regional
technocrats can and often act insensitively which deteriorates the deliberative process. 
10  th   Case: Euland Hendy v The Commissioner of Police et al: the tenth case came from the
Guyanese  court  of  appeal,  concerned  the  termination  of  a  police  officer.  He  was  awarded  20
months' salary for as compensation. He then challenged the amount of compensation in the lower
court of appeals and an additional pension was granted. Not satisfied with the ruling, he applied to
the lower court to appeal the decision in the CCJ which was granted on the condition that he pay
security for costs at the hearing in the sum of 400,000292 dollars. The CCJ noted that the security for
cation was submitted 13 months and 12 days after such rulings.
290  Nauth v. Attorney General, (2007) CCJ 4 [AJ] p. 7.
291  Nauth v. Attorney General, (2007) CCJ 4 [AJ] p.7.
292  All monetary amounts are denoted in the working currency of the appellate country. In this case Guyana.
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cost decision was: “without any written notice of application by the respondents or any evidence as
to the intended appellant’s financial position”.293 
The CCJ not only upheld the ruling of the lower court of appeal, however; it also ruled that
the decision to  pay securities  for  cost  action was legal.  This  ruling  is  questionable,  given that
securities of cost were demanded without any prior knowledge of the appellant's financial position,
especially considering that the matter was related to a dispute over financial remuneration.
Implication/s  of  the  ruling:  from  an  institutional  perspective,  any  ruling  of  the  CCJ  on
securing cost in appeal cases would also extend to its own livelihood. From the Neofunctionalist
point of view , institutions will make decisions that are beneficial to themselves. Thus, as per the
theory of Neofunctionalism, this incident can be seen as an instance of the CCJ ruling with bias to
extend its own livelihood, which is a pattern noted in its other rulings as well.
11  th   Case:  Wesley Emptage vs The Attorney General of Guyana: in the 11th final appellate
case,  the  CCJ ruled  that  “the relevant  facts  and documents  in  this  case are  respectively in  all
material respects the same as, and mutatis mutandis identical with (the previous case)”.294Thus, the
CCJ ruled ad verbum referencing the previous case.
Implication/s of the ruling: the CCJ references its own rulings in its entirety, and also creates
case law, dictating that in the event that a case has the same conditions as a previously ruled on
case, then the ruling for the latter case will entirely reflect the positions of the former. The CCJ
thereby creates its own body of case law and reaffirms its position as an independent institution in
CARICOM. Moreover, the CCJ creates a situation in which it reviews some cases individually,
concentrating on the merits of the case, with others based on precedents. This is a common action
proposed by the theory of Neofunctionalism, reflecting the individual character of the institution as
an entity with independent characteristics of its initial inauguration.
13  th   Case:  Elizabeth Ross v Coreen Sinclair: the 13th final appeal case originated from the
appellate court in Guyana. The appellant had been refused leave to apply as a poor person and was
thus required to provide security for costs in the sum of $100,000. As the court noted, this was in
spite of the fact that: “the appellant, Ms. Elizabeth Ross, is blind and virtually penniless ... (and) the
respondent, Ms. Coreen Sinclair ... is no better off financially than the appellant”.295
The CCJ granted leave to  appeal as a  poor person, overturning the ruling of the Guyana
appeals court  that the Applicants provide securities.  In so ruling, the CCJ set the precedent for
293  Hendy v. Commissioner Of Police, (2008) CCJ 1 [AJ] para 16.
294  Emptage v. Attorney General, (2008) CCJ 2 [AJ] p. 2.
295  Ross v. Sinclair, (2008) CCJ 4 [AJ] para 2.
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CARICOM citizens to be able to appeal on the grounds of 'poor persons', precluding the mandatory
provision of securities of costs.
Implication/s  of  the  ruling:  this  judgment  opens  up  possibilities  for  poor  Community
members296 to circumvent the requirements of the national appeal courts that they provide security
costs before they can go before the court. As the CCJ had advanced in its first annual report (quoted
earlier), it creates the possibility for an “accessible, fair … and impartial justice system” in which it
rules against national laws and allows poor persons access to lower courts of appeals. 
35  th   case: Elizabeth Ross Appellant v Coreen Sinclair: this case is the decision on the above
case, which concerned a dispute over the rightful tenement of the property between the owner and
the tenant of this property. The CCJ ruled that:
it  is  regrettable  that,  in  effect,  the  Authority  has  been  permitted  to  escape  the
consequence of their 'grave error'. ... This is not the first occasion in recent times that we
have had to deal with a situation where the real wrong-doer in cases of this sort has been
allowed quietly to exit the stage, unnoticed, leaving two innocent parties to tough it out
one of whom ultimately is bound to lose. … Since the Authority is not a party before us
we are not even able to make an order in these proceedings ... Nevertheless, we trust that
good sense will prevail and that the Authority, as a responsible body in a democratic
society that strives to abide by the rule of law, will act in an appropriate manner so as
financially to undo the effects of its breach of contract. (Ross v. Sinclair 2008:para 24)
The CCJ further allowed the appeal and quash the orders made by the courts below. In light of the
fact that both parties were poor persons, it made no order as to costs. 
Implication/s of the ruling: the CCJ chastised the judiciary system of Guyana, an action which
reveals  a  pattern  of  acting  outside  the  necessary  parameters  of  the  case.  Its  judgments  were,
however,  limited  to  comments  on  the  unfairness  of  the  judicial  system.  It  did  not  make  any
recommendations for any party to bring the state of Guyana to court to hear grievances, nor did it
require an extra-judicial review of the case by the lower courts. The theory of Neofunctionalism
proposes  that  these  actions indicate  the  insensitivity  of  regional  technocrats,  and  their  role  in
causing the deterioration of the deliberative process.
16  th   Case: Vibert Gibson v The Attorney General of Guyana: the  case  originated from the
296  Only Community member-states who have incorporated the CCJ as their final appellate court.
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Guyanese appellate courts, and was concerned with a dispute over the termination of employment
of a police officer. The CCJ struck out this appeal by referencing its rulings in previous similar
cases, namely, the tenth and eleventh, which were reviewed above.
Implication/s  of  the  ruling:  as  mentioned  earlier,  this  action  signifies  the  CCJ's  move  in
creating a body of case law in which it can refer to itself in passing judgments.
17  th   Case:  Yolande  Reid  v  Jerome Leon  Reid:  the  case  originated  in  Barbados  and  was
concerned with divorce and the division of marital assets. This case is of particular importance
because the  divorce  was filed and granted in  the USA. The appeal  courts  in  Barbados upheld
appeals. Because both parties were dissatisfied with the outcome; the case was referenced back to
the  USA authorities,  where  it  proceeded  without  the  presence  of  one  party  (Mr.  Reid,  the
defendant).  An  action  was  filed  in  Barbados  for  the  decision  enforced;  Mrs.  Reid's  interests
prevailed. This action was successfully appealed in the Barbados High court and the ruling was
overturned in favor of Mr Reid. Mrs Reid appealed the Court of Appeal Ruling before the CCJ. The
CCJ ordered the restoration of the rulings of the High Court of Barbados, thereby overturning the
ruling of the Appeal Court. The CCJ ruled that:
while we agree ... that the issue of substantial justice must be determined by standards
accepted by the courts of Barbados, this cannot mean that the system of justice or the
course of the proceedings in the foreign court will be acceptable only if it resembles or
approximates  what  obtains  in  Barbados.  A  failure  to  meet  the  threshold  of
incompatibility with substantial justice connotes some aberration, some procedural or
other deviation that is so fundamental that we regard it and the result it produces as not
being in accord with our basic notions of what is fair and just … we can find nothing of
the sort here. (Y. Reid v. J. Reid, 2008:para 47)
In doing so, the CCJ upholds the rulings of a 'foreign court' and struck out the entire process of
appeal in Barbados.
Implication/s of the ruling: this procedure follows a pattern of the CCJ of referring to and
relying on international tribunals, courts and agreements, over regional judicature. It attempts to
establish  itself  as  more  than  a  regional  and independent  'international'  court,  which  takes  into
account international rules over those of national or regional regulations. These actions of the CCJ
to create a body of cases can be explained by the Neofunctionalist utilitarian concept.
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18  th   Case: Chamanlall Mukhtiyar et al vs Poonardai Sukhu et al.: the case came from the
Guyana appeals court and concerned land titles. The appeal was based on the argument that the
Barbados court of appeal erred in its ruling, including the fact that the appellant's appeal to appear
as a 'poor person' was dismissed. The CCJ ruled that: “the reason for the dismissal of the application
... is that we do not consider that the appeal which it is sought to bring, is arguable”.297
Implication/s  of  the  ruling:  the  CCJ  consciously excludes  from the  dismissed  appeal  the
appeal for the right to be heard as a poor person, and maintains its body of case law on ruling in
favor of the right of poor persons to go before the lower courts without securities of cost or court
costs. In so doing, it clears itself from upholding the lower court's dismissal of an appeal to appear
as a 'poor person', which it had previously ruled on. This judgment also enables the CCJ to maintain
its body of case law, while ruling against an appeal, especially regarding appeals to appear as a poor
person. It furthermore proves that CCJ consciously rules in a certain pattern, also substantiating the
theory of Neofunctionalism, which states that actions are calculated by actors, and are utility-based.
Such  a  pattern  of  ruling  also  denotes  that  actors  utilize  their  positions  when  there  are  new
opportunities for strategic intervention, in this circumstance, creating a legal body of cases in which
poor persons are granted the right to appeal in the higher Courts and the CCJ without court costs.
This points to an independent moral component of Neofunctionalism.
23  rd   Case:  John  Sealey  v  The  Attorney  General  of  Guyana  and  The  Police  Service
Commission:  this  case  also  originated  from the  Court  of  appeal  of  Guyana and concerned the
dismissal of a police officer. The appellant's services were terminated on November 1984, he filed a
petition in October 1987, wrote an inquiry as to the petition in January 2001 and filed a motion in
February 2001. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, under the grounds that “it is unjust to
give a remedy to the appellant due to his neglect in filing his proceedings in a timely manner. His
undue delay without any explanation has rendered the proceedings an abuse of the court's process
which will undermine the integrity of the judicial system”.298 The CCJ upheld this ruling even while
accepting that “no specific limitation period applies to claims under Article 153”299 under which the
appellant filed suit, by arguing that “it is in the public interest that claims do not become stale, the
courts assisting those who are vigilant to enforce their claims, but not those who sleep on them”.300
Implication/s of the ruling:  this follows previous rulings of the CCJ where also it ruled that
parties  should not 'drag their  feet'  in the judicial  process.  This additionally points to the CCJ's
297  Mukhtiyar v. Sukhu, (2008) CCJ 9 [AJ] para 1.
298  Sealey v. Police Service Commission, (2008) CCJ 11 [AJ] para 6.
299  Sealey v. Police Service Commission, (2008) CCJ 11 [AJ] para 12.
300  Sealey v. Police Service Commission, (2008) CCJ 11 [AJ] para 13.
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previous  comments on berating national systems for slow judicial procedures. It follows the idea
under the theory of Neofunctionalism that institutions will act within their means to change issue
areas relating to their convictions. In this case it is the speed of the judicial process. 
26  th   case: Clyde Anderson Grazette v The Queen: arising from Barbados, the case concerned
the appeal of murder charge. The CCJ dismissed the petition, but advised for application to plea
against the death sentence. The grounds of the appeal were problems with DNA samples and gaps
in the chain of chain of custody. The CCJ dismissed these arguments by quoting Canadian case law,
specifically Romilly J, in R v Larsen (2001) BCSC 597. It is interesting to say the very least that the
CCJ would look to common law in Canada to make reference to DNA sampling in the Caribbean,
when it did not establish that the process is similar. The only argument can be that Canada is a
member of the common wealth, to which all countries of CARICOM belong as well, and as such
similar case law and background to law applies. The CCJ additionally ruled in favor of the public
appointed medical doctor in charge of the DNA sampling and labeling. It ruled that “Dr. Murray did
not say precisely how he labeled the sample ... in its ordinary English ... “label” refers to a piece of
paper or other material attached to an object and giving information about it”.
Implication/s of the ruling: with this ruling the CCJ was able to dismiss the appeal to set aside
a  murder  sentence,  however,  it  upheld  its  pattern  of  ruling  against  a  death  sentence,  and
recommended an application against the death sentence on its own accord. The CCJ again defines
itself  as  an independent  institution  which  can  rule  outside  of  the questions  raised in  the cases
brought before it.
28  th   case: Subhas Ramdeo v Heralall: this case came from the Court of appeal of Barbados.
The case was concerned with dispute over a contractual land purchase. The Appellant and purchaser
Mr Ramdeo, failed to lodge a caveat, despite delays on the part of his vendor in transferring title.
He then relied on fraud allegations as his argument, given that the Respondent/vendor Mr Heralall,
had been involved in some fraud relating to the transfer.
The CCJ ruled that “this case emphasizes the need for a contractual purchaser of land from a
registered proprietor to protect himself against a subsequent transfer of title to another person by
lodging a caveat against that title”.301
The CCJ dismissed the case arguing that even though rationally the appellant was 'right' there
were no legal provisions in the law of Guyana for granting the appeal.
Implication/s of the ruling: this case reveals the limitations to the CCJ's de jure power, as it
301  Ramdeo v. Heralall, (2009) CCJ 3 [AJ] Para 1.
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can only interpret  law,  but it  is  not granted the competence,  nor  does  it  possess the necessary
capacity to rule outside its scope of legal entitlements. Given its role as a court of final appeal, the
CCJ  acted  under  the  sole  recourse  available.  This  is  in  commenting  that  the  appellant  was
'technically right' however the law of Guyana does not provide any recourse. The competencies of
the CCJ are then put under question. 
31  st   Case: Ramnarine Somrah Applicant v The Attorney General Of Guyana et al: this case
came from the Guyana Court of Appeal. It followed a lengthy process, which was concerned with
an appeal over the dismissal of the Applicant from the public sector, for being absent from duty
without leave or excuse. After a lengthy process of appeals, including a petition for compulsory
retirement  with benefits,  which was ignored;  the Applicant  filed leave in  the Guyana Court of
Appeal to apply to the CCJ. This application was also denied. The CCJ however heard the request
under  other  technical  grounds  and  ordered  that  the  “Applicants  is  paid  pension  and  other
superannuation  benefits  to  be assessed  and calculated  on the  basis  of  24  years  of  pensionable
service”.302 The CCJ overturned the ruling of the Guyana Court of Appeal. 
Implication/s of the ruling: contrary to previous appeals of former public sector workers, the
CCJ ruled in favor of the appellant. In this case, the termination was not based on forced retirement
due to the termination of an agency. As such the ruling is well within the body of case law which
the  CCJ created.  The CCJ circumvented  the  rulings  of  the  lower  courts,  especially  relating  to
permission for the CCJ to hear the appeal. In doing so, the CCJ reinstates itself as an independent
institution, above national laws and court rulings. This action of the CCJ further reflects it political
clout and its supranationality.
38  th   case: Jeffrey Adolphus Gittens v The Queen: the case concerned a murder conviction. The
lower  court  of  appeal  in  Barbados  quashed  the  conviction  and  substituted  a  conviction  for
manslaughter  and a  sentence  of  20  years.  Among the  main  grounds,  the  appellant  argued that
Barbados Court of Appeal did not comply sufficiently or at all with the Penal System Reform Act of
Barbados. The CCJ ruled that there was a breach of and non-compliance of the Barbados law. The
CCJ further ruled that the Court of Appeal failed to afford the appellant an opportunity to be heard
on the question of sentence, which amounts to a denial of due process, and as such rendered the
sentence invalid. The CCJ found other “blatant errors” in the rulings of the Court of Appeals and
therefore reverted the case to be reviewed by the same judge for re-sentencing.
Implication/s of the ruling: wordings such as “blatant errors” and “denial of due process”
302  Sean Gaskin v. The Attorney General, (2010) AL 9 para 33.
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reflect a stern stance of the CCJ on upholding the right of CARICOM citizens, which it committed
itself to do in its first annual report quoted above. The CCJ can also be seen as being consistent in
its judgments.
41  st   Case: Daniel Ramlagan v Narine Singh: the case came from the Guyana Court of Appeals
and was concerned with the dispute over the ownership of two acres of land. The CCJ ruled against
the Court of Appeal, ordering that the ruling be quashed. Additionally, the CCJ ruled that: “in all the
circumstances the action of the Court of Appeal in this case was unjustified and wrong”. It ordered
the case be remitted to the lower court to be reheard on it merits. It also ruled that the order of the
lower courts to produce court cost also be quashed and that “the appeal will be re-listed for hearing
without delay”.303
Implication/s of the ruling: again, the CCJ addresses its dislike for the slow process of the
judiciary system. This case adds to the pool of cases in which the CCJ has addressed the pace of the
judiciary system in the member-states. In the present case, not only does the CCJ comment on the
slow pace of  the judiciary system in the member-states,  but  it  also rules  that  the lower courts
expedite hearing in this particular instance, which is a step further than simply issuing comments.
45  th   case: Jippy Doyle V The Queen: originating from the Court of Appeal of Barbados, this
case was concerned with the conviction of a pastor for the rape of his then 13-year-old church
member. During the trial, the jury was ordered to consider that since the victim was a child, any
proof of sexual intercourse should be treated as rape. The pastor was then convicted by the jury and
fined 10 years imprisonment for rape. The lower court of appeals substituted the 'guilty verdict' with
that of an 'indecent assault offense', which carried a 3-year imprisonment charge. In its ruling, the
CCJ made reference to its previous ruling, quoting itself verbatim, that:
this  Court  will  only  intervene  in  criminal  cases  in  circumstances  where  a  serious
miscarriage of justice may have occurred in the court below or where a point of law of
public importance is raised and the Applicants persuades the Court that if not overturned
a questionable precedent might remain on the record. (Doyle v. The Queen 2011:para 4)
The CCJ further argued that “The Court will not lightly interfere with findings of fact implicit in the
verdict of the jury or those made by the court from which the appeal originates”. 304 As a result of
these arguments, the case was dismissed.
303  Ramlagan v. Singh, (2010) CCJ 4 [AJ] para 14.
304  Doyle v. The Queen, (2011) CCJ 4 [AJ] para 5.
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Implication/s of the ruling: In quoting itself verbatim, the CCJ repeated its previous actions in
creating and following a series of case laws. This case reiterates previous proposals, in which it was
advanced that not only does the CCJ set precedents; it also follows its rulings verbatim, thereby
creating a new regional case law.
47  th   case: Romeo Da Costa Hall v The Queen: originating in the Court of Appeal of Barbados,
this case was concerned with a sentence of manslaughter. The CCJ commented that  “the present
appeal raises an important issue as to how a sentencing court should treat time spent on remand by a
prisoner, whether the courts below applied the proper principles in that regard and whether or not as
a result the sentence imposed was excessive”.305 In its ruling the CCJ again made reference to South
African laws for no apparent reason306. It ruled that:
in order to ensure that custody time will be fully credited in a consistent and transparent
way, the reasons for departing from the rule should be compelling and stated in open
court  when  passing  sentence.  Moreover,  the  time  that  must  be  set  off  against  the
sentence must be clearly specified by the sentencing judge. Clarity demands no less. (Da
Costa Hall v The Queen 2011:para 51)
In calculating time spent in custody, the CCJ ruled that it agreed “ the courts below have erred in
not applying the proper principles”.304 The CCJ further commented that “sentencing judges have
no business with concepts like 'calendar years' or 'prison years'”.307
Implication/s of the ruling: this case sets out the methods for calculating 'time in remand' and
'sentence time'. It depicts the CCJ's opinions and directives as having a clear impact on the judicial
process and for future cases of a similar nature. It further highlights the nature of the CCJ to use
international instruments,  or those of the Privy Council  (a rival under its appellate jurisdiction)
rather than regional instruments. In choosing its specific case reference in each setting, instead of
relying on a set body of jurisprudence the CCJ rules according to its own desires; instead of being
bound by a particular set of regional regulations/laws, the CCJ chooses the instruments which it will
apply on a case-by-case basis. Consequently, the CCJ has the possibility of shaping the direction of
its judgments.
305  Da Costa Hall v The Queen (2011) CCJ 6 [AJ] para 1.
306  Bearing in mind that it did a similar action in the 2nd case, where it made reference to Canadian rulings relevant to 
DNA samples.
307  Da Costa Hall v The Queen (2011) CCJ 6 [AJ] para 55.
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50  th   Case:  Florencio  Marin  &  Jose  Coye  v  The  Attorney  General  of  Belize:  this  case
originated from the Court of Appeal of Belize, and concerned an appeal against hearing a case in
which the attorney general of Belize went against two government employees who were alleged to
have,  without  lawful  authority,  transferred  state  land  to  a  company,  beneficially  owned  and/or
controlled by one of them, for $1 million under market value. The lower court of appeal held that
the former ministers could be held liable for loss of public property and that the Attorney General
was entitled to institute proceedings. The CCJ decided that:
an action of the kind initiated by the Attorney General in this case is to all intents and
purposes unprecedented and that from one perspective centuries of forensic thought and
assumptions could be taken to lean against his proceeding … to allow this suit could
have significant implications for the role of the State in the law of torts. To recognize
competence in the Attorney General to bring this suit naturally raises the prospect of the
Crown suing,  possibly as  parens  patriae,  in  a  host  of  other  torts  including trespass,
nuisance and negligence. (Marin v the Attorney General of Belize 2011:para 152) 
Nevertheless the CCJ ruled in favor of the Attorney General.
Implication/s of the ruling: through this case, the CCJ expands the pool of Applicants who can
bring suit before it, and also extends its competencies to hear cases such as these. The CCJ's actions
can therefore be seen as a means of increasing its competencies and political influence.
51  st   Case: Delys O’leen Colby V Felix Enterprises Ltd & Felix Broome Incorporated: this
case came from the Barbados Court of Appeal, and was concerned with a vendor-purchaser dispute
caused  by  “delays  of  the  parties  and  the  courts  and  due  to  the  absence  of  detailed  standard
conditions  of  sale  containing  clear  comprehensive  provisions  governing the  process  through to
completion or termination of contracts for the sale of land”.308 The CCJ criticized the process in
Barbados and asserted that:
 it would be remiss of us if we did not again comment adversely upon the excessive
delays in the delivery of reserved judgments. The trial judge took over two years four
months – and even then it took over eight months for his order to be finalized – while the
Court of Appeal took two years. (Colby v Felix Enterprises 2011:para 3)
308  Colby v Felix Enterprises (2011) CCJ 10 [AJ] para 1.
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Implication/s of the ruling: although the CCJ ruled that the orders of the lower courts should be
accepted and followed by both parties; it explicitly chastised the judicial system of Barbados. This
was not the first time it had made reference to its previous rulings in which it had criticized the
time-consuming judiciary process in Barbados. 
53  rd   Case: Sea Havens Inc. Appellant v John Dyrud: this case came from the Court of Appeal
of Barbados. It concerned one party who purchased a property it had previously leased from the
other party and used for business. The case was complicated by the process of concluding land sale
in Barbados. Again, in its ruling the CCJ criticized Barbados for the unnecessary delays, citing
rulings in which it had made fixed procedural delineations that  “in our view, as a general rule no
judgment should be outstanding for more than six months and unless a case is  one of unusual
difficulty or complexity, judgment should normally be delivered within three months at most”.309
The  CCJ  further  criticized  the  extensive  delay  (over  four  years)  in  the  case  before  the
Appellant’s case was heard. It again chided the system, declaring that:
this  is a most unsatisfactory situation that needs to be remedied … The expeditious
resolution of commercial disputes yields a net benefit not just to the litigants but also to
the economy of Barbados. It is very important that specific performance cases such as
this be identified early as needing timely disposition. (Sea Havens v Dyrud 2011:para 7)
Although the CCJ noted that such delays affect the interest in the outcome of money, it did not rule
that the State should be held culpable for such funds, instead it commented again on the delay in
cases. However, it acknowledged that Barbados had recently (2008) introduced a 'Civil Procedures
Rules'  (CPR),  which is a practice directive to decrease case backlog. The CPR lists  civil  cases
which are still in the judicial process dating back to 1990, and aims at efficient management of
these cases.
Implication/s of the ruling: the introduction of CPR influenced by the CCJ prior rulings are
directly  related  to  the  CCJ's  directives  on  the  pace  of  the  judicial  system  in  Barbados.  The
implementation of the CPR therefore reflects the CCJ's impact on the Barbados judicial system.
56  th   Case: The Guyana Cricket Board v The Attorney General Of Guyana: this case came
from the Guyana Court of Appeals, and concerned financial accountability of representatives of the
Guyana Cricket Board. Specifically, the Ministry of Sport assumed the national administration of
309 Y. Reid v. J. Reid, (2008) CCJ 8 [AJ].
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cricket outside of the jurisdiction of the Guyana Cricket Board. During the appeals process in the
lower court, the case was dismissed with no option for appealing the ruling. In a very interesting
move, the CCJ ruled that:  “due to the seriousness of the issues and the urgency of the matter this
Court most exceptionally will exercise the powers of the Court of Appeal”.310The CCJ made an
unprecedented move in taking over the role of the lower court.
Implication/s of the ruling: the above action of the CCJ, to take over the role of the lower
court again reveals an attempt to extend its competencies. The CCJ ruled in according to what it
believed should have been done by the lower court of appeal. It extends its competencies to those of
the lower courts and acts as the theory of Neofunctionalism predicts that institutions would do.
57  th   Case: Marjorie Ilma Knox v John Vere Evelyn Deane et al.:  this case came from the
Court of Appeal of Barbados. The case is an interlocutory appeal relating to an order from the lower
court of appeal affirming security of cost of the appeal. The lower court required the appellant pay
securities of cost because of residence outside the jurisdiction of Barbados. The CCJ ruled in favor
of the appellant, and stated that although decisions on securities of cost is discretionary, the lower
court was “wrong in that it was erroneous in law … it took into account irrelevant considerations
and failed to take into account matters relevant to the exercise of that discretion and whether it was
just in all the circumstances to make such an award”.311 The CCJ further ruled to set aside the orders
of the lower court.
Implication/s of the ruling: the CCJ made new interpretations on both securities of cost, and
the  implications  of  residential  status  of appellants/respondents  in  appeal  cases.  This  is  another
example in which the CCJ rules beyond its obligations to the case, and according to the theory of
Neofunctionalism, 'muddles about' in the regional judicial process.
67  th   case: BCB Holdings Limited & The Belize Bank Limited v The Attorney General Of
Belize: originating in the court of appeals of Belize, this case was related to a dispute over a special
tax regime allegedly crafted in a deed by the government of Belize for two companies. The case
was complicated, because it was not only concerned with challenging arbitration proceedings and
the power of international tribunals over CARICOM states, but also with public policy in Belize.
The case reveals a blatant level of corruption related to state-regulated market preferences in Belize.
The CCJ's recounting of the case reveals that the deal  “was executed by the Prime Minister (the
then Minister of Finance) and also by the Attorney General of Belize. The document was expressed
to be “confidential”. The parties agreed not to make any announcement concerning its contents or
310  Sing v The Attorney General of Guyana (2012) CCJ 2 [AJ] para 41.
311  Knox v Dean (2012) CCJ 4 [AJ] Para 51.
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any ancillary matter”312
Additionally,  the CCJ noted that, the arrangement, in the form of a deed was not brought
before  the  Commissioner  of  Income  Tax  of  Belize,  who  had  been  unaware  of  the  deed  and
implications more than a year after its execution. Furthermore:
 
the deed was never legislated by Parliament, but was honored for two years until  a
change of administration following a general election. The companies challenged the
decision in an international arbitration under a tribunal. The Tribunal ruled against the
State  of  Belize  and  awarded  damages  against  Belize  including  arbitration  totaling
approximately $44 million. (BCB Holdings v The Attorney General of Belize 2013:para
2) 
The judgment also included compounded annual interest of 3.38%. The companies applied to the
High Court of Belize to have the award enforced; it was resisted on the grounds that the act was
unconstitutional. The dispute could not be arbitrated, as it related to the tax rates and liabilities of
the companies, which was a matter for the Parliament of Belize.
The  CCJ  decided  that  courts  should  act  with  great  respect  for  judgments  from  foreign
tribunals and should only in the rarest circumstances refuse these judgments. It further ruled against
remitting the case due to additional cost for both parties for a new cycle of litigation, and because
the  case  would  have  to  be  reheard  before  a  new panel,  as  the  presiding  judge was no  longer
employed in the Court of Appeal. It ruled that the present deed created a unique tax regime in
Belize  which  the  parliament  could  not  alter,  and  the  implementation  of  such  a  deed  without
legislative approval (which was not sought or granted) was illegal. Furthermore, it stated that:
the rights and freedoms of the citizenry and democracy itself  would be imperiled if
courts permitted the Executive to assume unto itself essential law-making functions in
the  absence  of  constitutional  or  legislative  authority  so  to  do.  It  would  be  utterly
disastrous if the Executive could do so, selectively, via confidential documents. (BCB
Holdings v The Attorney General of Belize 2013:para 42)
312  BCB Holdings v The Attorney General of Belize (2013) CCJ 5 [AJ] para 5.
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 The CCJ went further to comment that:
in young States especially, keen observance by the courts of the separation of powers
principle remains vital to maintaining the checks and balances that guarantee the rule of
law and democratic governance. Caribbean courts, as part of their general function of
judicial  review,  have  a  constitutional  obligation  to  strike  down  administrative  or
executive action that exceeds jurisdiction or undermines the authority of the legislature.
(BCB Holdings v The Attorney General of Belize 2013:para 42)
Implication/s  of  the  ruling:  this case  follows  a  pattern  of  the  CCJ  superimposing  itself  in  a
'supervisory' role, via rulings outside of the case requirements, and commenting on consequential
matters. This is in line with the suggestions of the theory of Neofunctionalism in relation to actions
and characteristics of institutions. The CCJ officially appoints itself as 'guardian of democracy' in
the Caribbean in such matters. 
74  th   Case:  Clyde Brown v Michelle Moore:  this  case came from the Court of Appeals of
Barbados. It raises the question of “whether the CCJ has jurisdiction to set aside an order it has
previously made”.313 The Applicants contended that an order of the CCJ “was a breach of natural
justice, and that there should be a rehearing by a different panel”.314 The previous claim before the
CCJ related to  a  dispute over  the possession of  a  parcel  of  land.  Under the present  claim,  the
Applicants made two main arguments, that: the CCJ had erred in its judgment because it did not
read his written submissions, and as such his rights to a fair hearing was thereby prejudiced; and the
respondents had no standing at  the previous hearing before the CCJ and should not have been
considered parties, because their documents were filed and the fees paid late/after the deadline. 
The CCJ dismissed both arguments as unfounded and therefore the application for leave to
appeal was also dismissed.
Implication/s of the ruling: through such judgments, the CCJ did not have to rule on whether
it possesses the jurisdiction to dismiss its own rulings. In disregarding the main contention of the
case, i.e. its competencies, and ruling along another line, the CCJ avoids putting its competencies
under scrutiny.
The  review  of  the  above  cases  was  intended  to  examine  the  process  of  integration  in
CARICOM.  The  case  rulings  were  inspected  to  reveal  any patterns  in  the  CCJ's  rulings.  The
313 Brown v Moore-Griffith (2013) CCJ 12 [AJ] para 1.
314 Ibid para 1.
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patterns  discovered  were  found  to  be  consistent  with  the  proposals  of  the  theory  of
Neofunctionalism,  namely:  the  CCJ  acts  as  a  regional  institution,  with  utilitarian  interests,
superimposing its jurisdiction over CARICOM member-states; it holds international opinions over
national sentiments and regional practices; and it rules on extra-judicial aspects of cases outside of
the initial questions of the case extending its competencies.
5.3.2 Judgments under the CCJ's Original Jurisdiction
As mentioned  previously,  unlike  its  appellate  jurisdiction,  all  CARICOM countries  have
ratified the CCJ's original jurisdiction. The cases that are reviewed below are notably lesser than
those  under  the  appellate  jurisdiction315.  However,  this  can  be  attributed  mainly  to  what
Neofunctionalism describes  as  the  'initiation cycle  of  integration'  in  CARICOM. In this  phase,
according  to  the  theory  of  Neofunctionalism disputes  begin  sporadically,  the  reaction  to  these
disputes affect the process of regional integration, most times for the better. The theory further
proposes that over time the number of cases will increase, especially as cross-border integration
deepens and national borders eventually disappear; the cases below therefore signify the initial step
of deepening integration in CARICOM. In analyzing these cases, it is imperative that we observe
any patterns in the rulings of the CCJ, and whether these rulings positively or negatively influence
the depth and speed of regional integration.
1  st   Case: Trinidad Cement Limited & TCL Guyana Incorporated v Guyana: the first original
jurisdiction case that was brought before the court, was between Trinidad Cement Limited (TCL)
and Guyana Incorporated (TGI), the  appellants, against the Republic of Guyana, the defendant.316
The case, request for special leave, sets the precedent for the CCJ as a court of original jurisdiction.
In the suit, TCL and TGI claimed that Guyana breached the provisions of Article 82 of the
Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (Revised Treaty) which obliges contracting countries to establish
and maintain a Common External Tariff (CET) on all goods which do not qualify for community
treatment, in this case cement.317 In the case files, according to TCL and TGI, prior to 2007 the
government of Guyana suspended the CET on cement for third parties; and opened markets for the
free import of cement for external companies outside of CARICOM.
This affects both TCL and TGI as cement manufacturers, who therefore enjoy a competitive
advantage  over  external  producers.  The  CET is  a  pillar  of  the  CARICOM Single  Market  and
315  Since its inauguration until the end of 2013, the CCJ had ruled on 15 original jurisdiction cases. They are reviewed 
below, and are categorized first numerically and then by relation and context.
316  TLC v. Guyana, (2008) CCJ 1 [OJ].
317  As reviewed in Chapter 4, the common external tariff on cement protects the local producers of cement in the 
CARICOM market.
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Economy,  creating  a  competitive  bubble  for  CARICOM  manufacturers  in  the  CARICOM
community. Cement is also a determinative product for CARICOM markets. Prices and the supply
of cement affect and regulate the manufacturing, construction and other sectors in the CARICOM
member-states; therefore, the ruling of the CCJ on this matter was of utmost importance to the
CARICOM manufacturing sector.
In its decision, the CCJ noted that since this was the first original jurisdiction case, there was
no authoritative example to follow in interpreting and applying the Revised Treaty. It further stated
that in the future, the rulings of the CCJ would form the body of literature, which the CCJ can rely
on and refer to for its decisions. In the first paragraph of its first jurisdiction ruling, the court sets its
first precedent by ruling that:
Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago are parties both to the Treaty and to the Agreement.
Each of them has ratified and implemented these instruments which confer on the Court
compulsory and  exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes concerning the
interpretation  and  application  of  the  Treaty  ...  both  States  have  submitted  to  the
jurisdiction of the Court. Further ... the Agreement confer on the Court jurisdiction to
determine its jurisdiction in the event of a dispute concerning its jurisdiction. (TLC v.
Guyana 2008:para 1)
The Court  further stated that “the language of a treaty's  text  is  often imprecise and sometimes
deliberately ambiguous in order to accommodate politically acceptable interpretations in different
jurisdictions. This is particularly the case with multilateral treaties”.
It made reference to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT),
which reads “a treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to
be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”.318
Following this, the CCJ decided that in making its decision it should take into account factors such
as:
the context,  object and purpose of the Revised Treaty;  the status and role of private
entities accorded by the Treaty; the intention of the States Parties to the Revised Treaty;
the ordinary meaning to be attributed to the language of the text of the Treaty, and the
318 TLC v. Guyana, (2009) CCJ 1 [OJ] para 10.
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subsequent  conduct  of  the  States  Parties  establishing  their  understanding  of  the
instrument ... (and to) also comment on the relevance and significance of rules that have
been made pursuant to the Revised Treaty. (TLC v. Guyana, 2009 CCJ 1 (OJ) para 10)
The court affirmed the status of the individual as an object of international law in the Mavrommatis
Palestine  Concessions  from The Permanent  Court  of  International  Justice.319 It  also  considered
comments  from  the  International  Law  Commission  on  the  status  of  private  entities  under
international law.
In its twenty-page judgment, the court set a precedent, settling the “question as to whether a
private entity of a Contracting Party is entitled to bring proceedings against that Contracting Party”
by applying Article 222(c) of the Revised Treaty. In doing so, the CCJ grants the possibility for
future private businesses to bring proceedings to the CCJ against the member-states in which they
operate. 
Implication/s of the ruling: such a move provides clarity to company law and cross-border
trade in CARICOM; it moreover creates competencies for the to rule on future cases of this nature,
and  therefore  the  possibility  to  further  impose  its  will  on  the  CARICOM member-states.  The
explanation by the court that it will rely on itself and make self references for its judgment, adds to
the notion that the CCJ embodies a regional institution with autonomy from CARICOM member-
states. It further signals the CCJ's attempts to create a regional judiciary system in which it can be
viewed as setting the precedents and creating a body of literature, an action substantiated under the
utilitarian concept of Neofunctionalism. With this argument, the court has given itself 'compulsory
and exclusive jurisdiction' in cases relating to interpreting and applying the Treaty of Chaguaramas.
This compulsory jurisdiction excludes other bodies and institutions from the competencies of the
CCJ; it defines it as the sole interpreter of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas (Revised Treaty), and
therefore as the sole judiciary tribunal for disputes concerning the Revised Treaty.
The fact that the CCJ draws on international law in its interpretation of the Revised Treaty
reveals  that  the CCJ sees  itself  as  an  international  court.  This  act  also points  to  the utilitarian
hypothesis of the theory of Neofunctionalism, in which it is stated that institutions extend their
competencies for utilitarian purposes and in so doing extend the amount of 'supranationality' in a
union.
319  Greece v. U.K. (1924) Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions P.C.I.J. Reports, Series A, No. 2, p.12.
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2  nd   Case:  Trinidad  Cement  Limited  v  The  Caribbean  Community:  the  second  original
jurisdiction followed the previous case (a request for special leave to bring proceedings before the
court). The case was concerned with the suspension of CARICOM's Common External Tariff (CET)
on cement for some community members. Although individual CARICOM member-states maintain
the CET, it is the CARICOM's Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED) which is in
charge of its regional administration.
Additionally, according to CARICOM CET guidelines, in order for the suspension of CET to
be granted, a member country must provide reasons for the suspension; identify respective member-
states  which  previously supplied  the  goods;  and  specify endeavors  to  source  the  product  from
within CARICOM.
According to  the  CCJ (Application  No.  AR 3 of  2008),  in  September  2006 the  COTED
granted a 15% CET waiver to several member-states including Trinidad and Tobago and Suriname;
Guyana unilaterally suspended the CET which was till in effect at the time of the suit. 
First,  a  suspension  of  CET  was  granted  to  Jamaica.  In  2008,  Jamaica  applied  for  the
suspension of CET on cement.  It  was noted that Barbados could supply the necessary amount;
therefore, the application was declined. However, after a few days the Secretary-General granted
authorizations for suspension of the CET to Jamaica for a specific amount of Grey cement with
reference to Article 83(3) of the Revised Treaty. The court additionally noted that (CCJ Application
No. AR 3 of 2008) “no reason was given for the Secretary-General's apparent volte face, and TCL
was not consulted or notified”.320
Secondly a suspension of the CET was granted to Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada,
St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent (the six OECS states), and Suriname.
Audit reports made to the court revealed that “the TCL Group consistently supplied between
79% and 93% of the region's demand for cement between 2001 - 2008. The forecast was that it
would supply 100% of that demand in 2009 and 93% in 2010”.321
These facts contradict the guidelines and provisions of the COTED for waivers of the CET in
which a suspension can only be given where supply is “insufficient to satisfy a minimum of 75% of
regional demand for those goods”. The applicants therefore claimed that the actions of both the
COTED and the Secretary-General’s  suspension were 'unreasonable,  illegal  and null  and void'.
Furthermore, they required “orders setting aside or quashing these suspensions; a restraining order
against  the  Community;  and  a  mandatory  injunction  against  the  Community  to  revoke  the
320  TLC v. Caribbean Community, (2009) CCJ 2 [OJ] p5 para 10.
321  TLC v. Caribbean Community, (2009) CCJ 2 [OJ] p5 para 13.
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suspensions and notify those affected”.322
This is a landmark case for the CCJ because it is the premier original jurisdiction case in
which the court references itself in a ruling. It made reference to its previous ruling, TCL v The
State of the Cooperative Republic of Guyana; it ruled that CARICOM had a legal personality and
that a private entity could seek redress against CARICOM in the CCJ. It therefore ruled against
CARICOM, referencing its institutional independence and autonomy.
In its thirty-six page judgment, the court declared that Although Article 82 of the Revised
Treaty, which CARICOM relies on to explain its actions, delineates that CETs “can be suspended or
altered  at  the  discretion  of  the  body  administering  the  CET,  there  are  limitations  on  the
circumstances in which that discretion is exercisable and arguably on the manner of its exercise”.323
Therefore  CARICOM cannot  rely  upon  Article  82  of  the  Revised  Treaty to  suspend  the  CET
without reasons and moreover CARICOM does not possess the jurisdiction to interpret said article,
since the CCJ possesses sole competency to interpret the Revised Treaty and all articles herein.
Implication/s of the ruling: with such a judgment, the CCJ asserts its independence as an
international institution and puts itself above the regulations of CARICOM. This ruling reflects the
competence of the CCJ as well as its status and hierarchy in CARICOM. The initial will and action
of CARICOM are declared void, and a 'Community will' is enforced by the CCJ, which prescribes a
'Community system' and rules in favor of harmonizing integration in CARICOM. Thus, this ruling
did not  only address  a  dispute;  it  cemented  the  position  of  CCJ as  an  independent  institution,
functioning outside of the power of CARICOM bodies. It reinforced the CCJ's mandate as the sole
interpreter of the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas.  
In its interpretation of  Articles 187, 211, and 222 of the Revised Treaty, the CCJ also set a
precedent for who can take leave to appeal under original jurisdiction at the court,  the types of
disputes, and the matter of jurisdiction of the court. 
4  th   Case: Trinidad Cement Ltd and The Caribbean Community: this case follows the ruling of
the above case, Trinidad Cement Limited (TCL) v The Caribbean Community. TCL had challenged
decisions  by  CARICOM  to  authorize  the  suspension  of  the  CET on  Grey cement  in  specific
CARICOM member-states. TCL claimed that both decisions were ultra vires, and as such requested
that they be “quashed” by the CCJ.
The CCJ rejected the appeal of TCL to quash the decision of the Secretary General. It ruled
that the:
322  TLC v. Caribbean Community, (2009) CCJ 2 [OJ] p7 para 20.
323  Ibid p10 para 28.
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Secretary-General  acted throughout in  good faith  and in conformity with a practice
(now declared obsolete) that he inherited when he assumed office. While his procedural
flaw attracted an appropriate declaration, it was not of a sufficiently serious nature to
warrant the annulment of his decision. (TLC v. Caribbean Community, 2009:para 35)
Implication/s of the ruling: the CCJ's dismissal of TCL ultra vires claim shows that it sided with
CARICOM and upheld the decisions of CARICOM even when they were based on practices that
the CCJ itself made obsolete.324
5  th   Case: Trinidad Cement Limited and TCL Guyana Incorporated Claimants v Guyana : this
case dealt specifically with the issue of the suspension of CET on Grey cement by Guyana. The
plaintiffs requested various forms of relief, including declarations that Guyana was in breach of the
Revised  Treaty by failing  to  maintain  and  implement  CET on cement;  a  court  order  directing
Guyana to reinstate the CET;  damages for lost profits suffered by the companies due to the CET
suspension.325
The ruling centered around the following questions: Could Guyana be liable for damages; is
TGI entitled to said damages, and if so, what amount; and what declaratory relief could remedy the
situation? The proceedings of the case revealed that TCL “still managed to sell all the cement it
could produce without making a loss on the cement that might otherwise have been shipped to
Guyana”
This  revelation  caused  TCL to  abandon  its  claim  for  compensation  due  to  damages  by
Guyana, and the court declined any claim for compensatory damages.
The CCJ issued a declaration that Guyana was in breach of the provisions of Article 82 of the
Revised Treaty in failing to implement the CET. Furthermore, it made a coercive order requiring
Guyana to reimpose CET within 28 days.
Implication/s of the ruling: this judgment is in favor of the deepening of integration. The CCJ
ruled that through Guyana's commitment to the Revised Treaty, it must uphold the provisions of
said treaty, which include implementing the imposed CET determined by CARICOM. The rulings
clearly impinge on the sovereignty of Guyana, and in issuing a coercive order the CCJ further
324 Ibid para 80, The CCJ ruled (on the present case)that in order for the Secretary-General to be supplied with “accu-
rate, relevant and timely information when it meets to consider a suspension of the tariff ... appropriate ... forms
must be devised for both importers at the domestic level and for Competent Authorities. The importer should pro-
vide evidence of unfulfilled orders; evidence of the response of the regional producer including transportation logis-
tics and information showing what efforts they have made to obtain regional supplies”.
325 TLC v. Guyana, (2009) CCJ 5 [OJ].
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imposes the 'Community will' on Guyana. The arbitrary number of days - 28 - additionally reflect
the imperative stance of the CCJ to impose a set amount of time in which Guyana has to follow its
coercive order. In setting a deadline, the CCJ places further liability on Guyana to comply with its
decision.
6  th   Case: T rinidad Cement Limited & TCL Guyana v Guyana: pertaining to the case above,
through the sixth original jurisdiction case, Guyana had sought a stay of execution of the CCJ's
judgment for an “extension of time for compliance with that order and/or a variation thereof”.326 In
response to this stay of execution, the Claimant, Trinidad Cement, filed a counter appeal, requiring
the CCJ to dismiss  the  case on the  grounds of  contempt of  the  court.  The CCJ dismissed the
application from Guyana on all grounds, in addition to ordering Guyana to pay the court costs
which included all necessary taxes.
Implication/s of the ruling: the judgment against Guyana reveals the de jure power of the CCJ
to rule against the will of the nation states which founded it. The case also highlights that there is
some,  albeit  limited,  de  facto power  of  the  CCJ,  as  Guyana  not  only  submitted  to  the  CCJ's
jurisdiction but also requested that the CCJ grant a stay of execution.   
7  th   Case: T rinidad Cement Limited & TCL Guyana v Guyana: the seventh original jurisdiction
case was again related to the previous cases and judgments. TCL petitioned the CCJ to hold Guyana
in breach and contempt of the Court for not carrying out the rulings of the CCJ (August 20, 2009),
i.e. to reinstate the CET on cement within 28 days of the judgment. During this period, Guyana had
purportedly filed an extension a day before the 28-day grace period ended  (September 16, 2009)
and an application seven days after the end of the grace period. The application was dismissed on
October 14, and the Court ruled that Guyana had been in non-compliance since September 17,  2009
(the day after the 28-day grace period). On October 15, 2009 Guyana reinstated the CET on cement
imported from non-CARICOM countries on shipments that  had been ordered after  October 15,
2009. The CCJ noted that:
at a case management conference on November 13, 2009 counsel for Guyana admitted
that Guyana remained in continuing breach of the Order because of the Commissioner-
General's failure to reinstate the CET in respect of all non CARICOM cement imported
into Guyana regardless of the date when it was ordered. (TCL v. Guyana 2009:para7) 
326  TCL v. Guyana, (2009) CCJ 6 [OJ] p. 2 para 2.
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On January 8,  2010, nearly four months after the 28-day grace period,  Guyana reinstated with
immediate effect the CET on all imports of cement from non-CARICOM countries.
Implication/s of the ruling: in hearing the matter, the CCJ was compelled to rule on its power
to treat 'disobedience', it decided that Article 26 of the Revised Treaty “does not confer an express
power on the Court to enforce its orders by contempt proceedings”.327
In  its  executive  summary of  the  decision,  the  CCJ noted  that  the  lack  of  provision  was
because it was:
assumed that the Court would have such powers to punish contempt of court as the
national courts had, without averting to the fact that civil law systems of some member-
states knew no such concept. It was unclear what forms of contempt, if any, the CCJ
Agreement  meant  to  introduce  on  the  international  plane.  (TCL  v.  Guyana
2010:Executive Summary)
Furthermore although:  “ad hoc international criminal tribunals such as the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) asserted an inherent jurisdiction to punish contempt of
court, it had not been established that such power existed in non-criminal cases”.328 It further stated
that:
it had not been shown that the Court was endowed with an express, implied or inherent
power to make declarations or orders with respect to civil contempt of court. Further,
even if such a power existed on the international plane, the only practical remedy was a
declaration that a party was in contempt of court. The fact that such a declaration was
not significantly different from a declaration of non-compliance under Article 215 of the
Revised  Treaty  suggested  that  the  drafters  of  the  CCJ  Agreement  might  not  have
intended to confer on the Court any jurisdiction over civil contempt. (TCL v. Guyana
2010:para 9)
The  Court  emphasized  that  national  legislation  could  neither  confer  powers  on  the  Court  nor
diminish the powers of the Court in its original jurisdiction. The Court reiterated that whereas a
provision  had  been  enacted  for  enforcing  in  the  local  jurisdiction  orders  made  in  the  Court’s
327  TCL v. Guyana, (2010) CCJ 1 [OJ] p. 12 para 33.
328  Ibid p. 3 para 8.
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appellate jurisdiction,  no express provisions had been made for original jurisdiction orders, and
therefore the CCJ might require the assistance of the 'enforcement machinery of the national courts'
to impose its original jurisdiction decisions. In doing so, the CCJ calls on the lower national courts
to provide enforcement assistance for its ruling.   
Additionally, in noting that  “the CCJ Act … contains no express provision for making the
orders made by the Court in its original jurisdiction enforceable by the domestic process applicable
within the jurisdiction of Guyana”329,
It moreover admitted its lack of  de facto power over the national states of CARICOM with
regard to its original jurisdiction rulings.
Furthermore, the CCJ also accepted that it does not possess the power to compel the nation-
states to agree on any protocol to amend this; rather, it can only 'hope and comment' that “closer co-
ordination will have been achieved between the drafters at the Caribbean Community and those
within the national jurisdictions”.330
This ruling points to the  de facto limitations mentioned above. The CCJ is not granted any
competence to compel member-states to follow its actions; neither is there any machinery to enforce
the decisions. These de facto limitations have a conditional effect on the de jure competencies of the
CCJ. Studies such as Melton (2014) have revealed an under-performance of de jure competencies
when  there  are  limited  de  facto competencies.  The  conditional  theory  of  efficacy  of
Neofunctionalism also  offers  an  explanation  for  this  situation.  As  presented  by  the  theory  of
Neofunctionalism, the member-states act to retain their distinctive identity; that is to say, the fear of
the member-states of losing their competencies will compensate for lower efficacy in the functions
of institutions such as the CCJ. The member-states will consciously limit the same competencies
that they confer on the institution, limiting the influence of these institutions over the member-
states, even to the detriment of the functionality of the institutions.
The theory of Neofunctionalism also explain that when there is limited scope, such as with the
competencies  of  an  institution  to  carry out  its  functions,  there  will  also  be  a  limited  level  of
integration in CARICOM. Thus, when the scope of competencies of the CCJ is limited, the level of
the power it wields over the member-states and over regional integration in the member-states will
also be limited.
However, in referencing the Yugoslavia case, the CCJ noted that these  de facto limitations
were under its original jurisdiction, and did not pertain to its appellate jurisdiction. Therefore, while
329 TCL v. Guyana, (2010) CCJ 1 [OJ] p. 18 para 52.
330 TCL v. Guyana, (2010) CCJ 1 [OJ] p. 18 para 53.
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the  CCJ  accepts  its  limitations,  its  advances  competencies  in  other  areas  and  under  other
jurisdictions at the same time.
Overall, the above cases prove that the CCJ was the competent authority in CARICOM to
hear cases pertaining to a breach of the Revised Treaty. The above judgments also revel the CCJ
taking steps to further uphold its decisions, and referencing itself. The CCJ can likewise be seen
making references to international tribunals, and acting as an international court.
Additionally, although its influence is limited, the CCJ does posses some coercion power and
a soft form of de facto rule over the intergovernmental countries in CARICOM.
The CCJ also upheld the decisions of the Secretary General of CARICOM and did not hold
his actions as ultra vires, although it ruled that the way in which the Secretary General carried out
his  decisions  was  incorrect;  it  changed  the  way  in  which  the  Secretary-General  conducts  its
decisions in hearing CET appeals. The CCJ reaffirms the actions of the Secretary-General and in
turn CARICOM as overarching in the regional integration process in CARICOM. This draws on the
arguments of Neofunctionalism, which suggest that institutions in regional integration are not loyal
to the member-states which create them but to the process of deepening regional integration and
therefore, to the integration project and union.
3  rd   case:  Doreen Johnson v Caribbean Center  for  Development  Administration:  this  case
concerned the termination of a CARICOM employee. It sets a precedent and further defines the
jurisprudence of the Court under the matters of 'who' can be sued and what 'they' can be sued for in
the CCJ under its original jurisdiction. 
Doreen Johnson is a national of Barbados, who worked from 1990 to 2007 for the Caribbean
Center for Development Administration (CARICAD)331. According to the case files of the CCJ, the
Applicant was on an approved no-pay study leave between September 2005 and 2007. In August
2007,  she  wrote  to  the  Executive  Director  of  CARICAD  requesting  details  of  the  terms  and
conditions of her employment, including her right to a pension. Upon the applicant’s return to work
on September 3, 2007 “she was informed that her services were terminated forthwith. The Board of
CARICAD had decided to make her position as Head of the Administration Unit redundant with
immediate effect”.332 She then sought special leave from the CCJ to contest:
abuse of power, wrongful dismissal, violation of the labor laws of Barbados, breach of
contract, and breach of the Constitution of Barbados. She also claimed that she had been
331 Article 21 of the Revised Treaty recognizes/establishes CARICAD as an institution of CARICOM.
332  Johnson v. Caribbean Centre, (2009) CCJ 3 [OJ] para 1.
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discriminated against on grounds of nationality, because employees who were Barbados
nationals  were  not  afforded the  pension rights  conferred upon employees  who were
nationals of other countries. (Johnson v. Caribbean Centre 2009:para 1)
The court:  directed preliminary issues be tried before hearing of the application, specifically,  can
CARICAD be sued in the Caribbean Court of Justice;  which of the Applicant's  complaints are
justifiable by the Court? The Applicant's argument to bring the case before the court was that:
CARICAD  is  listed  in  Article  21  of  the  Treaty  as  one  of  the  Institutions  of  the
Community; further, that being such an Institution, CARICAD’s legal personality and
capacity  to  be  sued  are  derived  from Article  228  of  the  Treaty  which  accords  the
Community full juridical personality ... (The) Applicant further submitted that Article
222 of the Treaty gives this Court jurisdiction to hear this matter as the interests  of
justice require that she be allowed to bring the claim irrespective of the identity of the
defendant. (Johnson v. Caribbean Centre 2009:para6)
The CCJ made it  clear that under its original jurisdiction,  its duty was to interpret the Revised
Treaty of Chaguaramas, and rule on matters that were in breach of this treaty. Therefore, domestic
law contentions such as those relating to labor law or constitutional rights do not fall under the
purview of its original jurisdiction.
It further argued that although CARICAD can be characterized as an associate institution of
CARICOM “working within the CARICOM system they have no power actual or ostensible to bind
or  represent  the  Community.  Their  acts  and  omissions  are  not  necessarily  attributable  to  the
Community”.
Following this argument, the court ruled that actions against CARICAD cannot be undertaken
in the CCJ. It further concluded that “the Community can be sued for the conduct of its Organs and
Bodies and that of the Secretary General”
It however excluded other entities in CARICOM from any legal personality by arguing that
“even  if  CARICAD  were  an  Organ  of  the  Community,  it  could  not  be  made  a  defendant  in
proceedings commenced in the Court as proceedings in respect of its acts or omissions would have
to be brought against the Community itself”. It further identified CARICAD with certain agencies
of the United Nations, and suggested that:
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Institutions and Associate Institutions of the Community are not unlike the specialized
agencies  of  the  United  Nations  which  are  not  Organs  of  the  United  Nations.  ...
Specialized agencies are autonomous intergovernmental agencies which contribute in
their own way to the achievement of the objectives and purposes of the United Nations.
These institutions form part of the United Nations System, but they are not an integral
part  of  the  United  Nations.  Similarly,  Institutions  and  Associate  Institutions  of  the
Community  are  autonomous  inter-governmental  entities  which  contribute  to  the
achievement of the objectives  of the Community,  but are  not  an integral  part  of the
Community. (Johnson v. Caribbean Centre 2009:para12)
In the event that the CCJ technically does not possess the jurisdiction to rule on labor disputes, this
decision isolates certain institutions of CARICOM from judicial  recourse in the CCJ. Although
CARICAD was acknowledged by the Court as an entity of CARICOM, it was characterized as an
'independent' CARICOM organization which can only be sued under labor laws in the respective
country where its main offices are -- that is, in Barbados. This characterization of CARICAD as
being  similar  to  'specialized  agencies'  in  the  United  Nations  fails  to  take  into  consideration
additional possibilities for characterizing regional institutions. For example, the European Court of
Justice rules on cases in the category of direct action, especially actions for damages “caused by its
institutions or by its servants;”333 which includes institutions of the EU. The Treaty of Lisbon gives
the EU and all its bodies and organs full legal personality. Nevertheless, the CCJ chooses to make
reference to the United Nations rather than to the European Court of Justice in making its rulings.
This is in spite of the fact that the European Court of Justice, and the EU institutions are more
similar to the situation in CARICOM, than the UN and its specialized agencies.
Implication/s of the ruling:  with reference to the Revised Treaty,  the CCJ's  claims leaves
loopholes in characterizing and giving personality to parts of CARICOM. This judgment isolates
parts of CARICOM from legal recourse and creates a loophole for institutions in the community
such as CARICAD, and the Competition Commission to be characterized as 'specialized agencies';
precluding them from a legal personality and consequently their actions from some legal recourse;
granting some form of supranationality to these said 'specialized agencies'. Setting a precedent, CCJ
rules that actions such as those from the COTED or the Competition Commission  might be not
333  Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 2008 Article 340, Paragraph 2.
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liable  to  being  brought  before  the  CCJ.  In  precluding  such  actions  from  legal  recourse,  the
Competition Commission can, for example, carry out extensive review of cases or member-states,
without the possibility of any judiciary recourse before the CCJ. 
9  th    and 10  th   and 11 th   Case: H ummingbird Rice Mills v Suriname & The Caribbean Community:
the dispute was regarding the period of January 2006 to June 2010 during which Suriname imported
wheat and meslin flour from the Kingdom of the Netherlands at a rate of 0-5% customs duty instead
of the rate of 25% as was stipulated by the CET. Following the procedures that the CCJ installed
(arising from the TCL cases above), complaints were made by the trade ministries in the affected
country, in this case Trinidad and Tobago, to the Secretary-General of CARICOM. This original
jurisdiction case differs from the TCL cases in that a majority of the procedures that were carried
out by the CCJ in the TCL cases were taken over, in this case, by the COTED and the CARICOM
Secretariat.
Following is a brief overview of the proceedings that occurred before the case was brought to
the CCJ, which took place in consecutive COTED meetings. In February 2006, The Ministry of
Trade  and  Industry  of  Trinidad  and  Tobago  notified  the  CARICOM  Secretariat  of  the  non-
imposition  by Suriname of  the  CET on wheat  or  meslin  flour.  Following this  notification,  the
CARICOM  Secretariat  consulted  with  the  government  of  Suriname  in  March  2006;  and  also
reported  the  dispute  to  the  following  COTED  meeting  in  May  2006.  The  COTED  required
Suriname to investigate the dispute and report to the Secretariat. At a COTED meeting in November
2006, the CARICOM Secretariat reported that Suriname had admitted to importing flour from the
Netherlands at a 0% tariff. However, due to the type of flour imported further investigations had to
be carried out. In December 2006, Suriname requested a suspension of the CET on wheat or meslin
flour due to quality concerns regarding the regionally supplied flour and long-term arrangements
with Dutch  suppliers.  The request  was denied  in  January 2007,  and Suriname was required  to
impose the CET on extra-regional flour imports  by February 2008. In January 2008, Suriname
requested that COTED exempt flour from the CET. This request was also denied. The CCJ case
background revealed that in June 2008:
the CARICOM Secretariat reminded Suriname of the February 2008 deadline, and in
October 2008 Suriname advised the Secretariat that consultations were taking place in
Suriname with a view to rescinding the Ministerial  Decree of 1997 that allowed for
duty-free imports of flour. (Hummingbird Rice Mills v Suriname 2011:para 7)
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Suriname implemented the CETs on June 15 2009.  Hummingbird Rice Mills brought the above
proceedings to the CCJ and applied for leave to hear the case before the CCJ. It challenged actions
of  both  Suriname and CARICOM. Regarding Suriname,  that  it  breached the  provisions  of  the
Revised  Treaty  regarding  CETs.  Regarding CARICOM,  that  “the  Secretary-General  through
COTED unlawfully accepted Suriname’s undertakings and acquiesced in COTED’s extensions of
time granted for compliance with the CET”.334 Additionally, Hummingbird Rice Mills contended
that  “the Secretary-General  illegally and irrationally made an implied decision to  authorize the
suspension of the CET over the relevant period”.335 The CCJ granted leave for the application.
Implication/s of the ruling: the decision to grant leave follows the rulings of previous cross-
border disputes brought before the CCJ. In following its set precedence, the CCJ referenced itself in
its decision to grant leave, an action which reveals the political influence of the CCJ.
10  th   Case:  this case follows from the previous case, the grievances of which, are outlined
above. In its judicial review of the acts of CARICOM, the CCJ noted that:
the  Secretary-General,  perhaps,  could  have  put  forward  more  forceful  proposals  for
consideration  by  COTED  in  dealing  with  Suriname’s  prolonged  non-compliance.
(However) there was not much scope for COTED to be more definitive in dealing with
breaches of treaty obligations by member-states. (Hummingbird Rice Mills v Suriname
2011:para 36)
The  wording  of  the  judicial  review  of  the  CCJ  reveals  that  the  CCJ  clearly  sides  with  the
Community.  For  example,  the  CCJ  cited  words  such  as  “noteworthy  and  commendable”336 to
address the Secretary General's actions, even though it accepted that the Secretary General could
have been more forceful in its actions. In its ruling the CCJ announced that:
without evidence of a specific mandate from COTED, there is no basis to entertain the
allegations of more detailed responsibility by the Secretary-General in relation to the
monitoring and implementation of the CET... In all the circumstances of this case, the
Court finds that the Secretary-General did not act in dereliction of duty in respect of the
non-imposition  of  the  CET  by  Suriname.  (Hummingbird  Rice  Mills  v  Suriname
334  Hummingbird Rice Mills v Suriname (2011) CCJ 1[OJ] para 11.
335  Hummingbird Rice Mills v Suriname (2012) CCJ 1[OJ] para 11.
336  Hummingbird Rice Mills v Suriname (2012) CCJ 1[OJ] para 37.
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2011:paras 37-38)
As a result of this action, the CCJ dismissed the argument of unlawful conduct of the Secretary-
General. The CCJ additionally rationalized that the COTED could not be held culpable for the non-
compliance of Suriname. Therefore, the CCJ ruled that neither the Secretary-General or the COTED
did not conduct themselves unlawfully in the matter,  and therefore were not liable for punitive
damages to the claimant. With regards to Suriname, the CCJ ruled that it  did indeed breach its
obligations to the Revised Treaty with respect to the CET on rice; however, since Humming Bird
Rice Mills could not sufficiently prove financial damages, all claims for damages were dismissed.
Implication/s of the ruling: this ruling of the CCJ excludes this and future actions of a similar
nature  of  the COTED and the Secretary General  of  CARICOM from legal  recourse.  The very
wording of the communication between the COTED and Suriname should have been drawn into
question.  For  example,  it  should  have  been noted  that  the  Secretary General  and the  COTED
'reminded' Suriname of the deadline, and 'urged' it to comply, rather than 'requiring' and 'compelling'
it to do so. However, the CCJ excludes the actions of the COTED and the Secretariat from legal
recourse, thereby establishing the sovereignty and arbitrary actions of both the COTED and the
Secretary General as being lawful and just. This action positions the will of CARICOM entities
over  the  member-states,  at  the  same time  excluding the  possibility  of  legal  recourse  for  these
actions. The CCJ thus endows some form of soft 'supranationality' on these CARICOM entities.
11  th   Case:  this  case was concerned with the supplementary judgment as to the court  cost
between Humming Bird Rice Mills against Suriname and the Community. After hearing arguments
from all parties, the CCJ ordered the Community to bear its own costs only, and that Suriname pay
50% of Humming Bird Rice Mills costs.
Implication/s of the rulings: the CCJ rulings which are related to the cluster of three Humming
Bird Rice Mills cases, again reveal like the TCL group of cases, which the CCJ rules in favor of the
Community and does not award punitive damages against the Community. The CCJ is also ready to
rule against the nation states of CARICOM, but is not ready to sanction them by making them pay
for a percentage of claimant costs in case of their breaking the CARICOM regulations. The above
cases furthermore reflect the CCJ's prejudice in supporting CARICOM institutions.
The actions  of  Suriname can be  attributed  to  the  Neofunctionalist  curvilinear  hypothesis,
which proposes that when integration occurs too quickly and there are too many additional factors,
then the member-states act out of fear for their respective common good in a defensive and negative
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pattern.
12  th   14 th   & 16 th   cases: S hanique Myrie claimant v Barbados : the following three related cases
set the precedent for the freedom of movement of CARICOM nationals.  The case concerned a
Jamaican citizen who argued that her rights under the Revised Treaty were prejudiced by Barbados. 
12  th   case: this case sets a precedent, because it concentrates on “important issues of Caribbean
Community law which have not previously been addressed by this  Court.  The most prominent
among them is whether and to what extent CARICOM nationals have a right of free movement
within the Caribbean Community”.337 The claimant  (a  Jamaican citizen)  argued that  on leaving
Jamaica and traveling to Barbados, she was denied entry with no reason given. Furthermore she
claimed that:
she was subjected to insults based on her nationality and to an unlawful body cavity
search in demeaning and unsanitary conditions. Her luggage was also searched but none
of these searches revealed any contraband substances.  Ultimately,  Ms Myrie was not
allowed to enter Barbados and was instead detained overnight in a cell at the airport and
deported to Jamaica. (Myrie v Barbados 2012:para2)
The Claimant then sought a number of rulings from the CCJ, which included that Barbados pay
both  special  and  punitive  damages  in  addition  to  her  legal  fees.  338 These  were  based  on  her
arguments  that  her  right  to  free  movement  in  the  Community was  denied;  she  was  prejudiced
because of her nationality and treated less fairly than other Community nationals; and her body
search was “an assault,  a rape,  of such a serious character that it  constitutes a violation of her
fundamental  human  rights  and  freedoms  for  which  the  State  of  Barbados  must  be  held
accountable;”339  
Among other points,  Barbados challenged the provision of free movement of CARICOM
nationals across the Community as not being 'legally binding rights', and that furthermore, even if
there was such a right,  it  would not be absolute or without restrictions. Additionally,  Barbados
asserted that immigration and customs procedures do not fall under CARICOM jurisdiction.
14  th   case: the particulars of this case were related to the acceptance of witnesses/a witness for
the claimants against the will of Barbados, and additionally, the state of Jamaica seeking leave to be
337  Myrie v Barbados (2012) CCJ 3 [OJ] para 1.
338  Myrie v Barbados (2012) CCJ 3 [OJ] para 3.
339  Myrie v Barbados (2012) CCJ 3 [OJ] para 3.
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party to the suit, which was granted.
16  th   case:this case is the judgment on the above cases, in defining its jurisdiction, the CCJ
allowed for the review of the impingement on the claimant's fundamental rights under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the
American Convention on Human Rights. Like its appellate jurisdiction rulings, no mention was
made of the Charter of Civil Society of the Caribbean Community.
The CCJ declared that Barbados had breached Ms Myrie's rights in conjunction with Article
45 of the Revised Treaty. The CCJ additionally established and awarded both pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damages to the claimant, in addition to her court fees.
Implication/s  of  the  ruling:  the  ruling  solidifies  the  freedom  movement  of  CARICOM
nationals in the Community under CARICOM law. The free movement of persons is a cornerstone
of  the  CSME,  it  signifies  a  deepening  of  regional  economic  and  political  integration.  The
CARICOM member-states are obliged to implement provisions to facilitate CARICOM nationals to
travel freely across their borders. The CCJ has the sole authority for interpreting these provisions
and to rule over the extent to which member-states comply with them. Furthermore, the Revised
Treaty and this judgment of the CCJ additionally bind the member-states to CARICOM legislation
and offer a threat in the form of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, when states do not abide by
this legislation. In doing this, the CCJ clearly asserts its rule over the member-states and supports
integration.
This  case further  delineates  the stance of the CCJ on intra-regional  travel.  Following the
ruling,  countries  in  CARICOM  updated  their  regulations,  liberalizing  intra-regional  travel  for
CARICOM members. However, it is odd to say the least that, in ruling on an original jurisdiction
case involving the violation of human rights, the CCJ did not make reference to the Charter of Civil
Society of the Caribbean Community. By doing so, it would have introduced the Charter as a vital
document in the Community's legal hemisphere. The Charter is incorporated in the Revised Treaty
and therefore falls under the original jurisdiction of the CCJ. However, the CCJ chose yet again to
isolate certain facets of CARICOM from its jurisdiction.
Although this decision adds to the increased scope and level of integration, it also provides
limitations to that scope. The CCJ could have made a more extensive and compelling ruling on the
matter. Its ruling neglected certain provisions of the Community, and undermining the authority of
the instruments provided by the very treaty that it interprets.     
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13  th   Case:  T rinidad  Cement  v  The  Competition  Commission:  the  case  involved  TCL as
claimant against the CARICOM Competition Commission (the Commission). TCL brought special
leave to the CCJ to hear its grievances against the Commission, initiating and conducting a probe
into  anti-competitive  practices  of  TCL in  the  Community without  notification.  The case  posed
questions regarding the work, role, and functions of the Commission.
The Commission challenged the juridical personality of the CCJ and contended that the CCJ
did not have jurisdiction “to review actions of the Commission in relation to the initiation and
conduct  of  ...  investigation”.340 Contrary to  its  decisions  on  the  third  original  jurisdiction  case
reviewed above, the CCJ ruled that the Commission has 'full juridical personality', and as such is
liable for suit in the CCJ. Furthermore:
there was no conduct or exercise of power on the part of a Treaty-created institution
which could escaped its judicial scrutiny, due to the CCJ's compulsory and exclusive
jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the
Revised Treaty, as well as the Treaty's normative structure geared at transforming the
CSME into  a  regional  system under  the  rule  of  law.  (Trinidad  Cement  Ltd.  V The
Competition Commission 2012: para16)
Implication/s of the ruling: notably, when the competencies of the CCJ are questioned, it rules to
extend these competencies, to address legal personality in spite of the fact that it had previously
ruled that only the Secretary General and organs of the Community possess legal personality. In its
previous  judgment,  Johnson  v.  Caribbean  Centre,  the  CCJ  had  excluded  the  institutions  of
CARICOM from its jurisdiction. Contrarily, in this case, the CCJ awards institutions in CARICOM
legal personality, when its jurisdiction is in question. The CCJ further ruled that TCL's legitimate
interest was not affected by the Commission's preliminary probe. It dismissed TCL's Application,
and ordered that written submissions pertaining to costs be filed by both parties. Additionally, the
CCJ highlighted and encouraged a review of procedural flaws of the Commission in order for it to
conform to the standards of the Revised Treaty.
In doing so, the CCJ upholds the actions of the Competition Commission and sanctions future
actions.  It  affords  the  Competition  Commission  the  opportunity  to  emulate  and  conduct
investigations without the knowledge of or the necessity to inform the business/government under
340  Trinidad Cement Ltd. V The Competition Commission (2012) CCJ 4 (OJ).
146
5.3 An Examination of the CCJ
investigation.  The  Competition  Commission  can  therefore  sidestep  both  businesses  and
government, and investigate their regional practices. With such a ruling, the CCJ places the will of
the Competition Commission over that of the member-states, and grants assurance to the regional
initiative of economic and political integration in CARICOM.
15  th   Case: T rinidad Cement v The Competition Commission: the 15th original jurisdiction case
was the supplementary judgment of court costs resulting from the 13th original jurisdiction case.
Since the CCJ had dismissed the appeal,  it  ordered that  the TCL pay 30% of the costs  of  the
Defendant.
Implication/s  of  the  ruling:  in  dismissing  the  claimant's  appeal,  the  CCJ  upholds  the
supranational action of the Competition Commission, and justifies actions of this commission. It
relates  to  the  acceptance  of  community benefits  over  those of  the  individual  member-states  or
companies,  and  reveals  the  allegiance  of  the  CCJ  to  the  Community  as  the  theory  of
Neofunctionalism proposes.
These original jurisdiction cases reviewed above reveal the de jure and de facto competencies
of the CCJ. They demonstrate that a limitation on the scope of competencies affect the level of
jurisdiction  and  the  content  of  the  CCJ  rulings,  and  point  to  hypotheses  of  the  theory  of
Neofunctionalism. A further discussion of both appellate and original jurisdiction cases is provided
directly below.
5.4 Discussion
The overview above focused on the scope and level of integration in CARICOM. The scope
of  integration  was  investigated  by  observing  the  competencies  of  the  CCJ;  and  the  level  of
integration was examined by considering the extent to which the CCJ acted in the scope of its
competencies. Of special import were the content of the rulings of the CCJ, which were examined
in the context of the theoretical underpinnings of Neofunctionalism. 
This  section employs the theory of Neofunctionalism to offer a  further assessment of the
judgments and of the general process of regional integration in CARICOM.
5.4.1 Appellate Jurisdiction Rulings
As mentioned earlier, at the time this chapter was drafted, only three members of CARICOM
subscribed  to  the  appellate  jurisdiction  of  the  CCJ.  The  review  of  the  cases  is  nonetheless
noteworthy since it provided the possibility to observe patterns in the rulings that were consistent
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with the theory of Neofunctionalism; an interplay, especially in the power relationship, between the
CCJ and the member-states; the spatial relationship between the CARICOM member-states and the
CCJ.
Patterns  of  rulings:  in  addressing  the  institutionalization  of  a  regional  body  and  the
institutional aspect of theoretical analysis,  Neofunctionalism introduces the term 'encapsulation',
which rests on the premise  that there is an underlying competition brought about by exogenous
tensions  and/or  process-generated  contradictions  between regional  institutions  and the  member-
states which create them. It further proposes that this competition produces  consequences which
'feed back'  to the institutions.341 Encapsulation reasons that “the policy-making forum originally
established  is  sufficiently  resourceful  and  flexible  to  handle  the  consequences  and  sustain
satisfactory  performance  toward  the  attainment  of  common  objectives,  a  self-maintaining
international subsystem is likely to emerge”.342
Encapsulation  is  highly  relevant  for  examining  institutions  in  a  regional  arrangement,
especially the CCJ, which was already highlighted as a somewhat supranational institution in an
intergovernmental regime. The encapsulation hypothesis of Neofunctionalism the observation of the
power structure, order, and competition between the CCJ and the member-states343.
The CCJ was observed to be exceptionally resourceful in its judgments. It ruled in a pattern to
extend its competencies, and to deepen regional integration in CARICOM, the latter of which was
highlighted as a common objective in its first annual report. The patterns in the CCJ's judgments
also reveal a self maintaining system, where the CCJ extends its livelihood and its competencies. 
Self  maintenance  characteristic:  as  was  previously  highlighted,  the  characteristic  of
international cooperation typically resembles 'service oriented' cooperation, which is 'self contained'
and aimed at  resolving mutual  issues.  This  cooperation neither  expands the supranationality of
institutions  nor  limits  the  sovereignty  of  the  individual  states.  It  is  only  in  'exceptional
circumstances'  that  convergence  creates  exception,  i.e.,  cases  in  which  institutions  become
positioned above the member-states that create them. The above overview of the competencies of
the CCJ and the analysis of its case rulings reveal this to be one of the exceptional cases to which
the theory of Neofunctionalism points. The competencies of the CCJ under its appellate jurisdiction
reveal that some CARICOM member-states have converged on mutual issues, in this case a regional
341  Schmitter (2002).
342 Schmitter (2002:14).
343 This possibility is emphasized from the CCJ's perspective, where we observed that the CCJ often times criticized 
the judicial process in the member-states, and ruled outside of the cases, delivered directives and chided the mem-
ber-states.
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final appellate court  to displace a colonial  court.  The cases further revealed that the CCJ often
extends its competencies and superimposes its will on member-states, acting as a driving factor in
the process of integration, dictating its direction and speed. The CCJ compelled member-states to
increase their judicial efficiency and local processes, and called for the harmonization of regional
judicial standards and created a regional body of jurisprudence.
Effect of exogenous factors: it is possible to make sense of the limitations of the de jure and
de facto competencies highlighted above. The initial introduction of the appellate jurisdiction of the
CCJ noted the level of politicization, and the fact that the CCJ was viewed as a 'hanging court'.
These tensions relate to the actions of the CCJ in addressing human rights, especially regarding
capital punishment. The CCJ chose to use international instruments rather than the regional charter
to interpret and make its judgments pertaining to capital punishment. Therefore, as a result of being
viewed as a 'hanging court', these exogenous factors were fed back to the CCJ. Consequently the
CCJ acted to allay any fears, and the competencies of the CCJ and its structural subsystem were
sufficient for 'self maintenance.' Even when the process generated contradictions and exogenous
tensions were particularly evident, the policy-making forum of the CCJ was self-sufficient, and it
possessed  the  resources  to  handle  the  consequences  and  sustain  satisfactory  performance.  The
structure and competencies of the CCJ also enabled it  to be resourceful  in  dealing with issues
related to the consequences of feedback.
Humanitarian  and  Utilitarian  aspect:  a  prevalent  action  of  the  CCJ  was  to  uphold  and
promote the right of poor persons to appeal in the Higher Court, and in the CCJ, without securities
to cost. This humanitarian action of the CCJ reflects its commitment to its initial aims. Both the
Agreement  Establishing  the  CCJ and  the  CARICOM Civil  Society Charter  address  the  court's
competencies relating to the civil rights of CARICOM citizens. The actions of the CCJ can be
observed as adhering to the provisions of the two aforementioned instruments. 
Additionally, the actions of the CCJ such as creating a body of cases for under this topic can be
explained  by  the  utilitarian  concept  in  the  theory  of  Neofunctionalism,  which  proposes  that
utilitarian actions of institutions point to an increase in the level and depth of integration. Thus, the
CCJ's  humanitarian stance indicates that  the process of integration in CARICOM is potentially
deepening.
For example, under its appellate jurisdiction, CCJ played the role of 'moral police', criticizing
the pace of the Barbados judicial system. As a result, in 2008, after numerous commentaries and
directives by the CCJ, the Barbados Supreme Court introduced new rules of civil procedures aimed
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at addressing the number of backlog cases. This effectively had a bearing on the length of future
cases in the judiciary system.
Contradictions in cases: Contradictions can be viewed in the CCJ rulings. For example: in the
8th final appellate case, the CCJ's actions were contrary to previous actions. It dismissed a case in
spite of probable cause and also questionable circumstances. However, this inconsistent action can
be explained in the context of the Neofunctionalist politicization hypothesis. The CCJ was quick to
cite international regulations and rights in its judgment, because of the level of politicization and
international visibility directly before and after the inauguration of the CCJ. Likewise,  when it
gained the reputation as a 'hanging court', there was political pressure to alter this image. Its initial
rulings were impartial and international in nature; however, with a decrease in the spotlight, the CCJ
could  rule  in  favor  of  its  own  demands  and  requirements,  precisely  as  the  theory  of
Neofunctionalism proposes/suggests.
In the 9th final appellate case, the CCJ ruling was seen to contradict previous judgments as well as
showing bias which is a reflection of an internal mechanism/nature in the CCJ. This underlying
code of conduct personifies the CCJ, and reveals that it is not a mere instrument of the member-
states to interpret rules and regulations, but that it possesses its own set of ideals and character. That
is to say, The CCJ does not perform a set of designated tasks with predictable outcomes, instead it
acts independently of not only the member-states that created it.
5.4.2 Original Jurisdiction Rulings
The examination of the original jurisdiction cases helped to observe the general process of
regional  economic  and  political  integration.  The  above  review of  these  cases  highlights  CCJ's
characteristics and behavior in accordance as is predicted by the theory of Neofunctionalism.
Correlation between level and scope: the analysis revealed a limitation in the scope of both
the de jure and de facto competencies of the CCJ's original jurisdiction. For example, in the third
original  jurisdiction  case  Johnson v.  Caribbean Centre,  the  CCJ limited  the  definition  of  legal
personality  in  interpreting  the  Revised  Treaty  to  include  the  main  organ  and  bodies  of  the
CARICOM and the  Secretary-General.  The  CCJ granted  itself  jurisdiction  to  preside  over  and
review only the actions of the Secretary General and the main organs and bodies of CARICOM. In
excluding other entities of CARICOM, such as CARICAD, the Revised Treaty diminishes the de
jure competencies  of  the CCJ and further  isolates  certain aspects  of  CARICOM from regional
judicial recourse. Such an action has a direct impact on the competence of the CCJ, and therefore on
integration. Instead of a regional jurisprudence, judicial procedure is tasked to the member-state.
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This correlation hypothesis is exceptionally clear in this case and adequately explains the limitation
in the de jure competences of the CCJ. 
The CCJ then effectively extended legal culpability to institutions of the Community in the
Trinidad Cement Limited. v The Competition Commission case. These contradictions reveal actions
of the CCJ to limit and extend its de jure competencies to fit the case in question.
Relationship between de jure and de Facto power: given Neofunctionalism's proposal that de
facto power is correlated to de jure competencies, the lack of de facto powers observed in the cases
above can also be explained by Neofunctionalism. The limitation of  de facto power negatively
affects the functional capacity of de jure power. That is to say, the limitation of the CCJ's power to
implement  its  judgments  in  the  member-states  in  CARICOM  affects  its  power  to  rule,  and
moreover,  the  possibility  that  member-states  eventually  award  it  more  de  jure power.  This  is
substantiated by the above analysis of the TCL cases, which revealed that The CCJ possesses the
authority to issue coercive judgments to CARICOM member-states, but has limited authority in
relation to the compliance of said rulings. The member-states afford the CCJ the de jure power, and
in turn limit its coercive capacity to reinstate said power. It also can not extend its powers and
jurisdiction, without the in-put of the member-states.
At the same time, the TCL cases also point to the deepening of integration in CARICOM,
where, in the end, Guyana was compelled to follow the CARICOM-prescribed notion of CET and
adhere to CARICOM regulations. This is of special significance, since from the beginning Guyana
was against the CET and acted on national sentiments to suspend the regionally arranged CET. The
CCJ's  decision  to  favor  the  Community and go against  the  individual  member-state,  reflects  a
deepening of integration in CARICOM. This can also be seen in the Shanique Myrie case, in the
CCJ offered pecuniary damages against the member-state and as a warning for future cases of this
nature. The award of pecuniary damages attaches some monetary value to impediments of freedoms
assured from the Revised Treaty by the member-states. 
Based on the CCJ's pattern of rulings, this action signals the gravity that the CCJ has placed on the
freedoms granted by the Revised Treaty. The CCJ places the provisions of the Revised Treaty above
the  actions  of  the  member-states  and  holds  the  member-states  accountable  for  their  actions
regarding them.
As Neofunctionalism predicts, the CCJ acts on, and in circumstances where it is possible,
creates more de jure power for itself. The CCJ at times acts as an international institution, which is
superimposed  over  the  member-states.  It  enjoys  limited  de  jure sovereignty.  Neofunctionalism
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further suggests that it does so to reinforce itself in CARICOM`s legal and institutional hemisphere.
Hypothesis of curvilinearity: the theory of Neofunctionalism proposes that regional economic
and political integration is innovative and experimental, and occurs under substantial uncertainty
and insecurity. Where statesmen venture in new and unknown policy areas, creating new power
channels.  This  parabolic  relationship  can  be  observed  in  CARICOM  where,  member-states
knowingly or unknowingly react defensively towards regional integration, evident in cases such as
TCI  v  Guyana  and  Myrie  v  Barbados.  Neofunctionalism  further  explain  these  actions  of  the
member-states, but proposing that when “changes are so rapid and large in magnitude ... then actors
are liable to react defensively, if not negatively. They are getting too much of a good thing but not
knowing what to do with it or how to react to it” Schmitter (2002:24). Moreover, the theory of
Neofunctionalism directly addresses cases such as CARICOM, where there is regional integration
among  less  developed  countries.  In  such  cases,  the  theory  holds  that  there  is  a  illustrative
relationship and effect between the factors addressing change in the process of regional integration,
and the actors. Specifically with regards to the limitations of the de jure sovereignty and de facto
power.
The  analysis  revealed  that  the  CCJ  grants  the  institutions  in  CARICOM  autonomy,
independent  of  the  member-states  and  companies.  The  Competitions  Commission's  actions  for
example were seen  as  just  and benefiting  the  Community.  The CCJ sets  the precedent  for  the
Competition Commission to act outside of the 'good graces' of both companies and the member-
states, but for the 'good' of the Community.344
Problems affecting the CCJ: despite of traces of supranationalism, the above examination also
revealed institutional flaws and limitations regarding the CCJ.  As Perez (2008:7) suggests, “the
problem is not what jurisdiction the CCJ has. The real fundamental problem is what the CCJ has
jurisdiction over”. Although the CCJ is ideally established as both a final appellate court and a court
of original jurisdiction, this does not hold true for all member-states of CARICOM. The CCJ cannot
definitively establish  direct  effect  unless  it  has  a  Community over  which  to  preside:  this  is  a
fundamental obstacle to legal integration --and regional integration in general-- in the Caribbean.
This prevalence of opting in and out of the appellate jurisdiction, or of attempting and failing to
ratify the CCJ's appellate jurisdiction, points to the inability and inherent lack of decisiveness of the
CARICOM member-states further reflecting on the larger issue of compliance.
In addition to its de jure flaws, the CCJ is plagued by de facto limitations, namely, possessing
344 The above cases also relate to Neofunctionalism's hypothesis of curvilinearity, which explains this absence of de 
facto power.
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limited power to enforce its rulings. There is no supranational body in CARICOM that can enforce
the rulings of the CCJ and compel member-states to pay fines when they do not adhere to the
rulings. As the cases above reveal, the CCJ also complained about the inefficiencies of the national
judicial processes.
Additionally, specific functions of the judiciary and general economic integration are affected
by the initial provisions of the Revised Treaty and the member-states. For example, in pertinence to
the TCL cases, Guyana took more than four months to re-implement the CET rather than the 28
days which the CCJ declared in its judgment. In spite of this, the CCJ itself admitted that it did not
have the competence to hold Guyana in contempt of court. Moreover: 
 
an economic community needs an executive institution in the same way that a business
needs not just a Board of Directors, but it also needs a Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or
in the same way a government with a parliament also needs the executive arm of the
Prime Minister’s Office. What CARICOM instead has is a Secretariat which essentially
functions as an administrative institution. The absence of an executive institution means
that the system lacks a proper means to implement policy. (Jordan 2003:4)
In spite of the CCJ's attempts to widen its competencies and create a body of law for reference,
there is still a lack of a complementary institution to enforce the judgments of the CCJ. This issue of
compliance is a very essential one in the CCJ. This is because “the enforcement of CCJ rulings
requires that national legislatures transplant the ruling into national law. Thus, the member-states
have control over their own compliance.”345 
These arguments point to a weakness in the Revised Treaty and CARICOM's failure to create
an effective executive institution, to implement the judgments of the CCJ in the member-states. The
analysis revealed that the lack of oversight to create an institution to the implement the rulings of
the CCJ is an inherent factor that slows down integration.
Another glaring omission in the Revised Treaty, which was noted by the CCJ, is the absence
of an adequate and efficient means of resolving disputes between member-states. The Agreement
outlines a process for resolving disputes which involves negotiations that may lead to arbitration. A
major weakness of this process is that it requires the wronged party to initiate the process. Very
often,  for political  reasons,  a  member-state may not want to  lodge a  complaint against  another
345 Perez (2008:7).
153
5.4 Discussion
member-state which also limits the judicial scope of the CCJ.
The  independence  of  the  CCJ  from  the  will  of  CARICOM  member-states  is  therefore
arguable, as the CCJ and Caribbean integration in general are hostage to national partisan politics.
Hinds (2005:6), for example, suggests that in the Anglophone Caribbean, “control of political power
means absolute control of state resources and paramountcy of the party over the state. In many
respects  the  ruling  party  in  the  Anglophone  Caribbean  is  indistinguishable  from  the  state”.
Furthermore,  this  centralized  power  results  in  a  general  unwillingness  to  accept  any  form of
supranational authority, such as that of the CCJ's, because such an authority is perceived as eroding
national sovereignty. In a fervent move to control and assert their own power and authority, these
politicians limit the scope and competencies of institutions. It shows that the actions of élite in
limiting the competencies of institutions also correlate to a limitation of the pace, depth, and scope
of  regional  integration  in  CARICOM. Neofunctionalism proposes  that  an  increase  in  level  and
scope points to an increase in de facto rule of regional institutions; an increase in the level but not
the scope points to limitations for de facto rule; and an increase in the scope but not the level also
points to de facto rule. Therefore, in order for CCJ rulings to have an impact on the member-states
and integration, there must be an expansive scope of provisions including an expansive level.
The analysis therefore reveals important underlying factors for the general field of theorizing
regional integration. Specifically:
• there are both endogenous and exogenous forces at work during the process of regional  
integration;
• regional integration is a process, and not an outcome. It is characterized by reactions of  
states to global issues, which in turn propels the process:
• regional integration requires:
a. democracy;
b. non-state actors which act according to utilitarian concepts, independent of external  
perception;
c. supranational institutions, such as the CCJ, to provide checks and balances;
d. broad scope of regional competencies; 
e. coercion mechanisms including an institution to oversee the implementation;
f. regional decisions in the member-states' commitments. 
Establishing an institution to implement the judgments of the CCJ, for example, would not only
increase the scope of competencies of the CCJ, but would act as a coercive mechanism, which is
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currently lacking in CARICOM. 
5.5 Summary and Conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to apply the theory of Neofunctionalism to the CARICOM. This
was done by using the CCJ as an empirical case. The analysis concentrated on employing the theory
of  Neofunctionalism to  explain  the  actions  of  the  CCJ,  and understanding  their  effects  on  the
member-states and the process of integration.
The  CCJ  reflected  institutional  weaknesses,  which  is  reasoned  by  the  theory  of
Neofunctionalism, to slow down integration.  The CCJ admits that it lacks jurisdiction to rule on
cases of national discrimination brought against organs of CARICOM. Such a ruling relates to the
fact that there is limited form of regress for disgruntled nationals against the organs of CARICOM.
This highlights either the lack of institutionalization in CARICOM, and the supranationalisation of
the organs of CARICOM. In the former case, the 'specialized entities' in CARICOM are subject to
national jurisdiction, and in the latter as, the CCJ precludes institutions in CARICOM from both the
judicial process and pecuniary damages. These actions reveal the CCJ sidestepping national laws
and acting outside of judicial recourse, enabling CARICOM institutions to act outside of regional
regulations. 
The CCJ was further envisioned as acting in good faith for stable economic decisions, which
extend to promoting macro-economic stability for a capital importing region as CARICOM.  
The analysis  also uncovered a lack of 'symmetrical regional heterogeneity';  that is  to say,
variation in the social political and legal values of the CARICOM member-states. Some CARICOM
member-states were skeptical about expanding the CCJ's final appellate mandate, although the CCJ
itself builds on its initial mandate and creates new areas of rulings, comments on extra-judicial
matters, criticizing and making recommendations for the judicial processes in CARICOM member-
states. 
Additionally, in spite of the fact that the CCJ was established for and envisioned as mirroring
the collective social ethos of the region politically, with its appellate jurisdiction, and political and
monetary independence; the CCJ was observed as citing internal instruments over regional charters
on numerous occasions. 
Additionally, according to the theory of Neofunctionalism, spill-over occurs partly when the
political élite decide that integration is relevant; if the political élite is against integration, the result
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will  be  little  or  no  spill-over.  Therefore,  the  CCJ  judges  play  a  vital  role  in  integration  in
CARICOM; for example, when they use international and domestic orders as a frame of reference
in their rulings, then transnational dialog, which is a vital asset for integration, will arise. 
A decisive point from the above analysis is an identified trade-off between  de jure and  de
facto power. The limitation of de facto power adversely affected the de jure power and vice versa.
Coupled with the  de jure/  de facto trade-off,  Neofunctionalism's  conditional  theory of efficacy,
where member-states decrease the efficacy of institutions even at the cost of their efficiency due to
self-preservation tendencies, is a fitting explanation for the process of integration in CARICOM.
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Chapter 6: Neofunctionalism and the European
Partnership Agreement between CARICOM and the EU
6.1 Introduction
This is the third and the final empirical chapter of this thesis. It follows the direction of the
previous two empirical chapters346 by examining CARICOM, specifically the European Partnership
Agreement (EPA), with the theory of Neofunctionalism. It investigates the process of negotiation
and bargaining, and analyzes the outcome of the EPA; while acceding the impact of external factors
on regional integration in CARICOM. It furthermore pays close attention to the competencies of the
political élite and regional institutions in CARICOM. It furthermore treats the structure and flow of
competencies in these institutions as indicators of power relations, and therefore as defining factors
in the process of integration in CARICOM. Questions answered in this chapter are: 
• what are the roles of institutions in CARICOM in relation to the EPA;
• what  are  the  actions  of  institutions  and  the  political  élite,  and  how do  they  affect  the
dynamics that shape the EPA; 
• do institutions have or create  supremacy over national laws, and does the operation of  
institutions contradict with national supremacy;
• what is the nature of the relationship between domestic preferences and actions of political
élite in the decision-making process in CARICOM 
• what are the factors that explain the institutional design in CARICOM and those that are an 
outcome of the EPA? 
To  answer  these  questions,  the  chapter  considers  certain  parameters  of  the  EPA including  the
various  stages  and  issues  in  the  process  of  bargaining  the  EPA;  the  content  of  the  EPA;  and
member-state sentiments after signing the EPA. 
346  The previous two chapters examined the Caribbean Single Market and Economy and the Caribbean Court of Jus-
tice.
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As previously stated in chapter 2, three major developments have occurred since the creation
of  the  common  market  in  the  Caribbean,  these  are:  the  signing  of  the  Revised  Treaty  of
Chaguaramas (Revised Treaty) which created the Caribbean Single market and Economy (CSME);
the  establishment  of  a  regional  tribunal  with  original  and  final  appellate  jurisdiction  over  the
community members, i.e. the Caribbean Court of Justice (CCJ); and the negotiation of the European
Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU. Like the CSME and the CCJ, the EPA critically affects
the deepening and widening of the process of integration in CARICOM. This is because the EPA
addresses all matters related to the movement of people, goods, and services across CARICOM and
EU borders. In order to enable said free movement, CARICOM was forced to review its regional
provisions for the CSME before signing the EPA. 
Furthermore, the EPA is one of the extremely rare instances in which all the member-states of
CARICOM made a concerted effort and negotiated on a single platform as a union, on matters
directly affecting all areas of commercial activity.347 Previous regional negotiations, such as air and
sea  transport  between  the  West  Indies  Federation/CARIFTA and  the  US,  ended  in  individual
CARICOM member-states  signing  bilateral  treaties.  For  the  first  time,  CARICOM as  a  union
negotiates on behalf of its member-states on an expansive scope of issues ranging from trade to
welfare and financial aid. The EPA therefore provides the opportunity to observe the interplay of
member-states' preferences and their effect on the overall process of negotiation and integration in
CARICOM. 
Background: between the late 1950s and 1960s most of the colonies348 of the UK achieved
independence, and as a part of their independence agreement, they were granted preferential access
to the UK for both goods and services. In 1973, when the UK joined the then-European Economic
Community (EEC), it brought along its former colonies of Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific
(ACP). EEC cooperation with the ACP grouping was further extended to the Lomé Conventions.349
These outlined preferential access to the European markets and aid relief for the ACP countries.
After they expired, the Cotonou Partnership Agreement went into effect. 
The US and countries in Latin America brought the Cotonou Partnership Agreement between
the  EU  and  the  ACP  to  the  WTO  under  trade  disputes,  citing  a  contradiction  to  the  non-
347 Before the EPA, CARICOM member-states negotiated bilateral arrangements, or arrangements affecting only spe-
cific groups, for example, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, or other groupings inside of CARICOM. 
348  Most CARICOM member-states are former UK colonies
349 A span of conventions from Lomé Convention to Lomé IV bis Convention.
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discrimination principle350 in the WTO. A waiver with an expiry date was granted by the WTO,
essentially requiring the EU and ACP countries, including CARICOM member-states, to renegotiate
an agreement within the WTO stipulations351.  
The EU characterizes its EPAs as 'aid for trade' policies that fit under WTO stipulations. In
2009, the European Commission published that it has financially supported regional integration in
developing unions by arguing that from “the European Commission alone, total Aid for Trade to the
ACP in 2007 was € 2.12 billion. Of this, €412 million was trade related assistance”. 352 It  went
further to state that “the Commission is working with the ACP partners and EU member-states on
the preparation of what it has called 'Regional Aid for Trade Packages'. The role of these packages
is to support ACP's regional integration efforts”.353 The European Commission further describes
these packages as a means of providing: 
concrete EU financial response to needs and priorities expressed by the ACP countries
and  regions,  including  in  national  and  regional  development  plans.  ...  (T)heir
preparation involves mapping and matching key areas of support for regional integration
with ongoing and needed responses by various actors ... This work is primarily carried
out  at  regional  level,  with  the  regional  integration  organizations  in  the  lead  as
coordinators of the process. (European Commission, DG for Trade 2009:6) 
These arguments reveal that the EPA, promotes regional integration by creating financial incentives.
Essentially, in signing the EPA, CARICOM would be making commitments pertaining to market
liberalization relating to EU trade, and internal regional integration, in exchange for  development
aid from the EU. 
Moreover, in negotiating the EPA, CARICOM is directly reacting to the pressures of external
forces.  It  is  responding to  the  regulations  of  the WTO and negotiating  an agreement  designed
according  to  the  ideologies  of  the  EU.  The  EPA further  represents  a  bilateral  trade  agreement
between the EU and CARICOM as two unions, and not a set of arrangements among countries. It is
350 Unlike South/South Agreements, according to the WTO North/South and North/North FTA agreements must adhere
to Article XXIV for goods, and Article 5 under the GATS for services. These delineate strict limitations in which 
North/North and North/South trade agreements are limited to a non-reciprocal Generalized System of Preferences 
under the Enabling Clause, or a reciprocal FTA either partially under Article XXIV, or under Article XXIV and Art 
5 of the GATS. The Cotonou Agreement was challenged and upheld by the WTO as contradicting these regulations.
351 For more information see World Trade Organization (2001).
352  European Commission, DG for Trade. (2009:5).
353  European Commission, DG for Trade. (2009:5).
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the most expansive agreement between any two existing regional unions354 which incorporates both
trade in goods and services. 
The  process  of  negotiation  of  the  EPA:  the Dominican  Republic  was  included  in  the
CARICOM EPA negotiations with the EU, creating CARIFORUM. CARICOM was also compelled
by the EPA stipulations to 'create' a new institution355 to coordinate and negotiate with the EU on its
behalf. This led to the formation of the Caribbean Regional Negotiation Machinery356 (CRNM)357. 
Process of Consultations: the process of consultation among the CRNM and member-states is
explained below: 
• consultation  Rounds  were  initiated  at  the  national  level  through  interactions  with  
individuals, interest groups and Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and the national 
civil societies in general. They were then extended to the regional level where additional  
input from regional entities was taken into consideration;
• technical Working Groups (TWGs), which  included representatives of governments, the  
private  sector  and  NGOs were  formed  and  both national  and  regional  interests  were  
coordinated and harmonized into negotiating positions;
• a College of Negotiators  comprised of representatives from regional  organizations,  and  
national and regional stakeholders was created. The task of the College of Negotiators was 
to formulate recommendations from the representatives for an overall negotiating strategy; 
• the  recommendations  of  the  College  of  Negotiators  were  presented  to  the  CARICOM  
Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED) and the Cariforum Council of  
Ministers.  These  two  CARICOM  institutions  reviewed,  refined,  approved  the  
recommendations; and created a negotiating strategy;
• the strategy was presented to the CARICOM Heads of Government. The CARICOM Heads 
of Government then provided the final authorization. 
CARICOM points out that this process of review ensured that the interests of all Cariforum
member-states were taken into account, highlighting that the positions were not at variance with the
354 To date, with the drafting of this chapter at the end of 2014. The EU is in the process of negotiating agreements
with other unions and countries. See for example the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) be -
tween the United States of America and the EU; and other agreements between ACP unions and the EU.
355 Given that there was no existing institution of the type.
356 These included diplomats of the member-states, CARICOM dignitaries, ministers of governments of various mem-
ber-states, specialists and consultants employed by the CRNM and CARICOM and ministry adviser of the member-
states. For an exhaustive list of the college of negotiators please visit http:www.crnm.org website last visited June
2015. The CRNM can therefore be seen as a representation of the so-called 'political élite' referenced by the theory
of Neofunctionalism. 
357 Renamed 'Office of Trade Negotiations' and incorporated in the Secretariat. The CRNM includes a 'College of Lead
and Alternate Lead Negotiators' and Technical Working Groups.
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agenda of the CARICOM integration process as outlined in the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. 
In addition to this five-step process, the EU Commission called for a Regional Preparatory
Task Force, (RPTF), the task of which was to develop “a work program with specific interventions
that would reflect identical needs in the Cariforum states and be complementary to the National
Indicative Programs”.358 To do this, the RPTF would be present at the meetings of the technical
working  groups.  Additionally,  a  parallel  process  of  consultation  with  regional  stakeholders,
including the private sector and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), was also facilitated and
coordinated by the Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (CRNM) to complement the formal
consultation process.359 
The above review reveals that the process of consultation and the structure of deliberations
are  initiated,  defined,  and  organized  by  CARICOM.  Up  until  the  Conference's  signature,  all
decisions and actions are spearheaded and influenced by CARICOM.360
The phases of negotiations: CARICOM, through the Cariforum, formally opened negotiations
on the EPA with the EU on the 16th of April 2004 in Kingston, Jamaica. These negotiations were
organized in four phases.361 Phase 1: the 'Initial Phase', in which the priorities of the EPA negotiation
were  established.  This  included  a  local  focus  on  measures  and  guidelines  for  the  EPA
implementation, the fundamental concerns, interests, and the priority issues of the EPA.362 Phase 2:
a local/regional convergence on a strategic approach for entering into the EPA is reached. This
included the technical negotiations on aspect of the EPA.363 Phase 3: focused on structuring and
consolidating the negotiations, including discussions and points of common understanding, which
resulted in a draft EPA.364 Phase 4: the final phase of the EPA negotiations, in which the agreement
was  finalized  between  the  two  unions,  and  an  institutional  framework  was  created  for  the
implementation of the EPA365.
Before  the  outlined  phases  of  negotiations  began,  the  EPA's  parameters  were  defined by
358 United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (2008:18).
359 Midweek Nation, four-page feature, Titled The Economic Partnership Agreement. CRNM and European Commis-
sion. October 15, 2008.
360 Additionally, in comparison with the competencies of the EU Commission which negotiates on behalf on the EU, 
the CRNM is at a disadvantage. There is no agreement or declaration which grants the CRNM any special compe-
tences like those of the EU Commission to determine provisions on CETs, for example, on dumping, or on ICTs. 
For more information on the competencies of the EU commission please see http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm Last 
accessed 30.06.2015
361 The first two phases took place on a national level, the third phase took place on a regional level and the fourth 
phase was between CARICOM and the EU.
362 This phase took place from April 2004 until September 2004. 
363 This phase took place from September 2004 to September 2005. 
364 This phase lasted from September 2005 to December 2006. 
365 This was to take place between January 2007 to December 2007. 
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CARICOM  (not  by  the  member-states).  These  parameters  were  divided  into  four  technical
negotiating groups relating to:  market access;  services and investment;  trade related issues; and
legal and institutional issues.
Phase One: as mentioned above, the purpose of phase one was to establish the priorities of the
EPA negotiations. The framework for the EPA was set and its key issues were addressed. This stage
was spearheaded by the CRNM, which posted a bulletin on its website encouraging “the region's
private  sector  to  participate  more fully in  the current  negotiations  on an Economic Partnership
Agreement”.366 Along  with  the  bulletin,  the  CRNM also  provided  'user  friendly matrices',  that
summarized  the  positions  of  the  EPA negotiations  in  the  areas  of  market  access  in  goods  and
services,  trade  facilitation,  investment,  and  a  broad  area  called  trade-related  aspects  (such  as
innovation, competition policy, etc.). The private sector organizations in CARICOM countries were
urged to include their positions and comments in specific columns provided in the matrices. The
feedback would then be included in preparing the position briefs submitted to the trade ministries of
each CARICOM country. However, no specific deadline was given for such feedback. CARICOM
also asserted that during the first phase of the EPA, 
several  fora  were  established  to  formulate  regional  negotiating  positions.  National
positions which were formulated through national consultations, as well as the positions
of regional sectoral interests and regional NGOs, were systematically harmonized and
refined into coherent  regional  negotiating positions.  (Caribbean Regional  Negotiating
Machinery 2008:1)
Though no specific number was given, it was asserted that there were at least 29 meetings in this
round of consultations.367 CARICOM additionally suggests that  the process of intra-CARICOM
negotiation included harmonized strategy recommendations by the colleges that were referred to the
CARICOM Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED) and the Cariforum Council of
Ministers  for  review  and  consideration.  CARICOM  further  proposed  that  these  institutions
“determined the negotiating mandate with the authority of the Cariforum Heads of Government.
The approval of strategy and final positions therefore lay firmly within the ambit of  the Region’s
elected  representatives”.368 Sacha  Silva,  the  Commonwealth  Secretariat/IDB  Market  Access
366 Trade Bulletin CRNM website (now the Office of Trade Negotiations website). http://www.crnm.org/index.php?op-
tion=com_docman&Itemid=111 Accessed June 30, 2015.
367 Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (2008:1).
368 Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (2008:1)..
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Consultant  to  the  Caribbean  Regional  Negotiating  Machinery,  wrote  an  article  in  Trade
Negotiations Insight369 discussing the process of negotiations and the provisions of the EPA. The
article outlined the stages of the EPA, including the preparatory sage and final sages of negotiations.
During the first stages, the article explained the process of achieving the two main goals of the
CRNM, which were to build a trade and tariff database and to conduct country consultations. The
database was created in order to provide a clear overview of tariff structure for the Cariforum states.
The article made it clear that both goals were challenging for the CRNM; it was noted that “in
regions that shared the CARICOM CET, few countries had updated their national tariff data to meet
the new classification ... no single country had all three years of data … even procuring the actual
tariffs and trade data proved to be a headache”.370
It was further reported that “in many countries, turnout was low and understanding of the EPA
limited among the various stakeholders, even after the two rounds of country consultations which
were eventually conducted”.371 It was moreover highlighted that “the biggest obstacle and greatest
challenge for Cariforum was its lack of human resources and a general funding constraint at both
the national and regional level”.372 Silva (2008:10) additionally addressed inequalities affecting the
process, especially that the CARICOM states, which have a relatively long history and advanced
level  of  regional  integration  relative  to  the  other  ACP  regions,  had  different  ‘streams’  of
integration”.  These  were  identified  as  “the  deep  integration  of  the  Organization  of  Eastern
Caribbean States (OECS)373; the recent accession of Haiti; and the participation of the Bahamas (a
CARICOM member but not signatory to the Single Market)”. Additionally, the Dominican Republic
was a part of the Cariforum, but not CARICOM, and it already had an existing relationship with the
US and Canada, which was an additional issue in the negotiations. 
To this  end, Cariforum proposed that the uneven development of the Cariforum countries
must also to be reflected in the EPA, with a component of the EPA dedicated to differential and
special  treatment  of  these  differences.  The  Cariforum  also  called  for  emphasis  on  national
development strategies and assistance for development of regional economies in vulnerable sectors. 
The first phase of the EPA saw the CRNM define the scope of the EPA with limited to no
input  from  the  member-states;  the  CRNM  further  delineated  the  structure  of  the  institutional
369 Trade Negotiations Insight Volume 7 no.1 Feb. 2008.
370 Silva (2008:9).
371 Silva (2008:9).
372 Silva (2008:9).
373 As highlighted earlier, the OECS is a regional integration scheme embedded within CARICOM, and reflects deeper
commitments in comparison with the CSME. For more information on regional integration in the OECS see Lewis 
(2002) and Onnis (working paper) The OECS in CARICOM: A Comparison of the OECS and the CSME Integra-
tion Schemes'.
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arrangement  for  the  negotiations;  and  the  competent  parties  privy  to  participation  in  the
negotiations. The CRNM also defined the primary objectives of the EPA as they would relate to
CARICOM member-states, objectively determining the issues of importance regarding the EPA for
the member-states. 
In this stage, the CRNM takes a rather paternalistic view that was not initially conceived in its
competencies.  In  comparison  to  previous  instances  in  which  institutions  were  given  their
competencies dependent on the permission of the member-states, this particular occasion reveals
some form of national dependence on CARICOM and the independence/autonomy of CARICOM.
This relates to Neofunctionalism's proposal that institutions take on a paternalistic approach towards
regional integration, and are decisive in determining the level and speed of regional integration. As
the chapter will reveal, this issue is prevalent throughout the four phases of negotiations.  
Phase Two: the second phase of the EPA negotiations was related to the definition of the goals
of the EPA following its implementation. Additionally, another goal of this phase was CARICOM's
convergence on a strategic  approach to  outstanding issues of regional integration that were not
addressed in the Revised Treaty. During this phase, targets and deadlines were established to be
reached before the signing of the EPA, which was planned for the end of 2007. The negotiations
were organized through a structure in which the heads of governments provide the overall direction
and decision-making. Answering to these heads of governments was the appointed lead ministerial
spokesperson.  The  ministries  established  a  Technical  Coordinating  Committee  composed  of
officials from various government ministries, private sector groupings, Chamber of Commerce and
Industry, NGOs, labor and other civil society groups. As previously stated, CARICOM’s Council on
Trade and Economic Development (COTED) makes recommendations at the CARICOM level, and
approves strategies and positions for negotiations in addition to giving overall  guidance for the
negotiations.374   
During  the  second  phase,  the  CRNM  again  initiated  and  oversaw  the  entire  process  of
negotiations. For example, it launched a series of 'boot camps', an educational initiative primarily
targeting  CARICOM-based  companies  engaged  in  exporting  goods  and  services.  The  CRNM
characterized the 'boot camps' as interactive sessions which explain market access, services, and
trade facilitation terms, with the objective of training CARICOM businesspeople “in techniques
374 Ministry of Tade, Industry Investments and Communication of Trinidad and Tobago 
http://www.tradeind.gov.tt/Agreements/TradeAgreements/EconomicPartnershipAgreementEPA/EconomicPartnersh
ipAgreementEPAOverview.aspx Website last visited end of 2014.
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which would enable them to develop position papers  to  be fed into trade negotiations”.375 The
CRNM, however, did not explain how the participants were chosen for these boot camps or the
extent to which their feedback affected the consultation rounds and the EPA negotiation process.
In 2005, the CRNM additionally initiated a series of private sector surveys to collect data for
the negotiations and as a means of reinforcing “existing  private sector outreach and (to) canvas
current  private  sector  opinions  on  and input  to,  the  region's  external  negotiations”.376 In  2006,
further  surveys  targeted  respondents  from  National  Chambers  of  Commerce,  Manufacturer's
Associations,  regional sector-specific associations, and private liability companies.377 The surveys
addressed issues such as barriers and obstacles to market access and competitiveness, current and
future market interest,  the perception of benefits  to be derived from negotiations, challenges to
involvement in negotiations, and what the CRNM could do to improve its outreach. 
Even  the  CRNM admitted  that  the  surveys  done in  the  private  sectors  in  the  Cariforum
countries  revealed a  lack  of  private  sector  participation,  going further  to  acknowledge that  the
private sector was not well informed, did not utilize information made available to it, and did not
give extensive input  for  the  identified  matrices.  It  additionally opined that  the  regional  private
sector was placing itself at a disadvantage by not participating and assuming responsibility for the
CRNM surveys.378 Nevertheless, CARICOM advances the notion that the process of review done by
the CRNM “took account of the interests of all member-states ... and that the positions were not at
variance with the agenda of the CARICOM integration process as outlined in the Revised Treaty of
Chaguaramas”.379  
The  results  of  the local  and national  surveys  by the CRNM were pooled  into a  regional
strategy for negotiation,  while the interests  of local  businesses and national  groups became the
regional  interests  and platforms  for  negotiation.  Therefore,  the  formulation  and drafting  of  the
priorities, strategies and approaches, admittedly, reflect a CARICOM agenda instead of a country or
civil society agenda. 
The second phase of negotiations therefore saw CARICOM initiating the dialog on the EPA in
the  member-states.  In  the  process,  it  defined  the  scope  of  discussions,  provided  background
375 Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (2006).
376 Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (2006).
377 The Survey noted that the response rate included responses received from 20 national and sector specific associa -
tions, located in 8 of the 15 CARICOM target countries, with the associations representing more than 31512 indi-
vidual enterprises, including 3850 exporters. A large increase from 200 associations from 9 countries and 4700 indi -
vidual enterprises in the prior year. 
378 Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (2006).
379 Caribbean Regional Negotiating Machinery (2008).
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information on the EPA, and essentially guided the EPA discussions in these member-states.
The actions of CARICOM, especially those of the CRNM, reveal ideas from the theory of
Neofunctionalism which suggests that institutions will act based on utilitarian means and that their
actions will reflect a form of self maintaining logic. In this case, the CRNM spearheaded the two
phases and initiated most of the bargaining instances as a means of retaining power and maintaining
a regional presence. Additionally, the member-states did not interject because the issue area was too
complicated and it was easier to delegate them to a regional institution; moreover, due to lack of
knowledge, the member-states did not perceive that their sovereignty was threatened by the CRNM.
Interestingly, the first two phases of negotiations, which were aimed at NGOs and other local
sub-national groups, did not meet as much criticism from scholars, civil society, or other interest
groups as in the following two phases of the EPA. For example, phase three, which related to the
structure and consolidation of the EPA negotiations and common understanding for a draft EPA
agreement,  revealed  numerous  instances  of  contentions.  It  mirrored  Neofunctionalism's
politicization process among local civil society groups and also among CARICOM member-states
which were not present in the initial two phases.         
The final two phases of negotiations took place at the regional level, and were concerned with
negotiating the content of the EPA between CARICOM and the EU. Due to the fact that the private
sector in CARICOM and the civil  society were not fully mobile in the first  two phases of the
negotiations, phases three and four reflect a high level of ambiguity for the CARICOM civil society.
Phase Three: the third phase of the EPA negotiations was aimed at consolidating the above
points into a draft agreement. The structure of the EPA and the level and scope of its provisions
were defined by both parties, that is,  Cariforum and the EU Commission.  Issues such as those
related to trade liberalization, sustainable development and regional economic aid, were categorized
in the four technical  negotiation groups mentioned above,  namely:  market  access,  services  and
investment, trade-related issues and legal and institutional issues. 
The  third  phase  of  negotiations  reflected  an  accentuation  of  the  differences  between
Cariforum and the EU. For example:
despite the evidence of meaningful progress, the current state of negotiations reflects
four principal areas of divergence between the two sides as follows: (a) approach to
tariff liberalization; (b) articulation of the regional integration dimension of the EPA; (c)
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scope and domain of commitments in the fields of sustainable development and good
governance;  and  (d)  funding  for  the  costs  of  EPA implementation  and  adjustment.
(Preville 2007:34)
A  Select  Committee  on  International  EPA Development  of  the  United  Kingdom  Parliament,
reviewed the negotiations of the EPA and concluded that:
the EU is approaching the negotiations with the ACP as if they were playing a game of
poker. The Commission is refusing to lay its cards on the table and to dispel the ACP’s
fear  that  it  stands  to  lose  more  than  it  will  gain  … The  ACP is  negotiating  under
considerable  duress  and  the  EU  approach  emphasizes  the  unequal  nature  of  the
negotiation process. (Mandelson 2005: Summary)
The overview of the third stage of negotiations therefore revealed that the emphasis of the two
parties  differed  on  various  aspects  of  the  EPA.  For  example,  Cariforum's  emphasis  was  on
economic  and  sustainable  development,  whilst  that  of  the  EU  was  on  regional  integration.
Neofunctionalism suggests  that  this  external  pressure  will  compel  CARICOM to  develop  new
tactics and find avenues to cope, such as forcing member-states to relinquish a majority of decisions
to the regional level. 
Phase Four: consisted of 14 rounds of negotiations between the CRNM and the European
Commission. The theory of Neofunctionalism predicts that during the negotiations, states will make
their positions on a particular subject known and the political élite acts 'selfishly' according to their
own sentiments rather than supporting national positions. 
During the negotiations for financial services, Jessop (2008b:1) noted that “Europe tried to
have  the  Caribbean  adopt  OECD  principles  or  developed  country  rules  on  the  regulation  and
supervision of the financial services sector relating taxation, money laundering and possible tax
evasion”. He further explained that:
early  European  Commission  draft  text  also  required  information  exchange.  For  the
Caribbean, this was seen as Europe attempting to obtain via a back door, agreement on
issues  that  would  affect  the  competitiveness  of  the  region's  onshore  and  offshore
financial  services  industry  and  impose  a  form  of  extra-territorial  financial  services
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supervision.( Jessop 2008:1) 
He went further to add that 
in the end Caribbean negotiators backed by Heads of Government rejected the EC's
approach and achieved language that was neither intrusive nor challenging to Caribbean
sovereignty.  Thus,  the  main  text  of  the  EPA makes  it  clear  that  both  the  EC  and
Cariforum will only 'endeavor' to facilitate the implementation and application in their
territory  of  internationally  agreed  standards  for  regulation  and  supervision  in  the
financial sector. (Jessop 2008:1) 
Article 101 of the EPA, for example, has a 'Confidentiality of information' clause, in which it is
stipulated that “The EC Party and the Signatory Cariforum States shall ensure the confidentiality of
telecommunications and related traffic data by means of a public telecommunication network and
publicly available telecommunications services”.  At the same time, the EU possessed the upper
hand during the entire process, which negatively affected CARICOM; and:
in setting the parameters of the negotiations, European Commission officials were able
to use the doctrine of ‘WTO compatibility’ as the basis for their negotiating demands and
to  use  their  advantages  over  the  ACP  in  legal  and  technical  resources  to  exploit
ambiguities in existing WTO rule. (Girvin 2008:9)
He further argues that “the EC decided that EPAs would be negotiated within the terms of the
GATT Article XXIV relating to Regional Trade Agreements; which requires that ‘substantially all
trade’ between the Parties be liberalized within a ‘reasonable time’. EC negotiators interpreted this
to mean at least 90 percent of all EC-ACP trade should be liberalized within 10 years and sought to
have these established as benchmarks for the EPA negotiations.(2008:9)” It is further argued that
this was against the interest of CARICOM, because “Article XXIV was established to facilitate
integration  among  countries  of  roughly  equal  levels  of  development  rather  than  North-South
agreements; and that there is no written WTO rule or precedent to support the requirement of 90
percent  liberalization.  Nonetheless  in  the  EPA negotiations  the  EC  interpretations  prevailed.
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(2008:10)”380 Specific cases further reveal the extent to which the EU controlled the negotiations;
for example, during consultations, certain EU NGOs lobbied for adjustments to border tax, which
would include:
(a)  rules  securing  European  investments,  (b)  stronger  Intellectual  Property  rights
coverage and enforcement provisions, including Geographical Indications, (c) reduction
of non-tariff barriers to EU exports and investments, such as application of anti-dumping
mechanisms, national treatment, and competition policy and (d) opening up of public
procurement markets. As well (e) the European Services Forum. (Girvan 2008:10)
Girvin (2008:11) further adds that during the process of negotiations, the EC increased its leverage
against the Cariforum members. He argues that in 2001, when the EC created its 'Everything But
Arms'  initiative, providing  free  market  access  to  the  EU  for  all  less  developed  countries  as
categorized by the WTO:
the effect of this was to exert pressure on non-LDC ACP countries to conclude EPAs, so
as not  to  be disadvantaged vis-à-vis  LDCs. The pressure was substantially increased
when  it  became  apparent  that  the  EC  had  maneuvered  the  situation  so  that  these
countries would face considerably higher tariffs on their exports to Europe from January
1, 2008 if they failed to conclude EPAs before the official deadline. (Girvan 2008:10) 
Additionally,  it  was argued that the EC used a deadline and indirect 'threat'  of higher tariffs to
pressure Cariforum negotiators in speeding up negotiations and signing the EPA. Furthermore, the
EC put further pressure on Cariforum members by determining that:
the only alternative to EPAs for non-LDCs would be to access the European market
under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) scheme or Most Favored Nation
(MFN) provisions … The higher tariffs payable under GSP/MFN would result in major
trade  disruption  for  ACP non-LDCs,  a  group  that  includes  14  of  the  15  Cariforum
countries. (Girvin 2008:11)  
380 Girvan (2008:10).
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Girvan (2008:11) specifically denotes that “this threat of trade disruption proved to be a potent
weapon in the hands of European negotiators in the final stages of the EPA negotiations.” It is also
evident that consensus between Cariforum countries was difficult to attain; during the final phase of
the EPA, Cariforum/CARICOM member-states were still not united on the provisions of the EPA.
For instance, Guyana demanded an extra clause in the agreement for a review of the EPA after five
years, and the LDCs demanded a 'phase' clause on the signing of the EPA, in which specific goods
from the EU markets would still be subject to quotas and tariffs, that would eventually be phased
out,  as  opposed  to  a  blanket  liberalization.  The  list  of  goods381 in  the  EPA was  also  under
discussion,  with some CARICOM member-states  demanding special  protection of fisheries,  for
example, which was eventually delineated in the annex of the EPA. These concessions reveal the
limited  initial  input  of  the  member-states  during  the  first  two  phases.  However,  increased
politicization of the EPA during the final phases resulted in increased controversy.
Additionally,  ideas  of  Neofunctionalism,  such as  'spill-back'  and 'opting-out',  can  also  be
observed  in  this  phase  of  the  EPA.  For  example,  Guyana  agreed  to  sign  only  a  part  of  the
agreement, and Haiti decided to opt out of the agreement completely.382 Moreover, although “the
EPA appears to include a single regional liberalization schedule for Cariforum (with some national
exceptions) the reality is that the schedule comprises 15 country-specific schedules with a certain
level of overlap”.383 For instance, the products for trade ranged from 400 tariff line exceptions for
Dominica  to  3,600  for  Bahamas.384 CARIFORM liberalization  commitments  varied  among  the
member-states,  with  Dominica  committed  to  liberalize  23%  of  items  highlighted  in  the  EPA;
Antigua and Barbuda 88%; Jamaica committed to liberalize 11% of products that face a tariff of
20%; and the Bahamas more than 90%.385 
In January 2008 then-President of Guyana, Jagdeo, asserted that the Caribbean lost in the EPA
negotiations.386 His position as stated in a Guyanese newspaper was that the EPA “would cause
significant shock to the regional economies since many were already running on 'bare-bone' budgets
and they would incur bigger fiscal deficits and have to borrow more money, while their interest
381 Found in the annex of the EPA.
382 For an extensive review of provisions of the EPA, please see the section below and the tables at the end of the chap-
ter. 
383 Meyn (2008).
384 Meyn (2008).
385 Meyn (2008).
386 The then head of government of Guyana made numerous speeches where he stated that the EPA was 'forced' on 
CARICOM and not in the best interest of the member-states of CARICOM. Please see extracts of the speeches at 
the end of this chapter.
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rates would go up”.387 He argued that “the European Union would say that they had given the region
enough time to  adjust,  but  regardless  of  the  time-frame for  adjustment,  the  idea  of  reciprocity
between developed and developing states would place the region at a disadvantage”.388 He further
proposed that the EPA “was a situation the region had been forced into even though the EU would
claim otherwise;” that the EPA was a “well thought-out ploy by Europe to dismantle the solidarity
of the ACP by effectively dividing the ACP into six negotiating theaters – that is six EPAs – and
playing one-off against the other which they did very effectively”.389 
The  EPA was  further  conceived  as  CARICOM  institutions  coercing  member-states,  who
unwillingly  entered into the agreement. Neofunctionalism predicts that it is the same institutions
that the nation states create to address externalities which ultimately spearheaded integration. The
member-states of  CARICOM created the CRNM as a result of external pressures from the WTO
and the EU to negotiate a new EPA. The CRNM possessed some form of control over the process
and negotiated a treaty for the 'good of the Community', with some concessions for the individual
member-states.
During the final  phase of negotiations,  CARICOM member-states could not  agree on the
contents and structure of the EPA; the governments could not concede on principal issues in order
to sign either a full or interim EPA before October 31st 2008. Cariforum member-states like Jamaica
feared that390 if the agreement was not signed by that date then the preferences and provisions would
be withdrawn by the EU; whilst other countries like Guyana wanted to renegotiate the EPA for more
preferential  provisions  for  their  circumstances.  Up  to  the  last  day  before  signing  the  EPA,
Cariforum countries were still at loggerheads with regards to the EPA. Although a drafted EPA was
eventually  acquiesced,  the  countries  argued  that  the  EPA was  structurally  flawed391.  The  then-
President of Guyana, Jagdeo, proposed that the Cariforum countries sign a goods-only agreement
rather than the full EPA. The then-Prime Minister Thompson of Barbados, however, was against
this proposal, warning that reopening EPA negotiations might result in the ultimate collapse of the
entire  process.  The  then-Prime  Minister  of  Jamaica  was  also  against  any changes,  citing  that
renegotiation would bring about a situation in which the EC would also want concession on items of
their choice. With pressure from the EU to sign the EPA, The CARICOM heads of states decided on
387 The Caribbean lost in the negotiations with Europe (2008).
388 The Caribbean lost in the negotiations with Europe (2008).
389 The Caribbean lost in the negotiations with Europe (2008).
390 September 10th 2008 CARICOM Conference meeting in Barbados.
391 September 10th 2008 CARICOM Conference meeting in Barbados.
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signing the EPA. Thirteen of the 15 Cariforum member-states signed the Economic Partnership
Agreement (EPA) in Barbados on October 15, 2008. Haiti and Guyana were the only exceptions.
Five days after the 13 CARICOM countries signed the EPA in Barbados, Guyana signed the EPA in
Brussels, after the EU agreed that the EPA would be revised every five years, and Haiti on the 10th
of December 2009. Caribbean scholars such as Brewster (2008) Girvin (2009, 2011) Khor (2008)
and Thomas (2009) criticized the EPA after it was signed, and proposed that CARICOM member-
states were forced into an agreement with multiple and more negative than positive ramifications.
The COTED called for a review of the EPA. Critics also noted that other Cariforum countries like
Barbados and St. Lucia had some levels of 'discomfort' to the EPA.392 Additionally, EPA critics also
argue  that  there  was  “a  large  gap  between  the  CRNM’s  rather  formulistic  description  of  the
consultation process and the reality of those consultations.  … asymmetries existed between the
CRNM and CARICOM member-states including the various national and regional private sector
bodies”.393 The clear dissonance of the CARICOM member-states towards the EPA reveals that the
EPA did not entirely reflect their will; rather as the theory of Neofunctionalism suggests, it instead
represents the will of the political  élite and institutions in CARICOM; ad is a result of efforts to
address pressing external factors. This is also in line with the idea of 'decisional cycles' of the theory
of Neofunctionalism, which argued that increasingly, tasks and functions of the member-states will
be allocated to a regional body, and that this body will make decisions for the Community and not
the individual member-states.  In this process they will intentionally or inadvertently deepen and
expand integration. 
6.3 Examination of the EPA
As some scholars and interest groups have suggested that the EPA is “littered with examples
of the asymmetrical commitments ...(which) can be evinced in the liberalization schedules for goods
and services where the EU’s commitments are higher than those of the Caribbean”.394
The EPA document is structured as following: Trade Partnership for Sustainable development
(Art. 1 – 8); Trade and Trade related Matters (Art. 9 – 201); Dispute Avoidance and Settlement (Art.
202 – 223); General Exceptions (Art. 224-226); Institutional Provisions (Art. 227-232); and General
392 Caribbean leaders at loggerheads (2008).
393 Hall, Kenneth & Chuck-A-Sang, Myrtle (2012:168)
394 Lodge (2008:1)
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and Final Provisions (Art. 233-250). Added to these parts are protocols on Rules of Origin, Mutual
Administrative Assistance in Customs Matters and Cultural Cooperation. 
Below is a review of each section of the EPA, including an examination of the competencies
and scope of regional integration, which Neofunctionalism proposes defines the level of integration;
and moreover, to juxtapose these commitments with those provisions of the CSME.
6.3.1 Trade Partnership for Sustainable Development (Art. 1- 8)
Article 1 of the EPA lists the objectives, which include: 
• reducing and eventually eradicating poverty through establishing a trade partnership based 
on sustainable development; 
• promoting regional integration and economic cooperation;
• integrating Cariforum States in the world economy in accordance with their political choices
and development priorities;
• improving trade policy and trade related issues in Cariforum states;
• increasing investment in Cariforum states;
• strengthening and enhancing commercial and economic relations.
The partnership detailed by the EPA is envisioned as a trading dynamic that enhances regional
integration in CARICOM. The wording of the objectives expresses the benefits  of the EPA for
CARICOM. The EU assumes a paternalistic role towards CARICOM, characterized by its fostering
of  economic,  social,  and  political  integration  under  the  auspices  of  regional  integration  in
CARICOM. 
Article  4  of  the  agreement,  which addresses  regional  integration,  focuses  on CARICOM,
emphasizing the importance of integration in accordance with the Revised Treaty. Additionally, it
further acknowledges that “the pace and content of regional integration are matters to be determined
exclusively by the Cariforum States in the exercise of their sovereignty and in the light of their
current  and  future  political  ambitions”.395 The  article  emphasizes  that  the  EPA is  built  on  the
priorities set by CARICOM member-states for themselves, and cooperation and implementation of
the EPA should be done with respect for the regional integration process in CARICOM. 
Article 7, which addresses cooperation, also exhibits a paternalistic view of the EU towards
CARICOM,  as  with  Article  1.  'Cooperation'  is  seen  as  the  EU  supporting  development  and
integration in CARICOM. Furthermore, the EU takes on the role of benefactor for CARICOM, and
bears  the  responsibility  to  support  and create  economic  development  to  make the  EPA viable.
395 EPA Article 4 paragraph 4.
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Article 8 outlines the technical, technological, and infrastructure assistance that CARICOM requires
from the EU in order for the agreement to be effective. Specifically, the first sections of Article 8
detail that the EU shall provide assistance to “build human, legal and institutional capacity ...(for)
institution building for  fiscal  reform in order  to  strengthen tax administration and improve the
collection of tax revenues with a view to shifting dependence from tariffs and other duties and
charges to other forms of indirect taxation”. Additionally, the EU committed itself in Article 8, to
provide  “support  measures  aimed  at  promoting  private  sector  and  enterprise  development,  in
particular small economic operators, and enhancing the international competitiveness of Cariforum
firms and diversification of the Cariforum economies”. The EU also maintains the responsibility of
helping  CARICOM countries  to  diversify their  export  goods  and services,  and  to  enhance  the
technological and research capabilities of its member-states to facilitate development.  
The wording of the above Articles (1-8) quite apparently suggests that CARICOM requires
assistance from the EU in order for the EPA to be efficient and successful; and a commitment on the
part of the EU to fulfill them.
6.3.2 Trade and Trade Related Matters (Art. 9 – 201) 
Market access: One of the main focus of the EPA is market access which “removes quota and
tariff limitations on 98 percent of all goods from Cariforum countries into the EU. This provides
duty-free,  quota-free  access  for  agricultural  products  such  as  beef,  dairy,  cereals,  fruits  and
vegetables that previously incurred tariffs”.396 
In addition to  the  articles  in  the EPA concerning trade in  goods,  the  EPA also has  a  schedule
delineating each of the goods traded between the two unions. Of the nearly 2,000 pages of the EPA,
over 1,800 pages contain a 'Schedule of tariff liberalization of the Cariforum States'. 
Eliminating customs duties:  Article  14 of the EPA requires an elimination of all  customs
duties  on  exports  originating  from CARICOM member-states  to  the  EU,  it  does  not  however
require the same for EU exports to CARICOM. 
Preferential  Access:  As  previously  mentioned  in  the  history  of  the  EPA,  a  'Banana  row'
initiated the EPA when ACP countries were brought to the WTO for preferential treatment and
access in the EU by the USA and other countries in Latin America. Under the EPA, the CARICOM
countries enjoy full duty-free and quota-free access to the EU for bananas, with no schedule, i.e.
from the inception  of the  EPA.  The parties also concur that banana exports to the EU have been
assisted in the past by a substantial tariff preference and that the maintenance of such preference for
396 Thorburn et al (2010:06).
174
6.3 Examination of the EPA
as long as possible would increase the benefits of the EPA to the region.
Extraordinary provisions: The EPA, at the request of the EU, contains a 'Most Favored Nation
Concession' (MFN); which requires CARICOM to offer privileges to the EU that it has made with
any third-party, when if they are more favorable that these present concessions.397 The Cariforum
stated that they “consider that the possible reduction of the MFN tariff and the implementation of
Free Trade Agreements between the EC Party and certain third countries would pose significant
competitive challenges  for  the banana industry in  several  Cariforum countries”.398 They further
proposed that the possible reduction of this MFN tariff  imposed by the EU on non-preferential
banana imports - and the implementation of new free trade agreements such as those now being
negotiated with Latin American countries - “would pose significant competitive challenges for the
banana industry in several Cariforum countries”. Bananas have also been acknowledged in a section
of the EPA that specifically addresses traditional agricultural products, in which the EC commits
itself to undertaking 'prior consultations' on trade policy issues that may impact on the competitive
position  of  a  range  of  Caribbean  products,  including  bananas.  This  is  taken  by  Caribbean
negotiators to mean a commitment to consult in advance when the European Union (EU) removes
or  changes  its  tariffs  in  any  new free  trade  agreement  or  in  the  context  of  the  World  Trade
Organization (WTO). Moreover, under the EPA, the EU is committed to maintaining significant
preferential access for CARICOM agricultural products such as bananas, rum, rice, and sugar “for
as long as is feasible and to ensure that any unavoidable reduction in preference is phased in over as
long a period as possible”.399
Furthermore, Article 16, paragraph 3 specifically denotes that “for a period of 10 years after
the signature of this  Agreement,  the Cariforum States may continue to apply any such customs
duties ... other than those listed in Annex III to any imported product originating in the EC Party,
provided that these duties were applicable to this product on the date of signature of this Agreement,
and that the same duties are imposed on the like product imported from all other countries”. This
'grace period' grants CARICOM member-states a time frame in which to prepare for a complete
liberalization of their market. Article 16 paragraph 6 goes further to dictate in favor of CARICOM
member-states by delineating that “in the event of serious difficulties in respect of imports of a
given product, the schedule of customs duty reductions and eliminations may be reviewed by the
397 These economies account for over 1% of world merchandise and their exports count for 1.5% or more (Lists for 
quotes pp6 exclusive or shared competencies in the CCP. 1994 ECR 1-5267 paras 36-5).
398 Final Act accompanying the EPA (2008:10).
399 Jessop (2008c).
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Cariforum-EC Trade and Development Committee by common accord with a  view to possibly
modifying the time schedule for reduction or elimination”. Additionally, the article provides further
concessions  in  the  case  that  the  committee  cannot  bargain  and  reach  an  agreement  that  the
CARICOM member-states view as preferential. In the case where a decision cannot be reached in
90 days, Cariforum states are able to suspend the timetable for up to one year. Therefore, although
the EPA has been discussed earlier as being 'imposed' on the CARICOM member-states, its contents
reveal that CARICOM did bargain for sustainable outcomes. 
Article 23 of the EPA offers CARICOM countries protective measures against EU-subsidized
products.  It  refers  to  anti-dumping  policies  and  gives  CARICOM  countries  the  right  to  take
“countervailing measures in accordance with the relevant WTO agreements” to protect themselves
against any dumping by the EU. The article further makes it clear that anti-dumping in the EPA falls
outside the dispute  settlement  agreements  of  the  two parties,  giving  CARICOM member-states
political clout over the EC countries in relation to fair competition and dumping.  The EPA also
provides a 'safeguard-clause' in Article 25, in the event the event of 'dumping' where CARICOM
member-states can suspend the reduced rate of import duty for the specific product; increase the
customs duty on the specified product to that of other third-party values; introduce tariff quotas on
the specified product.
Moreover,  the  Article  offers  CARICOM  countries  up  to  eight  years  to  impose  such
safeguards,  whilst  the  EU is  afforded  two  years.  This  article  directly  provides  a  'fail-safe'  for
CARICOM member-states,  and allays  the  fears  of  CARICOM private  sectors,  by suggesting  a
possible introduction of increased tariffs on EU products.  
Export Subsidies: Article 28 of the EPA addresses export subsidies. It prohibits CARICOM
member-states from introducing new subsidies on specific agricultural products400 for export to the
EU. This can be seen as a win for the EC countries. This is especially because the EPA requires the
EC to phase out all existing subsidies granted upon the exportation of that product to the territory of
the Cariforum States”. This commitment creates a more level playing field for CARICOM member-
states by being more favorable for producers in CARICOM member-states than for those in the EU.
Article 34 of the EPA makes clear that for trade in goods to occur between the two parties,
they are both required to “promote to the fullest extent possible regional integration in the field of
customs  and  shall  work  on  the  development  of  regional  customs  legislation,  procedures  and
requirements,  in  line with the relevant  international  standards”.  This extra  demands for unified
400 These products are outlined in the Annex of the EPA.
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customs provisions include calls for steps to unify border regulations by each CARICOM member-
state,  and commitments related to those of the CSME.401 These demands by the EC reflect the
necessity  for  addressing  current  regional  arrangements,  and  therefore  regional  integration  in
CARICOM. 
Agriculture and Fisheries: Chapter 5 of the EPA addresses agriculture and fisheries. Article 37
refers to the needs of the CARICOM member-states; for example it was noted that:
the Parties agree that the fundamental objective of this  Agreement is the sustainable
development and the eradication of poverty in Cariforum States, and the smooth and
gradual integration of these economies into the global economy. In the agricultural and
fisheries  sectors,  this  Agreement  should  maximize  those  benefits  in  relation  to  such
factors as food security, employment, poverty alleviation, foreign exchange earnings and
social stability of fishing communities. (EPA:Article 37)
The constant reference to the economic well-being of CARICOM member-states in the EPA is a
welcome feature for CARICOM. Article 40, which addresses food security, acknowledges that the
removal of trade barriers can pose significant challenges for not only the producers in CARICOM,
but  the  consumers  as  well.  The  article  makes  provisions  for  the  well-being  of  consumers  in
CARICOM, providing the opportunity for CARICOM member-states in events “where compliance
with the  provisions  of  this  Agreement  leads  to  problems with the  availability of,  or  access  to,
foodstuffs or other products essential to ensure food security of a Signatory Cariforum State and
where this situation gives rise or is likely to give rise to major difficulties for such a State” to take
“appropriate measures”. for alleviation. 
Traditional Agricultural Products: refers to agricultural goods which had preferential access to
the EC member-states' markets. Article 42 binds the EU to “maintain significant preferential access
within the multilateral trading system for these products originating in the Cariforum States for as
long as is feasible and to ensure that any unavoidable reduction in preference is phased in over as
long a period as possible”. This article therefore replicates conditions for CARICOM member-states
that were similar to the previous preferential agreements with the EC. Consequently, hidden in the
EPA is a  clause for CARICOM member-states  to  trade their  'traditional'  goods to  the EC with
preferential access for an unlimited period of time. Additionally, CARICOM member-states are not
401 For information on the CSME see Chapter 4.
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required by article 42 to reciprocate these commitments. 
For the reasons described above, the trade in goods section of the EPA reveals that although
CARICOM was at a disadvantage in negotiating the EPA and was forced to make concessions, it
did secure certain provisions and 'preferential' treatment.
Investment,  Trade in Services  and E-Commerce:  Thorburn et  al  (2010:06)  notes that  “the
service provisions (of the EPA) are of particular importance since the Caribbean is the only member
region of the ACP grouping that is a net supplier of services. The benefits negotiated under the EPA
include agreements that cover investment, trade in services and electronic commerce”. They further
note that “the EU has undertaken to liberalize 94 percent of the list of services sectors and sub
sectors,  while  Cariforum countries  will  liberalize only some 65 to  75 percent  of  their  trade in
services.(2010:6)”.  These include “barriers to Cariforum investment in the EU, the cross-border
supply of services, limitations on the number of suppliers and volume of transactions, and access
for Caribbean business professionals.(2010:6)”
Article 60 of the EPA illustrates the objectives and scope of the agreement on  Investment,
Trade in Services and E-Commerce. It reaffirms the EPA's commitment “to facilitating the regional
integration and sustainable development of the Signatory Cariforum States and their smooth and
gradual integration in the world economy”. Additionally it delineates “the necessary arrangements
for the progressive, reciprocal and asymmetric liberalization of investment and trade in services and
for cooperation on e-commerce”. 
Article 62 of the EPA addresses 'future liberalization', in which it states that “the Parties shall
enter into further negotiations on investment and trade in services no later than five years from the
date of entry into force of this Agreement with the aim of enhancing the overall  commitments
undertaken under this Title”. 
Article 64 makes reference to a 'Regional Cariforum integration'. It recognizes that through
removing regulations and other barriers to trade, economic integration, contributes to the deepening
of  the  process  of  regional  integration  in  CARICOM.  To  this  end,  the  article  recognizes  and
emphasizes  that  the  principles  for  liberalization  are  a  mere  'framework'  for  “the  further
liberalization of investment and trade in services between Cariforum States in the context of their
regional integration”. The wording of this section is a direct contradiction to those of the previous
section on trade in goods. In the previous section, emphasis was placed on the permanence of the
EPA and its binding force between the two parties, while this section refers to the EPA as a 'mere
framework' for the liberalization of the sector. 
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Commercial  Presence: Article  65  of  the  EPA addresses  commercial  presence,  defining
commercial  presence  as  any  business  or  professional  establishment  performing  an  economic
activity in Cariforum states and/or the EU. This is a broad definition, leaving room for the inclusion
of a variety of actors. 
Except for mining, manufacturing and processing of nuclear materials; production of or trade
in  arms,  munitions  and  war  material;  audio-visual  services; national  maritime  sabotage;  and
national and international air transport services; the EPA text grant commercial presence for both
signatories of the EPA. 
Article 68 of the EPA grants 'national treatment' to the parties of the EPA. Additionally, like
the section on trade in goods, this section of the EPA also has a 'most favored nation treatment
clause' which dictates that “the EC Party shall accord to commercial presences and investors of the
Signatory  Cariforum  States  a  treatment  no  less  favorable  than  the  most  favorable  treatment
applicable to like commercial presences and investors of any third country with whom it concludes
an economic integration agreement after the signature of this Agreement” and vice versa. Unlike the
previous  clause,  this  section  of  the  EPA offers  certain  exceptions  for  CARICOM,  such  as
qualifications, licenses, or prudential measures and arrangements relating to taxation. 
The Investment, Trade in Services and E-Commerce section of the EPA also addresses all
cross-border supply of services402. Article 75 goes further, defining service parameters of the EPA as
“any service in any sector except services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority”, that
is  to  say,  any service supplied  for  a  competitive/commercial  basis.  This  far-reaching definition
opens up European markets to CARICOM member-states to provide cross-border trade in services.
These notable liberal provisions of the EPA reflect not only the reciprocal nature the EPA, but also
the depth of and the commitments of the member-states. 
Financial  services: The  section  of  the  EPA  on  'services'  also  specifies  that  financial
institutions in both the EU and Cariforum countries have the same rights as local companies to
establish  financial  services,  including  insurance,  banking  and  money  brokering,  in  the
corresponding markets. Article 106, for example, grants “a financial service supplier of the other
Party (the right to) provide any new financial service of a type similar to those services that the EC
Party and the Signatory Cariforum States permit their own financial service suppliers to provide
under  their  domestic  law in  like  circumstances”.403 At  the  same time,  there  are  limitations  for
402 With the exception of audio-visual; national maritime; and national and international air transport services. 
403 The schedule and annexes of the EPA also grant companies and other providers of EU and Cariforum mem-
ber-states the 'same treatment' as the local competitors. The EPA creates regulations and guidelines for pensions and
social security schemes in both the unions. 
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financial services, as  Article 104 of the EPA gives both parties the right of non-disclosure, which
makes it clear that “nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to require the EC Party or the
Signatory Cariforum States to disclose information relating to the affairs and accounts of individual
customers or any confidential or proprietary information in the possession of public entities”. This
is especially important for banking services in CARICOM countries, because bank secrecy in the
Caribbean is related to attractive services for international companies and individuals. The non-
disclosure condition in Article 104 therefore guarantees continued and complete banking privacy in
CARICOM countries, and thus a continued tax haven. Coupled with the freedoms of establishment,
it essentially creates a new system of tax haven for EU companies in CARICOM.
Tourism: During the process of negotiations, the EC campaigned for the inclusion of a small
section on tourism in the EPA. Cariforum, on the other hand, demanded a much lengthier text,
because of the importance of tourism for CARICOM member-states. The chapter in the EPA on
tourism covers eight articles, including provisions for the prevention of anti-competitive practices;
the  protection  of  small-  and  medium-sized  enterprises;  mutual  recognition;  environmental  and
quality standards; development cooperation and technical assistants; and increasing the impact of
tourism on sustainable development, among other issues. 
Additionally,  the EPA guarantees fair  competition for Cariforum member-states by strict
rules on anti competitive practices, identifying development needs in the tourism industry of the
Cariforum member-states, and making provision for skills development of the Cariforum members.
The EPA also reflects very specific limitations for “European operators in areas such as the
operation of hotels and restaurants; the letting of furnished accommodation; beverage serving with
entertainment; travel agencies and tour operators; tourist guides; hotel management; renting yachts
and so on”. 
Cultural cooperation: The EPA contains a protocol on cultural cooperation. During the last
phase of the negotiations, CARICOM was more than willing to make compromises on other issues
to secure a cultural cooperation clause in the EPA. The Barbados' Prime Minister, at the time, Owen
Arthur, suggested that liberalizing access for the export of Caribbean cultural and entertainment
products  was  'a  line  in  the  sand'  for  the  Caribbean.  Jamaica,  Trinidad  and  Tobago,  and  other
countries agreed, that “without access to the EU market for those involved in the region's hugely
valuable creative industries there would be no EPA: the Caribbean had to see gain in a sector in
which it excelled”404. To this end a 'Protocol on Cultural Cooperation' was included in the EPA. The
404 Jessop (2008a).
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protocol emphasized “the importance of facilitating cultural cooperation between the Parties and for
that purpose to take into account, … the degree of development of their cultural industries, the level
and structural imbalances of cultural exchanges and the existence of preferential schemes for the
promotion  of  local  and  regional  cultural  content”.  It  further  recognizes  that  “protecting  and
promoting cultural diversity is a condition for a successful dialog between cultures”, and as such, it
integrates a “cultural dimension at all levels of development cooperation and, in particular, in the
field of education” in the EPA. 
6.3.3 Dispute Avoidance and Settlement (art. 202 – 223)
Article 203 of the EPA defines the scope of the dispute avoidance and settlement provisions as
limited “to any dispute concerning the interpretation and application of” the EPA. The first resort
for dispute settlement of the EPA is consultations between the two unions. Article 205 of the EPA
then offers a mediation clause, which states that “if consultations fail to produce a mutually agreed
solution, the Parties may, by agreement, seek recourse to a mediator”. The mediators are chosen
from countries that  are not members of either union. The mediators' options are, however, non-
binding,  with  non-compliance  leading  to  an  arbitrary  procedure.  The  arbitrary  panel  again
comprises non-member parties to the dispute. 
Chapter 2 of Article 213 further addresses non-compliance to the rulings of the arbitrator, and
introduces compensation in this event. Furthermore, the article dictates that in the event that no
agreement on compensation is reached in 30 days, then the appealing party is entitled to adopt
'appropriate measures' against the defending party, which can also extend to the other signatories of
the agreement. Therefore, the actions of and judgment against one Cariforum country are further
extended to the other Cariforum countries, although they were not party to the dispute; which again
demonstrates some form of institutional rule over the member-states. In theory, Cariforum member-
states  should  act  and  sign  international  agreements  that  reflect  the  character  of  their
intergovernmental union. However when an arbitrary panel consisting of other member-states is
entitled to make decisions that directly affect a country without its direct or indirect participation in
any part  of  the  process  of  dispute,  this  directly  contradicts  the  intergovernmental  principle  in
CARICOM. Moreover, it reflects the idea that institutions are a driving force in integration and that
there are soft traces of supranationalism in CARICOM. 
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6.3.4 General Exceptions (art. 224-226)
Article 224 of the Agreement guarantees that commitments between the parties are null and
void  if  they  “constitute  a  means  of  arbitrary  or  unjustifiable  discrimination  ...  or  a  disguised
restriction  on  trade  in  goods,  services  or  establishment”.  Article  225  also  introduces  security
exceptions,  where  the  signatory parties  to  the  Agreement  are  not  liable  to  furnish/disclose any
information which it considers “contrary to its essential security interests”. Furthermore the EPA
under said article does not preclude the parties “from taking any action which it considers necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests”.
Moreover, this section of the EPA highlights the independence of the parties to enforce their
fiscal regulations regarding taxpayers whose place of residence is in one party and who invest in the
other territory. Additionally, Article 226 states that “nothing in this Agreement … shall be construed
to  prevent  the  adoption  or  enforcement  of  any measure  aimed  at  preventing  the  avoidance  or
evasion  of  taxes”.  It  also  prevents  double  taxation  and  guarantees  that  in  the  event  of  any
inconsistency between this Agreement and any (international tax convention), that convention shall
prevail to the extent of the inconsistency. 
6.3.5 Institutional Provisions of the EPA (art. 227-232) 
Article  39  refers  to  'enabling  policies'  of  the  EPA.  It  dictates  that  “the  Cariforum States
commit themselves to adopting and implementing policies and institutional reforms to enable and
facilitate  the  achievement  of  the  objectives”  of  the  EPA.  The  EPA  additionally  introduces
institutional provisions through Articles 227 to 232, including a:
Joint Cariforum-EC Council: Created by Article 227, it supervises the implementation of the
EPA. The council meets at the ministerial level at regular intervals, at least every two years and in
any extraordinary circumstances, and is responsible for the operation and implementation of the
EPA;  including  monitoring  the  fulfillment  of  the  objectives  of  the  EPA405.  Article  227  further
stipulates that the council “shall also examine any major issue arising within the framework of this
Agreement, as well as any other bilateral, multilateral or international question of common interest
and affecting trade between the Parties”. 
Article  229,  suggests  that  “in  order  to  attain  the  objectives  of  this  Agreement,  the  Joint
Cariforum-EC Council shall have the power to take decisions in respect of all matters covered by
the Agreement. The decisions taken shall be binding on the Parties and the Signatory Cariforum
States, which shall take all the measures necessary to implement them in accordance with each
405 The council as such is an institutional provision that oversees the implementation of the EPA. It possesses similar 
competencies like the COTED relating to the CSME.
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Party's  and Signatory Cariforum State's  internal  rules”.  These  institutional  provisions  place  the
council in an overarching role in relation to the member-states, in which it possesses the power to
make binding decisions on the member-states. These provisions are more extensive than those of
the CSME. The council is similar to the COTED/COFCUR in that it oversees the implementation of
the  provisions  of  the  agreement.  However,  unlike  the  institutions  of  the  CSME,  the  council
possesses coercive power over the member-states; and therefore, the commitments of the EPA are in
some cases deeper than those initial commitments of the CSME.
Cariforum-EC Trade  and  Development  Committee:  Article  230  also  creates  a  committee
whose  mandate  is  to  evaluate  the  results  of  the  agreement,  resolve  disputes  regarding  the
interpretation  or  application  of  the  Agreement,  and  facilitate  trade,  investment  and  business
opportunities  between  the  two  unions.406 It  also  has  the  power  to  set  up  and  oversee  special
committees and bodies relating to the EPA, in addition to making decisions and recommendations
on issues relating to the EPA. 
Cariforum-EC Consultative  Committee:  Article  232  creates  a  Cariforum-EC  Consultative
Committee, which has the mandate to assist the Joint Cariforum-EC Council in promoting “dialog
and cooperation between representatives of organizations of civil society, including the academic
community,  and  social  and  economic  partners”.407 The  Cariforum-EC  Council  decides  on  the
membership of this committee; in doing so, the Cariforum-EC Council reinforces its institutional
power. 
The operation and implementation of the EPA is dependent on these three institutions which
touch on the sovereignty of the member-states. They monitor the implementation of the objectives
of the EPA and make major decisions on the overall functioning of the EPA. They furthermore rule
over disputes between the regions on matters relating to the EPA and even interpret the application
of the EPA. These institutions are, therefore, supreme governing bodies with regards to the EPA.
They act outside of the intergovernmental member-states of CARICOM and take decisions and
power, relating to the EPA, away from the member-states. CARICOM, in addressing the importance
of the said institutions, noted that:
the  effective  functioning  of  the  EPA Institutions,  particularly  the  Joint  Cariforum
Council,  the  Cariforum-EC  Trade  and  Development  Committee  and  the  Special
Committee on Customs Cooperation and Trade Facilitation, is considered paramount to
406 Article 230 EPA.
407 Article 232.
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the successful implementation of the Agreement. These institutions hold responsibility in
varying capacities for overseeing the operation of the Agreement and for ensuring that
the  Agreement  meets  its  principal  objectives  which  includes  reducing  poverty  in
Cariforum States by facilitating their economic growth through freer trade. (CARICOM
Regional Negotiating Machinery:2009)
6.3.6 General and Final Provisions (Art. 233-250)
This section of the EPA included three protocols on Definition of the Concept of 'Originating
Products'; Mutual administrative assistance in customs matters; and Cultural Cooperation.
Article 234 of the EPA further designates a 'Coordinator' to “facilitate communication and to
ensure the effective implementation of the Agreement”. Article 235 addresses transparency of the
EPA  and  requires  both  signatories  to:  “ensure  that  any  laws,  regulations,  procedures  and
administrative rulings of general application as well as any international commitments relating to
any trade matter covered by this Agreement are promptly published or made publicly available and
brought to the attention of the other Party”. 
Article  238 acknowledges  regional  preferences  and necessitates  that  “any more  favorable
treatment and advantage that may be granted under this Agreement by any Signatory CARIFORUM
State to the EC Party shall also be enjoyed by each Signatory CARIFORUM State”.
The EPA also included Joint Declarations Development Cooperation, Bananas, Used Goods,
Rice, Reallocation of Undelivered Quantities under the Sugar Protocol.
6.4 Discussion 
In  analyzing  the  EPA,  both  the  process  of  negotiations  and  the  resulting  content  of  the
agreement reflect core Neofunctionalist hypotheses, specifically the role of:
Political   élite:  in line  with  the  theory  of  Neofunctionalism,  political  élite played  an
important/irreplaceable role in the crafting of the EPA, deciding the fate of regional integration in
CARICOM.  Political  élite further  decided  on  the  parameters  and  contents  of  the  EPA,  which
impacted the scope and level of regional integration in CARICOM. The signing of the EPA arose
from a CRNM-centered negotiation process, also revealing the determinative role of political élite
in  the  process  of  the  EPA and  regional  integration  in  CARICOM in  general.  Non-state  actors
therefore waived  influential  power  and  political  clout  in  the  process  of  negotiation,  which  is
ultimately expressed in the overall content of the EPA.
184
6.4 Discussion 
External Conditions: a prevailing factor that was evident throughout the above analysis was
the impact  of external  conditions  on the process of integration. This  initial  observation reveals
evidence of Neofunctionalism's exogenous factors hypothesis, which proposes that external factors
and institutions have a considerable impact on and affect the process of regional integration. It
advances  that  “tensions  from  the  global  environment  and/or  contradictions  generated  by  past
performance  give  rise  to  unexpected  performance  in  the  pursuit  of  agreed-upon  common
objectives”.408 Moreover:
external  conditions  begin,  as  do  all  the  independent  variables,  as  givens.  While  the
changes  in  national  structures  and  values  become  at  least  partially  predictable  as
consequences of regional decisions, the global position and the dependent client status
of  member-states  and regions  as  a  whole  continue to  be  exogenously determined ...
integrating  units  will  find themselves  increasingly compelled—regardless  of  original
intentions— to adopt common policies vis-à-vis non-participant third parties. (Schmitter
2002:22) 
In  the  present  case,  it  can  be  observed that  the  WTO rulings,  forced  CARICOM countries  to
negotiate an agreement based on the EU's set  ideals,  structures,  and terms. In spite of its  non-
member status, CARICOM was forced to align with the Dominican Republic to negotiate with the
EU. The Cariforum symbolizes an EU hybrid construct in which CARICOM was compelled to
operate and to negotiate the very agreement that was forced on it by external factors. The EPA spans
a comprehensive agreement on trade in goods and services and cross-border  freedoms, affecting
most sectors in CARICOM, and therefore symbolizes a pronounced and significant representation
of the effects of exogenous factors on the process of regional integration in CARICOM. 
Neofunctionalism's 'externalization hypothesis' also predicts that external conditions will become
less 'exogenously' determined when integrative rather than 'disintegrative' strategies are commonly
adopted. The 'independent' role of these conditions should decline as integration proceeds until joint
negotiation in relation to third parties becomes an integral part  of the process, in order for the
international system to affirm the new party 'full participant status'. This also explains the actions by
CARICOM to incorporate the CRNM as the 'Office of Negotiations' in its official structure after the
signing of the EPA.
408 Schmitter (2002:21).
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Neofunctionalism's externalization hypothesis additionally suggests that member-states will
face  considerable  difficulties  when  attempting  to  isolate  their  joint  negotiations  from a  global
context and dependence. This relates to the sentiments of the then Secretary General of the ACP Sir
Kaputin in addressing the negotiations of the EPA, that:
the ACP Ministers responsible for EPAs held a meeting in early November, less than two
months before the end of the Cotonou trade regime and the expiry of the WTO waiver.
By then it  was  clear  that  the  process  towards  the  finalization  of  the  EPA talks  had
become crucial in light of the information that most, if not all, of the ACP regions would
not be able to conclude the negotiations on time. Moreover, the European Commission
had categorically repeated that there was 'no plan B'. (Kaputin 2008:12) 
The ACP Secretary General went on to suggest that the EU further placed pressure on the ACP,
noting that:
 
the ACP Ministers were seriously concerned about the possible disruption of trade flows
should negotiations on EPAs not be completed on time. ... (T)he EU Commission issued
a  communication  on EPAs … which provided a  sort  of  road-map based on signing
interim agreements as the only way of stemming the disruption of trade. ...Therefore, I
can describe the process towards the initialing as one fraught with panic, confusion and
disagreements at the national and regional level. (Kaputin 2008:12) 
These statements not only reveal the impact of external pressure from the EU on the ACP, but also
reflects  the severity of external  pressure on CARICOM. They moreover  explain the actions  of
CARICOM to act on behalf of its member-states to negotiate 'aid for trade' with the EU.409
Decision-Cycles:  Neofunctionalism's  proposal  of  decision  cycles  enables  not  only a  clear
understanding of the actions of CARICOM in the negotiation process, but also the possibility to
pinpoint CARICOM's level of integration. Moreover Schmitter (2002:31) suggests that it should be
possible to distinguish the first signs of externalization during these cycles. That is to say, attempts
by CARICOM actors to manage 'extra-regional dependence'. External dependence affect regional
decisions,  and the  level  and  scope of  integration  which  positively correlates  with  'progressive'
409 Sir Kaputin further conceded that apart form CARICOM, other ACP unions were not able to sign an EPA. Reveal-
ing the importance of the highlighted factors in CARICOM in the process of regional integration.
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nature of the decision-making style.  Therefore, new commitments will reveal an increased scope
and a higher level of integration in comparison with what was generated by initial commitments. 
It is understandable then that in comparison with the CSME, the commitments of the EPA
reveal deeper obligations in certain sectors. For example, non-compliance of EPA commitments by
one  CARICOM country  can  result  in  sanctions  by  the  EU on  all  CARICOM countries.  With
reference to dispute settlement, in choosing mediators and arbitrators from external member-states,
the member-states that sign the EPA effectively concede some form of sovereignty to an institution
to rule over decisions affecting their  trade practices;  member-states are compelled to relinquish
more sovereignty to an arbitrary panel. 
Institutionalization:  the  initial  phases  of  the  EPA  reflected  ideas  of  the  theory  of
Neofunctionalism;  notably,  they reveal  a  level  of  institutionalization  in  CARICOM. In spite  of
CARICOM being characterized as an intergovernmental union, the initial phases, especially the
actions  of  CARICOM  during  the  process,  exhibit  a  high  level  of  supranational  authority  in
CARICOM. The CRNM crafted  the  matrices  and parameters  of  the  EPA and conceded that  it
spearheaded most of the consultations. It additionally, emulates the expansion of the institutional
landscape  of  CARICOM,  and  the  successive  creation  of  new  institutions  in  CARICOM.  This
reflects a change in both the institutional provisions of CARICOM, and the functional domain of
regional  integration.  With  emphasis  of  regional  structures,  institutions  are  created  and  granted
regional  authority,  to  implement  provisions  arrived  at  above at  the  regional  level.  The process
reveals a 'top down' approach towards integration, emphasizing the crucial role of institutions and
concurrently a deficit in the role of the member-states in the process of integration.
Non-state actors: the above analysis underscored  the exhaustive role played by CARICOM
throughout  the  entire  EPA process.  CARICOM  institutions represented  a  constitutive  role  in
defining  the  structure  of  the  EPA and  guided  member-states  during  the  process.  Essentially,
CARICOM  controlled  the  negotiations  for  the  member-states. The  first  two  phases  reflected
CARICOM's initiative in spearheading the negotiation process with no decisive involvement of a
regional civil society and limited input from individual member-states. The final two stages affirm a
more concerted effort on the part of the individual member-states and regional civil society. The
stages also reveal intensive media coverage,  which directly affected the input  of the respective
member of the Council and Conference. As such, they represent a high level of politicization as
proposed by the theory of Neofunctionalism.
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Notably, CARICOM argued in a press briefing that civil society in the region was involved in
negotiating the contents of the EPA. CARICOM advanced that “the (C)RNM's outreach activities
are geared at engaging a broad cross-section of stakeholders, to the extent that resources allow. We
want to hear their concerns and views. We consider the involvement of civil society an integral part
of the process”.410 The  CRNM's Director General Ambassador, Dr. Richard Bernal, went further
adding  that  civil  society  representatives  including  the  Barbados-based  Caribbean  Policy
Development Center (CPDC) exchanged views on the EPA with EU representatives. He noted that
“this most recent consultation between the (C)RNM and the NGO community demonstrates the
(C)RNM’s commitment  to  regular  interchange with these set  of  stakeholders”.411 However,  this
merely reflects the informal exchange and input of regional stakeholders in the process of forming
the  EPA.  Although such exchanges  are  extremely valuable,  they do not  relate  to  a  substantial
interaction or input of the regional civil society in defining the substance of and negotiating the
EPA.  Furthermore,  CARICOM  does  not  detail  any  existing  structure  or  formal  arrangement
between local government, private sector and/or local and regional civil society and the CRNM. On
the contrary, the analysis revealed the clear role of non-state actors in the formulation of the EPA,
Politicization: the third and fourth phases of the EPA reflected a high level of politicization.
The process of politicization in CARICOM with reference to the EPA fits within the explanations of
the theory of Neofunctionalism. Specifically the level of controversy relating to decisions at the
regional  level  increase which results  in  a  widening of  the audience interested in  the effects  of
integration.412
The  first  two phases  of  the  negotiations  were  technical  and  complicated;  therefore,  they  were
overlooked and did arouse much media attention. However, the final two phases were plagued with
controversy, which led to politicization of the process. As a result of national sentiments among the
member-states,  the  decision-making  process  of  the  EPA  was  scrutinized  by  media  and
pro/opponents of regional integration. Media attention and controversy were more evident in the
final  two phases than when the civil  society input was necessary.  The final  phases of the EPA
reveals a widening of the audience interested in the EPA as a result of the joint decision-making
venture.
410 CRNM Press release No. 02/2006 Bernal: RNM Welcomes Interchange with Civil Society.
411 CRNM Press release No. 02/2006 Bernal: RNM Welcomes Interchange with Civil Society.
412 Schmitter (2002:21) proposes that “somewhere along the line, a manifest redefinition of mutual objectives will 
probably occur (transcendence) ... Ultimately, one could hypothesize that there will be a shift in actor expectations 
and loyalty toward the new regional center. Nevertheless, it seems worth repeating that only in exceptional, i.e. high
scoring, circumstances is such a cumulative process to be anticipated. Normally, the response by established nation-
al officials to higher costs and wider public's will be entropy.”
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After  the  EPA, CARICOM member-states  provided new information  to  their  citizens,  on
understanding the EPA and benefits than can be derived from the EPA. These actions reveal a slight
shift in embracing the EPA and its regional objectives, and therefore a shift in expectations to the
new regional center, which is highlighted by the theory of Neofunctionalism. 
Natural Entropy: the advances of the theory of Neofunctionalism in its hypotheses of 'natural
entropy', help explain bargaining situations such as the EPA. The hypothesis refers to the process by
which integration reaches a state of rest or stagnation unless affected by new exceptional and often
unintended exogenous conditions and endogenous outcomes, which were not present at the initial
convergence.413 Only in exceptional circumstances will externalities give rise to actions to avoid
entropy; under normal circumstances, the actors will opt for encapsulation or stagnancy. Entropy in
CARICOM was avoided due to reactions to the external pressures of the EPA. The EPA, a new
'obstacle'  for  CARICOM  compelled  CARICOM  to  create  the  Cariforum  as  an  institutional
arrangement and solution for negotiating with the EU Commission. The creation of the Cariforum
and the move by CARICOM to redefine and extend its borders to negotiate under Cariforum with
the EU can be seen as one of these 'exceptional circumstances' which define a decisional cycle in
the process of integration in a region.
Insights into the process of Regional integration: the analysis revealed useful information for
the theorizing regional integration in CARICOM, particularly:
• strengthening  the  competencies  of  institutions  positively  reflects  on  the  process  of  
integration in CARICOM;
• regional institutions are not only dominant but useful in bargaining at  the regional and  
international levels;
• providing information for respective parties and interest  groups works to the benefit of  
regional integration;
• assessing and concentrating on regional gains, as opposed to national gains, has a positive 
correlation with the process of regional integration;
• member-states must relinquish certain competencies, in both negotiation processes and the 
general process of integration, to regional authorities;
• the EPA superimposes a deep scheme of regional integration on CARICOM, which simulta
neously affects its internal and external economic commitments. 
It also revealed salient features of theorizing integration in general, particularly:
413 Schmitter (2002:21).
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• member-states are inclined to react to external forces that drive integration. 
• these external conditions critically affect the process of regional integration. Exogenous  
factors affect the actions of both states and non-state actors in defining the direction, pace 
and depth of integration;
• there are distinctive (decision) cycles of integration; it progresses in bouts of action followed
by stages of rest;
• during  the  cycles  of  integration,  the  levels  of  politicization  increase,  giving  rise  to  an  
increase in the process; 
• decision making in unions is decentralized, that is to say, there are numerous parties who 
play a vital role in the decisions making process and in the general process of regional  
integration; these include the heads of member-states; and non state actors, including 
institutions and other political  élite. In the case of CARICOM, the CRNM dominated the 
first three stages of the EPA, defining parameters of the EPA, spearheading negotiations and 
disseminating information on the EPA to relevant parties. These actions reveal the dominant 
role of the CRNM as an institution in CARICOM.
6.5 Summary and Conclusion 
The theory of Neofunctionalism was employed in this chapter to analyze the EPA negotiated
between  CARICOM  and  the  EU.  The  examination revealed  information  on  the  process  of
consultations, negotiations, and the commitments of the EPA, and highlighted the applicability of
certain key hypotheses of Neofunctionalism. 
Whilst the previous two empirical chapters examined the process of integration in CARICOM
from a functional and institutional perspective, this chapter additionally paid close attention to the
actions of the political  élite and other non-state actors at the supranational level, and the ways in
which they shape the scope and domain of regional integration. 
The analysis of the chapter specifically converged on the process of negotiation, the platform
of bargaining utilized by CARICOM, and the power and will of the political élite in CARICOM. It
examined the scope of regional integration in CARICOM by reviewing the commitments of the
EPA.  It  moreover  proposed  the  that  regional  institutions,  such  as  the  CRNM are  pivotal,  and
decisive in the process of regional integration in CARICOM. The CRNM initiated and oversaw the
process of local and national consultations and shaped the preferences of the state. In so doing, the
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institution takes on the personality of and acts in the role of a member-state. Institutions as such, are
more than an arm of the state, they take on a persona of their own.
The EPA, therefore signifies a cycle of deepening regional integration in CARICOM. The
analysis  of the EPA, also reveals that inherent problems in CARICOM might not be related to
CARICOM itself,  but  to  failure  to  identify  structural  and  functional  issues  through theoretical
analysis. 
CARICOM itself  admits  that  the  process  of  consultations  was  flawed,  that,  for  example,
national groups did not play as big a role as was expected.
It is therefore necessary to conduct further analysis on  regional  groupings  and  orders  in
CARICOM, including, research that focus on the understanding process of preference formation
and development;  analyzing local participation in political  processes;  theorizing borders or lack
thereof, and on the formation of normative order.
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Chapter 7: Discussion and Conclusion
7.1 Introduction
This is the final chapter of the thesis. It offers a summary and discussion of the results of the
dissertation; presents new perspectives on CARICOM and the theory of Neofunctionalism; and
offers  proposals  for  future  theoretical  applications  and  analyses  of  regional  integration  in
CARICOM. 
7.2 New Perspectives on CARICOM 
The analysis of CARICOM using the theory of Neofunctionalism brought interesting details
to light. Notably: 
External Forces and Integration in CARICOM: Chapter 2 presented regional integration in
CARICOM as a reaction to external global events. It outlined previous integration efforts by the UK
during the period of its colonial rule in the Caribbean. It also related attempts at regional integration
by the newly independent CARICOM member-states as being directly linked to these prior efforts
and a reaction to exogenous factors. 
The analyses in chapters 4, 5 and 6  additionally  revealed the extensive effects of external
forces  on  the  process  of  regional  integration  in  CARICOM.  All  three  incremental  changes  in
CARICOM, i.e. the CSME, CCJ and the EPA, which have proven to deepen regional integration in
CARICOM, reflect reactions to external events. 
Chapter 4 highlighted a deepening of regional integration in CARICOM with the creation of
the CSME. It argued that the Grande Anse Declaration, which initiated the CSME, was a mere
reaction to global events, which spilled over to a structured agreement that introduced regional
competencies and organizations in CARICOM.
In Chapter 5, the analysis of the judgments of the CCJ demonstrated a considerable influence
of international law on the rulings of the CCJ.
Chapter 6 presented the entire partnership agreement (EPA) with the European Union (EU) as
a reaction to external events, including those of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the EU. It
further established that the contents of the EPA, especially its  institutional provisions,  reflected
objectives of the EU’s external trade policy. Moreover, it proposed that the reaction of CARICOM
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to these external events largely characterize the nature of the political process in CARICOM. 
Spill-over: the theory of Neofunctionalism proposes that spill-over mechanisms are driving
forces behind the process of integration. The analysis of the process of integration in CARICOM
also reflects these ideas. 
Chapter 4 proposed that the provisions of the protocols in the Revised Treaty, along with the
creation  of  the  regional  institutions,  resulted  from spill-over  of  initial  commitments  to  deepen
integration;  and  in  spill-over  of  economic  integration  to  other  sectors  in  CARICOM,  most
significantly,  in  immigration  policies,  education,  social  security,  standards  and  quality,  and
environmental issues. For example, the harmonization of immigration procedures was a direct spill-
over from the requirements for regulation in CARICOM states to accommodate the free movement
of  CARICOM nationals  across  CARICOM territories.  In  the  education  sector,  skills  and  other
degree requirements were harmonized in order to accommodate the provisions for free movement
of CARICOM nationals across member-state borders. Furthermore, provisions for social securities
and national pension schemes provided by the CSME in order to accommodate the free travel of
CARICOM individuals also reflect spill-over. Consequently, not only were CARICOM member-
states compelled to ratify the provisions of the protocols; they were also compelled to implement
new provisions which would address any limitations in providing benefits. This spill-over reveals
the extensive impact of the CSME on sectors that were not initially under consideration ab initio the
CSME. 
The analysis also revealed both horizontal and vertical connectivity among social, economic,
political, and legal actors. These connections414 evolved and spilled-over various areas. As predicted
by Neofunctionalism,  as  essential  deterrents  to  regional  exchanges  were  removed  and  policies
harmonized, new deterrents became obvious in other sectors. These hindrances were then perceived
as  salient,  new  competences  and  new  regulations  for  regional  authorities  were  introduced.
Intrinsically,  the  process  of  integration continued to  spill-over  into additional  policy areas.  For
example, the removal of tariff and quotas on intra-regional goods revealed explicit variations in
customs standards and regulatory, health and safety standards which were then harmonized. Thus,
what  started  as  an  attempt  at  addressing  tariffs  and  quotas,  explicitly  evolved  into  concrete
regulations and provisions for regional safety standards, which then spill-over to health and other
regulatory standards.
414 As noted, Stone Sweet and Sandholz (1997:304) suggest that “vertical linkages are the stable relationships, or pat-
terned interactions, between actors organized at the (regional) level and actors organized at or below the mem-
ber-state level. Horizontal linkages are the stable relationships, or patterned interaction, between actors organized in
one member-state with actors organized in another”. 
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Chapter 4 therefore presented the CSME as an expansion of an initial intergovernmental effort
at  addressing  global  problems  and  issues,  and  a  transformation  of  the  functional  sphere  of
CARICOM. This included both a widening and deepening of economic integration and institutional
building with spill-over in economic, political and social sectors. 
In Chapter 5, spill-over effects were observed in relation to the CCJ's rulings.415 For example,
under  its  final  appellate  jurisdiction,  the  CCJ's  judgments  on  property  purchases  urged  the
government  of Barbados to  introduce 'Civil  Procedural  Rules'  as a  means of updating its  legal
system. 
The analysis  of  the final  appellate  cases  also revealed  that  the CCJ often rules  on cases
beyond  the  scope of  its  requirements.  It  comments  on  the  deficiencies  of  the  legal  system of
Barbados, especially on the slow pace of its judicial system.  The CCJ also ruled that Barbados
should take certain steps in future capital punishment cases.
The  CCJ  created  functional  spill-over  through  the  integrative  action  under  its  original
jurisdiction, and an expansion of the reach of community law under its final appellate jurisdiction.
The CCJ therefore initiated and expanded structural change and spill-over in CARICOM.416 
Structural Change in CARICOM:  the three empirical chapters revealed extensive structural
changes in CARICOM's institutional landscape. 
Chapter 4 disclosed that the Revised Treaty represents a clear effort of CARICOM member-
states at deepening regional integration through economic, social, and political policy changes; all
symbolizing a structural adjustment in the functional sphere of CARICOM. The Revised Treaty
extend  those  initial  agreements  in  the  Original  Treaty  on  a  common  market,  to  include  an
institutional,  legal,  and  a  macroeconomic  framework.  It  moreover  created  provisions  and
regulations  for  market  access  and  sectoral  policies.  The  CSME  not  only  introduces  regional
institutions and new regional competences to CARICOM, but its also address the harmonization of
member-state legislation and economic and financial convergence in specific issue areas. 
In  addition to  an  overhaul  of  the  functional  scope of  CARICOM, the protocols  reflect  a
fundamental modification in the institutional landscape of CARICOM. They extensively introduce
new institutions417 with regional competencies over policy areas relating to agriculture; capital and
establishment;  commercial  enterprise;  competition  and  trade;  consumer  protection;  customs;
415 Both rulings under its original jurisdiction and its final appellate jurisdiction revealed spill-over.
416 The CCJ also represents a form of legal integration in CARICOM resulting from functional spill-over created by 
the deepening of the process of economic integration through the creation of the CSME.
417 Institutions including the COTED, COFAP, and the Competition Commission were created to monitor, implement 
and act as 'watchdogs' for the provisions reviewed above; revealing their importance to the process of regional inte-
gration in CARICOM.
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dumping and other market protection/regulation fiscal and macro-economic convergence; industry;
services; social securities; transport; and quality and standards. 
The Revised Treaty and the CSME therefore represent a functional overhaul of the preexisting
arrangements of trade, and an introduction of harmonized regulations governed at the regional level
in CARICOM. 
Chapter 5, presented and highlighted the supranational competences of the CCJ as a distinct
systematic transformation, arising from the CSME. Not only does the CCJ possess sole competency
to interpret the Revised Treaty, but it also possesses an appellate jurisdiction over some CARICOM
countries. It represents a decisive structural deviation of CARICOM's legal landscape, as it typifies
a supranational institution in a previously perceived intergovernmental union. 
Chapter 6 also reveals functional development in CARICOM. The CARIFORUM embodies a
new construct outside of the typical  functional  arrangement  of CARICOM. Moreover,  the EPA
represents the first concerted effort of CARICOM to negotiate on a single platform with another
union. 
Priming cycles in CARICOM: the analysis of the three variables, the CSME, the CCJ, and the
EPA,  provided  information  related  to  the  level  and  scope  of  regional  political  and  economic
integration in CARICOM. 
As explained in Chapter 3, Neofunctionalism's 'decision cycles',  as recounted in Schmitter
2002:26, offer a thorough explanation for the initiation and deepening of integration in CARICOM.
Decision cycles explain why CARICOM countries decided to negotiate the EPA with the EU, unlike
the member-states of other regions in the ACP grouping. Furthermore, decision cycles also provide
the possibility of characterizing the state/advancement of regional integration in CARICOM.
These  'decision  cycles'  include  an  'initiation  cycle'  and  a  'priming  cycle'  of  integration.
Neofunctionalism further suggests that at each decision cycle actors, member-states, the political
élite, and regional institutions are compelled to re-examine their initial respective plan of action. A
substantial variation between an initiating cycle and a priming cycle is the increase in relevance of
particular  regional  processes.  Crises  are  overcome  with  a  deepening  of  regional  integration,
including the establishment of new institutions, whose importance increase and outweigh national
sentiments.
Moreover, under Neofunctionalism's 'hypothesis of additivity', actors begin to calculate and
internalize the impact of the regional processes in their decisions. They also begin to add additional
variables  to  their  calculations  'one at  a  time',  with each variable  either  having a  negative  or  a
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positive impact on the outcome of their decisions. This hypothesis enables us to precisely observe
the  'cycles'  of  integration  and  therefore  to  better  understand  the  process  of  integration  in
CARICOM. It is possible to not only pinpoint CARICOM's current decision cycle, but also the
conditions under which these cycles are initiated and the influences of these cycles. 
The effort of deepening regional integration in CARICOM through the initiation of the CSME
represented one of Neofunctionalism's proposed decision cycles. Prior to which CARICOM had
already undergone the initial phase of integration. Under the Original Treaty of Chaguaramas, it
created institutions, delineated the borders of integration and the competences of the institutions.
Through the  Revised Treaty of  Chaguaramas,  integration  in  CARICOM further  deepened;  new
competences were extended to existing institutions; and new institutions were granted supranational
tendencies  and  characteristics.  Moreover,  the  initial  goals  of  CARICOM  were  redefined  and
extended.  The Revised Treaty therefore, signifies a deepening regional integration in CARICOM,
and also the start of a new decision cycle in CARICOM.418
The establishment of the CCJ, is also evidenced for the rising importance of supranational
institutions in the landscape of CARICOM. The  de jure and  de facto competencies of the CCJ,
reflects a high level of institutionalization, and traces of supranationalism in CARICOM.419
Additionally,  the  analysis  of  the  EPA  revealed  a  suggested  'redefinition'  attempt  by
CARICOM,  both  structurally  and  ideologically.  The  EPA signals  the  first  step  of  CARICOM
members in negotiating as a single regional unit with their parties. CARICOM countries have thus
signaled their commitment to integration among themselves and the supranationality of institutions
which can act on their behalf.  
I  therefore propose that the CSME, the EPA, and the CCJ reflect a general and prevalent
deepening of integration in CARICOM. Moreover that CARICOM has well undergone an initial
cycle of integration and is already on the verge of starting a new cycle of integration. The presence
of  institutions  such  as  the  CCJ,  the  influence  of  non-state  actors  on  the  process,  the
formation/development of a regional civil society, signal that this pending cycle is a 'priming cycle'
as described by the theory of Neofunctionalism.  
The role of institutions and other non-state actors in CARICOM: a striking revelation of the
analysis is the important role of institutions and political élite in the process of regional integration
in CARICOM. The assessment of the competences of institutions created by the Revised Treaty of
418 This decision cycle can be observed through the creation of the CSME, which embodies a new step of CARICOM 
towards creating supranational institutions such as the CCJ and the Competition Commission. 
419 A high degree of supranationality can also be observed through the introduction of institutions such as the COTED 
and the CRNM (now OTN), which took its own initiative and defining the parameters of the EPA. 
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Chaguaramas highlighted a  clear and decisive role  of political  élite  and non-state  actors in  the
process of integration, which had not previously been considered.420 
Chapter  4  further  detailed  the  significant  role  of  institutions  in  CARICOM.  The  CSME
introduced  and  expanded  the  competences  of  existing  institutions;  which  are  positioned  above
CARICOM member-states and were found to be decisive in the process of regional integration. 
The analysis in Chapter 5 underscored the importance and competences of the CCJ and its
power over member-states regarding both its final appellate and original jurisdictions. Under its
final appellate jurisdiction, it was possible to observe the CCJ directly influencing the laws and
reviewing  the  existing  legal  structures  in  member-states,  introducing  a  symmetrical  regional
heterogeneity and  cohesion into the legal hemisphere in the member-states. With reference to its
original  jurisdiction,  the  chapter  described the  CCJ's  overarching  position  and  its  influence  on
member-states' trade and customs regulations.  
Chapter 6 emphasized the role of the CRNM421 in spearheading the process of negotiating the
EPA. Furthermore, the chapter suggested that the EPA reflects the initiative of institutions and non-
state actors rather than those of the member-states. 
Therefore, all three chapters revealed the vital role of institutions and non-state actors in the
process of integration in CARICOM. The competences and power of institutions in CARICOM
point to their conclusive role in the process o regional integration..... Some CARICOM institutions
possess  the  ability  to  'police'  the  individual  member-states.  Such actions  relate  to  the  inherent
possibility of coercive power to bind member-states to regional commitments. 
Supranationalism:  the analysis in Chapter 4 demonstrated evidence of supranationalism in
CARICOM.  The  Revised  Treaty  withdrew  certain  competences,  such  as  the  administration  of
customs  regulations  and  safety  standards  from  the  member-states,  and  assigned  these
responsibilities to regional bodies. Member-states therefore, effectively relinquish sovereignty in
specific areas to regional authorities in CARICOM. In addition to extending the competences of
existing institutions,  the Revised Treaty also introduced new institutions  in CARICOM, further
superimposing these institutions on member-states and creating an overarching institutional  and
legal framework in the region.422 These institutions were created to address financial and economic
420 A review of earlier literature on regional integration in CARICOM highlighted the tendency to approach CARI-
COM by analyzing the actions of the member-states, or the effect of integration on an individual member-state and 
vice versa. This study represents the first attempt to address CARICOM from a 'non state-centric' approach, focus-
ing on the role of individuals and institutions in the process of regional integration.
421 Renamed OTN and incorporated as an office of the CARICOM Secretariat.
422 These include the establishment and ratification of the CCJ; the creation of the Competition Commission; COFUR; 
COFAP; COTED; a Conciliation Commission; a Regional Intellectual Property Rights Office; and a Standards Or-
ganization. 
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convergence; help and oversee the implementation and harmonization of CSME provisions; and
propose and initiate new policies for future regional integration in CARICOM.
Additionally, the CSME introduces provisions for breaches by member-states. Member-states
are directed to implement the binding agreements and harmonize their laws, relinquishing power to
regional institutions. These institutions are therefore 'superimposed'  on the member-states.  They
provide checks and balances for the commitments of the Revised Treaty, and direct the speed and
depth of integration. Moreover, by being in charge of overseeing the process of integration, they
consequently contribute to the depth and speed of integration in CARICOM. 
In Chapter 5, the analysis (of the appellate and original jurisdictions of the CCJ) also revealed
supremacy of the CCJ over CARICOM member-states. 
The examination of the original jurisdiction of the CCJ highlighted its de jure power, and to
some extent its  de facto power over the member-states. The CCJ's original jurisdiction introduces
further supranationality to CARICOM in two additional aspects. 
The competences of the CCJ under its original jurisdiction enable it to deliberate and decide
on all issues related to the Revised Treaty of Chaguaramas. It directs and compels member-states to
follow its rulings, and is therefore 'superimposed' on both the judiciary and executive branches of
government. 
Moreover,  it  imposes  compulsory  jurisdiction  on  matters  related  to  the  Revised  Treaty,
binding CARICOM member-states to comply with its decisions. The compulsory jurisdiction423 of
the CCJ also avails it authority to grant third parties and other extraordinary entities the possibility
of  bringing proceedings  against  a  CARICOM member-state.  CARICOM member-states  are  not
only obliged to submit to any proceedings brought  against  them before the CCJ, regarding the
Revised  Treaty,  including  any perceived  breach  of  the  treaty;  but  also  bound to  the  decisions
resulting from these proceedings. 
The CCJ therefore possesses static competences on matters regarding the Revised Treaty,  as
well as judgments under its original jurisdiction, which affect numerous policy areas and sectors in
the CARICOM member-states.  It  is able to rule on economic issues relating to agriculture and
fisheries,  tariffs  and  quotas,  the  quality  standards  of  goods  and  service,  telecommunications,
immigration issues concerning CARICOM nationals, social securities, and a further extensive list of
elements affecting numerous sectors in each of the CARICOM member-states. 
Regarding both its final appellate jurisdiction, the CCJ possesses final authority on both civil
423 The CCJ possesses the power to decide on allowing a third party to hear grievances before the Court.
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and criminal matters424. However, like its original jurisdiction, it is reliant on the member-states to
implement its judgments;425 therefore, comparable to national courts and the national judiciary, the
CCJ  is  dependent  on  the  executive  branch  of  the  member-state  government  to  enforce  its
supranational  decisions.  Neither  the  treaty  establishing  the  CCJ  nor  the  Revised  Treaty  of
Chaguaramas  create  any  form  of  regional  executive  structure  to  enforce  the  decisions  of  the
regional judiciary and de jure competences they introduce in CARICOM. The de jure competences
created  for  the  CCJ are  limited  by its  dependence  on the  executive  arm of  the  member-states
government over which it presides. 
The bi-variate hypothesis concerning priming cycles proposed by Neofunctionalism offers an
explanation for the above highlighted issue, and a highly likely outcome for legal integration in
CARICOM.  The  theory  of  Neofunctionalism  argues  that  regional  institutions  and  regulations
materialize  after  a  crisis  is  successfully  resolved  and  after  the  initiation  cycle  of  regional
integration; the process of regional integration then intensifies after which the gains of regional
integration  is  significantly  evident,  outweighing  national  sentiments.  Non  state  actors  are  then
bound to increase regional competencies, which would offset the emphasized  de facto limitation
problems above. 
Thus, although there are limitations in the executive competences of the CCJ --or rather, the
CCJ is reliant on the member-states to enact its decisions -- over time, the gains of legal integration
coupled with those of economic integration will create a status effect, in which group formation
leads to the development of regional reforms. In this respect, the CCJ sets precedents, exerting its
competences and promoting legal spill-over. For example, the analysis of the CCJ's final appellate
jurisdiction revealed that the CCJ granted itself the mandate to preside over matters in the member-
states that are directly related to democracy. A notable instance is the civil appeal case CV 7/2012
originating in Belize, where the government granted tax breaks to a specific company. The CCJ
ruled that  “the rights and freedoms of the citizenry and democracy itself would be imperiled if
courts permitted the Executive to assume unto itself essential law-making functions in the absence
of constitutional or legislative authority so to do”.426 The CCJ expressly stated that it possessed the
mandate to act as 'guardian of democracy' in CARICOM. Furthermore, the CCJ ruled that as a part
424 These include administrative, banking, civil, criminal, debenture and other corporate laws, environmental, family, 
intellectual, public, and tax laws.
425  Article 26 declares that CARICOM member-states are obliged to “take all the necessary steps, including the enact-
ment of legislation” in order to ensure that an “order or sentence of the Court given in exercise of its jurisdiction 
shall be enforced by all courts and authorities in any territory of the Contracting Parties as if it were a judgment, de-
cree, order or sentence of a superior court of that Contracting Party”.
426 BCB Holdings v The Attorney General of Belize (2013) CCJ 5 [AJ] Para 42.
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of  its 'general  function  of  judicial  review,'  it  has  “a  constitutional  obligation  to  strike  down
administrative  or  executive  action  that  exceeds  jurisdiction  or  undermines  the  authority  of  the
legislature;”427 creating  and  extending  its  competences  to  address  extra-judicial  matters;  and
presiding over the actions of the executive branch of the member-state. This action reveals the
imposition of the regional judiciary over the national executive in CARICOM. The CCJ therefore,
not  only  creates  new  competences  for  itself,  but  it  establishes  itself  over  the  very  branch  of
government which created it. 
Chapter 5 therefore revealed both abstract and concrete supranational influences of the CCJ
over the CARICOM member-states.  
Chapter  6  also  affirmed  that  CARICOM institutions,  such  as  the  then  CRNM428,  exhibit
supranational  tendencies  in  negotiating  the  EPA.  The  analysis  of  the  EPA revealed  that  the
parameters of the EPA were defined independently of the CARICOM member-states, and that the
negotiations and some definitive provisions of the EPA were contrary to the will of the CARICOM
member-states. 
All  three  empirical  chapters  disclosed  supranationalism to  be  a  common  variable  in  the
process of regional integration in CARICOM. 
New  power  structure  in  CARICOM:  the  above  analysis  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  the
traditional approach of characterizing CARICOM as a purely intergovernmental union should be
revised; moreover, that it is necessary to rethink the current approach of understanding CARICOM,
which is to typically conceptualize CARICOM state actions as the sole driving force in regional
integration.
Due to the influence of institutions and non-state actors in the process of regional integration
in CARICOM, I propose a new 'flow' of power in CARICOM429, which retains the Conference of
Heads of Governments as the primary institution in charge of the decision making. It also accepts
the role of the Council of Ministers. However, it also acknowledges the influence and competences
of institutions such as the CCJ, the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED), the
Council for Finance and Planning (COFAP) and the Competition Commission; and their decisive
roles in the process of integration in CARICOM. These institutions directly and indirectly impact
the level and scope of integration in CARICOM, and are therefore definitive factors in the process. 
Such a proposal also inherently suggests the presence of supranationalism in CARICOM, as
427 BCB Holdings v The Attorney General of Belize (2013) CCJ 5 [AJ] Para 42.
428 Now Office of Trade Negotiations, incorporated in the Secretariat
429 See attached Graph titled 'Proposed CARICOM Structure Based on the Analyses in the Thesis'.
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non-  state-power  centers  drive  and  control  regional  integration  and  policy-making  in  the
CARICOM member-states. 
Non-compliance:  notwithstanding the influence and authority of institutions,  issues of non-
compliance were also found to be prevalent in CARICOM; especially evident were those related to
the CCJ under both of its jurisdictions.
Under its original jurisdiction, it was noted that although the CCJ's rulings are  contra rem
iudicatam non audietur and binding on member-states, neither the treaty establishing the CCJ430 nor
the Revised Treaty create legal provisions relating to the implementation and compliance of the
CCJ's decisions, particularly under its first instance jurisdiction. Although the CCJ is technically
armored with an 'overarching position' in the CARICOM region and can theoretically decide on
issues that would change the constitutions of member-states, conceptually it does not possess brute
force to  implement  or coerce member-states to comply with these decisions.  In other  words,  it
possesses limited de facto power and competence to oversee and bind member-states to its rulings.
It was further reasoned that this limited de facto power of the CCJ is based on both an institutional
construct in CARICOM, or rather the lack thereof. There is no institution at either the regional or
the national level in CARICOM to actively coerce member-states to implement the CCJ's rulings.431
The analysis also revealed that pertaining to its original jurisdiction432, the member-states in
CARICOM were also slow to ratify the rulings of the CCJ.
The  process  of  legal  integration  in  the  Caribbean  is  therefore  riddled  with  both  an
implementation problem and a compliance deficit. When there are no legal provisions to address
non-compliance and implementation, then there is little to bind member-states to the provisions.
These problems in CARICOM partly result from matters addressed in Chapter 2. Factors such as:
limited resources433 for instance monetary and human capital  of the CARICOM member-states to
act  expeditiously  on  the  CCJ's  rulings,  and  to  implement  regional  directives  and  provisions;
inconsistencies  in  the  Revised  Treaty with  regards  to  implementing  the  CSME and addressing
issues  of  non-compliance  of  the  CCJ's  decisions  (including  a  blurred  chain  of  command  in
addressing regional directives, institutional arrangements, and  de facto power to coerce member-
430 The Treaty Establishing the CCJ incorporates the CCJ in CARICOM, 
431 Moreover, the CCJ's final appellate jurisdiction was not ratified in most of the CARICOM countries. 
432 This was especially in rulings such as a) the Shanique Myrie case in which it took approximately eight months for 
pecuniary damages against Barbados to be paid; b) Guyana failed to react expeditiously to the CCJ or to re-imple-
ment canceled CETs per CCJ's deadlines.
433 Limited resources are due to small administrations, and the incorporation of regional competences in offices already
burdened by national mandates. Additionally, the relevant party at the national level for addressing regional direc-
tives is not fully equipped either structurally or knowledgeably to address said directive.
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states  to  implement  said  provisions.434);  and  that member-states  were  unwilling  to  endorse  the
competences  of  and  comply  with  the  decisions  of  the  CCJ435 negatively  affect  the  process  of
implementation and compliance, and therefore regional integration in CARICOM.
In  international  Relations  (IR),  the  issue  of  non-compliance  is  generally  theorized  by
advancing utilitarian approaches or following the logic of consequences. These ideas or rationalist
theories advance that states are unitary, rational and act on self-interest, and that their decisions to
comply with or breach treaties are based on calculated costs and benefits. Rational theories advance
that enforcement and deterrence are primary ways of handling non-compliance. However, the focus
of these theories  on the causative factors  (denoted above)  of  non-compliance in  CARICOM is
limited. 
To address compliance in CARICOM, it is necessary to first address the constraints of the
Revised Treaty. The Revised Treaty provides limited legal recourse for member-states, CARICOM
citizens, companies, and other private entities for non-compliance and breaches of its provisions;436
and  empowers  specific  institutions  in  CARICOM  with  some  limited  role  in  overseeing  the
implementation of regional prerogatives, especially those concerning the CSME.437
Although the Revised Treaty explicitly offers numerous provisions and a legal basis for the
CSME, especially with the compulsory authority of the CCJ to interpret the treaty,  it  does not
explicitly address the implementation of the judgments of the CCJ, especially with regard to its
original jurisdiction. Save for the power of the Conference,438 the Revised Treaty does not create
any legal provisions for the implementation of the results of legal recourse relating to the original
jurisdiction of the CCJ. It neither provides an instrument addressing non-compliance, nor does it
create an institution specifically for the implementation of original jurisdiction decisions, especially
those arising from mediation, arbitration, or the CCJ's rulings. Therefore, although member-states
and CARICOM citizens do possess avenues for legal recourse, there is no guarantee that their rights
granted by the Revised Treaty, and ruled on by the CCJ will be upheld by the member-states. Not
only are there limited possibilities to implement regional decisions; there is also no possibility to
provide further sanctions, as seen fit by the CCJ, for previous cases of non-compliance. 
434 Additionally, the final appellate jurisdiction of the CCJ is ratified by only three CARICOM member-states. Up until
the first draft of this Thesis in December 2014.
435 Arising from a lack of trust in the CCJ as an institution by the CARICOM member-states.
436 The only recourse that the Revised Treaty provides is mediation, an arbitrary panel, or a hearing before the CCJ.
437 Article 13 paragraph 4 of the Revised Treaty endows the Community Council of Ministers the competences to es-
tablish a regional system in order to “promote, enhance, monitor and evaluate regional and national implementation
processes”. 
438 Under Article 12, para 6 of the Revised Treaty gives the Conference power to create/establish “such Organs or Bod-
ies as it considers necessary for the achievement of the objectives of the Community”. 
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Tackling Non-compliance in CARICOM: Buchannan (1977:288) proposes that without robust
regulations and enforcement mechanisms, even universally accepted rules become ineffective. Part
of  the  delay  in  the  integration  process  in  CARICOM  can  be  blamed  on  the  weakness  of  its
organizational  structure,  because  decisions  and  policies  cannot  be  implemented  without  a
functioning structure and body to oversee their implementation. Convergence and compliance are
often necessary and are inextricably bound to the enforcement of rules by a collective entity. The
CCJ  admitted  that  unlike  other  international  tribunals,  it  does  not  possess  the  competences
necessary to add (automatically or after the fact) pecuniary damages and monetary interest to is
rulings as a coercive mechanism. This includes increasing the  de jure competences of the CCJ to
penalize  member-states  which  do not  comply with  its  initial  rulings,  in  the  form of  pecuniary
damages, deadlines to pay fines, including 'interest accrued' as a term in the initial fine.
It  is  therefore  mandatory  to  introduce  structural  changes  to  CARICOM's  institutional
landscape, including a new institution responsible to oversee non-compliance. The introduction of a
new institution would apply coercion and other methods of deterrence as a means of curbing/coping
with and addressing  non-compliance,  especially with regards  to  the  CCJ's  original  jurisdiction;
effectively increasing the de facto powers of the CCJ.
The Secretariat is the principal administrative organ in CARICOM, whose mandate includes
initiating,  developing  and  conducting  studies/proposals  related  to  the  community  objectives,
including  requesting  the  assistance  and  services  of  member-states  to  accomplish  the  matter  in
question; assisting member-states on community-related matters and taking appropriate follow-up
action on decisions; and assisting in the implementation of community programs and decisions.
These responsibilities partially fulfill the role of a regional de facto institution 
Therefore, the institution could be incorporated as an Office of the Secretariat.439 The office
could be created by the Conference of Governments, which possesses the power from Article 18,
paragraph 3440 of the Revised Treaty to establish new bodies; and from Article 12441 to directly
address  non-compliance.  The office  would  be  tasked to  directly oversee  the implementation of
439 In the same way that the CRNM was at first created to negotiate a specific trade agreement (the EPA) on behalf of 
CARICOM and was subsequently incorporated in the office of the Secretariat as the Office of Trade Negotiations; 
this proposed office could also be incorporated in the Secretariat.
440 The article declares that “the Organs of the Community may establish, as they deem necessary, other Bodies of the 
Community”.
441 This section declares that “the Conference may establish such Organs or Bodies as it considers necessary for the 
achievement of the objectives of the Community. … Notwithstanding any other provision of this Treaty, the Confer-
ence may consider and resolve disputes between member-states. … The Conference may consult with entities with-
in the Caribbean Region or with other organizations and for this purpose may establish such machinery as it consid-
ers necessary”.
203
7.2 New Perspectives on CARICOM 
supranational judicial decisions of the CCJ in the member-states; oversee the implementation of
decisions of other institutions that relate to the community; and offer a physical address to post
issues of non-compliance, report non-compliance to the regional bodies who delivered the initial
ruling, and recommend further actions. 
Alternately, the office could be incorporated into the CCJ and established by the CCJ, since
Article 14 of the Agreement Establishing the CCJ permits the application for intermittent measures
to address its rulings. It declares that “the Court shall have the power to prescribe if it considers the
circumstances so require, any interim measures that ought to be taken to preserve the rights of a
Party”.  The CCJ could  then  technically  create  an  body that  functions  intermittently (i.e.  when
implementation and compliance issues arise) whose mandate is to address non-compliance. 
This arrangement could also be addressed as a provisional feature in all the CCJ's original
jurisdiction rulings. Such an office could function similarly to the COTED442, one of whose current
mandates is to oversee the implementation of CARICOM decisions in the member-states. Since the
CCJ has the sole mandate to interpret the Revised Treaty as well as final appellate jurisdiction, this
office could also operate alongside the CCJ in implementing the rulings of the CCJ in the member-
states, especially concerning original jurisdiction and final appeals.443
As mentioned previously, the overview of Chapters 4 and 5 revealed breaches of the Revised
Treaty and issues of non-compliance in CARICOM related to the CSME and the CCJ's original
jurisdiction. The mandate444 of such an office would be both to work closely with the secretariat and
the Council of Ministers to monitor and oversee the implementation of community decisions at the
national level, and would also primarily include the mandates to ensure that member-states comply
with the CCJ's rulings445 and implement the provisions of the Revised Treaty; create a list of items
already successfully implemented and those pending, according to the schedule in the annex of the
Revised Treaty and any other provisions of the Revised Treaty related to the implementation of its
provisions;  work directly with sectors of  the member-state  to  harmonize these regulations;  and
adopt the necessary technical measures to ensure that the said decisions are enforced in the member-
states. 
442 For information on the structure and competences of the COTED, see chapter 2, pp. 19, 30, 32; and chapter 5, pp. 8,
10, 11-13, 15 - 16.
443 For a graphic detail of this institution, see the attached Graph titled 'CARICOM Structure Based on the Proposed 
Institution in Chapter 7'.
444 For an extensive list of mandates of this proposed office including financial structure and accountability, and com-
position, see working paper, entitled 'Addressing Non-Compliance through restructuring CARICOM's Institutions' 
Tamara Onnis.
445 This would also include decisions from arbitrary panels presiding over matters (in)directly related to the provisions 
of the Revised Treaty.
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The office could be assisted by non-state actors at the local level in gathering information,
monitoring, and implementing community decisions. Proposed violations could be brought first to
this office, just as with the Competition Commission, before a hearing in the CCJ446. 
Regarding financing such an office, the office could be privy to the budget of the secretariat,
or the budget of the CCJ447. Such an office would operate at both the regional and national levels in
CARICOM.448 
Like other steps taken to deepen integration, the creation of this office would be beneficial to
each member of the conference, as it would ensure that the rights and assurances granted to it under
the Revised Treaty are upheld by other members. 
Alternately,  the  office  could  be  independent,  resembling  the  competition  commission;449
Under all three options, there is no need for national ratification or any extensive change of the
Revised Treaty because,  as highlighted above,  the Revised Treaty does  not  explicitly require  a
ratification  when  new  institutions  are  created;  rather,  the  Revised  Treaty  guarantees  the  legal
personality of such an institution when created under the provisions of Article 12.
The theory of Neofunctionalism proposes that once competences are increased and de facto
power is given to CARICOM institutions and bodies, member-states could then possibly be coerced
into implementing and conforming to regional rules and regulations. 
Complexities of preference formation in CARICOM: the analysis in Chapter 6 revealed the
importance  of  preference  formation  in  the  process  of  regional  integration  in  CARICOM.  A
historical  review  of  CARICOM  revealed  similarity  in  cultural  and  social  preferences  among
member-states.  Additional  concepts,  such as  interest  and politicization,  which affect  and define
preferences, were also observed. Moreover,  the systematic impact of externalities on preference
formation and deepening integration in CARICOM were likewise salient. 
The interplay of cultural and social constructs in preference formation was also disclosed to
be important in the process of integration in CARICOM. The interaction of heuristics, ideologies
and schema in preference formation were also noteworthy. 
Especially  relevant  was  that  politicization  is  related  to  preference  formation  and  directly
affected the process of integration in CARICOM. This revelation points to the necessity for further
examination of how social actors develop and use social relations, for example, to interrogate and
446 Such an action could cost the plaintiff less in financial terms.
447 In the case that the office is incorporated in the Secretariat, it would be privy to the budget of the Secretariat; and in 
the case that it is incorporated in the CCJ, the budget of the CCJ.
448 Given that one of the mandates of the Council of Ministers is related to overseeing the implementation of the Re-
vised Treaty, this office could also work alongside or be affiliated with the Council of Ministers. 
449 For a revised power flow, see Graph, titled 'CARICOM Power Structure with Proposed Enforcement Institution' 
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form preferences. 
Also critical  is the necessity for further examination of the importance of social filters  in
defining preferences; evaluation of social filters and other sources; and their role in the process of
regional economic, political, legal and social integration in CARICOM. It is therefore crucial to
further examine preference formation and social constructs in CARICOM and their impact on the
process of regional integration. 
To  further  understand  the  underlying  issues  affecting  the  process  of  regional  economic,
political,  legal,  and  social  integration  in  CARICOM that  were  revealed  by  this  research;  it  is
necessary  to  observe  the  relationship  among  the  member-states;  to  ask  questions  about  the
similarity of the relationship and characteristics of the CARICOM member-states and that of states
in other nations elsewhere. 
To summarize,  the application of the theory of Neofunctionalism to CARICOM provided
several interesting results, including the possibility to:
• observe actors in the process and the general phenomenon of regional integration in the  
Caribbean;
• identify a high level of transaction flow and interdependence in CARICOM, and observe 
and start  to  understand the power and interdependence  of  relationships  in  CARICOM,  
especially with relation to policy frameworks and international boundaries;
• review regime politics in CARICOM from a non state-centric point of view;
• identify the importance and impact of non-state actors on the process of regional political, 
economic, legal and social integration in CARICOM;
• observe the importance of societal factors and institutions in the process of integration with 
regard to the EPA, the CCJ, and the CSME. 
 The  analysis  therefore  revealed  prevailing  conditions,  circumstances  and characteristics  
particularly evident in the process of regional integration in CARICOM; specifically: 
• the history of regional integration in CARICOM is largely a reaction and adaptation to  
external factors;
• institutions and other non-state actors such as the political élite play a decisive role in the 
process of regional integration, which is often enough equal to, or more than that of the  
member-state themselves;
• elements of supranationalism are present in CARICOM;
• spill-over mechanisms deepen both the level and scope of integration;
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• issues of non-compliance in CARICOM, especially those related to the CSME and rulings 
of the CCJ, are based on the limited scope of institutional competences. Once competences 
are increased and de facto power is given to CARICOM institutions and bodies, member-
states could then be coerced into abiding by rules and regulations;
• there is evidence of extensive structural change in CARICOM, which has an impact on  
integration;
• the process of regional integration in CARICOM undergoes various 'decision cycles' which 
are decisive for its outcome. These cycles reveal the level of integration, or rather the state 
of the process of integration. 
The analysis in chapter 6 additionally revealed the complexities of preference formation. These are
evident at both the national and regional levels, and play a substantial role in the process of regional
integration in CARICOM.450
These results are essential, given that CARICOM is a union designed on intergovernmental
constructs. These results point to a new mode of understanding regionalism in CARICOM, and
suggest new possibilities for examining regional integration in CARICOM.
7.3 New Perspectives on the Theory of Neofunctionalism
Along with the advantages of theoretical research in CARICOM the analysis revealed the
usefulness  of  the  theory  of  Neofunctionalism  to  investigate  the  deepening  of  integration  in
CARICOM. It disclosed the role of institutions and other non state-actors, and their effect on both
the level and scope of integration in CARICOM. The research revealed significant information and
perspectives  about  the  integration  process,  which  had  hitherto  not  been  considered451.  It  also
provided the possibility to:
• focus  on  the  actions  of  non-state  actors  and  institutions  in  the  process  of  regional  
integration; 
• understand power relations, social constructs, and the politicization process;
• highlight new factors affecting integration that were not previously considered,  such as  
preference formation;
450 Preference formation is therefore of paramount importance for any future analysis of the process of integration in 
CARICOM.
451 This study, however, represents only the first step in theorizing regional integration in CARICOM. It reveals the ne-
cessity for further theoretical analyses of CARICOM.
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• observe the presence and role of supranationalism in the process of regional integration in 
CARICOM;
• detect and analyze spill-over of economic principles and integration in CARICOM;
• understand the general dynamics of the process of integration.
The  application  of  the  theory  of  Neofunctionalism to  CARIOM further  revealed  the  need  for
advancement  in  current  research.  Although this  first  attempt at  theorizing CARICOM provided
interesting results, it also points to the necessity for future research and moreover future theoretical
analyses of CARICOM to further analyze:
• the effects (and outcome) of the process of bargaining on regional integration;  
• the process of preference formation at the local and regional levels in CARICOM and its  
role in grand bargaining situations; 
• the relationship between 'grand bargains' and regional integration/the extent to which/impact
of bargaining on the process of integration in CARICOM;
• the formation of normative orders, and the (non)existence of borders in CARICOM;
• the  factors  relating  to  complex  governance,  and  their  role  in  the  process  of  regional  
integration in CARICOM.
The theory of Neofunctionalism is the only theory of European integration which takes the role of
non-state  actors  as  a  starting  point  for  explaining  regional  integration.  It  takes  supranational
interactions and governance in and among the institutions  in addition to political processes at the
supranational  level,  as  being  of  vital  importance  to  the  process  of  regional  integration.
Neofunctionalism further addresses the roles, effects, and actions of the national élite on the process
of  integration.  The theory of  Neofunctionalism further  provided the possibility of  unearthing a
'supranational' trend in CARICOM, where institutions and the political élite play a primary role in
the process  of  integration.  It  also enabled  spill-over  effects  to  be observed from one sector  to
another,  and  the  creation  of  new  institutions  to  address  the  general  and  overall  deepening  of
integration  in  CARICOM.  The  theory  also  revealed  valuable  information  regarding  the
politicization process in CARICOM. It further highlighted that preference formation at the local
level plays a vital  role in  'grand bargain situations' at the regional level in regional integration,
pointing  to  the  necessity  to  examine  the  intrinsic  nature  of  borders  and  normative  orders  in
CARICOM. 
At  the  same time,  a  purely  Neofunctionalist  approach  can  produce  limitations  for  future
analyses,  especially  for  research  concentrating  on  the  formation  of  preferences  and  orders.
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Specifically,  the  Neofunctionalist  perspective  might  not  offer  an  extensive  explanation  of  the
creation and formation of preferences of local and national civil society and other groups active in
the  process  of  bargaining  and  regional  integration;  or  a  comprehensive  examination  of  the
formation  of  national/local  preferences  to  explicitly  observe  local  government  participation
especially in 'grand bargaining' situations such as the EPA.452 
During the round of local and national consultations in CARIFORUM, for example, it became
clear that CARICOM initiated the civil society participation. The lack of mobilization and input of a
regional civil society in both local and regional matters, especially in forming national preferences,
should therefore be extensively addressed in future theoretical analyses in CARICOM. Moreover,
future research on CARICOM should concentrate on processes within the nation states and within
the regions; that is to say: the formation of local preferences and how they define the scope of
nation state/regional preferences; on understanding the lack of engagement in regional politics at
the domestic and regional levels in CARICOM; and on social systems and their importance and role
in the process of regional integration. To this end, I propose a few possibilities for future theoretical
analyses in CARICOM. Specifically:
Coupling Neofunctionalism with other prospective theories: the current theoretical application
of  Neofunctionalism  to  CARICOM  revealed  a  system  of  'interconnectedness'  and  a  mode  of
governance by various actors,  rather than the traditional intergovernmental approach which was
previously  conceived.  Additionally  an  overview  of  regional  integration  among  CARICOM
countries, revealed two 'streams' of integration.  This rendition directly relates to the necessity and
importance  of  examining  the  power  and  politics  notions/relations in  CARICOM  to  better
understand the process of regional integration. 
Therefore,  in maintaining that the theory of Neofunctionalism is still  useful for analyzing
CARICOM; and in acknowledging the necessity to further examine factors such as the formation,
persistence,  internal/external  exchanges453,  and  cycles  of  preferences  in  the  process  of  regional
integration; I  propose a dialog between Neofunctionalism and another social  theory  focused on
society, and societal structures and systems, as a possibility for conceptualizing future research in
CARICOM. 
452 The theory offers an extensive account of the role and input of structures and institutions in the process of bargain -
ing and regional integration. Is still the best suited of theories of European regional integration for an analysis of
CARICOM. Moreover, although it has a few limitations it was still capable of providing/revealing new information
on CARICOM in a single analysis. These arguments prove that the theory of Neofunctionalism is still relevant for
theoretical study of CARICOM.
453 Issues with preference formation were not only revealed from the analysis of Chapter 6, but also from the overview 
of integration among CARICOM where a deeper level of commitments of the OECS was identified. 
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In  spite  of  the  fact  that  any dialog  between  theories  requires  considerable  research  and
assessment,  to distinguish points of conjunction/disjuncture between the individual theories;454 I
propose that  such a venture  would be a promising possibility for  future theoretical  research in
CARICOM. This is because the findings of this research coincide with previous assertions that
regions such as CARICOM, “are not natural givens,  but are outcomes of political  processes of
social  construction”.455 Moreover,  since  Neofunctionalism reveals  that  regions  are  observed  as
social forms,  independent of the actions of states, and rather dependent on non-state actors; it is
necessary to ask further questions relating to the particulars and interplay  of ordering,  bordering,
and  social processes,  which  were  revealed  to  characterize  and  drive  the  process  of  regional
integration in CARICOM. It is also necessary to further analyze the interaction of the inner systems
of  these  societies,  in  order  to  observe  and  understand,  and  analyze  any differentiation  among
them.456
Keohane (1984) has long since cited asymmetrical interdependencies as sources of power
among international actors. Through the work of Keohane and Nye (1977), for example, one can
read  unions  such  as  CARICOM  as  a  network  of  norms,  procedures,  and  rules  creating
interdependent relationships.  These ideas concur with the revelations of this analysis, specifically
that there is a distinctive relationship between social  actors and institutions, independent of the
nation-states, in CARICOM; and also issues related to institutional design, including those related
to social process, functional needs, and society in general. Particularly in this regard,  Martin and
Simmons (1998:739) suggest that  IR scholars are “turning … to models of domestic politics to
suggest  new  questions  and  approaches  to  the  study  of  international  institutions”.  Moreover,
recently:
the field of international relations has developed into a state where ‘society’ plays an
increasingly important role. … the attentiveness towards theories of the state has risen in
the field in the wake of debates on an emerging ‘post-Westphalian’ order, it seems all
but natural that the interest in the concept of ‘society’ should ferment interest towards
sociological theories of society also. Albert (2004:1).
454 An amalgamation of theories, requires substantive overview and assessment of both theories, in order to identify 
which aspects of the theories of useful for a specific research. For more information see for example Albert (1999).
455 Albert and Onnis (2010:7)
456 The theory of Neofunctionalism revealed that non-state actors drive the process of regional integration, it however 
did not distinguish a specific combination of actors, and interactions. A societal approach would shed light on this 
aspect.
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Under this  'ideal type'  view, it  is  possible to approach CARICOM independent of states as the
primary  actors  in  regional  integration,  and  rather from  a  new  angle  focused  on  a  cluster  of
interdependent social systems. 
A societal approach that focuses more on social systems would further take emphasis away
from states as actors, and concentrate on the interplay of the systems that were revealed in this
dissertation  to  make up CARICOM. This  would aid the theory of  Neofunctionalism in further
examining the role of power relations, the 'connectedness' of systems in sub/regional/international
political  processes,  bargaining processes and the outcome of grand bargaining, factors affecting
spill-over, and the effect of spill-over processes on the general process of regional integration in
CARICOM.
The theory of Neofunctionalism is still relevant for future research; the thesis highlighted the
ability of Neofunctionalism to disesteem the role of nation-states in regional integration and instead
approach the process from a non state-centric angle, concentrating on non-state actors, functional
spill-over, spill-back, and muddle-about. Further hypotheses of the theory, including externalization,
curve linearity, and bivariate and multivariate hypotheses concerning the Priming Cycles also reveal
the value and significance of employing the theory of Neofunctionalism457 for future investigation
in CARICOM.458 Yet it is also necessary to further investigate deep rooted systems functioning
below  and  above  the  nation-states  in  CARICOM.  That  is  to  say,  although  the  theory  of
Neofunctionalism  is  useful  for  future  studies,  it  also  requires  assistance  in  examining  social
systems,  and  differentiation  in  CARCIOM,  It  is  therefore  useful  to  pair  the  theory  of
Neofunctionalism, with a theory such as Modern Systems theory to address the above delineated
factors. 
The  idea  of  a  theoretical  dialog  could  very  well  be a  viable  possibility  for  theorizing
CARICOM. Albert  (1999:239)  has  already  highlighted  the  lack  of  communication  between
theoretical disciplines; and has  argued for 'partial usage'459 of a theory and for a dialog between
theories. Albert (2004:1) moreover, advanced world society as a point for theoretical analysis and
proposed a dialog between a Systematic World Politics approach and other International Relations
457 A study employing both MST and Neofunctionalism will help overcome limitations of the theory of Neofunctional-
ism and will throw better light on the issues of preference formation and power relations. The coupling of MST ap-
proach, which takes on a holistic notion of society, with the Neofunctionalist approach, which addresses institutions
and non-state actors along with utilitarian objectives, would appropriately address the highlighted requirements for 
future theoretical analysis in CARICOM. 
458 Preference formation was revealed in the analysis to be important to grand bargains such as the EPA and necessary 
for future examinations. Moreover, the overview of integration among CARICOM member-states revealed two 
'streams' of integration, which is crucial to examine in future research on CARICOM.
459 Albert (1999:242).
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theories. In this regard, I also propose the use of Modern Systems Theory (MST) coupled with the
theory of Neofunctionalism, as a possible option for further addressing a theoretical analysis of
regional  integration  in  CARICOM.  This  specific  dialog  is  recommended  because  “MST  as
developed particularly by Niklas Luhmann, forms the only theory of society which takes world
society as its starting point, (and as such) a dialog between it and IR theory might seem to form a
particularly promising endeavor”.460 
In fact, a dialog between Neofunctionalism and MST is already in the making. The theory of
Neofunctionalism can be linked to Luhmann's System Theory and: 
“systems theory is, in fact, clearly functional because it analyzes system  processes in
terms  of  an  implicit  functional  requisite:  systems  need  to  reduce  an  environmental
complexity. That is, Luhmann analyzes structure (law, the sates, organizations, etc.) and
cultural  codes  in  terms  of  their  functions  for  reducing  environmental  complexity.
(Turner and Maryanski 1988:10)
In  addition  to  its  functional  component,  MST offers  the  possibility  for  engaging  in  a  critical
understanding of the factors addressing regional economic, political, legal, and social integration at
a local, regional and international level. Such an undertaking is also especially important for the
field of regional integration and international relations in general. 
An  approach  that takes  regions  as  social  forms  in  world  society,  empathizes  the  relationship
between social systems, and downplays nation-states as sole actors in international politics,  can
essentially provide the ability to better understand the interplay, modes of relationship, and social
structures among the members in CARICOM461 and in Caribbean regional society462. 
The notion of state is  completely sidestepped463,  and in taking the route of a coupling of
Neofunctionalism and MST we would focus not  only on non-state  actors  and their  role  in  the
process of regional integration, but also on the structure of CARICOM independent of member-
460 Albert (2004:1).
461 For more information see for example Albert and Onnis (2010)
462  A state-centric approach in IR does not fully address the performance of civil society in bargaining, and is limited 
in addressing the creation of institutions and bargaining outcomes. A society approach that focuses more on social 
systems, takes the emphasis away from states as actors, and look at the interplay of the systems that make up 
CARICOM. 
463 As Albert (1995:4) highlights “one of the most theoretical questions is whether the arrangements in the sphere of 
“governance by multiple government” could come to be seen as a model for a development which could transcend 
the duality of a statehood defined territoriality and a governance defined functionally, thus creating building blocks 
for a structure of world society”.
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state  borders,  orders,  and  relationships;  and  the  various  'streams'  of  integration  highlighted  in
CARICOM.464
In using such a route, it would also be possible to take the notion of a federation of states as
the end game of integration out of the question all together, and instead focus on the process and the
underlying actors and factors of integration in CARICOM. Identifying and observing the interplay
of social systems in CARICOM would also address and examine issues previously identified, i.e.
the formation of national preferences; the participation of a regional civil society or lack thereof; the
implications  for  regional  integration; segmentation  and  differentiation  related  to  the  deep
integration in the OECS compared with the rest of CARICOM; and regional politics and integration
in general. 
As  explained  earlier,  the  idea  of  a  dialog  between  theories  is  a  possibility  that  requires
extensive theoretical research465.  I am also compelled to state that this proposed format for future
research does not in any way diminish the findings of the present theoretical research466; rather, this
study  represents  the  first  step  at  theorizing  regional  integration  in  CARICOM,  and  forms
groundwork  for  further  exploration.  Furthermore,  it  is  only through  the  present  application  of
Neofunctionalism that we are made aware of the level of institutionalism and role of non-state
actors in the process of regional integration in the Caribbean.
Extension to other unions: As with this analysis, the theory of Neofunctionalism could prove
useful for an initial analysis of alternative unions in other developing regions such as those in the
ACP areas. The universality of the theory of Neofunctionalism makes it an ideal theory for a first
attempt at analyzing the process of regional integration, especially for those integration schemes in
continental  Africa.  The  analysis  underscores  the  possibility  for  'duplicating'  this  approach  for
analyzing  other  unions.  True,  the  level  and  scope  of  regional  integration  in  CARICOM  are
unmatched  by  other  unions  in  the  ACP;  however,  the  applicability  of  the  theory  of
Neofunctionalism in addressing issues relating to the process of regional integration such as those
affecting the pace and effectiveness of the general process should remain constant, regardless of the
union  under  consideration.  For  example,  the application  of  the  theory  of  Neofunctionalism to
CARICOM,  particularly  the  CSME,  revealed  the  changing  functional  nature  of  CARICOM,
particularly the  economic  and  institutional  restructure.  The  theory  of  Neofunctionalism further
pointed to the fact that the evolution of the common market into the CSME represents not only a
464 Which are the deep integration of the OECS, and the expansive integration of the CSME.
465 Space and time limit the presentation of extensive characteristics and ideas of MST.
466 Utilizing MST and Neofunctionalism to theorize integration in CARICOM would signify building on the results of 
this current research, and focusing on this new notion of 'governance by multiple government'. 
213
7.3 New Perspectives on the Theory of Neofunctionalism
deepening of integration based on economic provisions,  but also the creation/expansion of new
institutions  and  thus  the  restructuring  of  the  institutional  domain  in  CARICOM.  This  new
perspective of viewing the widely held intergovernmental union reveals the possibility of observing
other unions in the ACP. 
An application of the theory of Neofunctionalism to other ACP groupings would address three
aims: it would be an attempt to characterize and analyze the process of regional integration in these
unions; it would serve to propose solutions for the frequently highlighted malaise and inefficiency
(characteristically  muddle-about/spill-back  of  integration  in  these  unions);  and  it  would  offer
information on the theory of Neofunctionalism. 
Given the similarity in the functional and structural composition of unions in the ACP, an
application of the theory of Neofunctionalism to these unions, promises interesting results. 
Furthermore, the theory of Neofunctionalism could also directly address development policies
of the ACP. Spill-over and spill-back tendencies in the theory of Neofunctionalism would directly
address  the  evolving  and  expansive  nature  of  regional  integration  in  ACP.  Neofunctionalism's
decision cycles would also explain the changing climate in the relationship in and among ACO
countries.
A comparative study: the results of this analysis suggest that it could be worthwhile to further
observe inter-state relationships between CARICOM and other unions. A question that can be asked
is for example is the characteristic of the relationship among the member-states in CARICOM the
same as that among states elsewhere/in other unions. Chapter 2 highlighted the peculiar nature of
the history of regional integration in CARICOM. External forces have had more impact on the
process of regional integration in CARICOM than was previously thought.
Chapter 2 and 6 revealed the high level of dissonance among CARICOM countries, especially
with reference to internal trade and harmonization; and external cooperation. 
A comparative  analysis  could  therefore  shed light  on  the  different  streams  of  integration
within a particular union. That is to say, a concentration on the factors of economic integration, and
utilizing key hypotheses of Neofunctionalism, could address the intensifying of commitments in
particular sectors, and among a groups of nations within a specific union. A case in point being the
OECS,  which  reflects  deeper  commitments  at  regional  integration  than  those  of  the  CSME467.
Employing  the  theory  of  Neofunctionalism,  an  effective  comparison  could  be  undertaken  to
examine the factors  of  integration driving the deep commitments  of  regional  integration in  the
467 As mentioned earlier, integration in the OECS reflects extensive commitments at regional integration, and should
be concentrated on in future analyses.
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OECS, as opposed to those in the general CSME. Although the OECS is essentially embedded in
the integration scheme of the Revised Treaty, it reflects commitments at deeper economic, therefore
further analysis of this undertaking would provide useful for understanding regional integration in
CARICOM.
Pool of theoretical analyses: In characterizing the process of regional integration in union(s)
in the ACP, such research would be similar to this study in that it would concentrate on the factors
affecting integration in said unions. It would identify the extent and depth of regional integration
including  its  implications  in  the  unions  affected.  The  success  of  this  study also  points  to  the
possibility that such a venture might add to a pool of theoretical analyses on regional integration in
the ACP, and such a venture would no doubt add to the school of (theoretical) analysis of ACP
unions.
Therefore,  it  would be interesting to further  examine the relationships among CARICOM
countries, and attempt a comparative analysis among its members and those of other unions in ACP
or the EU.
Economic Integration and Foreign Policy: the results of this research also point to the value
of inspecting the relationship between economic integration and foreign policy in CARICOM. As
revealed  in  chapter  4,  the  Revised  Treaty established the  Council  for  Foreign  and Community
Relations  (COFCOR).  One  of  COFCOR's  mandates  is  to  determine  the  relationship  between
CARICOM  and  other  unions/states.  Since  the  COFCOR  was  established  by  the  CSME  and
possesses economic mandates, it would be interesting to observe the interplay between economic
integration and foreign policy in CARICOM.  
Chapter 6 revealed the extensive 'aid for trade' component of the EPA, and the dependence of
CARICOM on the EU and other external bodies for its financial well-being. This underscored the
importance of foreign relations and agreements such as the EPA, and essentially in the process of
regional integration in CARICOM. 
7.4 Summary and Conclusion
This thesis provided a first attempt at theorizing the process of regional integration in the
Caribbean, specifically, CARICOM. Through the application of Neofunctionalism to CARICOM, it
was possible to observe and analyze the process of regional integration in CARICOM, and the
Caribbean in  general.  The application of the theory of Neofunctionalism to CARICOM further
approached regional integration from a non state-centric view, in so doing, offered an introduction
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and  overview  of  regime  politics  in  the  Caribbean.  The  analysis  revealed  the  decisive  role  of
institutions  in the overall  process  of regional  integration in  CARICOM, and the importance of
regimes  in  traditionally  conceived  intergovernmental  unions.  Furthermore,  it  provided  the
opportunity to observe why and how change take place in international regimes; identified a high
level of transaction flow and interdependence in CARICOM; revealed extensive segmentation in
relation to the OECS; and in so doing, provided the possibility to start understanding the power and
interdependence  relationships  in  CARICOM,  especially  in  relation  to  policy  frameworks  and
international boundaries. 
The theory of Neofunctionalism moreover revealed that regional integration in the Caribbean
represents more than a mere political, economic, social and  foreign policy arrangement among a
group  of  Caribbean  governments;  rather,  it  is  a  complex  system  initially  employed  by  the
CARICOM member-states to address globalization and other exogenous issues, which proliferated
to other  sectors,  and thus  reflects  a  transformation into a  decentralized,  non-static,  institutional
construct.  Where  political  élite,  institutions  and  other  non-state  actors  determine  the  direction,
speed, and depth of integration, and bind the member-states to regional provisions and regulations. 
The theory of Neofunctionalism furthermore emphasized the importance of the process of
regional  integration  as  ongoing,  unintended,  indirect,  and  inevitable  in  CARICOM.  It  also
introduced a positive correlation between the level and the scope of integration, offering that an
increase/decrease in scope relates imperatively to an increase/decrease in the level of integration. In
addition to the process of politicization being an integral factor in integration. 
The aim of the thesis has been to examine why integration in CARICOM deepens and widens;
the critical support factors and impediments and the role of institutions in this process of integration
in CARICOM; and how far the process of integration in CARICOM has developed.
As to  why integration in  CARICOM is deepening and widening,  the thesis  revealed that
external factors initially foster integrative steps and institutions, and non-state actors primarily drive
the process of integration in CARICOM. 
Regarding the factors in the process of regional integration in CARICOM, the application of
the theory of Neofunctionalism revealed institutions and other non-state actors as decisive factors
that are vital to the process of integration.  
As to where and how far the process of integration in CARICOM has developed, the thesis
revealed that  CARICOM has undergone various  decision cycles,  as  described by the theory of
Neofunctionalism, and is at the beginning of / has started a priming cycle. 
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The  analysis  therefore  provided  an  initial  understanding  of  the  phenomenon  of  regional
integration in the Caribbean. It revealed the interaction and power relations of actors in the process
of regional integration. Moreover, this research disclosed the necessity for further examining issues
such  as  normative  orders  and  the  existence  of  borders  in  CARICOM,  along  with  prospective
analyses of the impact of politicization on the overall  process of integration in CARICOM. To
address  these  demands,  subsequent  examinations  of  CARICOM  require  a  novel  approach
concentrating  on  social  actors  and  the  role  of  institutions  in  the  process  of  regional  political,
economic, legal, and social integration in CARICOM.
This thesis should therefore serve as a reference point for theoretical analyses or undertaking
in  CARICOM focused  on  understanding  the  process  of  regional  integration.  That  is  to  say,  it
represents the commencement for observing the actions of Caribbean political actors, operating in a
regional  society,  in  which  the  power  and  constructs/definitions  of  nation  states  are  becoming
indistinct, where there are “changes in the functions of borders and of the cross-border activities of
sub national levels of government”.468 
468 Albert (1995:3) 
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Appellate Jurisdiction Rulings of the CCJ
6  th   Case Gladston Watson vs Rosedale Fernandes: the sixth final appeal case was concerned
with a dispute over land in Guyana, which due to procedural irregularities was awarded to the
defending parties in the national court. The CCJ ruled that procedural flaws are no grounds for legal
arguments  and  such  there  is  an  instance  of  the  miscarriage  of  justice.  In  doing  so,  the  CCJ
overturned the rulings of the lower court of appeal. It further remitted the matter to the lower court
of appeal, to be retried and ordered the respondent to pay to the appellant court cost. In setting aside
the rulings of the lower court and ordering a retrial, the CCJ clearly exerts its political power over
the national courts.
7  th   Case  Vaughn Thoma  s v Guyana:  the seventh final appeal case also originated from the
Guyana courts. It concerned the conviction of buggery, in which a policeman in uniform, as such an
government employee in service, was accused of sexually molesting a then 14 year-old boy. The
police officer was sentenced to 10 years in prison for this act. In addition to this conviction and
sentence the appellant was also charged and found guilty for common assault in relation to the same
incident. However the ruling judge failed to impose a penalty. Based on the merits of the case, 
the CCJ ruled that due to material misdirection and “the length of time (over seven years)
which had elapsed since the appellant was arrested; (b) the opportunity which a re-trial would give
to the prosecution to correct the several mistakes which were made at the first trial; and (c) the
ordeal  which  a  second  trial  would  involve  not  only  for  the  appellant  but  also  for  the  virtual
complainant”469 the appeal would be allowed, the convictions and sentences would be quashed and
the appellant discharged. In doing so, the CCJ rules on humanitarian grounds, and according to the
Charter of Civil Society for the Caribbean Community. 
8  th   Case The Queen v Mitchell Ken O’Neal Lewis: the eight final appeal case before the CCJ,
originated from Barbados and concerned an appeal against the dismissal of the death sentence ruled
on by the Barbados Court of Appeal. The CCJ dismissed this appeal in so doing upheld the ruling of
the Barbados Court of Appeal. Like the Barbados Court of Appeal, the CCJ cited deprivation of a
fair  hearing and an unsatisfactory verdict  as grounds why the defendant,  Mr O'Neal  should be
469  Thomas v. The State (2007) CCJ 2 [AJ].
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acquitted. In doing so the CCJ ruled against the convictions of the Barbados court of Appeal and
upheld the provisions in the Charter of Caribbean Civil Society.
12  th   Case Mohammed Yasseen VS The Attorney General of Guyana: the twelfth final appeal
case  also  originated  from  the  appellate  court  in  Guyana.  It  was  concerned  with  Mr  Yaseen's
compulsory dismissal from the Police Force. The CCJ ruled that the appellant did not have the right
to appeal to the CCJ in the given circumstances and that “in any event the appeal was wholly
lacking in merit and that therefore it should be struck out”.470 
14  th   Case Toolsie Persaud Limited v Andrew James Investments Limited et al: the fourteenth
final  appeal  case  again  originated  from Guyana  and  was  concerned  with  land  titles.  The  CCJ
rejected the view of the Guyanese court of appeal and ruled in favor of the appellant, it further made
rulings as to court costs. It ruled that “the first and second respondents in the case should pay two-
thirds of the Appellant's cost “in the CCJ and in the courts below while the Appellant was ordered to
pay one- third of the Third Respondent’s costs in the CCJ and the courts below”.471 In setting aside
the rulings of the lower courts including those relating to court cost, the CCJ inserts itself in not
only the legal claims, but also the financial and monetary aspects of appeals. Additionally, by using
the wording “courts below” the CCJ establishes itself as being above the national appeal courts, i.e.
supranational.
15  th   Case  Harrinauth  Ramdass  v  Salim Jairam et  al:  the  fifteenth  final  appeal  case also
originated from the Guyanese courts, it was concerned with property sales. The CCJ upheld the
ruling of the Guyanese appeal court. 
20  th   case Wesley Emptage vs The Attorney General Of Guyana: the twentieth final appeal case
brought before the CCJ was similar to a previous case  Hendy v Commissioner of Police and the
Attorney General of Guyana, and as such the CCJ referred to said ruling in its entirety as decision
for this case. In doing so the CCJ creates a body of case law for references and gives its rulings
more judicial and political clout especially observed in light of the arguments of Neofunctionalism
presented above. 
21  st   Case Chamanlall Mukhtiyar et al Poonardai Sukhu et al: the ruling of the twenty-first
final appellate case is related to a case. Again, such an action reflects the CCJ referencing itself and
acting along utilitarian ideas.
22  nd   case:  Stephen  Edwards  v  the  Attorney  General  of  Guyana  and  the  Public  Service
Commission: the case originated from the Guyana appeal courts and was concerned with unlawful
470 Yasseen v. Attorney General, (2008) CCJ 3 [AJ] para 1.
471 Toolsie Persaud v. James Investments, (2008) CCJ 5 [AJ] Summary of ruling.
219
Appellate Jurisdiction Rulings of the CCJ
dismissal of a public servant.  The case was dismissed by the lower courts “on the ground that
constitutional  proceedings  brought  some  twenty  years  after  termination  of  the  appellant's
employment  constituted  unreasonable  delay  and  were  an  attempt  to  abuse  the  process  of  the
court”.472 The CC also agreed with the lower court.
24  th   case David Lachana et  al  vs Cooblal Arjune et  al:  this case came from Guyana and
concerned dispute over a 480 sq m. of land. It concerns a family living for generations on land
without a title and appealing court decisions under adverse possession against the transport of the
parcel of land (as a part of a compound) to another party. The appeal was dismissed by the CCJ due
to technical flaws in the appellants case. 
25  th   case Chamanlall Mukhtiyar et al v Poonardai Sukhu et al: this case arose form Guyana,
and was dismissed by the CCJ, it again was concerned with dispute over land. However, the CCJ
ruled that there was not substantial evidence to review the appeals.
27  th   case: Winton Campbell v The Attorney General: this case came from the Court of Appeal
of  Barbados  and  raises  important  issues  as  to  the  rights  of  senior  civil  servants.  The  appeal
concentrated  on  the  termination  of  the  appellant's  employment  in  the  public  service,  with  the
argument that this was against the constitution and as such the Applicants remained in the public
service and was entitled to receive the emoluments that had been attached to his position. The CCJ
ruled that an important purpose of the law is the avoidance of disputes and that it will “ensure as far
as possible that proper solutions can be reached within the confines of the governmental powers
themselves, without the public servant having to resort unnecessarily to, what often proves to be,
expensive, tortuous and extremely lengthy litigation”.473
The CCJ further ruled that
“clearly, a public officer whose office has been abolished in accordance with the law and who
subsequently has been retired from the public service in violation of the law, is not in a position to
be reinstated in an office that no longer exists and can, therefore, not be deemed to have remained in
his post such as to entitle him to continued payment of emoluments”.
The  CCJ  reviewed  the  case  considering  “the  dual  dimension  of  the  public  employment
relationship” under which it ruled in the Edwards v Attorney General of Guyana case. In doing so,
the CCJ referenced not only its own ruling but its classification of legal cases and civil servants.
The CCJ follows its previous rulings on the dismissal of government employees, as being just by
the state. 
472 Edwards v. Attorney General (2008) CCJ 10 [AJ].
473  Campbell v. Attorney General, (2009) CCJ 1 [AJ] Para 59.
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29  th   Case L.O.P. Investments Limited Appellant v Demerara Bank Limited et al: came from
the Court of Appeals of Guyana and concerns debentures issued in Guyana. 
The CCJ found that the appellant had wrongly been refused leave to appeal by the Court of
Appeal and as such gave leave to appeal the case before the CCJ. 
30  th   Case Vernon O’connell  Hope v  Shaka Wayne Rodney et  al:  this  case came from the
appeals court of Barbados and concerned a claim to enforce a contract for the sale of a parcel of
land. The CCJ ruled that “we consider that it would require very grave and weighty reasons for us
to take a course which would result in, first of all, our hearing argument and resolving an issue
which  should  have  been raised  before  the  Court  of  Appeal  but  was  not,  and secondly,  in  our
overriding  the  discretion  exercised  by  the  Court  of  Appeal  when  it  declined  to  entertain  the
respondent’s notice which was not properly brought to its attention. We do not think that those
circumstances exist in this case and accordingly we will not allow the issue ... to be revived before
us in this appeal”.474 
In doing so the CCJ indirectly cited procedural flaws as a reason for its dismissal of the case.
This is another instance where the CCJ follows its previous rulings.
32  nd   Case Julian Oscar Francis vs the Queen: the case arose from the court of appeals in
Barbados, and concerned an appeal against both the conviction and sentence relating to the theft of
a motor car. The appeal was dismissed by the CCJ and the rulings of the Barbados Court of Appeals
upheld.  
33  rd   Case Lackram Bisnauth v Ramanand Shewprashad et al: this case originated from the
appeals  court  in  Guyana and concerns  a  petition  to  obtain  land by prescription.  The case  was
dismissed by the lower courts in Guyana and subsequently by the CCJ.
34  th   Case L.O.P. Investments Limited Appellant v Demerara Bank Limited et al: this case is
the ruling on the 29th case concerning debentures which was reviewed by the CCJ. The appeal was
dismissed, and the judgment of the Guyana Court of Appeal was upheld and affirmed.
36  th   case Vernon O'Connell Hope v Shaka Wayne Rodney: this case came from the Court of
Appeals of Barbados and concerned the contracted sale of property between two parties. The appeal
had been dismissed by the lower court and the CCJ upheld this dismissal. 
37  th   case Jeffrey Adolphus Gittens v The Queen: this case came from the Court of Appeal of
Barbados. The CCJ gave an oral Judgment for quashing a 20 year imprisonment sentence imposed
by the Court of Appeal. 
474 Hope v. Rodney, (2009) CCJ 12 [AJ] Para 24.
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39  th   case Jassoda Ramkishun v Conrad Ashford Fung-Kee-Fung et al.: this case came from
the Court of appeals of Guyana. The CCJ in its ruling relied on “a substantial body of Roman-Dutch
law,  mainly South African cases  and legal  writings,  which seemed to be highly relevant”475.  It
granted appeal on the basis of the said cases and ruled also in according to the rulings of the said
cases.  In not  only referencing by relying on international  law,  the CCJ reveals  a pattern in  its
rulings,  which is  that is  it  independent of national and even regional law, and instead looks to
common wealth and international law for references.  
40  th   Case Frank Errol Gibson Appellant v The Attorney General:  the case came from the
Court of Appeals of Barbados, the application was awaiting trial of murder and complained to the
CCJ of  breaches  of  his  fundamental  rights.  The proceeding had more  to  do with  the  time the
appellant spent under arrest than the matters of the case, as the appellant was charged in January
2004 and the inquiry commenced in June 2004 with the appellant being remanded in custody the
entire time. The case was then further traversed to February 2006. Additionally, the appellant sought
that the State pay for qualified expert forensic witnesses to assist in the preparation of his defense
which was dismissed the Barbados Court of Appeals. The CCJ in its ruling “allowed the appeal, ...
and further ordered the State to pay the applicant's costs fit for two counsel”.476 It furthermore ruled
that  the  length  of  preparation  does  not  deem that  the  case  should  be  dismissed  however,  the
applicant should be granted bail. 
42  nd   Case:  Sean Gaskin v  The Attorney General  & Clyde Nicholls;  43 rd:   Case Frederick
Hawkesworth v The Attorney General & Clyde Nicholls Second Respondent; 44  th:   Case John Wayne
Scantlebury v The Attorney General & Clyde Nicholls: these cases originated from the Barbados
Appeals Court and were concerned with appeals against extradition proceedings initiated by the
Government of the United States of America. During the process of the applications, the appellants
missed  deadlines  of  the  CCJ and neglected  to  file  required  documents  in  accordance  with the
regulations of filing appeals in the CCJ. The first case was dismissed by the CCJ on the grounds
that: 
“this is a case where repeated and egregious breaches of the rules have served only to prolong
the final disposition of a hearing before the Chief Magistrate that is still to be completed. There is
no cogent explanation for the several breaches. Since the liberty of the subject was at stake the
Applicant himself should not have been as dilatory as he was. In any event it is a profound error to
believe that a litigant can flout the rules, thus rendering them utterly meaningless and then take
475 Ramkishun ad item Sukhree v. Fung-Kee-Fung, (2010) CCJ 2 [AJ] para 1.
476 Gibson v. Attorney General (2010) CCJ 3 [AJ] Para 70.
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shelter under cover of the overriding objective”.477 
The cases below were also dismissed.
46  th   Case Guyana Bank For Trade And Industry v Desiree Alleyne: the case originated from
the Court of Appeal of Guyana and was a case regarding a bank director being held liable for
guaranteeing a company's liability for $10 million. The lower court of appeals prescribed a retrial,
however both parties preferred not to. As such the case came before the CCJ. The CCJ ruled in
favor of the bank with the defendant, the director, paying $10 million and an interest of 22.75% per
in addition to bearing the cost of the case. 
48  th   Case Ashmidphraque David Sheermohamed & Aslim Sheermohammed v S.A. Nabi And
Sons Limited: this case was concerned with an application to appeal in the CCJ to challenge of the
appointment of a director of a company. The case originated from the Court of Appeals of Guyana.
The CCJ accepted the application.
49  th   Case Aslim Sheermohamed v Azeez Sheermohammed & Shir Affron Nabi: this case is the
ruling on the previous case.  The CCJ quashed the decision rulings of the Court of Appeal and
reinstated those of the high court. 
52  nd   Case Lroy Garraway v Ronald Williams et al.: this case was concerned with a 15 year
process originating from the Court of Appeal of Guyana to challenge the decision of the Guyana
land Commissioner of Title to refuse the prescriptive title of a private property. The CCJ following
the rulings and the courts below dismissed the appeal.
54  th   Case Barbados Turf Club v Eugene Melnyk: the case came from the Court of Appeal of
Barbados and was concerned with an appeal to overturn the rulings on a disputer between an event
promoter and the winner of the event. During the process the lower court of appeal ruled in favor of
the event promoter who sponsored a horse racing event where the winning horse was tested positive
for 'doping'. The CCJ upheld the rulings of the lower courts. 
55  th   Case: British Caribbean Bank Limited v The Attorney General Of Belize & The Minister
Of Public  Utilities  Respondents:  this  case  came from the  Court  of  Appeal  of  Belize.  It  was  a
decision  on  a  case  management  conference  concerning  a  dispute  between  the  Government  of
Belize, the defendant, who had initiated legislation to appropriate properties from the Appellants
against their will. The Appellants sought declarations that such legislation was unconstitutional and
void. Additionally the appellant sought consequential relief which included declarations, orders and
directions  to  secure  and  enforce  the  invalidity  of  the  defendant's  actions;  damages,  including
477 Gaskin et al. v. Attorney General (2011) CCJ 1 [AJ] Para 22.
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punitive damages; interest; and any other relief deemed equitable by the Court. 
The CCJ decided to stay the appeals on the cases below. 
58  th   Case: Mayan King Ltd v Jose L Reyes et al: this case came from the Court of Appeals of
Belize.  It  concerned  claims  of  unlawful  dismissal  of  employees  as  a  result  of  their  pro  union
activities. In the first court, financial damages were awarded to the employees. The company then
appealed the decision, and the Court of Appeals subsequently reduced the damages and ordered the
company to pay 75% of the court costs. The company appealed this decision in the CCJ on the
grounds that the award of damages was still excessive. The CCJ also reduced the award. The CCJ
justified its ruling by stating that “this was not … a case that was pleaded as a constitutional action
and the defendant is not a state actor or a public body. We therefore agree with the Court of Appeal
that the trial judge erred in treating the action as if it were one for constitutional redress”.478
The CCJ further argued that the evidence presented to assess the pecuniary loss suffered by
the employees was insufficient and unsatisfactory. Since all the employees found new employment
granting extra salary where no loss of salary could be established “would secure to them an element
of double-dipping”.479
59  h  Case Guyana Furniture Manufacturing Limited v Robert Ramcharan & National Bank Of
Industry and Commerce: this case came from the Court of Appeal of Guyana and was concerned
with default payments on debentures. The company argued that that it overpaid the debentures due
to increase in commissions of the receivers. The CCJ upheld the ruling of the lower court of appeal
that dismissed this claim. 
60  th   Case Atlantic Corporation Ltd v Development Finance Corporation: this case came from
the Court of Appeal of Belize. It was concerned with questions of if equitable property charges have
priority over legal charges after obtaining a property. The appeal arose from interlocking provisions
of company law, property law and the registry act in Belize. The CCJ in interpreting the provisions
of the laws ruled that  equity charges have priority over  legal  charges.  This decision will  settle
disputes in the future preemptively and as such this case is important in the property landscape in
Belize. The CCJ further ruled that charge created on the Properties by a Debenture ranks in priority
to the charge by way of legal mortgage. It therefore ruled on behalf of the appellant. 
61  st   Case Roseal Services Limited v Michael L Challis:  this case came from the Court of
Appeal of  Barbados. It arose from a challenge against the attempt for sale of a property on the
grounds that the appellant failed to show a good marketable title to the property and was concerned
478  Mayan King Ltd v Reyes (2012) CCJ 3 [AJ] para 29.
479  Mayan King Ltd v Reyes (2012) CCJ 3 [AJ] para 35.
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with  payment  of  court  cost  for  the  case  in  the  appeal  court  below.  The  CCJ  ruled  that  the
proceedings in the Court of appeal be struck out save for court cost which should be covered by the
appellant.
62  nd   Case Kampta Narine Called Mohan v Gupraj Persaud: this case came from the Court of
Appeal of Guyana. It was an application to seek special leave to contest the rulings and dismissal of
appeals  of  the lower court  on a  dispute  over  the  sale  of  a  motor  vehicle.  It  was  further  more
concerned with the legality of granting an extension to appeal to appeal any lower court of appeal
judgment and also the refusal to grant recourse in the CCJ. The trial judge ruled in favor of the
respondent, that is to say, the lower court of appeal ruled against an extension to appeal, and also
against appealing its ruling in the CCJ citing the limited scope of the CCJ's jurisdiction. The CCJ
then treated the case as a special appeal in order to review the case, and in turn overthrew the
rulings of the lower court of appeal. This move reflects the power of the CCJ to rule against the
appeal courts below, even if the appeal courts rule that cases can not be brought before the CCJ, the
CCJ in its capacity can still sidestep this ruling, and not only review the case but also overthrow the
decisions of the lower court on the case. This bold move of the CCJ reflects it political clout and
how it superimposes itself as a regional judicial tribunal.
63  rd   Case Sandy Lane Hotel Co. Limited v Brigitte Laurayne: this case came from the Court of
Appeal of Barbados. It was concerned with a dispute over constructive dismissal of an employee.
The CCJ allowed the appeal and ordered the employee to pay the employer court cost as no unfair
dismissal could be proved. The CCJ comment that “this is a sad case where emotional feelings
would appear to have clouded rational judgment”480 however the claim of constructive dismissal
cannot be established. 
64th Case Alfred Chung & Ingrid Campbell v AIC Battery And Automotive Services Company
Limited: this case came from the Court of Appeal of Guyana and had to do with dispute over land. It
had to do with a dispute over the occupation of a property which was subject to debentures held by
a bank. The bank appointed a civilian as receiver of property who filed an affidavit verifying the
claim which was challenged by the appellant before the CCJ. The case is of particular importance
because according the CCJ “the issue which has to be determined in this case is procedural but of
great practical importance. Its determination will alter the practice in relation to specially endorsed
writs under Order 12 of the Rules of the High Court”.481 In Guyana, it was an established practice
that appeals arising from the final orders of judges of the High Court would go to the Court of
480 Sandy Lane Hotel Co. Limited v. Laurayne (2013) CCJ 1 [AJ] para 1.
481 Alfred Chung et al v. Aic Battery And Automotive Services Company (2013) CCJ 2 [AJ].
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Appeal. In this case however, the case judge ruled that appeals from final orders in the summary
proceedings should proceed to the Full Court instead of the Court of Appeal. The Court of appeal
upheld this ruling and so did the CCJ. 
65  th   Case Jafarally Asraf Ali v John Choong: the case came from the Court of Appeals of
Guyana. The case was concerned with a dispute over ownership of a parcel of land under the claim
of adverse possession of land. The CCJ ruled that the claim failed due to the facts of the case which
entitles the deed owner ownership of the land. 
66  th   Case: British Caribbean Bank Limited v The Attorney General of Belize: this case came
from the court of appeals of Belize and had to do with dispute over the compulsory acquisition of
loan and mortgage debentures. The task of the CCJ was to assess the jurisdiction of the Belize
courts in issuing injunctions which restrain international arbitration proceedings. The CCJ found
that the Belize courts do have authority to grant injunctions, however it ruled that due to the merits
of the case, the Belize courts should have shown restraint in granting an injunction and as such
ruled outside of its discretion. The CCJ discharged the interlocutory injunction and granted leave to
continue the arbitration proceedings.
68  th   Case Clyde Browne Applicant v Michelle Moore Griffith et al.: this case came from the
Court of Appeal of Barbados and was concerned with dispute over adverse possession of a parcel of
land. The CCJ dismissed the application on the ground that the applicant did not satisfy “Rule
10.3(2)(b) because he had not succinctly set out the facts upon which his claim was based”.482
69  th   Case  Godfrey  Andrews Applicant  v  Lester  Moore:  this  case  came from the Court  of
Appeal of Guyana and was concerned with “the interpretation of rules of procedure designed to
reduce the law’s delays”483 The CCJ ruled on two points, whether or not to allow specific documents
in an appeal in the lower appellate court below and also “where no step has been taken in an action
or no document filed for more than one year,  and the parties proceed to a full trial  and obtain
judgment, can a cause or mater be properly deemed abandoned on appeal?”484 The CCJ allowed the
appeal and cited that on a case specific basis there was no abandonment of appeal and as such
extended the time for the appellant to file an appeal in the court below and granted special leave to
appeal in the courts below for a hearing on merits. The CCJ additionally, set aside the rulings of the
court of appeal and restored those of the trial judge.
70  th   case: Madanlall Mahamad v S & R Abdulla Cane Farming Inc: this case is a result of a
482 Browne v. Griffith et al. (2013) CCJ 6 [AJ] Para 2.
483 Andrews v Moore (2013) CCJ 7 [AJ] para 1.
484 Andrews v Moore (2013) CCJ 7 [AJ] para 3.
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process of disputes from the High Court, Commercial Court and Court of Appeals of Guyana. It
concerns a specially endorsed writ and damages from a work contract. The main grounds of appeal
to the CCJ was to overturn an order set that had dismissed rulings for rewards from the lower courts
for the appellant. In hearing the appeal, the CCJ relied on section 8 of the CCJ Act, which provides
for “special leave of the Court from any decision of the Court of Appeal from any civil or criminal
matter”. The CCJ ruled that the court of appeal had erred in its ruling, and overturned its rulings
while reinstating those of the lower courts, which granted the appellant $7 million plus $210,000 in
general damages. The CCJ further ruled that the respondent was to pay court fees for both the CCJ
hearing and that of the Court of Appeal.
The significance of the sums, including those for pecuniary damages, signals as in previous
rulings that the CCJ uses its rulings as a form of warning/deterrence for future cases. This impartial
stance of the CCJ reflects its institutional independence from the CARICOM member-states, and its
overarching role in regional integration.
71  st   Case Rosemarie Ramdehol v Haimwant Ramdehol:  this  case came from the Court of
Appeal of Guyana and was concerned with dispute over matrimonial property. More specifically, it
is  a  interlocutory  appeal  against  an  “Order  restraining  the  execution  of  the  judgment  for  the
payment of $8,000,000 … which is part of the subject of Civil Appeal ... against the judgment ...
made in Commercial Court … until the hearing and determination of this Application for special
leave or until further Order of (said) Court”.485 In other words, the Applicant petitioned the CCJ to
review an interlocutory appeal and in doing so exercise discretion as to the amount and duration of
the stay that can be granted by the courts below. The CCJ ruled that the courts below did not err in
their judgment and dismissed the case. 
72  nd   Case The Commissioner of The Guyana Geology & Mines Commission v Pharsalus INC:
this case came from the Courts of Guyana and is related to a dispute between Pharsalus Inc and the
Guyana Geology and Mines Commission.  The case was a dispute over obtaining a prospecting
license  for  radioactive  minerals  and  rare  earth  elements  specifically  Uranium  for  an  area  of
approximately 11,450 acres. The CCJ ruled that “the majority of the Court of Appeal made all four
nisi  orders of (the lower court)  absolute so that  Pharsalus obtained a  uranium license over the
11,450 acres area and so that (another company's) License could not be extended to uranium in that
area. This Court discharges the fourth order nisi of (the lower court) but allows (the) first three
orders  nisi  to  stand,  …Thus  this  Court  holds  that  Pharsalus  has  no  entitlement  by  way  of  a
485 Ramdehol v Ramdehol (2013) CCJ 9 [AJ] para 11.
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substantive legitimate expectation to a uranium license over the 11,450 acres area, but it can still
apply to be granted one if it can, pursuant to its three nisi orders, prevent the Commission going
ahead with its intent to extend (another company) License to uranium. This will enable Pharsalus’
claims to be heard at a trial on the merits of its case affording the opportunity for fuller evidence
than was available so far in these proceedings”.486
73  rd   case Da Costa Handel Marshal v The Queen: came fm the Court of Appeals of Barbados
and was concerned with an appeal of drug charges relating to the possession of over 346 kilograms
of a controlled drug, Cannabis and prejudice against a fair trial for the appellant. The appellant
argued that “mere knowledge of the possession of controlled drugs in the hands of a confederate
was not enough to fix the Applicant with possession of those drugs because he was present; (and)
the opening remarks of the prosecutor, the Deputy Director, were prejudicial to the extent that they
deprived the Applicant of a fair trial”.487 On the first grounds the CCJ ruled that “the jury had to
decide whether the Applicant was in possession of the controlled drugs. The fact that he might have
been in joint or sole possession ... was neither here nor there because on the new indictment all that
was necessary for the jury to find was that he was in possession as charged without the need to
specify whether he was in joint possession or in sole possession”.488 On the second grounds, the
CCJ accepted the arguments of the respondent that “the opening remarks were well  within the
normal standards of prosecutorial ethics and were simply an indication of the type of case that the
prosecutor intended to prove”.489 With these considerations the CCJ dismissed the case. 
486 Guyana Geology & Mines Commission v Pharsalus INC (2013) CCJ 10 [AJ] Para 36.
487  Marshal v, The Queen (2013) CCJ 11 [AJ] para 3.
488  Marshal v, The Queen (2013) CCJ 11 [AJ] para 9.
489  Marshal v, The Queen (2013) CCJ 11 [AJ] para 5.
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